





Class 554

Book 481

Copyright N<sup>o</sup> 11



**COPYRIGHT DEPOSIT.**











# HISTORY

— OF THE —

## TWELFTH REGIMENT

Pennsylvania Reserve Volunteer Corps

(41ST REGIMENT OF THE LINE),

— FROM ITS —

Muster into the United States Service, August 10th, 1861, to its  
Muster Out, June 11th, 1864,

— TOGETHER WITH —

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF OFFICERS AND MEN AND  
A COMPLETE MUSTER-OUT ROLL.

---

Compiled from Official Reports, Letters, and Other Documents.

— BY —

M. D. HARDIN,

*Brig. Gen. U. S. Army (retired), late Col. 12th Reserves.*

NEW YORK:  
PUBLISHED BY THE AUTHOR.

1890.

55-3211

copy 2

E 527  
.5  
41st  
copy 2



---

COPYRIGHTED, 1891  
BY MARTIN D. HARDIN.

---

## TABLE OF CONTENTS.

	CHAPTER.
Organization of Pennsylvania Reserve Volunteer Corps, -	I
Camp Life at Tennallytown and Camp Pierpont, - -	II
Battle of Dranesville, December 20, 1861, - - - -	III
Peninsula Campaign (before arrival of the Reserves), - -	IV
Battle of Mechanicsville, June 26, 1862, - - - -	V
Gaines' Mill, Allen's Farm and Savage Station, - - -	VI
Battle of New Market Cross Roads, - - - - -	VII
Battle of Malvern Hill, July 1, 1862, and Harrison's Landing, July 2 to August 11, 1862, - - - - -	VIII
General Pope's Campaign, - - - - -	IX
South Mountain, Antietam and Fredericksburg, - - -	X
Gettysburg Campaign, - - - - -	XI
Bristoe Station, Rappahannock Station and Mine Run, -	XII
Grant's Campaign, Wilderness and Spottsylvania, - - -	XIII
North Anna and Bethesda Church, - - - - -	XIV
Biographies and Miscellaneous Papers, - - - - -	XV


## MAPS.

Dranesville	(opposite 1st page), - - - - -	III
Mechanicsville	“ “ - - - - -	V
New Market X Roads	“ “ - - - - -	VI.
Second Bull Run Camp.	“ “ - - - - -	IX
South Mountain	“ “ - - - - -	X
Antietam	(opposite 2d p - - - - -	X
Fredericksburg	“ 3d “ - - - - -	X
Bristoe Station	“ 1st “ - - - - -	XII
North Anna	“ “ “ - - - - -	XIV
Bethesda Church	“ 2d “ - - - - -	XIV
General map	“ last “ - - - - -	XIV

## ENGRAVINGS.

Frontispiece, - - - - -	{ Diven, Grim, Hardin, Gustin, Clark.
Facing 1st page, Chapter XV, - - - -	{ Lucas. Hazzard, Briggs, Thomas, Croasdale, Hoadley.
Facing last page, Chapter XV, - - -	{ Schelling, Jewell, Snyder, Oliver, Weaver, Myers, Elder. Rohn, Fackenthal.



HE WRITER is indebted to Colonel J. H. Taggart for information furnished; to Major Lucas for much useful information, particularly in relation to "C" Company, also for addresses of officers and men of several companies; to Colonel Hazzard for information relating to "F" and "I" Companies, and for biographical notices, etc.; to both Colonel Hazzard and Major Lucas for encouragement in his work; to Hon. J. P. Giles for valuable and interesting information relating to "I" Company, Twelfth ("D" 190 Penn.), which the writer could not otherwise have obtained; to Lieutenant W. R. Peacock (First Lieutenant 190 Penn.) for much assistance in accounting for final discharge of members of Twelfth Regiment who re-enlisted as Veterans; to Captain Schelling for valuable notes on the war; to Lieutenant F. D. Stevens for much assistance in accounting for members of "I" Company ("D" 190 Penn.), whose muster-out roll was very defective; to George H. Mason, of "C" Company, for interesting notes; to Sergeant Johnston for interesting notes; also to many other members of the Regiment for information, all of whom he takes this occasion to thank.

To General Drum, Adjutant-General United States Army, he is deeply indebted for facilities for studying the records of the war and examining the rolls of the Twelfth Regiment.

His thanks are also due to all the gentlemen connected with the War Department with whom he came in contact, for polite attention and assistance.

Having been refused further access to the records, or information in regard to the officers or men of the Regiment after the "Rebellion Records" were placed in the possession of Doctor Ainsworth, the writer apologizes to the members of the Regiment for many incomplete records of officers and men.

With incomplete records, and no diary to go by, the writer has done his best. He hopes his companions in arms will excuse all defects. Having been selected by the Regimental Association to write a history of the Regiment, he feels more keenly than he otherwise might, these deficiencies.

## CHAPTER I.

### ORGANIZATION OF PENNSYLVANIA RESERVE VOLUNTEER CORPS.

The war between the States—for and against the Union—was formally opened by the attack of the South Carolinians upon Fort Sumter in Charleston Harbor, S. C., April 12, 1861.

This fort was garrisoned by United States regular artillery under command of Major Robert Anderson. The great majority of the people of the North and Northwest, and a small majority of the inhabitants of the Border States, believed, until this attack was made on Government troops, that some compromise would be adopted which would settle the difficulties or differences which had arisen between the sections of the Union on account of Slavery, which then existed in the Border and Southern States. However, the fires which had been started in Nullification times, in South Carolina, on account of the tariff, which were extinguished by General Jackson, were renewed under new political leaders; and, secession, on account of the agitation for the limitation or extinction of slavery, was so persistently advocated by extremists, especially in South Carolina, that when Mr. Lincoln was legally elected president, on a non-extension of slavery platform, and the greater number of the political leaders of the Southern States advocated secession as the only means of saving that section of the Union from subjection to the Northern portion, the majority of the white people of the seceding (Southern or Cotton) States and nearly one-half of the inhabitants of the Border States were ready to follow such leaders out of the Union.

The Southern people had been for years grossly deceived by their political leaders as to the character of their fellow citizens of the North, and of their feelings toward them. The Northern people had been represented as all being violent Abolitionists, ready to destroy the Union in order to extinguish slavery; and, at the same time, as a set of cowardly traders, who under no circumstances could be induced

to fight, while on the other hand, the people of the Northern States believed the Southern people would only bluster, make a great fuss and then, finally, accept some compromise which would prevent the extension of slavery, and gradually put an end to it.

Probably some such compromise could have been effected had the extremists on both sides been willing to wait.

However, the war was possibly inevitable to punish our people for inaugurating African slavery in our country.

An overwhelming majority of the inhabitants of the Middle and of the Northwestern States, and a majority of the people of the New England and of the Border States were profoundly attached to the Union. They were ready to preserve it at any cost.

Such being the state of affairs, it only required the decided action of a small party or force to inaugurate the war which followed. The firing upon and subsequent surrender of Fort Sumter aroused the feelings of the Union-loving inhabitants of the North and Border States to fever heat, and literally millions of men dropped everything to save the Union. Never was there greater unanimity amongst a people than existed throughout the whole North immediately after the fall of Fort Sumter.

The first military as well as political blunder of the new Administration was the failure to take advantage of this enthusiasm, that is, if the Administration were honest in its expressed desire to suppress the Rebellion as quickly as possible. So much has been written by the close friends of the Administration since the war, in regard to the freeing of the slaves, and so little in relation to the preservation of the Union, the latter always being spoken of as incidental or subordinate to the former, suspicion arises as to the honest desire of the Administration to have had the Rebellion suppressed suddenly, which, of course, would have left slavery still existing.

The war was inaugurated on the part of the people of the North for the preservation of the Union. But the slavery question became so prominent in a political point of view, it is feared the greater question, the indissolubility of the Union, is regarded by many as still in abeyance.

"On the 16th of April, 1861, General Patterson, commanding the Pennsylvania troops at Harper's Ferry, requested Governor Curtin to call out twenty-five additional regiments of infantry and one of cavalry, to serve for three months and to be mustered into the service of the United States. Immediately upon receipt of this request the summons to arms was telegraphed to every part of the State, and men were organized in

a day and started for the State Capitol. The authorities at Washington, however, had in the meantime determined not to receive any additional regiments to serve for three months, and hence the order of General Patterson was countermanded April 30, 1861. In response to this call companies were daily arriving at Harrisburg from every direction, and the State was literally swarming with troops which the War Department would not receive. The Governor was, therefore, the more earnest in recommending that the Legislature should provide for the immediate organization of these companies in a manner that would render them available in case the public safety required their service, and also to allay the clamor of the men who had been stopped in the middle of their march. \* \* \* The act authorizing the organization of the Reserve Corps became a law May 15, 1861. As finally passed it contained the following provisions: "That the Commander-in-Chief, in conjunction with the officers composing the grand staff of the militia of the Commonwealth, are hereby authorized and required to organize a Military Corps, to be called the Reserve Volunteer Corps of the Commonwealth, to be composed of thirteen regiments of infantry, one regiment of cavalry, and one regiment of light artillery. The said regiments shall severally be composed of companies of like number, and to be armed and equipped, clothed, disciplined, governed and officered as similar troops in the service of the United States, and shall be enlisted in the service of the State for a period not exceeding three years or for the war, unless sooner discharged, and shall be liable to be called into the service of this State at such time as the Commander-in-Chief may deem their services necessary for the purpose of suppressing insurrection, or to repel invasions, and further to be liable to be mustered into the service of the United States at such times as requisition may be made by the President of the United States. That the Commander-in-Chief, in conjunction with the officers aforesaid, shall cause two or more camps of instruction, not exceeding eight, to be formed in different sections of the State, for the accommodation and instruction of said troops: and the Governor shall appoint suitable officers or drill masters with the rank and pay of captains, whose duty it shall be to instruct said troops in the military art, conforming as near as may be to the plan of instruction, rules, regulations and discipline adopted for similar troops in the service of the United States. That the Commander-in-Chief shall cause the troops aforesaid to be drilled and instructed in such encampments for and during such periods of time as he may deem necessary to perfect

them in military art. That the several companies and regiments composing said volunteer corps shall be entitled to elect, and the Governor shall commission officers similar in number and rank to those allowed like troops in the army of the United States. Provided, that the Governor shall have power to appoint and commission chaplains for said corps and to designate their rank. That no troops shall be kept in camp longer than three months at any one time, except the Governor shall, upon the expiration of three months, deem the longer continuance of said troops necessary for the protection of the Commonwealth, or shall have a requisition for troops from the President of the United States. That the Commander-in-Chief, in conjunction with the grand staff as aforesaid, are hereby authorized and empowered to make and adopt all needful rules and regulations for the speedy and efficient organization of said Volunteer Reserve Corps, and for arming and equipping the same with the most approved style of arms and equipments: and the officers and rank and file composing said volunteer corps shall be sworn or affirmed to support the Constitution of this State and the Constitution of the United States."

At the time of the passage of this act more men than were required to fill these regiments had been offered to the Governor. General McCall was appointed April 16, 1861, Major-General under this act. He graduated at the West Point Military Academy in 1822, had served with distinction in the Florida war and in the war with Mexico. He had resigned from the regular army on account of ill health in April, 1853. The Twelfth Regiment was organized in Camp Curtin at Harrisburg, July 25, 1861. It was formed from the following named companies: Wayne Guards of Philadelphia, Captain J. H. Taggart, A Company; the Factoryville Infantry of Wyoming County, Captain D. N. Mathewson, B Company; the Troy Guards of Bradford County, Captain Richard Gustin, C Company; the Kepner Fencibles of Dauphin County, Captain Samuel B. Wilt, D Company; the Easton Guards of Northampton County, Captain Peter Baldy, E Company; the West Newton Guards of Westmoreland County, Captain A. G. Oliver, F Company; Bailey's Invincibles of York County, Captain Samuel N. Bailey, G Company; the Indiana County Infantry, Captain A. J. Bolar, H Company; the McClure Rifles of Franklin County, Captain James S. Eyster, K Company; the Huntingdon Guards, Captain James C. Baker of Huntingdon County, subsequently joined as I Company. These companies—the nine first mentioned—elected as field officers, Captain J. H. Taggart, Colonel;

Captain S. N. Bailey, Lieutenant-Colonel; and Captain Peter Baldy, Major. And Henry B. Whisner became Captain of A Company; Charles W. Diven, Captain of G Company, and John I. Horn, Captain of E Company; William H. Thorne was appointed Surgeon and Isaac L. Clarke, Assistant Surgeon, and assigned to the Twelfth Regiment.

"The companies composing the Twelfth Regiment, raised primarily for the three months' service, but not accepted, rendezvoused at Camp Curtin. \* \* \* The men were mustered into the State service for three months \* \* \* as a part of the Reserve Corps. They had no previous military experience, except the McClure Rifles of Franklin County, which had been attached to the volunteer militia. Before the regiment was organized valuable instruction was given by Captain Tarbutton, military instructor at Camp Curtin, appointed by the Governor." The Twelfth Regiment was retained after the other regiments of the Reserve Corps left Camp Curtin, and was ordered to Harrisburg to protect the State arsenal from a threatened attack by the three months' troops, disbanded there during the latter part of July. This delicate duty was performed in such a manner as to receive the approval of the Governor and without precipitating a conflict. An account of this affair by a member of the regiment says: "The regiment came in from Camp Curtin by a back street; the three months' men heard of it, then there was a race to see who would reach the arsenal first; the Twelfth beat and surrounded, with loaded muskets, the arsenal, after which only loud talk followed." The regiment was mustered into the United States service at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, August 10, 1861, by Captain Hastings, United States Army.

The same date the regiment, in pursuance of orders to proceed to join General Banks at Harper's Ferry, started for Baltimore, Maryland, arrived at Baltimore August 11, when the order to proceed to Harper's Ferry was countermanded, and the regiment was ordered to report to General McCall at Tennallytown, near Washington, D. C. The regiment, in pursuance of this last order, arrived at Washington the same day (August 11) and was quartered in the theatre opposite the City Hall. The following afternoon (August 12) joined the Reserve Corps at Tennallytown.

## CHAPTER II.

### CAMP LIFE AT TENNALLYTOWN AND CAMP PIERPONT.

At camp near Tennallytown (which is situated on the Rockville road about four miles from Georgetown), drills, parades, picket and such like duties occupied the time. Details were made from the command to build Fort Pennsylvania, afterwards called Fort Reno, in honor of General Reno, killed at South Mountain, September 14, 1862, a fort which became well known at the time of Early's attack on Washington in June, 1864. The formidable appearance of this large fort, which was situated on a commanding eminence, dominating the country for miles in its front, had much to do with Early's failure to assault this fortified position. The writer (who had the honor to command the defences of Washington north of the Potomac at this time) has no doubt that General Early's command could easily have carried these fortifications had it attacked before the arrival of the Sixth Corps, on account of the lack of defenders, the Union line being held by a small force of hundred-day men, veteran reserves and convalescents, which force was posted on the picket line about a mile in front of the fort, there not being sufficient numbers to hold both the forts and picket line. A small detail to fire the hundred-pounder Parrott rifle, located in an angle of the fort, and some citizens, constituted the only garrison of this formidable looking fortification for nearly two days, whilst Early's veterans maneuvered in front of it.

Sutlers were permitted, but their diet of pies and things at camp at Tennallytown was regulated by orders, as shown by a regimental order of August 23, 1861, that "Sale of lemonade, beer, cider, ale, pies, cake, watermelons, citrons, green corn or cucumbers, forbidden near camps, on account of increased sickness." August 20 the regiment was attached to the Third Brigade, Pennsylvania Reserve Corps; the regiments composing the brigade were the Sixth, Ninth, Tenth and Twelfth. Colonel McCalmont, of the Tenth, commanded the brigade. General J. F. Reynolds commanded the First Brigade and General Meade the Second. The Twelfth Regiment continued in this brigade its entire service.



The following items of interest are taken from the regimental order book. August 24, recruiting officers sent to Pennsylvania; August 27, inventory of the effects of J. W. Campbell, II company. This appears to have been the first death in the regiment. September 3, Lieutenants Fletcher and Miller resigned; September 7, officers to be instructed in picket duty by Colonel Simmons of the Fifth; September 6, General McClellan's Sunday order received; September 9, order to parade to receive regimental colors; September 22, lists of officers to be made for examination by Military Board; September 24, volunteers asked for regular artillery and cavalry; September 28, command ordered to be held in readiness to move (first, but not last order of this kind); October 4, corps of pioneers for each regiment formed; two men to a company, twelve axes, two picks and four spades.


"The men, hearing of skirmishes and other exciting times on the Virginia side of the Potomac, all welcomed the order to cross to old Virginiy, 'to invade the sacred soil;' " crossed October 10. "Their ardor was somewhat abated upon their arrival at their camp at Langley, as it was late at night, and they were obliged to lie out without shelter in cold and disagreeable weather."

Here the Reserve division, now fully organized, went into winter quarters, occupying the right of the line. The new camp near Langley was called Camp Pierpont, named for the Union Governor of Virginia. The division held a long picket line covering its front. It also had to keep the connection with the Potomac on the northwest. This involved a great deal of picket duty. As the enemy held a large force in the vicinity of Leesburg, threatening the right of the army and to cross into Maryland, the division held a very responsible position, and one involving not only arduous but careful picket duty and numerous reconnaissances.

Colonel Bayard (afterwards the distinguished cavalry general) commanded the division cavalry, First Pennsylvania Cavalry. November 19 General Ord was assigned to command of the Third Brigade. November 20, order for the grand review of McClellan's army by the President. A number of officers resigned about this time. Sypher, in his history of the Reserves, says: "It is noteworthy, that while the commanders of other divisions had frequently the mortification to report the loss in capture by the enemy of wagons, artillery, horses or men, the general commanding the Pennsylvania Reserve Corps was in every expedition successful, and on no occasion reported a reverse in his com-

mand or an accident to his troops." This was most probably due to the fact that the division, each of its brigades, and the cavalry attached, were all commanded by regular army officers who had proved themselves efficient before they were assigned to command in the division, all of whom became greatly distinguished afterward. The Army of the Potomac produced no better generals than McCall's brigade and cavalry commanders. Sypher says: "October 18 General McCall was directed to move his command on the following day to Dranesville, to reconnoitre, map the roads, etc. He was informed that the enemy had left Leesburg, that there need be no fear of attack from that direction, but he was cautioned to look out for his left. Early Saturday (October 19) the troops moved out with two days' cooked rations. At 6 P. M. the head of the column halted one and a half miles beyond Dranesville, in the direction of Leesburg. Bayard's cavalry leading, then Reynold's, then Meade's, then Third Brigade, McCalmont commanding, in rear. McCall asked to remain till Monday, which was granted. The division started back at 10 A. M., Monday. As General McCall was dismounting at Camp Pierpont at 1 P. M., he received orders to remain at Dranesville until further orders. Two brigades had arrived in Camp Pierpont. He telegraphed: "What shall I do?" He was told that he "should let his command rest and be prepared to move at a moment's notice if required." The men were kept under arms till the next day at 4 P. M. Colonel Baker was attacked at Hall's Bluff at 4 P. M., October 21, three hours after McCall arrived at Camp Pierpont. Drills and picket duty filled up the time until the battle of Dranesville.





## CHAPTER III.

### BATTLE OF DRANESVILLE, DECEMBER 20, 1861.

On the 19th of December, 1861, one of the scouts of the First Pennsylvania Cavalry returned to camp and reported that the enemy would be at Dranesville the next day with a strong foraging party and a wagon train. Whereupon General McCall sent the following order to General Ord :

“ HEADQUARTERS MCCALL’S DIVISION,  
CAMP PIERPONT, Va.,  
December 19, 1861. ”

GENERAL—You will please move in command of your Brigade at 6 A. M. to-morrow on the Leesburg Pike, in the direction of Dranesville, the First Rifles, Pennsylvania Reserves, Lieutenant-Colonel Kane has been ordered to form right in front on the pike near Commodore Jones’ house and await your arrival, when the commanding officer will report to you for further orders. Captain Easton’s battery has been directed to form on the left of the Rifles. The captain will report to you for orders. Two squadrons of cavalry will also be placed under your command. The senior officer will report to you this evening for orders. Sherman, the guide, will likewise report to you for duty.

The object of this expedition is two-fold. In the first place, to drive back the enemy’s pickets, which have recently advanced within four or five miles of our lines, leaving a force of about seventy cavalry at Henderson’s, and carried off two good Union men and threatened others ; and secondly, to procure a supply of forage. It has to-day been reported to me that there is a force of about one hundred cavalry lying between Dranesville and the river. This force might be captured or routed by sending a regiment of infantry up the pike beyond their position, to strike their rear by a flank movement to the right, while your disposable cavalry, after picketing the cross roads near Dickey’s might move near the river and attack them in front or on the left. Should you *not* arrive at Dickey’s in time to make this movement and leave the ground

on your return before nightfall it must not be undertaken, as I do not wish any part of your command to remain out over night. The forage will be procured at Gunnell's or at some other rank Secessionist's in the neighborhood of Dickey's. Direct your quartermaster to confine the selection of forage to corn and hay. Captain Hall will have charge of the wagon train. The regiment intended to move forward from Dickey's (if you think proper, Jackson's,) might ride in the wagons as far as Dickey's, and then be fresh for the forward movement."

The troops composing General Ord's command for this expedition consisted of his own brigade, Sixth Reserves, Lieutenant-Colonel W. M. Penrose; Ninth, Colonel C. F. Jackson; Tenth, Colonel J. S. McCallmont, and Twelfth, Colonel J. H. Taggart; also the First Rifles (Bucktails), Lieutenant-Colonel Kane; Easton's battery, two twelve pounders (heavy), and two twenty-four pounder Howitzers, Captain H. Easton commanding; and two squadrons of the First Pennsylvania Cavalry, Lieutenant-Colonel J. Higgins commanding. (The Twelfth Regiment was composed of nine companies, K Company, a rifle company, specially armed.) At 6 A. M. of the 20th this command began its march, the cavalry scouting in front, the Bucktails leading the infantry. Skirmishers were thrown out from the infantry regiments to act as flankers, the march being conducted strictly according to regulations for the movement of an armed reconnoissance in the enemy's country. The Ninth in wagons followed the Bucktails, then the Tenth, Sixth and Twelfth, the latter in the rear. It was a fine frosty morning, just the weather to make the men march well, and to prefer marching and fighting to loitering around camp. General Reynolds, with the First Brigade, was directed to move to Difficult Creek, to be ready to support General Ord in the event of his meeting a force stronger than his own. There was a false alarm at Difficult Creek. General Ord's command halted there, lunched and then moved on; the head of the command reached Dranesville about 11 A. M.

General Ord reported the action as follows :

" CAMP PIERPONT, Va., December 21, '61.

SIR—I have to report that, in obedience to the enclosed order, I, at 6 A. M. yesterday, started towards Dickey's and Hendersons, about three miles this side of Dranesville, on the Leesburg Pike, with my brigade, the First Rifles, Lieutenant-Colonel Kane; Easton's battery and two squadrons of cavalry. I likewise heard that it was probable there was

a respectable picket of cavalry at Dranesville, and that the picket supposed by you to be near the river behind Dickey's had left. I then determined to send three companies of the Tenth and Twenty cavalry with the foraging party to Gunnell's, between the pike and the river, and with the remainder of the force to proceed to Dranesville, satisfied that, though I might be exceeding the letter of my instructions, should I find the enemy and pick up a few you would not object. This I did, though Colonel McCalmont, hearing that there was a large force on our left, remained with his part of the regiment, and that detained the two regiments behind him. I had sent for them, but was obliged to enter Dranesville with my artillery and cavalry and a small advance guard only on the road, the First Rifles and Colonel Jackson's regiment flanking this column in the woods on the right and left. The cavalry picket in town fled and scattered and remained in small squads watching.

While waiting in Dranesville for the regiments in rear to come up, I posted my artillery and cavalry and Jackson's regiment of infantry and a couple of companies of the First Rifles so as to cover the approaches, and sent for Kane's regiment to occupy the road in our then rear, my front being toward Centreville. This I did because from the occasional appearances of a few mounted men on a slope behind some woods in a hollow to my left and front, and a broad mass of smoke in that neighborhood, I felt pretty sure there was a force there preparing some mischief.

As soon as Colonel McCalmont came up with his regiment (the Tenth), followed by Lieut.-Colonel Penrose (the Sixth) and Colonel Taggart with the Twelfth, and while preparing to resist any attack and to cover my foraging party, I learned that the enemy in force had approached on the south side of the Leesburg Pike, with field pieces and infantry, and had driven in my pickets, wounding two men. Thinking they would attack on both sides of the turnpike, as I returned eastward, I ordered (to meet this expected attack) Colonel McCalmont's regiment on the left or river side of the road in the woods, left in front, and if the enemy showed himself on that side to bring his regiment forward into line.

Colonel Jackson's regiment (of which and its gallant colonel I cannot speak in too high terms) I ordered to flank the road in the same way on the right of the road in the woods, and do the same if the enemy showed on that side. Between these flanking regiments I ordered the

Kane Rifles to meet the enemy behind us in the road—the cavalry to follow—and the artillery I took with me to post them and answer the enemy's artillery, which had opened fire on our then right (the south), directing the rear guard to cover the column of the Sixth and Twelfth regiments of infantry in the road from cavalry.

The artillery went at a run past the station I selected for them, capsizing one of their pieces. I brought them back, told the captain where to post his guns, and then went to remove the cavalry then exposed in the road swept by the enemy, whose attack was from a thickly wooded hill on our right flank (the south). Their force, I saw, was a very bold one, very well posted, and the artillery was only about 500 yards off, with a large force of infantry on both flanks and in front, covered and surrounded by the woods and thickets. Moving east with the cavalry, which was of no use here, I came to a place in the road covered towards the enemy by a high bluff and dense thicket, which thicket I intended to occupy with infantry. Here I left the cavalry surrounded by dense forests, wherein they could neither fight nor be hurt. The accompanying sketch will show the ground (not found). As I had at first thought the enemy would attack on both sides of the road (road to Alexandria), and moved my infantry to meet such an attack, and as their attack was confined to the right, it became necessary for me to change my front, as neither McCalmont nor Jackson had had time to come into line under first orders, when I discovered this, and were moving by the flank, and, as before I placed the artillery and cavalry I had seen the Rifles closely engaging the enemy by a flank movement, covering themselves by some bushes and fences, my right, in meeting the attack, thus became the village of Dranesville, my left the gorge and woods occupied by my cavalry on the Leesburg Pike.

After securing the cavalry, I found, by carefully observing the enemy's fire and battery, that their guns were in a road which could be enfiladed. I ordered Captain Easton to right the capsized gun and bring it to the spot from which this road could be raked, removed two other guns to this spot, gave the gunners the distance and elevation, observed the result, and finding after a round or two that the enemy's fire slackened and the gunners were raking the road beautifully without being discomposed by the enemy's fire, I told them "to keep at that," and determined to push the infantry forward.

I found them, except the Kane Rifles, the Ninth (Jackson's) and the Tenth (McCalmont's) regiments which were, as above stated, in the



ditches, under fences, and covering themselves as best they could. I started them forward, Kane, at the head of his regiment, leading. His and Jackson's regiments required no urging. McCalmont's regiment was kept in excellent order by its colonel—than whom a better officer is not found in my brigade—and acted as a reserve. I put them in the woods, pushed and exhorted them up the hill, having directed the battery to cease firing, and proceeded with my infantry with the bayonet.

About this time, between 3 and 4 o'clock (the action began at 2.30), General McCall, I was informed, arrived on the field. \* \* \*

He was so kind as to direct me to continue the pursuit in the same order and to continue my disposition, which I did. The enemy were pursued fully half a mile further, but they had left the neighborhood in great haste, leaving their arms, a portion of their dead and wounded, clothing, ten horses, and a quantity of artillery equipments, with two caissons and a limber scattered along the road towards Centreville and in the woods on both sides. \* \* \*

The enemy left twenty-one of their most desperately wounded on the field, who were taken up, carried to houses and their wounds dressed by our surgeons, but they will nearly all die. Their dead left on the field is variously estimated from fifty to seventy-five.

Our artillery did terrible havoc, exploding one ammunition wagon, and some of their men whom we brought in say the slaughter was terrible. \* \* \*

The prisoners further stated that Colonel Taylor was doubtless killed.

\* \* \* After the affair we built our bivouac fires in Dranesville. Thus, sir, we, on returning to camp, had marched twenty-four miles, beaten the enemy, loaded our wagons with forage, bringing in (twelve miles) our killed, seven, and wounded, sixty, among whom are four captains. Some of our wounded had to be brought the whole distance on stretchers, while I am informed the Pennsylvania ambulances for this division are lying empty in Washington. It is impossible to remember all who were conspicuous, especially as the fighting occurred in thickets and was scattered over much ground. Captain Easton was very efficient and his battery well served. The wounded officers, Lieutenant-Colonel Kane and Captain Niles, of the Kane Rifles; Captain Bradbury of the Sixth, and Captains Dick and Galway of the Ninth P. R. V. C. were conspicuous, leading their men when wounded. \* \* \*

The prisoners report that the brigade engaged against us was composed of the Kentucky Rifles, an Alabama, a South Carolina and a Virginia regiment, with a six-gun battery, all under the command of General Stuart.

I must not forget the prompt manner in which General Reynolds came up from Difficult Creek, some four miles off, as soon as he heard the cannonading. He arrived too late, it is true, to take part in the affair, but the certainty that he would come with his brigade insured a victory and stimulated our men to earn it."

When the enemy was discovered to be in force on the Centreville Road, General Ord's command was arranged about as follows: The Ninth Regiment on the south side of the Alexandria and Leesburg Pike, four companies and a platoon of the Tenth on the left (north) side of that Pike, both regiments a little east of Dranesville, and both moving eastward by the flank; a part of the Rifle Regiment on the pike near the village, the balance on picket across the Centreville Road, and extending to the Alexandria and Leesburg Pike: the Sixth on the Pike at the eastern end of the village; the Twelfth on the Pike, just east of the Sixth; the cavalry and artillery in the village: three companies and a platoon of the Tenth after forage between the river and Dranesville Pike. It was soon after this learned by the Union commander that none of the enemy was north of the Alexandria and Leesburg Pike, but that he was advancing on both sides of the Centreville Road, supporting his artillery on that road.

General Stuart, commanding the Confederate force, reported under date of December 23, 1861, as follows:

"That on the 20th inst. I was placed in command of four regiments of infantry, 150 cavalry, and a battery of four pieces of artillery, viz.: Eleventh Virginia Volunteers, Colonel S. Garland, Jr.; Sixth South Carolina Volunteers, Lieutenant-Colonel Secrest: Tenth Alabama Volunteers, Colonel J. H. Forney: and First Kentucky Volunteers, Colonel Thomas H. Taylor: making an aggregate force of 1,600 infantry; Sumter Flying Artillery, four pieces, Captain A. S. Cutts; One Hundredth (?) North Carolina Cavalry, Major Gordon: and Fifty Second (?) Virginia Cavalry, Captain Pitzner, for the purpose of covering an expedition of all the wagons of our army that could be spared (after hay) to the left of Dranesville. I proceeded at once by the nearest route at daylight towards Dranesville. \* \* \* Accompanying sketch (not found). Knowing the situation of the enemy's advance posts, I sent the

cavalry forward far in advance of the infantry, to take possession of the two turnpikes to the right of Dranesville, leading directly to the enemy's advanced posts, so as to prevent any communication of our movements reaching them, and with the main body I followed on to take a position with two regiments and a section of artillery on each turnpike, also to the right of Dranesville, and close enough to their intersection to form a continuous line. Such a position I knew I could hold against almost any odds, but as my cavalry came in sight of the turnpike Captain Pitzner discovered the enemy at the point (A) on the ridge and sent me word immediately. I galloped forward at once, and, reconnoitering for myself, found that a portion of the enemy was in possession of the ridge, and I could hear distinctly artillery carriages passing up the Georgetown Turnpike in considerable numbers, and presently saw the cannoneers mounted on limber boxes passing up towards Dranesville, about 200 yards from the intersection (A). I knew, too, that the enemy's infantry were in advance, and I at once suspected that he was either marching upon Leesburg or had received intelligence through a spy of our intended forage expedition and was marching upon it. In either case our wagons would have fallen an easy prey to him, and I saw at once that my only way to save them was to make a vigorous attack upon his rear and left flank and to compel him to desist from his purpose.

I sent back for the infantry to hurry forward and sent Captain Pitzner with his detachment of cavalry to gain the road towards Leesburg, give notice to our wagons to return at once to camp, and keep between them and the enemy, threatening his front and flank; and I will state here, parenthetically, that this duty was performed by Captain Pitzner and his gallant little detachment in the most creditable manner, all our wagons reaching camp safely." (But without any forage!)

"In the meantime the enemy's skirmishers took possession of the dense pine in our front, and as our infantry was met by my messenger three-fourths of a mile back, it was some time coming up. Colonel Garland's regiment, leading, was directed to deploy two companies on each side of the road to clear the ground of the enemy's skirmishers. One of these companies, having mistaken its direction, went too far to the right, and Colonel Garland had to replace it with another. The pines were cleared at double quick, and the battery was ordered in position at B, and fired very effectively during the whole engagement to the front. The infantry were placed in position as follows: Garland's regiment on the right of the road, a little in advance of the

artillery : Secrest (S. C.) on the left of the road : Forney's regiment, arriving late, replaced Garland's, which moved by the flank to the right, and the First Kentucky, Colonel Taylor, at first intended as a reserve, was ordered to take position on the left of the Sixth South Carolina Regiment. As our infantry was well secured from the enemy's view, their artillery fire, which opened about fifteen minutes after ours began, had little effect upon the infantry, but played with telling effect along the road, as from its position (C) and the straightness of the road in our rear, it raked the latter with shell and round shot completely. Their caissons and limbers were behind in a brick house, and completely protected from our shot, while our caissons and limbers were necessarily crowded and exposed. There was no outlet to right or left, for a mile back, by which the artillery could change its position. When our forces took their position the fire of the artillery caused great commotion in the enemy's lines, and a part evidently took to their heels. The right wing was ordered forward, and the Tenth Alabama rushed with a shout into a shower of bullets, under the gallant lead of their Colonel (Forney) and Lieutenant-Colonel Martin, the latter falling in the charge. A part of this regiment crossed the road and took position along a fence, from which the enemy felt the trueness of their aim at short range. The Colonel was here severely wounded and had to retire. In his absence the command fell upon Major Woodward. The Eleventh Virginia, holding position on the right of the Tenth Alabama, was not so much exposed to the fire of the enemy, and consequently suffered less. The Sixth South Carolina gradually gained ground also to the front, and being, together with the Tenth Alabama, exposed to the fire of the enemy's sharpshooters from a two story brick house suffered most. My orders to Colonel Taylor, First Kentucky, were given through Colonel Forney, and I soon knew by the commotion on my left that it was in place. The thicket where the Sixth South Carolina and First Kentucky operated was so dense that it was impossible to see either (their) exact position or their progress in the fight, and I regret to say that the First Kentucky and the Sixth South Carolina mistook each other for the enemy, and a few casualties occurred in consequence; but with that exception the whole force acted with admirable union, and advanced upon the enemy with the steadiness of veterans, driving him several times from his position with heavy loss. When the action had lasted about two hours I found that the enemy, being already in force larger than my own, was recovering from his disorder and re-

ceiving heavy re-enforcements. I could not, with my small numbers, being beyond reach of re-enforcements, force his position without fearful sacrifice, and seeing that his artillery, superior to ours in number and position only, was pouring a very destructive fire into Cutts' battery, I decided to withdraw the latter at once, preparatory to retiring from the field, judging, too, that I had given our wagons ample time to get out of reach of the enemy.

The battery suffered greatly. Its position was necessarily such that it could fire only to the front, and the caissons and limbers had no cover whatever from such a fire. Three or four cannoneers had been shot at their posts and several wounded, and every shot of the enemy was dealing destruction on either man, limber or horse. The conduct of the brave, true and heroic Cutts attracted my admiration frequently during the action, now acting No. 1 and now as gunner, and still directing and disposing the whole with perfect self-command and a devotion to his duty that was, I believe, scarcely ever equalled. He executed my orders to withdraw his battery under a ricochet fire of great accuracy. One piece I found it necessary to detail some infantry (Eleventh Virginia) to assist in conducting to the rear, which was done by them under great personal exposure. Having secured the artillery, I sent orders to the four regimental commanders to disengage themselves from the enemy and retire slowly and in perfect order to the railroad, where a stand would be made. This delicate duty was performed admirably, and our troops marched back leisurely, bringing with them all the wounded that could be found. \* \* \* One regiment reached the road in rear of point where it left its knapsacks. \* \* \*

As to the strength of the enemy, if concurrent statements of the citizens residing on his route of march can be credited, he had fifteen regiments of infantry, several batteries and seven companies of cavalry." (The citizens probably referred to McCalls entire division.) "Colonel Taylor became separated from his regiment, but rejoined his command. \* \* \* Our loss is as follows :

	KILLED.	WOUNDED.	MISSING.
Eleventh Alabama.....	6	15	—
Sixth South Carolina.....	18	45	—
Tenth Alabama.....	15	45	6
First Kentucky..	1	23	2
Cutts' Battery.....	3	15	—
<b>Total, 194."</b>			

Discovering the enemy in force on his right flank, as his command was then disposed, General Ord changed front to the right. The Ninth Regiment was faced to the south and directed to advance west of and parallel to the Centreville Road. The First Rifles were pushed forward at double quick to the brick house on left of Centreville Road; the Sixth Regiment was ordered to report to Lieutenant-Colonel Kane and support his regiment on its right; the Twelfth to advance as a reserve to this whole force; the Tenth to support the battery and to send a skirmish line out to the left of the battery to watch the left flank.

Soon General Ord perceived the confusion of the enemy around his battery, and he at once assumed the offensive by advancing his command as now arranged. He assumed command of this advance in person. The Ninth Reserves met the First Kentucky in the thick woods, and not recognizing it as an enemy, received its first volley before firing; but notwithstanding so severe a test of its discipline, this gallant regiment held its ground and opened a vigorous return fire. The Sixth Regiment, supporting the Rifles, crossed the Centreville Road and met the enemy's centre and right; the Twelfth was advanced first against the enemy's left, then afterwards sent around the enemy's flank, in hope of taking his battery. The Tenth supported Easton's battery in its new position. The battery having its left flank exposed in this position, Captain McConnell of B Company of Tenth was thrown out on the extreme left with the platoon of his company which was present (the other platoon having gone for forage). He deployed his men as skirmishers and advanced to some ditches, where he was joined voluntarily by the pioneers of his regiment. Captain McConnell's small force succeeded in checking the enemy's advance in this direction, being assisted by an occasional shell thrown from Easton's battery, in his (McConnell's) front.

After a short and sharp contest the enemy was driven from his position and followed half a mile. The Confederate loss shows that both his infantry and artillery gallantly contested the ground, while the Union success showed that he was no less courageous.

General Ord's artillery, although of the same number of guns as the enemy's, was much the superior, and conduced greatly to the Union success. The forces of infantry were as near equal in numbers as ever happens in war. It was a gallant and honestly won victory for General Ord, Easton's battery, Kane's Rifles and the Third Brigade.

Casualties in General Ord's command were :

	KILLED. Enlisted Men.	WOUNDED. Officers.	WOUNDED. Enlisted Men.
Artillery.....	None	None	1
First Rifles.....	3	2	26
Sixth Regiment.....	2	1	12
Ninth Regiment....	2	2	18
Twelfth Regiment.	—	—	1
Aggregate, 70.			

Lieutenant-Colonel Kane and Captain Niles of Rifles, Captain Bradbury of Sixth, and Captains Dick and Galway of Ninth, wounded. Colonel Taggart's report stated that he was the only field officer present, only three captains present; 575 officers and men present. Lieutenant Reid acted as adjutant, and that "Private William R. Fox of Company K was wounded in the right thigh during the first part of our advance in the woods. He made a narrow escape. A porte-monnaie in his pocket was bored through, and a \$2.50 gold piece in it was bent nearly double."

Instead of regarding its safety, the cavalry ought to have been thrown upon the enemy's flank when the infantry assumed the offensive. General Ord had a chance to cause a genuine route and a great capture, but at that time in the war and for a year afterwards the only thought about cavalry was, "how to take care of it." The defeated Confederate general became one of the most noted generals of cavalry of the war, but this lesson seems never to have been forgotten by his superiors, and he seldom had an infantry command. The following orders were published to the command:

"HEADQUARTERS, A. P., }  
WASHINGTON, D. C., December 28, 1861. }

G. O. No. 63. The Commanding General expresses his thanks to Brigadier-General Ord and the brave troops of his brigade, who so gallantly repulsed an attack of an equal force of the enemy on the 20th inst. The General takes pleasure in observing the readiness of the remaining troops of McCall's division and the able dispositions of their commander to repel the enemy in case of the advance of re-enforcements.

The General would also acknowledge the distinguished services of Colonel McCalmont, Tenth Infantry, Pennsylvania R. C.; Colonel Jackson, Ninth Infantry, P. R. V. C.; Lieutenant-Colonel Kane, Rifle Regiment, P. R. V. C.; and Captain Easton of Easton's Battery, which contributed in a large degree to the success of the day.

By command of Major-General McClellan,

S. WILLIAMS, A. A. G.

WAR DEPARTMENT, December 28, 1861.

Brigadier-General G. A. McCall, Commanding Division, Camp Pierpont, Virginia.

GENERAL.—I have read your report of the battle of Dranesville, and although no reply is necessary on my part, yet as a citizen of the same commonwealth as yourself and the troops engaged in that brilliant affair, I cannot refrain from expressing to you my admiration of the gallant conduct displayed, by both officers and men, in this their first contest with the enemy. Nearly all your command upon that occasion are either my personal friends or sons of those with whom for long years I have been more or less intimately associated. I feel that I have just cause to be proud that, animated by no other motive than patriotism, they are among the first to revive the glory shed upon our country by the men of the Revolution and soldiers of the war of 1812. It is one of the bright spots that give assurance of success of coming events; and its effect must be to inspire confidence in the belief that hereafter, as heretofore, the cause of our country will triumph. I am especially gratified that a Pennsylvania artillery corps, commanded by officers who have necessarily had but limited systematic instruction, have won not only the commendation of their friends, but an unwilling compliment from the enemy, for the wonderful rapidity and accuracy of their fire. I wish I could designate all the men who, nobly discharging their duty to the country, have added to the glory of our great commonwealth.

Other portions of the army will be stimulated by their brave deeds, and men will be proud to say that at Dranesville they served under McCall and Ord.

I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

SIMON CAMERON,

Secretary of War."

"The gallantry of our troops in the late affair at Dranesville demands a public acknowledgment. Their courage, conduct and high discipline are honorable to the Corps and to the Commonwealth, by whose forecast it was raised and formed, in anticipation of the exigencies of the country, and whose sons fill its ranks.

General McCall and Brigadier-General Ord, and the officers and men who were engaged under their commands, may be assured that Pennsylvania is not insensible to their martial virtue, and from them and



their fellows confidently looks for as many further illustrations of it as there shall be opportunity afforded them.

By order of A. G. CURTIN, Governor of Pennsylvania.

A. L. RUSSELL, Aid-de-camp."

Syphur says ; "General McCall published a congratulatory order, and caused to be read to his division the letter from Secretary Cameron and the order from Governor Curtin. The colors of the regiments that were engaged in the battle were taken to Washington, and on each flag, 'Dranesville, December 20, 1861,' was printed in golden letters."

#### FROM DRANESVILLE TO PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN.

After the battle of Dranesville, the camp was visited by many distinguished persons, and the Reserves were the heroes of the Winter. Many congratulatory orders were issued. That of General Ord suggested the use of distinctive badges, the origin of corps badges. No order was given to build Winter quarters, but temporary huts, three to four logs high, with tents over them, were erected. Sheet iron stoves furnished heat. Drills were required whenever the weather permitted, and there was much picket duty. These duties filled in the time until Spring. December 26, 1861, First Lieutenant McMurtrie, who was promoted from the First Rifles, joined and was appointed adjutant. December 28 there was a review for Governor Curtin, and December 30 the flags were sent away to have Dranesville inscribed upon them.

The regimental band (which could play only a few pieces) was discharged, for the reason that the men had not been enlisted as private soldiers. It rained almost every day. Some men volunteered to serve with Stewart's regular battery (to which the writer was attached). Bad weather and hard work discouraged these volunteers and they all returned to their companies. Some men volunteered for gunboat service. The crew of the Gunboat Carondelet was composed of these men. This vessel gained a national reputation. January 10, 1862, there was a review to receive the flags with Dranesville inscribed on them. March 10, 1862, the division left Camp Pierpont. Woodward says :

"We continued up the pike, crossing Difficult Creek, to Spring Vale, within three miles of Dranesville. When turning to the left and following a bridle path through the woods and over the hill we reached about dark the neighborhood of Hunter's Mills, near which, on the Loudon and Hampshire Railroad, we bivouaced, the night being very cold and rainy. Here we remained until the next afternoon when we

marched about two miles to a high elevation near the ruins of Hawk-hurst Mills, where we encamped, about seventeen miles from Camp Pierpont, two miles from Fairfax Court House, and eight from Bull Run battle ground. \* \* \* Here we received our shelter tents. The men called them 'dog houses.' On the evening of the 14th, during a light fall of rain, we took up our march through the woods, on every side bivouacs and burning bough huts and arbors, the glare of which lighted up our road for miles. \* \* \* Reaching the Alexandria and Leesburg Pike, we turned to the right, and passing along it for two miles, about 11 o'clock filed into a dense open wood, where, in spite of the falling rain, our fires soon burned brightly, and we slept soundly. The next morning early, during a heavy rain, we took up our line of march, moving across the country to the Dranesville Pike, and turning down it crossed Difficult Creek, passing within four miles of our old home at Pierpont, and entering a wood moved back again towards the Alexandria and Leesburg Pike by a private road. The rain by this time was falling in torrents, flooding the swampy ground, making the marching most tiresome and fatiguing. Soon the ranks were broken, the men scattering, plunging through the mud, and toiling under their knapsacks, made doubly heavy by their blankets and overcoats becoming saturated with water. Soon they commenced dropping out, laid scattered through the woods for miles. Upon striking the turnpike again a long halt was called for the stragglers to catch up, and then moving on, we soon filed into a wood and stacked arms. This was about 3 o'clock, and although we had marched fifteen miles we were but three miles from the starting point, the detour to the left having been made on account of the enemy's having burnt the bridge over Difficult Creek. It rained all night. The command had no tents. General McCall said this was the only march the men ever complained of. At 10 A. M. the next morning, we moved down the pike, passing Falls Church, Munson's Hill and a long line of fortifications erected at different times by the Union and Confederate troops, and arriving within a mile of Alexandria, moved over the fields to the left, and encamped near the Cemetery and Fairfax Seminary. On account of bad roads and a previous sleepless night, this was a hard march, but the men had spirit enough to guy a red-legged Zouave. Remained in camp here nearly a month. The war had changed Alexandria from a quiet, sleepy old Virginia town into a bustling business place. McClellan's army was encamped all about it, awaiting embarkation to the Peninsular. The soldiers and army employees swarmed in the streets, and although

the sale of liquor was prohibited yet large quantities were sold. One man had a barrel up the chimney, another a barrel on top of his house, from which he drew liquor by a gas jet. Another drew it from a private house adjoining his store by his hydrant. The men of the Reserves were very well behaved. The weather during our encampment here was cold, rainy and unpleasant, rendering the ground mostly unfit for drilling, but every favorable opportunity was taken advantage of for that purpose. We received our full rations, and a ration of whisky was served out every rainy night. The division was attached to McDowell's command. Early on the 9th of April struck shelter tents and strapped them on our knapsacks with three days' cooked rations in haversacks and moved off. \* \* \* Rained and snowed. \* \* \* Passing down between Forts Ellsworth and Lyons, we marched about three miles on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, when we halted to await transportation. \* \* \* Marched about six hours in the mud and then embarked (took cars); arrived at 9 P.M. about two miles beyond Bull Run Creek, in front of a large deserted encampment of rebel huts; had a good night."

The Twelfth Regiment left camp near Alexandria April 11th, marched to Manassas Junction, where it arrived next day at 5 P. M.; remained there until April 18, when it marched to Catlett's Station, where it arrived the same day. Distance marched, fifty-five miles. April 21st the regiment (Twelfth) was detailed for guarding the Orange and Alexandria Railroad from Bristoe to Catlett's Station. The Twelfth Regiment up to the 7th of May was guarding the Orange and Alexandria Railroad. On the 7th marched from Catlett's Station towards Falmouth, and arrived at camp near Falmouth on the 9th, when it joined the Third Brigade Pennsylvania Reserves, and remained with the brigade till the end of the month.

On this march to Falmouth five men who were outside of the command were captured by guerrillas, and private William Fox, of Company B was wounded. Colonel Taggart sent back cavalry and infantry to capture these guerrillas. This command not succeeding in finding these guerrillas, Colonel Taggart went back the next day with two companies and found the house where the guerrillas had been harbored, and finding Private Fox's gun there, he caused the house to be destroyed, to prevent a recurrence of such harborage. His act appeared to have had a salutary effect.

A portion of the Reserve Corps was sent to Fredericksburg. Bay-

ard's cavalry had a successful engagement with the enemy's cavalry on the Richmond side of Fredericksburg.

\* The Twelfth Regiment remained in camp near Falmouth from May 9th till it started for the Peninsular

## CHAPTER IV.

### PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN (BEFORE ARRIVAL OF THE RESERVES).

On the 13th of March, 1862, Fortress Monroe, Virginia, was adopted as the base of operations for the Army of the Potomac in its advance on Richmond. "For the prompt and successful execution of the projected operation it was regarded by all as necessary that the whole of the four corps" (McDowell's, Sumner's, Heintzelman's and Keyes') "should be employed, with at least the addition of 10,000 men drawn from the forces in the vicinity of Fort Monroe."

Fortress Monroe and vicinity, were under the command of General Wool, one of the old general officers of the regular army. The Army of the Potomac moved by transports the latter part of March and 1st of April from Alexandria, McClellan reaching Fort Monroe, April 2d. At the solicitation of General Wool, and, no doubt, harrassed by McClellan's enemies in Washington, the President issued orders, April 3d, depriving McClellan of command of Fort Monroe, his base of operations, and forbidding him to detach any men from General Wool's command. This was the first of a series of orders from Washington, which, in great part, caused the misfortunes of the Army of the Potomac on the Peninsula. It was no doubt hoped by McClellan's enemies that he would now throw up the command of that army. He had shortly before, at their instigation, been relieved of the command-in-chief.

The maps as made up by General Wool's engineers showed the Warwick river as flowing parallel to but not crossing the road from Newport News to Williamsburg, making Mulberry Island a real island. The Confederate general, Magruder, with about 10,000 men, defended Yorktown and vicinity. General Huger, at Norfolk, had about 15,000. The Union commanders supposed these forces opposed to them much larger. April 3d, the part of the Army of the Potomac which had arrived at Fort Monroe, started up the Peninsula. On account of the difficulty of moving animals by water the army land transportation at this time was very insufficient. McClellan's plan, as he says, was "to move the two

divisions of the Fourth Corps (Keyes'), by the Newport News and Williamsburg Road, to take up a position between Yorktown and Williamsburg, while the two divisions of the Third Corps (Heintzelman's) moved direct from Fort Monroe on Yorktown, the reserves moving so as to support either corps as might prove necessary. I designed, should the works at Yorktown and Williamsburg offer a serious resistance, to land the First Corps (McDowell's), re-enforced, if necessary, on the left bank of the York river or on the Severn, to move it to Gloucester and West Point, in order to take in reverse whatever force the enemy might have on the Peninsula and compel him to abandon his positions." When the army reached Yorktown and Lee's Mills, it met serious resistance, and here, on the 5th of April, the next and fatal order from Washington was received, withdrawing McDowell's, the largest corps, from McClellan's command. The controversy which this order provoked, being still unsettled, the results of the order only will be considered as we proceed. The first result was the stoppage of the advance of the force on the Peninsula. McClellan, naturally cautious, became over-cautions. The writer thought, at the time the army reached Yorktown, it could by a little hard fighting and by rapid movements have forced the enemy's position there. Since he has learned how small a force Magruder had at the time, he is confirmed in his opinion. He thinks McClellan, Barnard, chief engineer, and the other generals whom McClellan consulted made a mistake in deciding that an apparently strong position, come upon unexpectedly, could be taken only by a siege. The writer went in person amongst the Union pickets to a position where he thought a line of battle could be formed which could carry the Yorktown entrenchments. That is, when the Union army first arrived in front of them. The writer (who was on the artillery staff at the time) with others urged that an attempt be made to carry the enemy's works. He was disappointed at hearing talk of a siege before anything was done to test the strength of the enemy's position. After several days' delay any assault would possibly have failed. Moreover, there was at the time the Union army arrived before Yorktown no Confederate force north of the York River to prevent the Union commander from turning the position of Yorktown, nor for many days after. General McClellan is somewhat excused by the military conditions in Virginia about this time. They were concisely stated in a letter from General Keyes to Senator Harris, a letter to be shown to the President and Secretary of War. Keyes says: " \* \* \* The greatest master of the art of war has said 'that if you

would invade a country successfully, you must have one line of operations and one army under one general.' But what is our condition? The State of Virginia is made to constitute the command in part or wholly, of some six generals, viz., Fremont, Banks, McDowell, Wool, Burnside and McClellan, besides the scrap over the Chesapeake in the command of Dix. The great battle of the war is to come off here. If we win it, the Rebellion will be crushed; if we loose it, the consequences will be more horrible than I can tell." (Terrible prophesy). " \* \* \* It is no doubt agreeable to the commander of the First Corps (McDowell) to have a separate department. \* \* \*," That letter doomed General Keyes. The following letter of the President to General McClellan, dated April 9th, is given to show a certain condition of affairs then existing: "Your dispatches complaining that you are not properly sustained, while they do not offend me, do pain me very much. Blenker's division was withdrawn from you before you left here, and you know the pressure" (to give Fremont a command?) "under which I did it, and as I thought, acquiesced in it, certainly not without reluctance \* \* \* but you must act."

The pressure by certain newspapers, by certain extremists, and by the Committee on the Conduct of the War, on the one side, and General McClellan's natural inertness on the other, placed Mr. Lincoln in a most difficult position. This is the true defence of him for issuing the fatal military order which deprived McClellan of an essential part of his force at the outset of his campaign.

The Confederates abandoned their lines at Yorktown May 4th. McClellan followed slowly, his troops being much delayed by the muddy state of the roads, which were few in number and narrow, mere country roads. The cavalry, under General Stoneman, met the enemy near Williamsburg on the 4th. The infantry, under Generals Heintzelman, Sumner, Keyes, Hooker, Hancock, Kearney, Smith and other officers fought the battle of Williamsburg May 5th and 6th. The march of the Union Army continued slowly towards the Chickahominy, which the advance reached on the 20th, at Bottoms' Bridge. They found this bridge, as well as the railroad bridge a mile above, destroyed.

"The Chickahominy in this vicinity (where the Union Army approached it) is about forty feet wide, fringed with a dense growth of heavy forest trees, and bordered by low, marshy bottom lands, varying from half a mile to a mile in width. Our operations embraced that part of the river between Bottoms' and Meadow bridges, which covered the

principal approaches to Richmond from the east. Within these limits the firm ground lying above high water mark seldom approaches near the river on either bank, and no locality was found within this section where the high ground came near the stream on both sides. It was subject to frequent, sudden and great variations in the volume of water, and a rise of a few feet overflowed the bottom lands on both sides. At low water it could be forded at almost any point, but during high water it rose above a fording stage, and could then be crossed only at a few points where bridges had been constructed. These bridges had all been destroyed by the enemy on our approach, and it was necessary not only to reconstruct these, but to build several others. The west bank of the river opposite the New and Mechanicsville bridges was bordered by elevated bluffs, which afforded the enemy commanding positions to fortify, establish his batteries, enfilading the approaches upon the two principal roads to Richmond on our right, and resist the reconstruction of the important bridges. This obliged us to select other less exposed points for our crossings." The left (Casey's Division) was moved across the river near Bottoms' Bridge about the 20th, and the left of the army (Keyes and Heintzelman's Corps) was the next two days crossed over, and soon after advanced to Seven Pines, and to the right, and rifle pits for infantry and epaulements for artillery were commenced. The centre and right of the army were advanced to the north bank of the river, and Mechanicsville was taken on the 24th. Secretary Stanton writes McClellan, May 18: "McDowell (then near Fredericksburg) has been ordered to march upon that city (Richmond) by the shortest route. He is ordered—keeping himself always in position, to save the capitol from all possible attack—so to operate as to put his left wing in communication with your right wing, and you are instructed to co-operate, so as to establish this communication as soon as possible, by extending your right wing north of Richmond. It is believed this communication can be safely established either north or south of the Pamunky river. \* \*"

An order worthy of the Aulic Council. A committee of the Military Historical Society of Massachusetts, to which was referred the subject of "McClellan's plans of campaign of 1862, and the alleged interference of the Government with them," report upon the latter that, "There can be no doubt that the Government has behaved towards McClellan for some months before the campaign opened in a manner which your committee consider alike unjust to him, injurious to the morale of his army, and detrimental to the success of our arms. Few men at the



head of affairs during a great war have ever given such evidence of an entire unfitness to have general direction over military men as Mr. Lincoln and Mr. Stanton." It is believed this criticism, though made to and approved by a great historical society, a generation after the close of the war, is too severe on Mr. Lincoln. The writer's explanation or defence of Mr. Lincoln is that his better judgment was often over-ruled by the Committee on the Conduct of the War (whose representative in the Cabinet was Mr. Stanton), who controlled a two-thirds majority of Congress, this committee being backed up by most powerful newspapers and popular orators. McClellan writes to Washington, May 21, " \* \* \* Frankness compels me to say, anxious as I am for an increase of force, that the march of McDowell's column upon Richmond by the shortest route will, in my opinion, uncover Washington, as to any interposition by it, as completely as its movement by water. The enemy cannot advance by Fredericksburg on Washington. Should they attempt a movement, which to me seems utterly improbable, their route would be by Gordonsville and Manassas." McClellan was right in his science, but ill-informed as to the movements of the enemy. Jackson was then advancing from Gordonsville to the valley of the Shenandoah. In consequence of Jackson's movement McDowell's was suspended, and most of his command sent to the valley.

A Confederate force having advanced on the right of the Army of the Potomac beyond Hanover Court House, interposing between that army and McDowell, General Porter, commanding on McClellan's right, went, May 27, with Morrell's Division and other troops, about 8,000 men, to Hanover Court House, where he met a Confederate force under General Branch. Porter defeated the enemy, causing him a severe loss in killed, wounded and prisoners.

On the 30th of May the Union troops on the south side of the Chickahominy were: Casey's Division, on the right of the Williamsburg Road, and at right angles to it, the centre at Fair Oaks; Couch's Division at Seven Pines, Kearney's Division on railroad from Savage Station towards Bottoms' Bridge, Hooker's Division near White Oak Swamp. During the day of the 30th and the following night a violent rain fell, rendering work on the rifle pits and bridges impracticable. The enemy took advantage of it, and on the 31st attacked first Casey's Division, and then Couch's. Heintzelman's Corps was brought up to the assistance of Keyes' Corps. The Confederates obtained great advantages at first, but Hooker's and Kearney's divisions sustained the struggle until

Sumner succeeded, after herculean efforts, in getting up a battery (Kirby's) and one division of his infantry. Sumner's Bridge, over which he crossed his force, was kept in place by the weight of his troops, it disappearing as soon as the troops left it. There is no doubt but that the Union troops made a most gallant resistance on the 31st, and an equally gallant advance on the morning of June 1st. The losses of the Union forces engaged were very heavy.

"The approaches to New and Mechanicsville bridges were also overflowed, and both of them were enfiladed by the enemy's batteries, established upon commanding heights upon the opposite bank. \* \* \* The only available means, therefore, of uniting our forces at Fair Oaks for an advance on Richmond soon after the battle was to march the troops from Mechanicsville and other points on the left bank of the Chickahominy down to Bottoms' Bridge, and thence over the Williamsburg Road to the position at Fair Oaks, a distance of about twenty-three miles. The idea of uniting the two wings of the army with the prospect of overtaking the enemy before he reached Richmond, only five miles distant, is absurd, \* \* \* and was never for a moment seriously entertained by anyone connected with the Army of the Potomac."

The losses of the Union Army at Fair Oaks were about 7 000. McClellan asked that troops be detached from Halleck's army (which at this time had no large force in its front), and sent to the Army of the Potomac. Halleck's army was however broken up and scattered all over the West, resulting soon in Bragg's invasion of Kentucky.

On the 13th and 14th of June Stuart made his raid around the Army of the Potomac; the Union cavalry at this time was distributed throughout the army, only one small brigade, under General P. St. G. Cooke, being kept together.

The Pennsylvania Reserves joined the Army of the Potomac on 12th and 14th of June. Were first placed on the railroad between the White House and Tunstall's Station; afterward's joined Porter's corps. In regard to this division General McClellan telegraphed Secretary Stanton on the 14th: "It ought to be distinctly understood that McDowell and his troops are completely under my control. I received a telegram from him requesting that McCall's Division might be placed so as to join him immediately on his arrival. That request does not breathe the proper spirit. Whatever troops come to me must be disposed of so as to do the most good. I do not feel that in such circumstances as those in which I

am now placed General McDowell should wish the general interests sacrificed for the purpose of increasing his command."


Woodward writes: "On a Sunday morning, the 8th of June, (Division) ordered to prepare to march and marched that night by a fine moonlight, wending our way by music of our bands down the Rappahannock, seven miles, where we bivouaced. The next morning marched to Gray's Landing and embarked \* \* \* as happy a set of blue coats as ever trod a planet. \* \* \* At 9 o'clock (12th) First Brigade marched up the railroad, passing Tunstall's Station about 4 o'clock; passed Despatch Station and moved to the right of the road and camped at the head of a heavy wood near the Chickahominy river, having marched about ten miles. Through the day we heard the slow fire of heavy guns. \* \* \* Rested the 13th; moved that night to Tunstall's Station." This latter movement was made to intercept Stuart's cavalry. The Third Brigade, now commanded by General Seymour, was delayed on the Rappahannock, waiting for transports. This accidental delay caused that brigade to arrive at White House on the Pamunky, June 14th, most opportunely, enabling it to frustrate Stuart's designs on the Army of the Potomac's base of supplies, at this time located here.

On the 17th of June the whole Reserve division was concentrated at Despatch Station except four companies of the First Rifles, which were under Lieutenant-Colonel Kane serving in the Valley of the Shenandoah, and the Sixth Regiment, Colonel Sinclair, left at Tunstall's Station. The division was to be reviewed by General McClellan at this point, but he failed to put in an appearance, and on the 18th it marched along the road parallel to and north of the Chickahominy to Gaines' Farm.

Woodward, of the Fourth, in "Our Campaigns" (a most interesting book) says: "The Nineteenth moved to Ellison's Mill, on the river road where it crosses the Beaver Dam Creek, about one and one-half miles, then countermarched and moved to the left; bivouaced in an oat field where Rush's Lancers were encamped. Professor Lowe made a balloon ascension; enemy's fire made him descend. Early next morning moved back about a mile to Nanaley's Mill. Early on the 24th started on picket to Mechanicsville, about one mile distant, where we found the Twelfth Reserves, four companies of Rush's Lancers and Cooper's battery, Colonel Taggart in command of the line as senior officer. Our regiment forming the reserve, we laid in the grove of Dr. Lumkin's house. Mechanicsville lies on the high ground overlooking the Chickahominy on its north bank, from which it is about 500 yards distant. It consists

of a church and about fifteen houses, all of which were deserted and perforated by shot and shell. The south bank of the river rises gradually for about a half mile, where a long line of redoubts and rifle pits front a heavy wood. In the centre of the stream is an island, which is connected with either shore by a bridge, we holding one end of it, and the enemy the other, the island being neutral ground. The pickets at this point, although quite near each other, remained on good terms, the enemy's relief upon one occasion presenting arms to Lieutenant-Colonel McIntyre of the First Reserves, as he was visiting one of our posts. We were disposed to show acts of courtesy to one another, as we daily expected to meet in battle. Richmond is but five miles distant from Mechanicsville, and from a shed near the roadside we could see the spires. One of our officers wagered a hundred cigars he would be in the city in a week ; he was, but as a prisoner. During the night the position of our guns was changed, and General Reynolds required hourly reports in writing, there being strong indication of a movement by the enemy. Cooper, at 5 A. M. on the 25th, fired about twenty shells ; there was no response. We subsequently learned the enemy were then making a move to our right."





## CHAPTER V.

### BATTLE OF MECHANICSVILLE, JUNE 26, 1862.

On the 19th of June the greater part of the Reserve Division was directed to move from Gaines' Farm to Mechanicsville to relieve Taylor's Brigade of Franklin's Division at above-named village, then the extreme right of the Army of the Potomac. The First and Third Brigades, commanded respectively by Generals Reynolds and Seymour, were posted on the left bank of Beaver Dam Creek in a line nearly perpendicular to the Chickahominy, in a position naturally strong, the Third Brigade on the left near Ellison's Mill, the First on the right. One regiment and a battery were sent to Mechanicsville and a strong picket line was extended from Mechanicsville to Meadow bridges. Beaver Dam Creek was impracticable for artillery except at the bridges, one at Ellison's Mill, and a second about a half mile above. On the right of the upper bridge an epaulement for artillery was thrown up and rifle pits and slashings of timber were made in front of each brigade, especially near the bridges. The Eighth Illinois Cavalry, Colonel Farnsworth, patrolled the woods towards Hanover Court House and to the Pamunky. The Union troops at the beginning of the engagement were posted as follows: First Brigade on the right; Second Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel McCandless, (seven companies) on extreme right; on its left the First Regiment, Colonel Roberts; on its left Eighth Regiment, Colonel Hays; six companies of First Rifles on picket at the railroad and Meadow bridges; the Fifth Regiment, Colonel Simmons, on picket at Mechanicsville; the Third Brigade, General Seymour commanding, on left of First Brigade, consisting of Tenth Regiment, Colonel Kirk, on right of Ellison's Mill Road; eight companies of Twelfth Regiment posted in rifle pits on both sides of the lower (Ellison's Mill) road, and two companies, Captain Mathewson's B and Captain Gustin's C, at a rifle pit near Ellison's Mill, in advance, on the right of the road, which commanded the meadow between our position and the advance of the enemy; (Sixth Regiment, Colonel Sinclair, absent at Tunstall's Station), and the Ninth Regiment, Colonel Jackson, in reserve.

The Second Brigade, General Meade, consisting of the Third, Colonel Sickel; Fourth, Colonel Magilton; Seventh, Colonel Harvey; and Eleventh, Colonel Gallagher, was held in reserve. The Eleventh being on picket along the Chickahominy, four squadrons of Fourth Pennsylvania Cavalry, Colonel Childs, attached to the division of Pennsylvania Reserves, held in reserve.

The artillery of the Division, Captain DeHart, Chief of Artillery, consisted of DeHart's Battery C, Fifth United States; six light twelve-pounders, posted near centre of the line, near which was a section of Kern's Battery B, First Artillery; the balance, four guns of Kern's Battery (all ten-pounder howitzers), on the extreme right of the line; Cooper's Battery B, First Pennsylvania Artillery; six ten-pounder Parrotts, two guns under Lieutenant Fullerton on left of road near Ellison's Mill, the other four guns with Kern's on extreme right; Easton's Battery A, First Pennsylvania Artillery, four twelve-pounders, on right of Ellison's Mill road; Smead's Battery K, Fifth United States, six twelve-pounders, two guns under Lieutenant Van Read near Easton's Battery, the balance of Smead's Battery on left of the upper road. Martindale's and Griffin's Brigades of Morrell's Division and Edwards' Battery L and M, Third United States, were ordered to support McCall's Division.

According to General Lee's order of battle, "General Jackson was to march from Ashland on 25th in the direction of Slash Church, encamping for the night west of the Central Railroad, and to advance at 3 A. M. on 26th to turn Beaver Dam. A. P. Hill was to cross the Chickahominy at Meadow Bridge when Jackson's advance beyond that point should be known, and move directly on Mechanicsville, as soon as the Mechanicsville bridge should be uncovered. Longstreet and D. H. Hill were to cross, the latter to proceed to the support of Jackson, and the former to that of A. P. Hill. The four commands were directed to sweep down the north side of the Chickahominy toward the York railroad. Jackson on the left and in advance, Longstreet nearest the river and in rear. Huger and Magruder were ordered to hold their positions against any assault of the enemy, to observe his movements, and to follow him closely should he retreat. \* \* \* Stuart's Cavalry was sent out on Jackson's right flank, and Pendleton's reserve artillery was left on Richmond side of Chickahominy, but to be used as required."

Jackson's march was delayed by obstructions placed in its way by Stoneman's Cavalry. General A. P. Hill says: "In obedience to orders I concentrated (June 26), my division near Meadow Bridge, viz., the



brigades of J. R. Anderson, Gregg, Field, Pender, and Archer, the brigade of Branch having been directed to move to the bridge, some seven miles above, where the Brooke Turnpike crosses the Chickahominy, the batteries of Braxton, Andrews, Pegram, Crenshaw, McIntosh, Bachman and Johnson, with four extra horses each (Johnson accompanied Branch), in all about 14,000 men." Jackson was to inform Branch of his near approach, and the latter was then to cross the Chickahominy and move down the river road and clear Meadow Bridge. This done, A. P. Hill was to cross Meadow Bridge and move down to Mechanicsville and clear that bridge for Longstreet and D. H. Hill.

Branch heard of Jackson's approach about 10 A. M. He then crossed the Chickahominy and endeavored to carry out his instructions, but was delayed by the Union skirmishers. Neither Branch nor Jackson appearing, and fearing, as he (A. P. Hill) says, that the whole plan would fail, he determined to cross the Chickahominy without waiting for Branch. Field's Brigade seized Meadow Bridge without serious opposition, the Union force falling back to Mechanicsville. Field advanced toward Mechanicsville, followed by Anderson's and Archer's brigades. Gregg and Pender, after crossing the Chickahominy, turned short to their right and moved through the fields to cover the right of the column. A. P. Hill says: "The enemy opened a concentric fire of artillery on the head of Field's column, who, throwing his brigade into line of battle, with Pegram in the centre, steadily advancing, drove the enemy from Mechanicsville." Until the Confederates had passed Mechanicsville they were opposed only by the Union batteries and skirmishers. The Fifth Regiment, Colonel Simmons commanding, picketing at Meadow and Mechanicsville bridges, seeing the enemy advancing in force, fell back in accordance with orders, and took position in the line of battle on the right.

The advance of the Confederate force down the river road forced back the Union cavalry, and three companies of the First Rifles were sent to its assistance. Major Stone, commanding the First Rifles (Buck-tails), who opened this notable battle, says: "At 1 P. M. (June 26), while my regiment (six companies, the other four companies being absent in the Shenandoah Valley,) was doing picket duty on the extreme right of our line, two companies occupying the railroad and Meadow bridges over the Chickahominy, one company on the left of the bridges and the remaining three companies in reserve, I was ordered to take my reserve companies to the assistance of the cavalry, who were falling

back before the enemy, already advanced to Atlee's Station. I moved rapidly forward, posted Captain Wistar's company at the junction of the three roads leading to Meadow Bridge, Crenshaw's Bridge and Atlee's Station; deployed Captain Irvin's company across Crenshaw's road, 300 yards in advance, and moved Captain Jewett's company forward toward Atlee's, to act as skirmishers for the cavalry beyond the road leading off to Shady Grove Church. \* \* \* Captain Jewett had scarcely deployed when the enemy's infantry appeared in his front in heavy force. He opened fire on them at short range and with great effect. The enemy halted in confusion; when they had re-formed he gave them a second volley. At this moment I learned that my companies guarding the Meadow and railroad bridges had been withdrawn by order of Colonel Simmons, commanding the Grand Guard, and the enemy had immediately crossed. I immediately sounded the recall and directed Captain Jewett to move rapidly to the rear. I rode back to the junction, where I found Captain Wistar already engaged with the enemy's troops approaching from Meadow Bridge. His determined front and steady fire had checked their advance, but they were gathering heavier forces to the front, and soon forced him to retire. His route to Mechanicsville was already interrupted and he fell back to the north, contesting every inch of the ground. I went back to meet Captain Jewett's command, turned him off to the left, and, with a small rear guard of cavalry, made a wide detour to the north. \* \* \* Captain Irwin had been advised by the same messenger who brought me news of the enemy's flank movement to retire to a safe position, but he declined to do so without orders. When I sent him orders it was already too late, and he was entirely surrounded. I heard heavy firing in his direction. \* \* \* None of them returned to camp. (They retired to a swamp and were finally starved out.) With the other companies I succeeded, after a long and fatiguing march through woods and swamps, part of the way under fire, in making my way to the ford in the swamp above my camp. The three companies which had been recalled from picket had already come safely in. \* \* \* Two companies of United States Sharpshooters, Captains Drew and Giroux, attached to my command during the (subsequent) action behaved with great steadiness and delivered a most effective fire." The Bucktails and Sharpshooters joined the Second Regiment in holding the ford above the upper bridge.

Anderson's Confederate Brigade moved to the left of Field's to take in reverse a Union battery which "was spiteful in its activity;" McIn-

tos's Battery was advanced to support Pegram, then Archer's Brigade was moved to further support Field's left, and Braxton's Battery was advanced to support McIntosh's. Gregg and Pender, advancing over the fields, covered Field's right and attacked the Union force at Ellison's Mills. The five brigades of A. P. Hill's Division, with Pegram's, Andrew's, McIntosh's and Braxton's Batteries in the advance, using their utmost strength and skill, were unable to force any part of the Union line. General Lee and President Davis now, in person, urged on the Confederates, who made desperate efforts to carry some point of the Union line; but after very heavy losses, these advance brigades gave up the attempt and fell back to a safer distance and opened musketry fire. Branch's Brigade now, near sunset, coming down from the North, with Johnson's Battery, was put in to support Field, and a new effort was made to carry the ford near the upper bridge; but the Second Regiment, gallantly led by McCandless, and the Bucktails by Major Stone, succeeded in repulsing all efforts of the enemy to carry this ford. A portion of Gregg's and Pender's Brigades, and Ripley's Brigade of D. H. Hill's Division, supported by the whole of A. P. Hill's Artillery, at the same time as Branch's attack, at dusk, made a desperate attempt to carry the left of the Union line near Ellison's Mill. This final effort of the Confederates was repulsed with severe loss to them, some of their regiments being practically annihilated. In the meantime, the First and Third Pennsylvania Reserve Brigades had been reinforced by Edwards' Battery, the Seventh Regiment Pennsylvania Reserves and a Massachusetts regiment, all posted on the left of the Ellison's Mill road, and by Martindale's and Griffin's brigades, which were sent to the extreme right where the ground was open and the whole line liable to be turned. The Fourth Michigan and four companies of Fourteenth Brooklyn, N. Y., Regiment, were sent, near dark, to relieve the Fifth Regiment at the ford, whose ammunition was exhausted. The firing ceased only with darkness, with the Reserves holding firmly their entire line.

General Porter, commanding Union troops north of the Chikahominy, says: "For our success at the battle of Mechanicsville I desire especially to commend the admirable dispositions made by Generals Reynolds and Seymour, owing to which, with the skillful management of their men, the losses were few." Seven brigades of Confederates, supported by two divisions, were engaged: at least 18,000 actually took part, whose losses were at least 2,000. Two brigades of Union troops, supported by three brigades, only two brigades seriously engaged,

about 6,000. Loss of Union side, 33 killed, 150 wounded, and Irwin's company First Rifles captured 70 men. Twelfth Regiment lost : 2 killed, 11 wounded and 5 missing.

McCall's report says : " Where all so gallantly supported the honor of the flag, it would seem almost invidious to particularize, but my thanks are particularly due to Generals Reynolds and Seymour, and to Colonels Simmons, Taggart, Lieutenant-Colonel McCandless and Major Stone, who were all closely engaged." General Seymour, the only general left with the division after the seven days, in his official report says : " In the absence of General Reynolds I may say that much of the credit of this day belongs to him. His study of the grounds and ample preparations, even to the smallest detail, justify his high reputation as a soldier. \* \* \* General Meade came up with his brigade, and by his advice, as well as by the presence of his command, was of valuable assistance. Major Stone, with rare intelligence, prepared his position and fought it like a true soldier to the end ; and to Colonel Simmons, since dead, the same praise is due. To Colonel Taggart, of the Twelfth Reserves, praise is due for the good service rendered by his regiment, which held on the left the crossing at Ellison's Mill with the greatest tenacity, repelling several assaults. Colonel Jackson, of the Ninth, deserves good mention for the skill with which he relieved the Twelfth, withdrew himself from battle and covered the movement to Gaines' Mill. Colonel Roberts on the right rendered excellent service, as did Lieutenant-Colonel McCandless, preventing that part of the line from being forced. To the artillery arm belongs also much credit. Captain Easton, since dead, repeated his glorious conduct of Dranesville, directing his guns with great effect. \* \* \* Lieutenant Fullerton, on the left with the Twelfth, did excellent service. \* \* \* Men never behaved better. To their constancy and courage, after all, the good stand made against a greatly superior force is due, and Pennsylvania may forever be proud of the memories connected with the deeds of her sons at Mechanicsville." It being certainly ascertained on the 26th that Jackson's army was moving to turn the right of the army, it was decided during that night to withdraw the troops from the advanced position at Beaver Dam Creek, and to form a line covering the bridge over the Chickahominy. Orders were received by General McCall a short time before daylight to withdraw. These orders were received so late the withdrawal had to be made by daylight, a most difficult and dangerous movement.

Martindale's, Griffin's and Meade's brigades were withdrawn first

and without injury to them, but the movement was noticed by the enemy, who immediately began efforts to cross Beaver Dam Creek. These efforts brought on a serious engagement, as the men of the Twelfth, supported by the Ninth and the Rifles, the latter covering the withdrawal of the First Brigade, answered the Confederate attack with a furious fire. Tidball's and Robertson's horse batteries were sent to assist the infantry. The fire of this Union force was strong enough to check the advance of the Confederate skirmishers and enable the whole Union force to withdraw without any serious loss of material or men.

Of this movement McClellan, in his official report, says: "The delicate operation of withdrawing the troops from Beaver Dam Creek was commenced shortly before daylight, and successfully executed. Meade's and Griffin's brigades were the first to leave the ground; Seymour's Brigade covered the rear with the horse batteries of Tidball and Robertson; but the withdrawal was so skillful and gradual, and the repulse of the preceding day so complete that, although the enemy followed the retreat closely and some skirmishing occurred, he did not appear in front of the new line in force until about noon of the 27th, when we were prepared to receive him." General Porter's report states: "The firing ceased about 9 P. M., and the men lay on their arms in ranks as they stood during the day, while exertions were being made by their officers to refill the exhausted cartridge-boxes, and to bring food to such men as had none in their haversacks. \* \* \* All was made ready for a renewal of the contest on the old ground, or an advance towards Richmond via the bridges which the enemy had crossed, should our success warrant it. During the night, however, as the Commanding General (who had joined us at an early hour in the afternoon and remained until about 10 o'clock at night) is aware, numerous accounts came in which tended to corroborate intelligence of the advance of Jackson's force from the direction of Gordonsville, whereby our right was to be effectually flanked without at all weakening the force in our immediate front. It was thus rendered necessary to select which side of the Chickahominy should be held in force, there being on each side an army of our enemies equivalent, in connection with their breast-works" (having over 200 permanent guns in position), "to the whole of our own. And these armies and defences well connected with each other and with Richmond, their base."

This statement, made by General Porter, July 8, 1862, in the light of subsequent information, is substantially correct. Whereas there were

at that time Union forces, not under McClellan, operating against the Confederate force in Virginia, exclusive of necessary garrisons, almost if not quite equal in numbers for duty to the Army of the Potomac. Such being the case, was McClellan's army fairly supported by the Government? Was there not a systematic effort on the part of certain persons to deceive both Mr. Lincoln and the general public as to the number of men for duty in the Army of the Potomac, increasing that number, at the same time belittling that in the numerous Union commands scattered all about Virginia's circumference?

How else can we account for the exceptional dullness of the Government and the people, in expecting an inferior army to take a fortified place garrisoned by a superior force.

It may thus be understood why members of the Army of the Potomac of that time clung to McClellan ever after, with all his faults. When one considers the feelings of the men, who, after so grand a success as was that of the first day, found that their skill and valor had been thrown away, because so small a force (which might so easily have been larger) was expected to accomplish the impossible. Who now doubts that if McClellan had had the reinforcements he might have received without injury to any interest, the battle of Mechanicsville would have been but the prelude to the destruction of Jackson's force? How fearfully was General Keyes' prophecy to be verified!

Colonel Taggart's report of July 5th, 1862, says: "On the next morning, June 27th, having orders to fall back, I ordered the rifle pits to be cleared, and the men to form on the road in the rear. The firing had commenced in the morning and was kept up with spirit on both sides, which made the task of getting the men out of the rifle pits a difficult and dangerous one. In fact, many of the men seemed so determined to stay, that they either did not hear the order to fall back, or would not do so, and a number (perhaps twenty) were left behind, and were either killed, wounded or taken prisoners. Captain Gustin's company at the Mill, being detached from the regiment, was in a perilous position and in danger of being cut off. They maintained their position for nearly an hour single-handed after my regiment had left, and large bodies of the enemy's troops had crossed the creek and attempted to surround them. Captain Gustin finally succeeded in withdrawing his company with only three men wounded. Captain Gustin's conduct on this occasion was worthy of all praise.

Captain Mathewson succeeded in withdrawing his company at an

early hour of the day. I regret to report that nearly all the men left their knapsacks and many their haversacks behind them, not having time to secure them before leaving. We moved slowly towards Gaines' Creek, where we halted and took up a new position, in compliance with orders from General McCall. I desire to mention particularly the good conduct of the officers and men on the occasion. Major Baldy was active and energetic in cheering on the men, and gallantly exposing himself while the battle lasted. Captains Daniels, Mathewson, Gustin, Horn, Schelling, Oliver, Baker, Bolar and Eyster, were constantly with their men, encouraging them by their exhibition of coolness and bravery. Captain Oliver received a slight wound in the cheek, but continued on duty till the battle closed. Captain Bolar rendered excellent service by observing with his field glass the effect of our fire, both artillery and infantry. The subaltern and non-commissioned officers are equally deserving honorable mention as well as the men. All did their duty nobly. Adjutant McMurtrie, who was under fire the whole time, is deserving of honorable mention for his coolness and bravery and the alacrity with which he obeyed all orders intrusted to his charge. Lieutenant Fullerton, commanding the section of artillery, displayed great coolness and intrepidity. He worked his guns without intermission for nearly five hours. I respectfully present the name of this officer to attention of the General commanding."

## CHAPTER VI.

### GAINES' MILL, ALLEN'S FARM AND SAVAGE STATION.

General McCall's report states : " My division moved leisurely and steadily to the ground designated in rear of Gaines' Mill, where it arrived at 10 A. M. Here I was notified by General Porter that my division, having been deprived of much sleep during the previous night and having been engaged for three hours that morning with the enemy, would be held in reserve that day." General McClellan's report states : " The position at Beaver Dam Creek, although so successfully defended, had its right flank too much in the air, and was too far from the main army to make it available to retain it longer. I therefore determined to send the heavy guns at Hogan's and Gaines' houses over the Chickahominy during the night, with as many of the wagons of the Fifth Corps as possible, and to draw the corps itself to a position stretching around the bridges, where its flanks would be reasonably secure and it would be within supporting distance of the main army. General Porter carried out my orders to that effect. It was not advisable at that time, even had it been practicable, to withdraw the Fifth Corps to the right bank of the Chickahominy. Such a movement would have exposed the rear of the army, placed it between two fires, and enabled Jackson's fresh troops to interrupt the movement to James River, by crossing the Chickahominy in the vicinity of Jones Bridge before we could reach Malvern Hill with our trains." Morell's Division held the left of the line in a strip of woods on the left bank of the Gaines' Mill stream, resting its left flank on the descent to the Chickahominy, which was swept by our artillery on both sides of the river, and extending into open ground on the right towards New Cold Harbor. In this line General Butterfield's Brigade held the extreme left, General Martindale's joined his right, and General Griffin's, still farther to the right, joined the left of Sykes' Division, which, partly in the woods and partly in open ground, extended in the rear of Cold Harbor. Each brigade had in reserve two of its own regiments. McCall's Division was formed in a second line in rear of the first : Meade's Brigade on the left, near the Chickahominy; Reynolds' Brigade on the



right, covering the approaches from Cold Harbor and Dispatch Station to Sumner's Bridge ; and Seymour's Brigade in reserve to the second line, still farther in the rear.

General P. St. George Cooke (commanding cavalry) was posted behind a hill in rear of (left of) the position and near the Chickahominy. The troops were all in position by noon, with the artillery on the commanding ground and in the intervals between the divisions and brigades. Besides the division batteries, there were Robertson's and Tidball's horse batteries from the artillery reserve, the latter posted on the right of Sykes' Division, and the former on the extreme left of the line in the valley of the Chickahominy.

Porter's report says : " Believing my force too small to defend successfully so long a line, I asked of General Barnard (Chief Engineer of the Army), who had selected and pointed out this position, to represent to the Major-General commanding the necessity of reinforcements, and he was to send me felling axes for defensive purposes." General Barnard neglected these requests. Porter and others contend that if they had been attended to, that is, if Porter had received reinforcements earlier, and had had axes to intrench his new position, the first position taken up could have been held.

Porter's report further states : " Deserters from their ranks and loyal citizens of Virginia represented that General Jackson, with 50,000 men, had joined his forces with those of A. P. Hill and D. H. Hill and Longstreet, from Richmond, and that they were advancing with the determination to overwhelm and crush the Army of the Potomac." (Lee's plan as heretofore given was, in fact, at this time being carried out.) " The dust from the immense columns of the enemy could be seen for miles, and soon our scouts and pickets warned us that they were extending over our whole front. About 2 P. M. they began with their skirmishers to feel for the weakest point of our position, and soon large bodies of infantry, supported by a warm fire of artillery, engaged our whole line. Repulsed in every direction, a few hours of ominous silence ensued, indicating that their troops were being massed for an overwhelming attack. Our infantry and artillery were drawn in towards the centre and posted to meet the avalanche. Reinforcements were again asked for and all available troops were sent forward by the Commanding General." The answers of Keyes, Heintzelman, Sumner, and Franklin, the corps commanders south of the Chickahominy, to McClellan's circular of the 26th asking how many troops they could

each spare to help Porter, and the telegrams from the same on the 27th, would seem to confirm Porter's statement. Franklin sent Slocum's Division, Sumner, French's and Maegher's brigades. Heintzelman, whose corps had been engaged on the 25th, could spare none, but sent troops to take French's and Maegher's place on Sumner's line.

Porter's report continues as follows: "About 6 o'clock the enemy renewed the attack, advancing immense bodies of infantry under cover of artillery, along the road from Cold Harbor to the Adam's House, immediately upon our right and centre, where Sykes' Division and Griffin's brigade were placed. This furious attack was successfully resisted and repulsed, but immediately renewed by fresh troops, and the reserves were pushed as rapidly as possible into the woods to the support of Griffin, whose regiments were relieved upon the expenditure of their ammunition. This and all our positions were held against the enormous odds, and the enemy were at times driven back by our battalions of fresh troops as they were successively thrown into action. At each repulse by us fresh troops were thrown by the enemy upon our exhausted forces, and in such numbers and so rapidly that it appeared as if their reserves were inexhaustible. \* \* \* The promised reinforcements (Slocum's Division) arrived just as the last of McCall's troops had been sent in to the relief of those of Morell's battalions, whose ammunition had been exhausted, or to take the place of those which had been nearly cut to pieces. Newton's Brigade of Slocum's Division, being in advance, was promptly led, regiment by regiment, to the right of Griffin's Brigade and left of Sykes' Division, into the thickest of the fight by its gallant commander, and was soon followed in the same manner by Taylor's Brigade, each regiment relieving the regiment in advance as soon as the ammunition of the latter was exhausted.

In the meantime, Sykes, hard pressed on the right, \* \* \* required support, and Bartlett's Brigade of Slocum's Division was sent to his relief. \* \* \* Previous to the arrival of Slocum's Division, Reynolds, having repulsed the enemy in his front, and hearing the tremendous contest on his left, had, acting under a true maxim and with the generous spirit of the soldier, moved to the sound of cannon, and led his men, regiment after regiment, where our hard-pressed forces required most assistance. \* \* \* As if for a final effort, just as darkness was covering everything from view, the enemy massed his fresh regiments on the right and left and threw them with overpowering force against our thinned and wearied battalions. In anticipation of this, our artillery,

which till now had been engaged at favorable points, \* \* \* or held in reserve, was now thrown to the front to cover the withdrawal of our retiring troops. The batteries already engaged continued playing on the coming horde, while the others (in all about eighty guns) successively opened as our troops withdrew from in front of their fire, and checked in some places and in others drove back the advancing masses.

All appeared to be doing well, our troops withdrawing in order to the cover of their guns, the enemy retiring, and victory, so far as possession of the field was concerned, had already settled upon our banners, when to my great surprise the artillery on the left was thrown into confusion by a charge of cavalry coming from the front. With no infantry to support, these and the other batteries limbered up and moved to the rear, some with deliberation and only after dealing destruction to the enemy, others in haste, but without confusion, leaving the battlefield with no enemy upon it. The explanation of this is that \* \* \* General Cooke, doubtless misinformed, ordered it (Fifth United States Cavalry), as I have since learned, to charge between our infantry and artillery and the enemy on our left flank. \* \* \* This charge, executed in the face of a withering fire of infantry, and in the midst of heavy cannonading, resulted, of course, in their being thrown into confusion, and the bewildered horses, regardless of the efforts of their riders, wheeled about and dashed through the batteries. \* \* \* This convinced the gunners that they were charged by the enemy. \* \* \* At this juncture the cheering shouts of French and Meagher's men were heard advancing to our support."

General Seymour, the only General with the division, reports July 15th, 1862, the action of Gaines' Mill, as follows: "The several brigades of the division, arriving successively upon the ground selected for the next point of resistance near Gaines' Mill, were formed as a reserve to Morrell's and Sykes' Divisions, already posted in battle order. The contest here may be described briefly as a struggle for the mastery of a body of woods on our front and left, the possession of which gave control of the open ground in our rear, over which passed the roads to the bridges over the Chickahominy, by which we must be supported or retire. Morrell's Division occupied these woods. Sykes' ground comparatively open to the right. This division was in rear of the woods in reserve. Reynolds' Brigade on the right, Meade's on the left, Seymour's as a reserve to the division, in rear of it. Cooper's battery was on the

right, overlooking open ground towards Cold Harbor, and the batteries of DeHart, Easton and Kerns on the left, sweeping from commanding ridges the space between the woods and the Chickahominy. The cavalry covered the main bridge still farther to the rear. The engagement commenced fiercely about 3 P. M., and such overpowering numbers were brought into action by the enemy, that it was soon necessary to send forward this division, in support of the line already engaged. Regiment after regiment advanced, relieved regiments in front, in turn withstood, checked, repelled or drove the enemy, and retired, their ammunition being exhausted, to breathe a few moments, to fill their cartridge boxes, again to return to the contested woods. Some of these regiments stood for four hours, scarcely changing position, yielding to no odds and to no diminution of their own numbers.

At times parts of the line would be driven from its ground, but only to receive aid and to drive the enemy in his turn. The woods were strewn with the heroic dead of both sides, and multitudes of wounded and dying sought every hollow affording even momentary shelter from the incessant and pitiless fire. Through such scenes, upon such ground, the Reserve Corps principally enacted its part. Several regiments were detailed from their brigades to the support of distant points; no brigade went into action entire, and it is difficult to describe connectedly the movement of any one command. Of the First Brigade, the Second Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel McCandless, was detached to the left in support of General Morrell's line. The Bucktails, First, Fifth and Eighth, went in to relieve the left of Sykes' Division and the right of Morrell's. They held their ground well and steadfast, even after four hours' work had exhausted their ammunition. The First only was relieved, retired, and after some rest subsequently advanced a second time. The Eighth, posted in support of two batteries of Sykes' Division, was advanced to relieve the Second U. S. Infantry, where it gallantly repulsed an attack of the enemy. In the Second Brigade, the Third and Fourth Regiments were also ordered forward to support the main line of battle, and the Fourth relieved Warren's Zouaves, the Third the Fourth Michigan; these both did manly service. The Fourth held the enemy in check for some time, but was compelled to fall back. The Ninth, of Seymour's Brigade came to its relief. It reformed and again returned to support the Third, still further to the left, was finally overpowered, and fell back in good order. The Third, Colonel Sickel, was engaged for two hours, losing many men. The Eleventh had been ordered to relieve an

exhausted regiment in front, and moved into line through the woods by a flank upon the right of the Fourth New Jersey, at the moment when the left of Sykes' Division was being relieved. The enemy, pressing strongly, fell upon the Eleventh, and finding it at disadvantage, surrounded it and compelled it to yield. The New Jersey (regiment) shared the same fate.

The Third Brigade, early in the day, was ordered to the extreme right, to support batteries, but the attack being developed more to the left, the Twelfth was left in support, and the Ninth and Tenth moved to the rear of the woods, into which they were soon ordered. The Ninth. Colonel Jackson, relieved the Fourth on the right of the woods at a moment when the enemy endeavored to advance; joined by parts of the Ninth Massachusetts and Sixty Second Pennsylvania, it drove him back across a field in front, thereby exposing itself to a severe fire, under which it fell back. Reforming in the woods it returned, but could not force the enemy, whose forces rapidly increased. Again it fell to the rear and again advanced with no better success. The enemy's weight was overpowering, but the Ninth took one of his colors from him. Adjutant Swearingin, doing his duty like a brave soldier, was here severely wounded. The Tenth, more employed in the support, was not so seriously engaged.

Towards evening both the right and left of the line was forced. The enemy came through in great numbers, and from the edge of the woods poured fire upon the artillery. The batteries had already played an important part. They now endeavored to drive the enemy, and opened with rapidity and precision, but could not continue successfully against the bullets of the enemy at this short range. Captain Easton, nobly encouraging and cheering his men, shouted that they should never have his guns except over his body. This gallant gentleman fell and his battery was lost with him. First Lieutenant William Stitt, of this battery, was severely wounded here. The horse of Lieutenant Dietrich was shot under him, both behaved with courage and coolness. Captain Mark Kerns was wounded early in the battle, but, in spite of the injury, kept the field, and when the enemy came down quickly upon his battery loaded and fired the last shots himself, and brought four of his guns off the field. Captain DeHart's battery did its best service. \* \* \* Captain DeHart was wounded here. Officers and men all displayed the greatest gallantry, but no efforts could repel the rush of a now successful foe, under whose fire rider and horse went down and guns lay immova-

ble upon the field. Some time here, during the confusion incident to relieving regiments, etc., General Reynolds was taken, with Captain Kingsbury, his A. A. G. No greater loss befell the division on this or any subsequent day. Supports came up about this time. The cavalry came forward, and the division fell back a few hundred yards to reform and to pass the night.

Still later, in conformity to original plans, it withdrew with the rest of the army across the Chickahominy. \* \* \* Major Baldy, of the Twelfth, behaved excellently. Adjutant McMurtrie was noted for special coolness and good conduct under fire."

Colonel Taggart, commanding Twelfth Regiment, reports July 12, 1862, as follows: "At the commencement of the battle of Gaines' Mill, on the 27th of June, the regiment under my command was ordered to support a battery of regular artillery near the centre of the field. After being in this position for two hours the regiment was ordered to support Griffin's battery, and moved to a position on the right of the field. For some time the battery was not engaged. I placed my men under cover of a hollow slope or ravine, where we rested. During the afternoon the enemy's batteries obtained a good range of our position, and we were subject to a most galling cross fire, by which we lost several killed and wounded. Toward dark, when the batteries were preparing to leave, I moved the regiment off in tolerably good order toward the road leading to Woodbury's Bridge over the Chickahominy, which I crossed after dark, and bivouaced on the flats on the opposite side. Although not actively engaged, the officers and men were exposed nearly all the time to a heavy fire of the enemy's artillery, and under the circumstances they behaved with coolness and courage. \* \* \* Casualties: five killed, thirteen wounded and eight missing." The battle of Gaines' Mill was never very clearly reported by either Union or Confederate commanders, and exact details cannot be given. The foregoing extracts, the writer believes, give a correct idea of the battle. The Twelfth Regiment having only acted as support to batteries, the writer of its history has spared his strength for other battles where it was more actively engaged.

The numbers engaged were: Union—At beginning, about 25,000; reinforcements, about 10,000. Confederate—Three grand divisions and one army, at least 70,000 muskets. Losses—Union, about 7,000; Confederate, at least 9,000.

McClellan's report of this engagement closes with the following: "Although we were finally forced from our first line after the enemy

had been repeatedly driven back, yet the objects sought for had been obtained. The enemy was held at bay. Our siege guns and material were saved, and the right wing had now joined the main body of the army. \* \* \* Diedrich's, Kneirem's and Grinn's batteries took position during the engagement in front of General Smith's line on the right bank of the stream; and, with a battery of siege guns, served by the First Connecticut Artillery, helped to drive back the enemy in front of General Porter (on his extreme left). So threatening were the movements of the enemy on both banks of the Chickahominy that it was impossible to decide, until the afternoon, where the real attack would be made. Large forces of infantry were seen during the day near the old Tavern on Franklin's right, and threatening demonstrations were frequently made along the entire line on this side of the river, which rendered it necessary to hold a considerable force in position to meet them." McClellan, as Commanding General, ought to have been at Gaines' Mill early in the day to have assisted, by his presence, the officers commanding in that battle, and in order to have determined when reinforcements were necessary, and whether they could be spared from the south bank. With modern weapons, the action moves faster than formerly; consequently, the commanding generals of brigades, divisions, corps and armies must be present in person, if possible, at the key or hard-fighting points.

McClellan's report continues: "The operation of this day proved the numerical superiority of the enemy. \* \* \* I therefore effected a junction of our forces; this probably might have been \* \* \* effected on the left bank. \* \* \* We would have been compelled to fight if concentrated on that bank. Moreover, we would at once have been followed by the enemy's forces upon the Richmond side of the river, operating on our rear, and if \* \* \* we had been defeated we would have been forced to fall back on the White House, and probably on Fort Monroe. And as both our flanks and rear would then have been exposed, our entire supply train, if not the greater part of the army itself, might have been lost. *The movements of the enemy showed that they expected this.* \* \* \* It may be asked why \* \* \* I did not at once march directly on Richmond. \* \* \* The enemy was on our rear, and there was every reason to believe he would sever our communications with the White House. We had on hand but a limited supply of rations. \* \* \* It would have required considerable time to carry the strong works around that place." McClellan's decision in

this case is supported by the fact that General Grant, with an army very much superior in numbers to the enemy's, being near the position of Gaines' Mill battlefield, made no attempt to attack Richmond from the north side of the James ; but no doubt, reluctantly, and against the feelings of the military critics at Washington, after the battle of Cold Harbor, followed in the footsteps of McClellan and made a flank movement to south side of the James. Moreover, General Grant went to a point not within the enemy's line, as did McClellan, but to one held by a Union army. While the losses of the Confederates in fighting McClellan equalled those of McClellan's army, the losses in General Grant's army, fighting Lee's inferior army, were almost as great as the entire force opposed to him.

General McClellan's report continues : " On the night of the 27th corps commanders were assembled and instructions given in regard to the flank movement to the James.

Keyes' Corps was sent across White Oak Swamp. It had crossed by noon of 28th. Orders were given to the different commanders to load their wagons with ammunition and provisions and the necessary baggage of officers and men, and to destroy all property which could not be transported with the army. Orders were also given to leave with those of the sick and wounded who could not be transported a proper complement of surgeons and attendants, with a bountiful supply of rations and medical supplies." The Confederate Surgeon-General criticises very severely some of their officers for making improper use of these supplies. Twenty-five hundred beef cattle and the trains were started on the 28th over White Oak Swamp, and moved unmolested. In fact, this flank movement of the Army of the Potomac was not suspected by the Confederates. Their cavalry followed Stoneman toward Yorktown and Jackson moved toward Williamsburg, and Lee's army lost a whole day which it never recovered. Porter's Corps left its camp near the south bank of the Chickahominy on the afternoon of the 28th, followed by the artillery reserve, guarded by the Pennsylvania Reserve Division, which latter moved at 8 P. M.; marching all night, reached the north side of the White Oak Swamp about noon on the 29th, then crossed the Swamp and went into the position about 5 P. M. that Keyes' and Porter's Corps had left. Rested here in a dry (no water) camp a short time, then resumed the march through a country destitute of drinking water. The weather being intensely hot, the suffering of the men was terrible.



About dusk the division resumed its march, and after dark came to the position of New Market Cross Roads. Here a small stream of fairly good water was found. While enjoying this refreshing water little did they dream that within twenty-four hours it would run red with their blood. During the evening the division was moved about. It was moved out the New Market Road and then back to the open ground where it had rested, the men from fatigue and heat falling down and going to sleep the instant a halt was made.

"On the morning of the 28th, while General Franklin was withdrawing his command from Golding's Farm, the enemy opened (with artillery) upon General Smith's Division from Garnett's Hill from the valley above, and from Gaines' Hill on the opposite side of the Chickahominy, and shortly afterwards two Georgia regiments attempted to carry the works about to be vacated, but this attack was repulsed by the Thirty-Third New York and Forty-Ninth Pennsylvania on picket and a section of Mott's battery. \* \* \* During the night of the 28th the Corps of Sumner and Heintzelman and Smith's Division were ordered to an interior line, the left resting on Keyes' old entrenchments, and curving to the right so as to cover Savage Station. Slocum's Division was ordered to Savage Station in reserve. This force was ordered to hold their position until dark of the 29th, in order to cover the withdrawal of the trains, and then to fall back across the White Oak Swamp and unite with the remainder of the army."

#### BATTLE OF ALLEN'S FARM, 29TH JUNE.

"General Sumner vacated his earth works at Fair Oaks June 29th at daylight, and marched his command to Orchard Station, halting at Allen's Field, between Orchard and Savage Stations. The Divisions of Richardson and Sedgwick were formed on the right of the railroad facing towards Richmond, Richardson holding the right and Sedgwick joining the right of Heintzelman's Corps. The first line of Richardson's Division was held by General French, General Caldwell supporting in the second. A log building in front of Richardson's Division was held by Colonel Brooke with one regiment (Fifty-Third Pennsylvania) with Hazzard's battery on an elevated piece of ground, a little in rear of Brooke's command. At 9 A. M. the enemy commenced a furious attack on the right of Sedgwick, but were repulsed. The left of General Richardson was next attacked, the enemy attempting in vain to carry the position of General Brooke. Captain Hazzard's battery and Parke's


battery, which afterwards replaced it, were served with great effect, while the Fifty-Third Pennsylvania kept up a steady fire on the advancing enemy, compelling them at last to retire in disorder. The enemy renewed the attack three times, but were as often repulsed. Slocum was moved early on the 29th across White Oak Swamp, and relieved Keyes, who moved on towards the James River."

#### BATTLE OF SAVAGE STATION, 29TH JUNE.

During the morning of the 29th General Franklin, hearing that the enemy had repaired the bridges over the Chickahominy, and was moving toward Savage Station, sent this information to General Sumner and moved Smith's Division to the Station. "A little after noon General Sumner united his forces with those of General Franklin and assumed command. General Heintzelman with his corps had been ordered to hold the Williamsburg road until dark at a point where there were several field works and a skirt of timber between these works and the railroad, but he fell back before night and crossed the White Oak Swamp at Brackett's Ford."

On reaching Savage Station, Sumner and Franklin's commands were drawn up in line of battle in the large field to the left of the railroad, the left resting on the edge of the woods and the right extending down the railroad. General Brooke with his brigade held the woods to the left of the field, where he did excellent service, receiving a wound but retaining his command. General Hancock's Brigade was thrown into the woods on the right and front. At 4 P. M. the enemy commenced his attack in large force by the Williamsburg Road. It was gallantly met by General Burns' Brigade, supported and reinforced by two lines in reserve, and finally by the Sixty-Ninth New York. Hazzard's and Petit's batteries again doing good service. Osborne's and Bromball's batteries also took part effectively in this action, which was continued with great obstinacy until between 8 and 9 P. M., when the enemy were driven from the field. By midnight all the troops were on the road to White Oak Swamp Bridge, General French's Brigade acting as rear guard, and at 5 A. M. on 30th all had crossed and the bridge was destroyed.





## CHAPTER VII.

---

### BATTLE OF NEW MARKET CROSS ROADS,

or Glendale, Charles City Cross Roads, Nelson's Farm, Frazier's Farm, (all of these names have been given to the battle fought near New Market Cross Roads) June 30th, 1862.

Description of the battlefield of New Market Cross Roads : Starting from the junction of the New Market and Charles City Cross Roads, the New Market Road makes a bend to the southwest and then turns northwest ; at about five hundred yards from the cross roads it turns almost at right angles to the last direction and runs southwest, continues this direction about a thousand yards, and then turning nearly west continues this direction about five hundred yards, when it turns southerly and leads off towards Richmond and the James River. Just at the last turn mentioned a branch road leads off northwestward. At the turn before the last above mentioned, a country road leads southeastward toward the Charles City (Quaker) Road, which latter it intersects just north of the Willis Methodist Church. Starting from the New Market and Charles City Cross Roads, the Charles City road leads almost northwest towards White Oak Swamp in one direction, and almost south towards the James River at Malvern Hill in the other.

The New Market Road east of the Cross Roads runs a little north of east ; this part of this road is called the Long Bridge Road. The road from White Oak Swamp, over which the greater part of the Army of the Potomac (all but Heintzelman's Corps) passed, after leaving the bridge over the swamp, runs a little west of south till it intersects the Long Bridge Road, which latter road the army followed to the New Market and Charles City Cross Roads. (Reference should be made to the map to understand fully the region under consideration.)

The whole country south of White Oak Swamp and within several miles of the New Market and Charles City Cross Roads is wooded, traversed by small streams with swampy banks, the streams running northeast to White Oak Swamp or southerly to the James River. The only openings in the woods are occasional farms. These are somewhat connected near the cross roads and thus there is so much cleared land there-

abouts that this general "clearing" or settlement has been named "Glendale." There is a "Frazier" farm near White Oak Swamp, a little south of the bridge over which the greater party of the Army of the Potomac crossed, and, judging from the Confederate reports, there must be a Frazier farm about two miles west of the cross roads. Nelson's farm is a little south of the cross roads. There is a clearing on the Quaker Road beginning two to three hundred yards south of the cross roads and extending about 500 yards westwardly from the road and half a mile southerly along the road, also extending east of the road 200 to 300 yards.

At the third bend of the New Market Road (west of the cross roads), where this road takes its west course, there is a series of fields extending north and south of this east and west course of the road. Where the road crosses them they are between 400 and 500 yards wide; to the south of the road the opening extends 400 to 500 yards; to the north of the road these openings extend half a mile or more, becoming wider in an east and west direction as they extend toward the north. A small stream, with swampy wooded shores, rises in a dense wood to the west of this open ground, crosses the New Market Road just west of this opening, then runs easterly 400 or 500 yards, where it joins a small branch coming from the north; the stream thus formed flows south and soon becomes an impassable swamp.

In passing towards the James River, early on the morning of June 30th, General McClellan notified Generals Sumner and Heintzelman that he wished them to cover the New Market and Charles City Cross Roads, from the northwest and west, until the army trains had passed that point. He seems to have given only general directions to this effect, leaving these corps commanders to use their discretion as to how it should be done. It will be noted, in this connection, that these were the senior corps commanders of the Army of the Potomac, corps commanders who had been appointed to command by the President's famous corps order. McClellan was compelled to use great caution in giving them orders, lest there might be a conflict of authority; also, it should be further noted, that a very serious misunderstanding had taken place, the day before, between Sumner and Heintzelman, the former accusing the latter of deserting him.

Some time during the night of the 29th Porter's Corps had rested near these cross roads. Porter had gone out towards Richmond on the New Market Road in the afternoon of the 29th to look over the ground for the purpose of arranging his command, the Fifth Corps and Pennsylvania

Reserve Division, for its defence, until other troops then in the rear should come up to relieve him. Upon the arrival of the advance, Meintzelman's Corps, Porter moved his own corps proper, Morrell's and Sykes' divisions, on toward the James River. About 4 P. M. on 29th, the writer (being a staff officer of Colonel Hunt, commanding the artillery reserve of the Army of the Potomac), reported to General Porter on the New Market Road, in the fields near the point where this road takes its course westward, with the German batteries of Diedrich and Knieriem. Lieutenant Randall, with his battery from the same force, reported about the same time. He was directed to report to General McCall. It is well known that General Porter failed to order McCall, who was attached to his corps, to follow his other divisions toward the James. He also failed to give these German batteries any orders.

The troops that took part in this battle and their positions at the beginning, as near as can be learned, were as follows: The bridge over which the greater part of the Union army passed White Oak Swamp was destroyed about 10 A. M. The troops posted there to defend this crossing, under the general command of General Franklin, were, at this time, Richardson's Division of Sumner's Corps and Neglee's Brigade of Peck's Division of Keyes' Corps to the left of the road facing north, Smith's Division of Franklin's Corps to the right of the road. These forces were afterwards, between 2 and 6 P. M., reinforced by Dana's and Sully's brigades of Sumner's Corps. There was only artillery firing and skirmishing at this point during the battle. Slocum's Division of Franklin's Corps was posted early in the day to the right of Charles City Road, its left resting on that road, its line facing nearly north towards White Oak Swamp; only artillery firing and infantry skirmishing along Slocum's front during the battle.

To the left of Slocum, with his right resting on or near the Charles City Road (at a point two miles from the cross roads), and his left near the New Market Road, extended Kearney's Division of Heintzelman's Corps. The Second Brigade, Birney's, on the right, extending over a space nearly two miles long from the Charles City Road to Robinson's Brigade, posted on Birney's left. There was only artillery firing and infantry skirmishing on Birney's front during the battle. During the day the Fifth Michigan, of Berry's Brigade, was sent to Birney's support. Robinson's (First) Brigade, of Kearney's Division, rested its left near the New Market Road, near the point where this road makes its right angle bend to the southwest, five or six hundred yards from the

cross roads. Thompson's battery "H," First United States Artillery, was posted on its left; Twentieth Indiana on the right, in a hastily-made breastwork, Fifty-Seventh Pennsylvania in the centre, Sixty-Third Pennsylvania on the left, One Hundred and Fifth Pennsylvania in reserve. Robinson's Brigade was supported at different times during the action by regiments from Berry's, Birney's and Caldwell's Brigades, and late at night by Taylor's Brigade.

To the left and front of Kearney's Division, across the New Market Road, 1,200 to 1,500 yards from the cross roads, was posted McCall's Division as follows: On the right, Randol's battery, six light twelve-pounders, about 300 yards from the New Market Road; immediately to the right of the Road was posted Kerns' battery "G," First Pennsylvania Artillery, four ten-pounder rifles, under command of Lieutenant Amsden (Captain Kerns was wounded at Gaines Mill); immediately to the left of the New Market Road was posted Cooper's battery "B," First Pennsylvania Artillery (six ten-pounder parrots); about 300 yards to the left of the road were posted Diedrich's and Knieriem's German batteries (eight twenty-pounder rifles); extending in a line of battle behind and nearly parallel to the line of batteries were the Second and Third Brigades of Pennsylvania Reserves; in rear of these was posted the First Brigade in reserve. General Meade commanding the Second Brigade, Colonel Simmons, of the Fifth, the First Brigade, and General Seymour the Third Brigade. The regiments of the Second Brigade were posted as follows: The Fourth on the right; the Seventh, with remnant of the Eleventh, on left of Fourth; the First, Colonel Roberts, on skirmish line. The regiments of the Third Brigade: Ninth on the right, Tenth on its left, Twelfth on left of Tenth and forming the left of the Division (Sixth Regiment absent). The regiments of First Brigade: First Rifles (five companies) on the right, Second on left of Rifles, Fifth on left of Second, Eighth on left of the Brigade, Third (Col. Sickel) on skirmish, Fourth Pennsylvania Cavalry, Colonel Childs, to the left rear of McCall's Division.

Five hundred to 600 yards to the left rear of McCall's Division was posted the right of Hooker's Division of Heintzelman's Corps, its right (Grover's Brigade) resting on the country road which leads from the New Market Road to Quaker Road. The regiments of his right brigade (Grover's) posted as follows: Sixteenth Massachusetts on the right, its right on the country road, its line extending perpendicularly to the left from this road; Twenty-sixth Indiana on line with and to left of Six-



teenth Massachusetts; Eleventh Massachusetts sent to extreme left of (division) line; First Massachusetts on the right, Second New Hampshire on its left, both in reserve to Sixteenth Massachusetts and Twenty-Sixth Indiana. Sickles' Brigade of Hooker's Division was extended in line on the left of Grover's Brigade. Carr's Brigade of Hooker's Division held in reserve. All artillery of Hooker's Division was sent to James River before the battle.

Sedgwick's Division of Sumner's Corps was posted in the morning on the Quaker Road, about half way between the cross roads and Willis Church, in the opening heretofore described. In the action of the afternoon "Kirby's battery was placed upon a knoll on the left of the division and west of the road." "Tomkins' battery on a knoll on the west of the road, and in rear of the centre of the division, his caissons were placed on the east side of the road, the fence being leveled between them and the guns" (Quaker Road supposed to be meant). Kirby says: "Toward night was placed in position in rear of our troops  
\* \* \* Enemy did not approach within 500 yards of my position."

The Confederate general, Longstreet, in command of his own and A. P. Hill's Division, had brought up these divisions to a point about three miles west of New Market and Charles City Cross Roads on the evening of June 29, Longstreet's Division leading.

During the morning of the 30th he sent out Jenkins' Brigade to find out the position of the Union troops. This duty Jenkins evidently did very well. Longstreet says: "My own division was put in position for attack or defence at once. Ordered forward Branch's Brigade of Hill's Division to support my right flank, the rest of Hill's Division being left for the time on the road to secure the right or to move up to support the front."

It will be seen (especially by examining the map) that there was a dangerous interval between McCall's left and Hooker's right, also that there was not a good connection between McCall's right and Kearney's left. These two weak points on the general line of defence of the cross roads were the cause of all the trouble on the Union side during the action, and of the unhappy controversy which began about 4 p. m., June 30, 1862, and which remains still unsettled. This matter will be further discussed after the description of the movements of the troops on both sides. It was not the intention of the Union Commander to take the offensive at this point, although General Longstreet seems to have apprehended something of the kind. Longstreet waited until he heard

General Huger's guns, on the Charles City Road, open before he started his attack. He first threw forward Jenkins' (R. H. Anderson's) Brigade to skirmish and reach up to the Union line of battle. The skirmishers of this brigade no doubt reached up to the west side of the open ground in front of McCall's and Kearney's divisions, and from their reports Longstreet gave his instructions for the attack. He probably learned of the irregular connection of Kearney's left and McCall's right, also that McCall's left "was in the air." Also that dense woods reached close to McCall's left, whilst a large open field extended in front of McCall's right.

His first attack was arranged with Kemper's Brigade on his right of the New Market Road, Jenkins' Brigade "straddling" the road, and Picket's Brigade on Jenkins' left, a large part of Jenkins' Brigade acting as skirmishers to the whole line. About 4 P. M. Longstreet says he started his infantry attack. Before, for an hour or more, whilst Jenkins was skirmishing forward, he caused his batteries to open upon McCall's line, to which he says McCall's batteries "replied viciously." To meet this first attack of Longstreet it will be well to see what McCall, who is to bear the brunt of it, has done. McCall says: "He had a beautiful battlefield," which means, of course, that he was satisfied with it; "but it was too extensive for his force (of say 5,600)."

In the first place, it is evident from the actions of himself, Meade and Seymour that they expected the attack to begin on their right, and probably to be principally from that direction during the day. The enemy was coming generally from that direction. His artillery began firing first in that direction, and firing was heavy all the morning in the direction of White Oak Swamp. McCall, Meade and Seymour all went over to the right of the division line of battle and arranged with General Kearney for a connection between the divisions. But all seemed to have overlooked the danger on McCall's left, except that McCall ordered his left regiments refused, until late in the day (too late to save the left). When Seymour began making some effort at strengthening the left, this effort was evidently made with the expectation that there would be ample time after the battle opened on the right to complete it. It so happened it was a misfortune that Seymour made this attempt, for by it he detached a part of his command just as the enemy's assault reached his front.

The position of Thompson's battery was changed several times, and finally, as he says, it was echeloned forward on its left piece in order to

reach the enemy. It is believed, from the conformation of the ground and the Confederate reports, that all the Confederate attacks, except Featherstone's and Gregg's, against Robinson's front were made in an oblique direction coming from Robinson's left front, a very advantageous position for his brigade, the enemy having to pass diagonally across McCall's right in order to reach Robinson's Brigade.

McCall placed his Third Brigade with its left refused, the Tenth and Twelfth Regiments facing southwest, but the German batteries facing west.

General Seymour took six companies of the Twelfth Regiment and advanced to the Whitlock House, two to three hundred yards to his left front, and the men of these companies were in the midst of forming a barricade when Kemper's Brigade, driving the Union skirmishers before it, burst upon them. The other four companies of the Twelfth Regiment were in rear of the German batteries to support them. Early in the afternoon McCall had sent the First Regiment, Colonel Roberts, to picket the New Market Road and the ground to the right of it, and the Third Regiment, Colonel Sickel, to picket to the left of this road. Roberts appears to have seen Kemper's advance, and felt Jenkins' skirmishers, and very judiciously called in his regiment and joined the Second Brigade.

On the left of the road Sickel's men, who were holding the east side of the Hobson opening, checked Jenkins' skirmishers, and made such resistance to Kemper's advance in line that Kemper's men, as he (Kemper) says, thought they had the Union line of battle in their front, and the brigade charged the skirmish line, of course driving it in. The Union skirmishers were forced back by such overwhelming numbers, and passed through the interval between McCall and Hooker, and some over on General Sickles' Brigade.

Kemper, commanding Longstreet's First Brigade, describes his, the first attack of the Confederates, as follows: "Formed brigade on right and nearly perpendicular to the road"—New Market Road—"leading through Frazier's Farm, one regiment of the Second Brigade (Jenkins') between my right and the road, Seventeenth Virginia occupying the right, Twenty-Fourth Virginia the left, First Virginia the centre, Eleventh Virginia right centre, Seventh Virginia left centre. Posted Rogers' four guns on eminence near my right, and threw back right regiment. At 5 P. M. advanced right regiment to front line and advanced brigade, being the extreme right of general line of battle.

\* \* \* The advance continued to be conducted in good order until, very soon coming upon the pickets of the enemy and driving them in, the men seemed to be possessed of the idea that they were upon the enemy's main line, and in an instant the whole brigade charged forward in double-quick time, and with loud cheers ; the cheering of the men only seemed to direct the fire of the enemy's batteries, and the movement in double-quick time through dense woods crossed by a swamp produced more or less confusion ; \* \* \* but a single idea controlled the minds of the men, which was to reach the enemy's line by the directest route and in the shortest time, and no earthly power could have availed to arrest or restrain the impetuosity with which they rushed toward the foe. \* \* \*

After advancing some twelve hundred yards across two fields and some woods, the line suddenly emerged into another field, facing a battery of the enemy, consisting of not less than eight pieces, distant but a few hundred yards, while the enemy's infantry were formed, protected by an imperfect and hastily-constructed breastwork and a house near by ; another battery of the enemy considerably to our left. These two batteries and the enemy's infantry poured an incessant fire of shell, grape, canister and lead upon my lines, and did much execution. \* \* \* When the command came upon the enemy's batteries there was no perceptible faltering in the advance of these brave men, who rushed across the open field, pouring a well-directed fire into the enemy, driving him from his breastworks and the battery in our front. The guns of the battery were abandoned to us for the time being, and my command was in virtual possession of the chosen position of the enemy. \* \* \*

The left of my line was entirely unsupported. \* \* \* I had supposed that the movement of my brigade was part of a general advance of our entire lines ; up to this time no firing was heard upon my left, except the firing of the enemy. \* \* \* At the time when my command had obtained virtual possession of the enemy's position, no Confederate troops were anywhere visible except my own. It now became evident that the position sought to be held by my command was wholly untenable by them unless largely and immediately reinforced. The inferior numbers, which had alarmed the enemy and driven him from his breastworks and batteries, soon became apparent to him, and he at once proceeded to make use of his advantage. While greatly superior numbers hung upon our front, considerable bodies of the enemy

were thrown upon both flanks of my command, which was now in imminent danger of being captured or wholly destroyed. Already they were capturing officers and men at different points of my line. \* \* \* No reinforcements appearing, \* \* \* the necessity of withdrawing was submitted to. \* \* \* Soon after my command was overpowered, and, before all of it had fallen back, General Branch's Brigade was found coming up, and General Branch was shown by me into the position which my gallant men had vainly sought to hold, \* \* \* and immediately afterwards the Third Brigade, Hunton commanding, took position on Branch's right."

It is evident that Kemper's Brigade began the battle; its movements, as described by Kemper, showed that its left carried the breastworks which the six companies of the Twelfth Regiment were constructing. These companies of the Twelfth Regiment were in no shape to meet such a sudden assault. Some of the men had laid down their guns to collect rails and such like articles to construct the breastwork. It is evident that neither General Seymour nor any other Union commanding officer expected this sudden and overwhelming assault at this point at this time. The men were not only in the described unready condition to meet it, but the batteries in their rear could not open on the enemy until the men of the Twelfth Regiment got back from in front of the batteries.

Moreover, the Union skirmishers came running in ahead of this attacking force. This attack was to all intents and purposes, so far as the Twelfth Regiment was concerned, a surprise, for which its commanding officers should be held responsible. This successful assault of Kemper's Brigade carried the officers and men of these six companies (except those killed, wounded or captured) of the Twelfth Regiment, and probably the colonel commanding the regiment and the general commanding the Third Brigade, the caissons of the German batteries, also many non-combatants, as well as some of the skirmishers of the Third Regiment, back past the right of Hooker's Division and toward the open ground on General Sumner's front. As there were no Union troops to stop the centre and right of Kemper's Brigade on the left of McCall (there being an interval of 500 to 600 yards between him and Hooker), these Confederates pushed on until they struck the front of Grover's Brigade and Sixty-Ninth Pennsylvania, Colonel Owen, of Sedgwick's Division, on right of Hooker's Division, and the fire of Sumner's batteries, to right rear of Hooker's Division. Hooker, Grover, Sumner,

and other commanding generals stationed in the left rear of McCall's Division, seeing such numbers and such a variety of fugitives, were somewhat justified, at the first impulse, in thinking McCall's entire division had been overwhelmed.

But, as Kemper states, such was by no means the case, for almost immediately after Kemper's men ran through McCall's unprepared left, McCall organized an attack on Kemper's left rear (it is believed the greater part of Jenkins' Brigade, as skirmishers advanced with Kemper). This counter attack of McCall's consisted of the Ninth Regiment, Colonel Jackson; Tenth, Colonel Kirk, in front line, supported by the Fifth, Lieutenant-Colonel Fisher, and Eighth, Colonel Hays, in second line, all commanded by Colonel Simmons, of Fifth. This force advanced to the Union left of the New Market Road, and at first drove back the enemy's rear, being part of Kemper's and Jenkins' Brigades, capturing many prisoners and several flags. Whilst thus engaged with Kemper's and Jenkins' men, Branch's Brigade of A. P. Hill's Division, advancing to cover Kemper's right (having been detached for such purpose from Hill's Division), is led in, as heretofore mentioned by Kemper, and struck these Union regiments whilst they were in the disarray of a successful advance. The reserve regiments were compelled to retire with their prisoners (of course losing some). As they fell back to the open ground their losses became so heavy they retreated in some confusion toward the position from whence they had started. The wounded men, who could walk, of these charging regiments, and other men escorting prisoners, passed to the rear, to the right of Hooker's Division, thus giving a second alarm to the generals commanding in rear, and a second report that McCall's Division had been overwhelmed.

The Union batteries could give Simmons' men no assistance till they had recrossed the field in front of the batteries, but General McCall, hearing the renewed firing in the woods in his left front, and foreseeing the danger to Colonel Simmons' command, hastily moved the First Rifles, Major Stone, and the Second Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel McCandless, forward to the edge of the woods beyond the open ground, on his left of the road. These two regiments laid down and allowed Simmons' command to retreat over them. As soon as their friends had passed, Stone's and McCandless' men opened fire on the enemy and repulsed him.

There being nothing on their right to oppose them, this part of Branch's Brigade advanced down the country road till it met Hooker's

right, but the left of Branch's Brigade fell back in confusion through Picket's (Third) Brigade, which was now advancing over the same ground which Kemper's, part of Jenkins' and Branch's Brigades had already passed over. A portion of Picket's men moved on towards Hooker's right and Sumner's front, another part attacked the batteries on the Union left of the road, and probably caused the German drivers and cannoneers, with two of their guns, to move hastily to the rear, and the four companies of the Twelfth Regiment supporting these guns to retreat (the men of these companies accused the drivers of the German batteries of running them down), partly toward the rear and partly toward the part of McCall's Division which remained intact.

The woods on the Confederate side of the battlefield, in front of McCall, was, at this time, filled with men from the Confederate brigades, which had already advanced, and infantry firing from this woods was severe. As Picket's advance was made along on either side of the road, Prior's Brigade of Longstreet's Division, advancing, as Prior says, one regiment at a time, to the left (Confederate left) of the road, assaulted the right of McCall's Division and Robinson's Brigade of Kearney's Division. This was probably between 5 and 6 P. M., and thus, about this hour, severe fighting extended throughout Robinson's and McCall's front and desultory fighting on right of Hooker's Division. Robinson's Brigade not only repulsed all attacks on his front at this time, but some of his men followed the enemy back to his side of the field and held a portion of his woods until the next advance of the Confederates.

This first general attack by Longstreet's Division, assisted by Branch's Brigade of Hills Division, although persistent and courageously conducted, not being made connectedly from right to left, was successful only in carrying the German batteries and in breaking McCall's extreme left and alarming Hooker, Burns and some other officers in the rear.

Having thus, at 6 P. M., failed to carry either McCall's or Kearney's main line, Longstreet starts his second and better ordered advance. Wilcox's Brigade on the right, part of Prior's in the centre and Featherstone's on the left. The whole line was posted to the (Confederate) left of the road at the beginning of the advance. Wilcox's report says: "He was ordered first to touch to right (Picket), then to left (Prior), and finally to go straight ahead; was guided in the woods by the artillery fire of the enemy; soon found the two regiments on right

and two on left of Long Bridge (New Market) road; crossed a boggy stream on right of road under artillery fire; woods very dense; came to a field on the left of the road; the enemy's infantry in the woods on the left of this field. He opened a brisk and close fire upon the left regiment of my line (Eighth Alabama); it halted and began firing.

In this field, about 300 yards to the front and 100 yards to the left of the road was a house, and beyond the house about 200 yards more was a six-gun battery of the enemy; the battery had an open field of fire, the ground in front being perfectly level; the Eighth Alabama being engaged with the enemy, the Eleventh Alabama, the regiment next to it, continued to advance and, entering upon the open field, came within full view of the six-gun battery on this side (the left) of the road. This battery began at once a rapid discharge of grape and canister upon this regiment; it did not halt an instant, but continued to advance steadily and rapidly and without firing until it approached within 200 yards of the battery, when it gave loud cheers and made a rush for the guns; halting for an instant in front of it, they fire upon the battery and infantry immediately in rear of it, and then make a successful charge upon and take the battery. The enemy's infantry are in the woods in heavy force beyond, and 200 yards distant, and in the woods skirting the field to the left of the battery, and not so far, and here in like manner in strong force. The enemy have a direct and flank fire upon this regiment now at the battery.

The two regiments on the right of the road continued steadily to advance through the woods which extended along the road side to within one hundred yards of the second six-gun battery, this battery being nearly opposite to the one on the left of the road and some two hundred yards from it. Halting for a few minutes in the woods fronting this battery, to deliver their fire, these regiments, Ninth and Tenth Alabama, charge upon and take this also, the enemy's infantry supports being driven back. Both these batteries were now in our possession. \* \* \* The taking of the battery on the right of the road was not attended by such a bloody strife as followed the assault and capture of the one on the left, for here the enemy had not the heavy pine forests so close in rear and on one flank in which he could retire, reform and renew the conflict with renewed numbers. On the contrary, the pine was in our possession and our men, under cover of it, were within one hundred yards of and in front of the battery, the field extending far off to our right and the timber in rear of the battery



being more distant. Other brigades, too, (portions of Kemper's, Branch's, Picket's and Jenkins') were on our right engaging the enemy, but none on our left and near the batteries. The battery on the left of the road was the first taken. The Eleventh Alabama had experienced severe loss in crossing the open field while advancing against this battery. Here the enemy, at first repulsed and driven from the battery, retire to the woods both on our left and in the rear of the battery, and with superior numbers, deliver a terrible and destructive fire upon this regiment. \* \* \* The latter" (the Fourth and Seventh Reserves) "seeing this regiment isolated and unsupported, now advanced from their cover against it. Our men do not flee from their prize, so nobly and so bravely won, overwhelmed by superior numbers, but, with a determination and a courage unsurpassed, they stubbornly hold their ground, men and officers alike engaging in the most desperate personal conflicts with the enemy; the sword and bayonet are freely used. \* \* \* No reinforcements come, and they are at length forced to yield and retire to the pine woods on the right of the road, and in rear some 150 to 200 yards, the enemy not pursuing. \* \* \* The Eleventh Alabama retired, as above stated, to the right of the road in the pine woods and there, together with the Ninth and Tenth Alabama, remained." (The Ninth and Tenth Alabama had also been compelled to relinquish possession of the battery, Cooper's, on the right of the road by the Ninth Reserves.) "From this position the battery on the right of the road was in full view and not more than 100 yards distant. The enemy made no effort to retake (re-hold) this battery, though their infantry continued to fire at long range upon our men in the woods. The Eighth Alabama joined Prior's and Featherstone's brigades. \* \* \* It was now sunset, \* \* \* the brigade was withdrawn." Prior says: "Ordered in at 4 P. M., but the woods and other obstructions forced me to form columns and to send in my regiments successively. \* \* \* Arriving on the field, discovered that the brigade (Wilcox's) on my right had been repulsed, and that my brigade was exposed to a destructive fire on my flank as well as in front. Stood their ground until relieved by Gregg's Brigade. \* \* \* In this engagement my loss was enormously heavy." Featherstone says: "Brigade was held in reserve at first, but about 5 P. M. ordered to attack on left of Longstreet, left of Prior; was afraid of my left; advanced to the front lines to or near a fence at the edge of the field; here opened on the enemy, and the enemy poured a well directed fire into our ranks and seemed not to be giving

way but inclined to advance ; \* \* \* feared a charge, was wounded, but was being relieved by Gregg."

To resist this magnificent assault of the remainder of Longstreet's Division McCall had only his crippled division, which at this time had already received its principal losses of the day.

The recapture of Cooper's and Randol's batteries after the terrible losses the Reserve Division had received, was an instance of heroism not often repeated during the war.

As at this time the Reserves had fired almost their last cartridges, these batteries were retaken principally with the bayonet, the only recorded instance of the kind during the war. McCall justly grows more eloquent than Wilcox over the struggle for Randol's Battery. To meet this assault on Robinson's front Kearney sends the One Hundred and Fifth Pennsylvania to the front line, the First New York to support Thompson's Battery, Second Michigan to the front line in the Twentieth Indiana's breastworks, and the Third Michigan to Birney's left. These reinforcements to Robinson's front line gave it such a volume of fire as to enable it to repulse Prior's and Featherstone's brigades.

General Kearney's report says: "There was now (7:30 P. M.) a lull in the fighting, the enemy being (having) failed on the New Market Road, he expected an attack on the Charles City Road, and went there: was gone forty minutes."

An exciting state of affairs took place in Kearney's absence. Longstreet now (just at dusk) threw in the whole of A. P. Hill's Division, with Field's Brigade on his right. The Fifty-Fifth and Sixtieth Virginias of this brigade on (Confederate) right of the road, and Fortieth and Forty-Seventh Virginia of this brigade on the left of the road. Pender's Brigade followed Field's. Gregg's supporting Featherstone's on the Confederate left, Archer's Brigade going to the right, and Anderson's coming on as a final reserve. Five of the strongest brigades of the best troops, and the very ablest Confederate generals to lead them.

What has the Union front line to oppose to this torrent of valor?

McCall's Division, disorganized by its terrible losses, all its batteries disabled and short of ammunition, (Kern's withdrawn, its caissons having by mistake gone on with Fifth Corps, it had none), but its line still bravely held by a handful of infantry with scarcely a round of ammunition to a man. But one says, Kearney's Division line is still complete. If Kearney had been there it would have been, but the instant he left to examine the right of his line Thompson, thinking

more of the safety of his guns than of his division line of battle, hastily withdraws his battery, so hastily as to leave one gun behind, and sad to say of a division chief of artillery, he sent no guns to take his place. Almost fatal interval. Lieutenant Jastram hurries two guns into Thompson's position, but only in time to lose one of them. Kearney's line can only be reinforced by the Thirty-Seventh New York and Fifth Michigan.

However, there is a reserve to this front line which may well give a homely but striking sobriquet to a noble old soldier. "Bull" Sumner is at the Cross Roads.

It will be remembered that the infantry of Sedgwick's Division of Sumner's Corps had early in the day marched up to and beyond the Cross Roads, stopping on the Quaker Road about half way from the Cross Roads to Willis Church. About 2 P. M., upon call for assistance from Franklin, Sumner, always ready to help a fight, sent off Sully's and Dana's brigades to Franklin at White Oak Swamp Crossing. The understanding between Sumner and Heintzelman evidently was that Heintzelman should post his corps across the the New Market and Charles City Roads and Sumner would support him, wherefore Sumner took no part in posting the troops to cover the roads toward Richmond. Sumner was to hold the cross roads, and help either Franklin or Heintzelman, or both, as might become necessary. Thus, when the fight opens in front of McCall, Sumner has only Burns' Brigade with him. His batteries, except one, appear to have remained with Franklin till sent for late in the day. Hooker, in looking to his right, having found the long interval between himself and McCall, instead of moving to his right and connecting with McCall, extends his division way off to the left, and permits his batteries to go off to James River. But he calls on Sumner to weaken still more his meagre reserve by asking for the Sixty-Ninth Pennsylvania, of Burns' Brigade, to be put on his right. Sumner gives Hooker the Sixty-Ninth Pennsylvania rather than have it said he refused a reinforcement. Thus, it will be seen, Burns has only the Seventy-First, Seventy-Second and One Hundred and Sixth Pennsylvania and a battery to cover a large interval which neither he nor Sumner understood.

As we have seen, the first assault of the Confederates carried Kemper's Brigade to the left of McCall, and unfortunately carried in front of it six companies of Twelfth Reserves, part of Third Reserves, non-combatants, etc. Things thus early in the action did look uncomfortable on

the Quaker Road for a little while, and some of the generals there lost their heads, which they did not appear to recover during the entire afternoon and evening. Sumner soon saw, as he says, "that this crowd was composed only of a few soldiers and some stragglers." He sends for Sully's and Dana's brigades and for Kirby's and his other batteries, although Kemper's advance was easily checked by the Sixteenth Massachusetts and Sixty-Ninth Pennsylvania and a battery of Sumner's Corps. When this last Confederate assault reached the Union front line Dana's and Sully's brigades had arrived near the cross roads. Field, commanding Hill's leading brigade, says: "It was late on the evening of the 30th when I was notified to move upon the field of battle. \* \* \* About 300 yards in front were two of the enemy's batteries posted in an open field on right and left of the road; heard that these batteries had been *several times taken and retaken* during the day, a constant struggle being maintained for their possession. At this time (sundown) they were held by the enemy, but the horses were killed or wounded. He (the enemy) was unable to remove the guns. \* \* \* The whole line rushed forward under heavy fire, beat the enemy back from the guns into the woods beyond and pushed him on the right of the road back a half mile. The two regiments on this side (right) of the road, Fifty-Fifth and Sixtieth Virginias, were at this time in the enemy's rear, having penetrated through the centre, but were withdrawn before he could profit by the circumstance. \* \* \* The charge was impetuously made and was an instance where bayonets were really crossed." (No regiments on Union side, except Pennsylvania Reserves, claim to have crossed bayonets over guns.)

"Fortieth Virginia, on my extreme left, became detached. \* \* \* The Forty-Seventh Virginia manned the guns on the left of the road and fired them. \* \* \* Forty-Seventh Virginia captured General McCall late in evening."

Colonel Mayo, Forty-Seventh Virginia, says: "Were called on with brigade to advance on two batteries which had been taken by Longstreet's Division, but which had been recaptured. \* \* \* The Forty-Seventh Virginia, with the Second Virginia (Fortieth Virginia) battalion, were ordered to advance upon the battery on the left of the road, which they did, charging immediately in front and exposed to a raking fire of grape and canister for three-quarters of a mile; \* \* \* fired on and charged and drove off the cannoners, followed about fifty yards beyond, when were opened on upon both flanks, halted, one of the guns was

turned and fired to our left, where the firing was hottest. \* \* \* The fire from the front having nearly ceased, while that on the right and left still continued, \* \* \* formed command on the road." (Fell back to the road.)

Colonel Mallory, Fifty-Fifth Virginia, says: "We were formed in line of battle on the right of the road, Sixtieth Virginia on my left. We advanced through the woods until we came to the brow of the hill, where was a battery recently taken from the enemy. The brigade (Wilcox's) which had taken it had disappeared, and the enemy had advanced to within a few yards of the battery. We halted, fired a few volleys and charged, driving the enemy about one mile in the woods, where we halted to reform; finding enemy about to flank us we fell back to the edge of the woods; rested here till guns were carried off." Colonel Starke, Sixtieth Virginia, says: "Regiment advanced at double quick nearly two miles to the brow of a hill, where a battery of eight guns, Randol's Pennsylvania battery" (guns on McCall's left) "was posted, which had been taken from the enemy, and by them recaptured before we reached the ground. \* \* \* Joined Fifty-Fifth Virginia in charge. \* \* \* After driving them for half a mile beyond this point (the batteries) the brigade was ordered to halt, where we remained for half an hour, it being then quite dark; the enemy not again appearing, the regiment returned to the battery."

Penders' Brigade, following Field's, "reached the batteries abandoned on his left of the road," but late in evening met some of the Union reinforcements, pushed forward late in evening by Sumner and Kearney. Gregg's Brigade advanced to Confederate left. Colonel McGowan, of Gregg's Brigade (there is no brigade report), Fourteenth South Carolina, says: "Threw out skirmishers and advanced to the left and front; found General Featherstone wounded; enemy's skirmishers all about; came upon a hasty breastwork of the enemy, drove back his skirmishers, halted at edge of the clearing and kept up for a time volume of fire on the enemy, who returned it; just at dark both sides evidently thought were firing at friends. An officer of Twentieth Indiana (Captain Read) came into our line during this cessation of firing. \* \* \* Soon after heard enemy give order commence firing. \* \* \* Took twenty prisoners: H. Patrick, Company B, Twelfth Reserves; F. Harvey Fortieth New York; others mostly of Twentieth Indiana."

McGowan's were the skirmishers Kearney "came upon," as he says, "as he came back to his left." There is no report of Archer's

Brigade, but Pender says: "At this position (position of the batteries) I left a few men to hold the flank (right flank), and pushed forward the rest into the woods; but for failure of ammunition would have taken many prisoners" (same trouble on Union side); "enemy in disorder, but in considerable numbers. We here forced a battery, which had opened on our right, to leave;" (could this have been De Russy's battery?); "dark coming on, withdrew to edge of the woods, holding ground and batteries taken; got some of Field's Brigade to hold batteries in front whilst I held the right flank. Subsequently led forward one of Field's regiments, so as to flank enemy on left of the road, where firing was going on; after making these arrangements found Archer was on my right flank and right."

J. R. Anderson's Brigade, led in late in the evening on Robinson's front, "received a sudden volley and scattered."

It is impossible to give the exact positions of the various Union regiments which were brought up to meet this last Confederate assault to reinforce Kearney's Division and to close the interval on McCall's left and left rear.

No Confederate commander states that he moved down the New Market Road between Randol's and Cooper's batteries; each commander who reaches these batteries states distinctly that his command went to the right or left of this road at this point. There was no Confederate advance to their left of this road more than a few yards east of Robinson's original line. None reached the Charles City Road here.

It would appear that until Field's attack, late in the evening, McCall's Division held the woods on McCall's left rear to the open field on this left rear; that all the Confederate troops who passed McCall's left kept to the left (their right) of this opening; they were stopped at this west edge of the opening by Sumner's batteries, and farther to the Union left by the Sixty-Ninth Pennsylvania and Sixteenth Massachusetts. But Field's attack drove back the feeble force McCall's Division could offer at this time at this point, which enabled Field to follow through the woods down nearly to the cross roads, getting literally in rear of McCall. Some of Pender's men followed Field's in this direction.

To meet A. P. Hill's assault the Union line in rear of McCall was posted or arranged about as follows: Hooker's right on the country road, Sixteenth Massachusetts on road, to right of this road, in edge of woods, Sixty-Ninth Pennsylvania; then an interval of 200 to 300 yards, being an open field with battery in rear; then a battery supported by the

Seventy-First Pennsylvania; then an interval of 200 to 300 yards, with battery in rear; then the Seventy-Second Pennsylvania pushed forward into the woods in rear of McCall's left, One Hundred and Sixth Pennsylvania, in rear of Sixty-Ninth Pennsylvania, in reserve. Field here probably struck Seventy-Second Pennsylvania, Colonel Baxter, first; Seventy-First moved to Baxter's assistance, and One Hundred and Sixth Pennsylvania, Colonel Morehead, started to aid Baxter, when Dana's Brigade (Nineteenth and Twentieth Massachusetts, Seventh Michigan and Forty-Second New York) arrived. Three of Dana's regiments, Twentieth Massachusetts, Seventh Michigan and Forty-Second New York, under Colonel Lee, were in advance; the Seventh Michigan and Forty-Second New York were taken in flank as they arrived at double quick, and were repulsed; the Seventy-First Pennsylvania and Nineteenth Massachusetts were hurried into the interval just left.

Dana, is trying to fill the interval from Baxter's left to right of Sixty-Ninth Pennsylvania, Sully's Brigade follows immediately; Fifteenth Massachusetts, Eighty-Second and Thirty-Fourth New York are brought up to support this line; Eighty-Second and Thirty-Fourth New York well to the right; the First Minnesota is first halted to support a battery, but is afterwards brought up to the line in the woods. Meagher's Brigade is advanced to Sumner's right, and to right rear of line first formed; thus the whole of Dana's, Sully's and Meagher's brigades is sent to reinforce Burns' Brigade. Caldwell's Brigade arrives soon after these brigades, and somewhat more to the right. Barlow, of this brigade, appears to have sought the firing, and thus found Robinson's front, where he arrived most opportunely to relieve Hays. The remainder of Caldwell's Brigade appears to have halted at the Cross Roads, where Kearney found it just after dark, and pushed it into Robinson's right. Kearney's line had not been broken, but was forced slightly back on its left by reason of the "Thompson" interval. Kearney re-established it after dark, and when Taylor's Brigade of Slocum's Division reported to Kearney, the latter pushed Taylor out to Robinson's old front and to Randol's battery.

Sumner, after his line was firmly established, finding no more pressure upon it, ordered it advanced, and moved it out to the left part of McCall's front line. His line, on account of darkness, moved out in a confused manner. The Twentieth Massachusetts appears to have passed over the German guns and met the Confederates on their side of McCall's battlefield; here received a volley or two, when the regiment

returned to the Quaker Road. Field's Brigade soon afterwards reoccupied the ground where these and Cooper's guns stood. The Sixteenth Massachusetts and Sixty-Ninth Pennsylvania advanced up the country road to their front, to McCall's battlefield, met about the same reception as the Twentieth Massachusetts, and then returned to their old position. The official reports show that no Union troops were under fire more than a few minutes, and that about sunset, except McCall's Division, two brigades of Kearney's Division, two regiments of Grover's Brigade of Hooker's Division, and Sixty-Ninth Pennsylvania of Burns' Brigade. About the heaviest loss in any of the reinforcing regiments was in the Twentieth Massachusetts, whose loss was partially due to the giving away of part of the brigade to which it belonged.

Sumner and Kearney re-established the front line in part, and made a strong line across the interval between McCall's and Hooker's positions. The responsibility for leaving this interval should rest upon Heintzelman and Hooker, who knew of its existence, yet took no steps to fill it. Heintzelman appears to have directed in person the posting of the front line of defence. This battle, with the exception of the loss of guns (artillery), was a great success for the Union arms, and many Union officers claim that most of these guns could have been brought off if General Heintzelman had not ordered them left, he fearing, he said, to bring on a renewal of the contest. These guns lay between the lines until the Union troops retired. The Confederate losses far exceeded the Union, and two of the strongest and best Confederate divisions were so used up as to be unavailable in the engagement of the next day, whereas Heintzelman's and Sumner's corps were intact in the next battle.

The six companies of the Twelfth Regiment, which were preparing a breastwork two to three hundred yards in front of the left of McCall's line of battle, were overrun and necessarily broken and carried back by the rush of Kemper's Brigade and Jenkins' Brigade skirmishers. The men of the Twelfth Regiment would have been overrun if they had been prepared to meet such an attack, as the woods in front was less than a hundred yards off, and so thick the advancing enemy could not be seen until he came out of the woods. Moreover, the batteries in their rear could be of no assistance in the position in which these companies were. The officers and men of these six companies of the Twelfth Regiment who remained to the last were able to fire not more than two to three times, and were then killed, wounded or taken pris-



oners. When we consider that Wilcox, with no larger force, coming from this woods, carried Cooper's battery on its front whilst it was supported by infantry, the Confederates having a longer distance to pass over in the open field before reaching Cooper's battery than they had to overrun the position of the detached companies of the Twelfth Regiment, we can see there was no chance for this small force of the Twelfth Regiment to hold their position. It was a case of retreat or become prisoners. It was a mistake placing so small a force detached, as this was, and to this error was due the misfortune of these companies, for which they were blameless. The officers and men of these six companies met no Union force to rally upon till they reached the Quaker Road, more than half a mile in rear of their late position. Here those who were not wounded or completely exhausted rallied and joined various commands, Twentieth Massachusetts and others. The remaining four companies of the Twelfth Regiment continued to support the German batteries until Wilcox's charge, when these batteries, or what remained of the personnel of them after Kemper's charge, retiring over these four companies, officers and men of these companies joined the organized commands to their right. Some of these continued on the front until all the Union troops hereabouts retired.

A portion of the Twelfth charged with the Twentieth Massachusetts after dark. Other members of the regiment were in front as far to the right as Kearney's Division, H. Patrick, Company B, being taken prisoner on his front line after dark, together with members of the Twentieth Indiana.

A part of the Third Reserves, which were on picket on the left front of McCall's line, being driven in, as heretofore related, by charge of Kemper's and Jenkins' brigades, was forced back on the position of the Twelfth Regiment; another part of Third Reserves was forced back to the Union left rear, and, following the wooded country, came upon Sickles' Brigade of Hooker's Division, where, being mistaken for, and being somewhat mixed up with, the Confederate skirmishers, were fired upon by Sickles' men, which fire they may by mistake have returned. General Hooker's statement in his report that the Reserves fired upon and killed men of Sickles' command was not founded upon facts, since none of Sickles' Brigade were killed in this action. Sickles' report states that "his losses in this action were nominal;" in fact, two or three men wounded. Also Sickles' statement in his report that these men tried to run through his line, and that he drove them back over to

the right of McCall's position, is not founded upon facts. There were too few men of the Reserves on his front—certainly not a hundred—to run down his brigade, several thousand strong. And to have driven these unfortunate Union skirmishers over to McCall's position, three quarters of a mile to his right front, over ground then and for hours afterwards held by the Confederates, was impossible.

The unjust statements made by Hooker, Sickles, Heintzelman (the latter always criticised severely troops not in his command) and other commanders, in regard to the conduct of the Reserves in this engagement, were founded—1st, upon misinformation; 2d, the number and variety of men and materials carried to the rear by Kemper's charge, all of which was due to the interval left by Heintzelman and Hooker on Hooker's right; 3d, on account of the misbehavior of some supporting troops (the report of a colonel of Massachusetts troops states that Sickles' line gave way and his regiment was sent to close the interval left; it is difficult to see what made Sickles' line yield, as nothing but enemy's skirmishers were in his front); 4th, by reports of officers and men of the Reserves who had retreated before Kemper's or Wilcox's charges, and who did not rejoin their divisions or other troops, as they ought to have done, at the front. Lieutenant Randol, of the artillery, was more excusable than any other person for making unjust remarks, for he fought his guns magnificently and assisted in their recapture, but what artilleryman would admit that his guns could be taken in front across an open field, three to five hundred yards wide?

The writer believes a full record of what occurred (which he has endeavored to give) on this hard fought battlefield is the best defence of the Reserve Division.

Longstreet, the best fighting Confederate corps commander, says: "After preliminary artillery firing he began the fight at 4 P. M.," and it continued uninterrupted until after dark on a clear midsummer's day. He says: "This was one of the hardest contested fights of the war."

General McCall (who displayed good skill and the greatest courage and determination), commanding officer of the division, after losing all his staff and many orderlies, killed and wounded, while at the head of a remnant of his division, and while seeking a position in front of his original battlefield to post this remnant, after dark, being accompanied by only two orderlies, was captured by the Forty-Seventh Virginia, of Field's Brigade. This remnant of more than five hundred men in command of Major Stone and other officers of the Reserves, remained on

their old line of battle on the right of the New Market Road immediately behind the abandoned guns, so often taken and retaken during this bloody day, begging to be allowed to haul off by hand these disabled guns (there were no horses and many of the carriages were disabled), until the order for retreat at midnight was received. The Confederates admit they had 18,000 men engaged.

McCall had not to exceed 5,600, and Kearney (Robinson and Berry's brigades) about 4,500; 10,100 on Union front line. The Reserves captured three Confederate flags, and carried to the rear several hundred prisoners. The Confederate losses are unknown, but according to the statements of the Confederate generals, Longstreet, A. P. Hill, Kemper, Wilcox, Field, Prior and Featherstone, they were very severe.

The losses in McCall's and Kearney's divisions were also very severe.

The losses in Hooker's Division were in a few regiments only. This division's loss not equal to the loss of one regiment of the Reserves.

The losses of Sedgwick's Division of Sumner's Corps—only division of corps engaged—not very serious, except in Sixty-Ninth Pennsylvania, all occurred in a few minutes just at or after dark.

During the afternoon of the 30th, whilst the contest raged on the New Market Road, the Confederates advanced a force down the river road, and opened with some field guns upon the Union Reserve artillery posted on the west side of Malvern Hill. The Reserve artillery soon crushed the Confederate light battery, and their advance on the river road was checked. Later in the war, McCall and Kearney would have entrenched their whole front.

## CHAPTER VIII.

### BATTLE OF MALVERN HILL, JULY 1, 1862, AND HARRISON'S LANDING, JULY 2 TO AUGUST 11, 1862.

"The position selected for resisting the farther advance of the enemy, on the 1st of July, was with the left and centre of our lines resting on Malvern Hill, while the right curved backwards through a wooded country toward a point below Haxall's, on James River. Malvern Hill is an elevated plateau about a mile and a half by three-quarters of a mile in area, well cleared of timber, and with several converging roads running over it. In front are numerous defensible ravines, and the ground slopes gradually toward the north and east to the woodland, giving clear range for artillery in those directions. Toward the northwest the plateau falls off more abruptly into a ravine which extends to James River. From the position of the enemy, his most obvious lines of attack would come from the direction of Richmond and White Oak Swamp, and would almost of necessity strike us upon the left wing. Here, therefore, the lines were strengthened by massing the troops and collecting the principal part of the artillery. Porter's Corps held the left of the line (Sykes' Division on the left, Morrell's on the right), with the artillery of his two divisions advantageously posted, and the Reserve artillery so disposed on the high ground that a concentrated fire of some 60 guns could be brought to bear upon any point in his front or left.

Colonel Tyler also had, with great exertion, succeeded in getting ten of his siege guns in position on the highest point of the hill. Couch's Division was placed on the right of Porter; next came Kearney and Hooker, next Sedgwick's and Richardson's, next Smith's and Slocum's, then the remainder of Keyes' Corps, extending back nearly to the river. The Pennsylvania Reserve Corps was held in reserve, and stationed behind Porter's and Couch's position. One brigade of Porter's was thrown to the left on the low ground, to protect the flank from any movement direct from the Richmond Road. The line was very strong along the whole front of the open plateau, but from thence to the extreme right the troops were more deployed. \* \* \* The right was

rendered as secure as possible by slashing the timber and by barricading the roads. Commodore Rogers, commanding the flotilla on the James River, placed his gunboats so as to protect our flanks, and to command the approaches from Richmond.

Between 9 and 10 A. M., the enemy commenced feeling along our whole left wing with his artillery and skirmishers as far to the right as Hooker's Division. About two o'clock a column of the enemy was observed moving toward our right within the skirt of the woods in front of Heintzelman's Corps, but beyond the range of our artillery. Arrangements were at once made to meet the anticipated attack in that quarter, but, though the column was long, occupying more than two hours in passing, it disappeared and was not again heard of. \* \* \* About 3 P. M. a heavy fire of artillery opened on Kearney's left and Couch's Division, speedily followed up by a brisk attack of infantry on Couch's front. The artillery was replied to with good effect by our own, and the infantry of Couch's Division remained lying on the ground until the advancing column was within short musketry range, when they sprang to their feet and poured in a deadly volley, which entirely broke the attacking force and drove them in disorder back on their own ground. This advantage was followed up until we had advanced the right of our line some 700 or 800 yards, and rested upon a thick clump of trees, giving us a strong position and a better fire. Shortly after 4 P. M. the firing ceased along the whole front, but no disposition was evinced on the part of the enemy to withdraw from the field. Caldwell's Brigade, having been detached from Richardson's Division, was stationed upon Couch's right by General Porter, to whom he had been ordered to report. The whole line was surveyed by the generals" (except the General-in-chief), "and everthing held in readiness to meet the coming attack. At 6 P. M. the enemy suddenly opened upon Couch and Porter with the whole strength of his artillery, and at once began pushing forward his columns of attack to carry the hill. Brigade after brigade formed under cover of the woods, started at a run to cross the open space and charge our batteries, but the heavy fire of our guns, with the cool and steady volleys of our infantry in every case sent them reeling back to shelter, and covered the ground with their dead and wounded. \* \* \* About 7 P. M., as fresh troops were accumulating in front of Porter and Couch, Meagher's and Sickles' Brigades, as soon as it was considered prudent to withdraw any of Sumner's and Heintzelman's troops, were sent to reinforce that part of the line and hold the position. These brigades relieved such

regiments of Porter's Corps and Couch's Division as had expended their ammunition, and batteries from the Reserve were pushed forward to replace those whose boxes were empty. Until dark the enemy persisted in his efforts to take the position so tenaciously defended; but despite his vastly superior numbers, his repeated and desperate attacks were repulsed with fearful loss, and darkness ended the battle at Malvern Hill, though it was not till after 9 P. M. that the artillery ceased its fire. During the whole battle Commodore Rogers added greatly to the discomfiture of the enemy by throwing shells among his reserves and advancing columns."

After the battle of Malvern Hill, in which the Confederate army had been severely punished, and whose attacks had been completely repulsed, the fighting generals of the Army of the Potomac were unanimous for remaining where they were, or for making an advance towards Richmond. The ground at Malvern Hill was high and dry, and could be easily intrenched so as to be perfectly safe for even a smaller force than the Army of the Potomac to hold. A strong detachment could be made to protect the water communications. It was supposed strong reinforcements would now be sent to the Army of the Potomac. General McClellan, who did not remain long enough with the fighting part of his army to feel as that part felt, but who saw so much of his rear, which was, of course, in a demoralized condition, believing he could not hold his communications on the James without the aid of the navy, and the commander of the naval force being unable to promise to do so unaided.

McClellan ordered a retreat to Harrison's Landing, below City Point, that being the supposed dangerous point in his rear.

"The Reserve regiments broke camp at Malvern Hill just before midnight on the 1st of July, and took up the march towards Harrison's Landing. Though the night was dark, the road was well lighted up by numerous fires that were kept continually burning by the guards stationed by the wayside. At daybreak a short halt was ordered, the troops rested and refreshed themselves from their scanty supplies, and then, resuming their march, moved on through the woods until they crossed Herring Run, and debouched on the open plain at Harrison's Landing. Several of the regiments were ordered to encamp in a beautiful field of oats, nearly ripe for the reaper; the heavy rain and the continual tramp of the troops soon transformed the silvery freshness of the waving grain into a plain of mud. The whole division was, during the afternoon of the second, ordered to encamp in a dense pine thicket.

The men cut boughs and constructed huts and shelters to protect themselves from the storm." So writes Woodward.

The position occupied by the Army of the Potomac at Harrison's Landing consisted of a strip of land on the northern bank of the James River, about five miles long by three deep, with heights along the north-west portion, with flats extending from these heights to the river, and a swamp on the northeast side extending to the river.

On the 8th of July Colonel J. H. Taggart resigned, and Lieutenant-Colonel M. D. Hardin, in view of his promotion to the Colonelcy (the War Department had refused to allow him to join the regiment as Lieutenant-Colonel), was ordered by General McClellan to assume command of the Twelfth Regiment. The division changed camp a day or two subsequently and went into the permanent camp, which it occupied during its sojourn at Harrison's Landing. This camp bordered the swamp on the northeast part of the ground occupied by the whole army, and was about a mile in a direct line from the river. Orders were issued for putting the camp into perfect sanitary condition. Good sinks, perfectly screened, were constructed. Deep wells were sunk by placing barrels on top of each other; a depth of at least three barrels was required. Drills were resumed, and efforts made to get the men to move about and rouse their spirits. All men of the regiment who had been found by the late campaign to be unfit for military duty by reason of physical disability were discharged. The serious cases of sickness were sent North, and everything possible done to get an effective force.

"Various kinds of sickness (fevers, diarrhœa, scurvy, etc.) attacked the members of the regiments by reason of their late extreme exertions, bad food, lack of food, lack of preparation of food, overwork in marching, lack of proper sleep, all in addition to the natural excitement of continual battle." For the first two weeks after settling in this camp things looked very blue, but as soon as fresh vegetables arrived (about end of July) and the men were strong enough to walk about in comfort, and to drill, the majority of the members of the regiment plucked up their spirits and began to look hopefully to the future. In the third week the camp regimental hospital was free of sick, all were improving, but there still hung to most a tendency to diarrhœa. About this time a most welcome order was received to picket the south side of the James. Never did a command seek picket duty as did ours at this time, that on south side of the James. The green corn found there was devoured by the dozen ears to the man. The doctors said this would kill us, but on

the contrary this cured the diarrhoea, set us up and gave us great spirits. Ever since then we have known how the "Johnnies" managed to fight so well. Corn and bacon are far superior to "hard tack" and coffee, even with "salt horse" thrown in, for soldier food.

Many times we thanked, in spirit, the Confederate batteries which shelled us on the night of July 31st, 1862. Soon after the arrival of the regiment at Harrison's Landing, an order was issued by General Seymour, commanding the division, for each regiment to be armed throughout with one kind of weapon. This order hit the Twelfth Regiment very hard, as the companies were not uniformly armed, and "K" company had their own arms, rifles issued by the State, or owned by the men. The first order was that the Twelfth should be armed with smooth bore muskets. This naturally caused the members of "K" company to rebel. In their ignorance of the force of military law in the presence of the enemy, they got themselves into a very bad scrape. The regiment was finally armed with the Springfield rifle musket, but "K" company was broken up, its officers discharged, and the men distributed to the other companies. Captain Baker of Company "I" died August, 8, 1862, and was buried with military honors. General Reynolds, and the officers and men who had been captured during the late campaign, returned to the command about August 8th, and General Reynolds assumed command of the division. General McCall was not well enough to undertake a new campaign.

The authorities having decided to withdraw the Army of the Potomac to the front of Washington, McClellan was, July 30th, directed to send back his sick, and on August 3d ordered to withdraw the army. Sypher says: "The majority of the officers expressed themselves in favor of a withdrawal." This decision on the part of most of them was due to the fact that it was said the Army of the Potomac could not be adequately reinforced where it was. How many brave men laid down their lives, and how many of us will go crippled to our graves by reason of this decision. At what a fearful cost of noble life was it that we got back here in 1864 on the James River, from which it was so easy to move us.

In the discussion between Halleck and McClellan, as to whether McClellan moved his troops and sick as quickly as he could, the record appears to sustain McClellan, there being delays in fitting up hospitals at Fort Monroe and other places; Burnside's command using vessels which belonged to the Hospital Department of the Army of the Potomac,



and a general interference by the authorities at Washington with the water transportation of the Army of the Potomac, which caused delays. General Lee's main army remained near Richmond till the 13th of August, when, he says, he was definitely informed that the Army of the Potomac was to leave the Peninsula, which shows that General Lee thought he could not move the main body of his army away from Richmond so long as there was a strong Union force on the James.

The Twelfth Regiment was embarked at Harrison's Landing August 11, 1862, and arrived at Acquia Creek August 13, and with the division moved by rail and went into camp near Falmouth, Virginia.

Our baggage, knapsacks, etc., went on to Washington. We haven't got them yet. For the coming campaign we were to be in light marching order, sure enough.


## CHAPTER IX.

### GENERAL POPE'S CAMPAIGN.

On the night of August 21, 1862, at 10 o'clock, the Reserve division moved out of camp at Falmouth, Va., leaving tents standing. The knapsacks of the men and baggage of the officers were quietly reposing in or near Washington, D. C., where, it is said, they were subsequently given away to contrabands and others as old rubbish.

It was dark as Erebus: our brigade (the Third), commanded by General Jackson, got lost, wandered about till daylight; when, finding itself still in sight of camp, it then moved on the proper road and advanced six or eight miles, when it stopped for the exhausted men to make coffee. The night had been hot and sultry; the morning began hotter still, with a brilliant sunlight. Within an hour after halting, the brigade resumed the march along a turnpike in the direction of Kelly's Ford. The march was continued with infrequent and very short halts till dark, when an enforced bivouac was made in a fine open wood. The men had by reason of the heat and rapid march and previous night's march, fallen out along the road till the brigade was less than a regiment, and the regiments only companies. The white, glistening turnpike, with very little water, had been a most trying route. General Reynolds had the whole night's start on our brigade: he succeeded with the head of the column in reaching the vicinity of Kelly's Ford that night (22d). That night and day's march was one of the hardest we ever made. Only the next day and night's march can be compared with it. As each person struggled into the place of the bivouac he fell down utterly exhausted. No one attempted to make coffee; everyone decided to rest first and make coffee afterwards. The men's misfortunes were not yet full; for, just as they began to get strength to move about, a Virginia Summer thunder storm broke upon them: it was found our beautiful woods was a swale, which in rain storms received all the water in the vicinity.

The writer endeavored to rest upon the upper side of a log; he quickly recalled the saying, "easier than rolling off a log;" he was finally content with the angle of a worm fence.





At daylight the next morning (23d) the Third Brigade moved on towards United States Ford, and afterwards changing direction, reached the church near Kelly's Ford about 10 A. M., to find that General Reynolds with the head of the division had already gone on up the Rappahannock. The men were allowed a rest of half an hour, when the Third Brigade started for Rappahannock Station. Soon after starting the ambulances, wagons and sick were sent off on a road leading to the right, which, it was said, led to Bristoe's Station, on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad. At the time we were not certain where this road led, and the question arose as to what instructions to leave here for the stragglers who had fallen out the day before, whether they were to follow the road to Rappahannock Station, or to go off indefinitely to the right. As many of these stragglers were our best men (simply overcome by the heat in the previous day's march), we did not like to lose them. However, the greater part of them went over towards Bristoe Station, and our division got a bad name for straggling on account of these men, many of whom were not stragglers in the usual sense of that term. Very few of these men succeeded in finding their commands during the ensuing campaign. The Third Brigade overhauled the head of the division before reaching Rappahannock Station, where we arrived in the afternoon. It was expected our division would find McDowell's Corps here, but instead, it found the Confederate cavalry, followed by the Confederate infantry skirmishers, taking possession of McDowell's earthworks near Rappahannock Station. Skirmishers were thrown out from the head of the division, at sight of whom and the Army of the Potomac flags, borne by the division, the Confederate cavalry and skirmishers evacuated the station, and our division took possession. General Lee now knew a portion of the Army of the Potomac had joined Pope's army, and he decided at once to move to his left, to protect his rear from an advance by the Army of the Potomac, and to strike Pope's right before all of the Army of the Potomac could join Pope's army.

General Pope designed crossing the Rappahannock (22d and 24th), near the station, to strike Lee's communications.

General Lee saw this design, but instead of preparing to meet such a movement by concentration here, he decided to move on Pope's communications. This was a good and safe movement on Lee's part, and not subject to the criticism which it has usually received. It succeeded. Moreover, if he had been defeated in battle, Lee could have fallen back

on the Shenandoah Valley. Soon after the Reserve division arrived at Rappahannock Station, an order was received for it to join McDowell's Corps, then moving toward Warrenton. After a few minutes rest the division moved along the river road back of Barnett's Ford to the sound of artillery. Darkness and rain soon came, also a few of the enemy's shells. That was a night march we will never forget.

There was Confederate cavalry all around us ; no one dared to straggle ; we had neither ambulances nor wagons ; it was necessary to keep up or go to Richmond. Human endurance was put to a severe test that night. The march only terminated with daylight, when we came upon one of McDowell's divisions in camp. We were ragged, shoeless, foot-sore, tired to death, with nothing but our guns and our battle-stained flags to show we were soldiers. McDowell's men were fully equipped, completely uniformed, knapsacks and all, "spick and span" new. They looked to us like a militia command out for parade. We were welcomed with shouts of pleasure, and our cry of "Grab a root" was taken up and we were soon enjoying a hearty breakfast. The division joined Pope's army in a critical mood. There was no battle, no enemy visible but a few stray cavalymen. Why march men as we had been marched? We had lost by exhaustion nearly one-third of our command, and that for nothing. Our division started from Falmouth nearly 4,000 strong ; we reported with little over 2,500. The distance by the route we marched was about fifty miles, passed over in the hottest of weather, with thunder-storms at night. We naturally asked, If there were such urgent necessity for reinforcements to Pope's army, why did our division remain so long at Falmouth under Burnside?

General Pope wrote Halleck at 9.15 p. m., June 23d. "I must do one of two things : either fall back and meet Heintzelman behind Cedar Run (which is near Catlett's Station), or cross the Rappahannock with my whole force and assail the enemy's flank and rear. I must do one or the other at daylight ; which shall it be? I incline to the latter," and General Halleck, replying at 11 p. m., says : "that he thinks the latter of the two propositions the best." Pope and Halleck would thus have done, in the face of Lee's victorious army, what the greatest complaint of McClellan rested upon, namely : have left the route to Washington open to Lee's advance.

It never seems to have occurred to either Union general, that in the position that Lee then was, he could rest his army on the Shenandoah Valley, and let General Pope's army go toward Richmond. The farther

the Union army went toward Richmond the more its right would be exposed. The generals who had fought Lee on the Peninsula thought that the only safe thing for the Union forces to do, at this time, was to get to Centerville with as little loss as possible and there concentrate the armies. Fortunately for General Pope, he was unable to attempt such a wild project. Sigel's slowness, as well as the rising river, were General Pope's salvation.

"Between 9.15 at night and the next morning, upon reports received from General Sigel, General Pope changed his mind, and, while his army was in the act of moving to cross the river at Rappahannock Station, he ordered it to concentrate to the support of General Sigel, who was ordered to Sulphur Springs or to Waterloo." McDowell was moving in accordance with these last orders when the Reserves joined him (on 24th). General Pope also on the 23d (the day the Reserves were to join McDowell at Rappahannock Station) "abandoned his works beyond the river at Rappahannock Station, and withdrew the troops; he destroyed the bridge there; and for the time being, at any rate, he renounced his plan of recrossing the river—though not definitely."

General Pope's army, when the Reserves joined it, or during the 24th, was stationed as near as can be stated as follows:

General Pope's headquarters at Warrenton: Sigel's Corps, with Buford's cavalry in the front, at Sulphur Springs and Waterloo; Bank's Corps near the river on Sigel's left; Reno's two divisions (of Ninth Corps) between Sulphur Springs and Warrenton, near Sulphur Springs; Ricketts' Division of McDowell's Corps between Waterloo and Warrenton; King's Division of McDowell's Corps between Warrenton and Sulphur Springs, east of Reno. The Reserve Division about one mile southeast of Warrenton; Bayard's cavalry on the right front. Lee's army was immediately opposite on south bank of Rappahannock. Longstreet on (Lee's) right, Jackson on left. Jackson's attempt to cross the river on 22d and 23d had been stopped by high water, and the opposition of Buford's cavalry supported by Sigel's Corps.

The 25th and 26th, the Reserve Division remained near Warrenton, moving over on the 26th to the Warrenton Pike, between Warrenton and Sulphur Springs. Here got some rest and plenty of roasting ears, resuming the diet the command enjoyed so much on the south side of the James. On the 26th a large empty train of wagons was sent to our division, ostensibly to transport our baggage. As we had no baggage this train was parked on the Warrenton and Sulphur Springs Road

facing the Rappahannock River. Tradition says, "It remains there still waiting for our baggage."

On the morning of the 25th General Jackson began his famous march around the right of the Union army. This movement was indicated by a dust line, which was visible all this and a part of the following day to all the Union troops located along the Warrenton Pike. The writer sought his friend, General Bayard, to learn where the enemy was going. He could not find General Bayard, but conversed with many officers, all of whom thought we ought to be doing something to meet the enemy's movement, instead of lying idle in camp. When the order was received, the night of the 26th, to move to the rear, there was great relief to our anxiety. But we soon learned that the enemy had cut our communications at Manassas. How strong the enemy were in our rear was unknown, since Stuart's cavalry had been in our rear for several days. Our fears that Stuart's cavalry might have gathered in a number of our division stragglers (many of whom, as before said, were good men) were not allayed by the news brought to the division at this time by the Second Regiment. It had marched from Bristoe in pursuit of our division, which, after many fatigues and great risks, it had reached at Warrenton. Lieutenant-Colonel McCandless, of the Second, was entitled to much credit for bringing up the Second Regiment through an unknown country to an unknown position. General Pope, in carrying out practically his orders to "discard lines of retreat and bases of supply," and "letting these take care of themselves," at this time, lost the confidence, not only of his general officers, but of the rank and file as well, for the latter, as well as their commanders, saw this turning movement of the enemy, and saw nothing and heard of nothing being done to meet it.

"General Pope on the morning of the 25th issued a general order for the formation of a new line of battle, running north and south. McDowell's Corps to be on the right, at Warrenton; Sigel on his left at Fayetteville; Banks from Bealton Station to a creek near the river; Reno at Kelly's Ford, with orders to watch the river. Reno accidentally went to Warrenton Junction, Banks went to Bealton. Sigel was ordered by General Roberts of General Pope's staff (of his own motion), to hold Waterloo Bridge at all hazards, informing Sigel that he would be supported by Banks and McDowell. Sigel sent back to find Banks and McDowell; neither were where General Roberts said they were, whereupon Sigel was about to fall back in accordance with his prior



order to go to Fayetteville, when he received orders from General Pope to march to Warrenton. He burnt Waterloo Bridge and reached Warrenton at 2 A. M. August 26th."

On the night of the 25th, General Heintzelman's Corps was at Warrenton Junction and had reported to General Pope (who had moved his headquarters to that point). Of the Fifth Corps, Army of the Potomac, Morrell's Division was at Kelly's Ford, Sykes' Division at Bealton Station. General Porter, commanding Fifth Corps, reported to General Pope on 26th. Early on 26th, McDowell's Corps was ordered to Sulphur Springs; King's Division went there and shelled the enemy, which was Anderson's Division, the rear guard of Lee's army. Buford was ordered on 26th to move at dawn on 27th with all of his and Sigel's cavalry toward Chester Gap. General Pope appears to have taken it for granted Jackson's movement, which was visible all day of 25th and part of 26th, was toward the Shenandoah Valley, and he, in consequence, made no effort till this order to Buford (which was entirely too late) to ascertain where Jackson was going, unless we consider the sending of a regiment of cavalry from Manassas on 26th toward Manassas Gap as such an effort. General Pope did not believe General Lee would dare attempt to cut his (Pope's) communications. He has since said he expected Halleck and the reinforcements coming from Washington would protect his rear.

This movement of Jackson's was not as risky as it has generally been considered; he could always fall back toward the Shenandoah Valley. Moreover, he had a preponderance of cavalry, which enabled him to screen himself and to keep watch of the movements of the Union army.

At the close of this day (26th) Buford with his cavalry was near Waterloo; Rickett's Division on the road between Waterloo and Warrenton, about four miles from Waterloo; King's Division on road between Warrenton and Sulphur Springs, one brigade at the Springs; Reynolds' (Reserves) Division at Warrenton; Sigel's Corps near Warrenton; Banks at Fayetteville; Reno and Heintzelman near Warrenton Junction, where were General Pope's headquarters; Morrell's Division at Kelly's Ford; Sykes' Division five to six miles east of Bealton Station. This same evening Jackson was at Bristoe Station with Taliaferro's, A. P. Hill's, and Ewell's divisions, about 25,000 strong. "He (Jackson) had marched all day from Salem, through White Plains, Thoroughfare Gap and Gainesville, and had nowhere met with the smallest opposition,"

yet his movement by its dust line had been visible from the region of Warrenton nearly two days. Comment is unnecessary.

"On the evening of the 26th General Pope determined to form a new line of battle, running east and west, between Warrenton and Gainesville. General Pope wrote McDowell at 8 P. M., August 26th, that he thinks the fight will be at Warrenton. Reno was ordered to move from Warrenton Junction at daylight (of 27th) to the neighborhood of Warrenton, and McDowell was then to send Reno to Greenwich (Greenwich is nearer to Warrenton Junction than it is to Warrenton). Arrived at Greenwich, Reno was to throw forward four regiments and a battery to Gainesville. Heintzelman, who was at Warrenton Junction, was ordered to send Kearney's Division to Greenwich, to retain Hooker's Division. Porter was ordered to march through Fayetteville to vicinity of Warrenton." Soon after issuing these last orders, General Pope learned that his railroad communication was cut. He ordered General Heintzelman "to put a regiment on a train of cars and send it down immediately to Manassas to ascertain what had occurred, repair the telegraph wires and protect the railroad there until further orders." But at midnight he wrote General McDowell that the question "whether the whole force of the enemy or the larger portion of it has gone round (through Thoroughfare Gap) is a question that we must settle instantly."

Early on the 27th General Pope issued the following order: "The following movements of troops will be made, viz: General McDowell with his own and Sigel's Corps and the division of Brigadier-General Reynolds will pursue the turnpike from Warrenton to Gainesville, so as to reach Gainesville, if possible, to-night. The army corps of Heintzelman, with the detachment of the Ninth Corps under General Reno (General Reno leading) will take the road from Catletts station to Greenwich, so as to reach there to-night, or early in the morning. Major-General Reno will immediately communicate with General McDowell and his command, as well as that of General Heintzelman, will support General McDowell in any operations against the enemy. General Porter will remain at Warrenton Junction till he is relieved by General Banks, when he will immediately push forward with his corps in the direction of Greenwich and Gainesville, to assist the operations on the right wing. Major-General Banks, as soon as he arrives at Warrenton Junction, will assume the charge of the trains and cover their movements toward Manassas Junction. \* \* \* The general headquarters will be with the corps of General Heintzelman until further notice." Reserve Divis-

ion moved on morning of the 27th toward Washington on the Warrenton Pike and went into camp that evening a little west of Buckland's Mills, together with McDowell's Corps and part of Sigel's. During the day we heard of Jackson's raid upon the Orange and Alexandria Railroad at Bristoe Station, and we received our first order to "bag Jackson." When first received we thought we had some chance to do this, and were in consequence highly elated and marched cheerfully to the rear, a direction our judgment told us was the proper one, wherever Jackson might be. We hoped to cut in two Lee's long line, which we knew extended from the upper Rappahannock to Bristoe via Thoroughfare Gap. The Reserve Division broke camp early on 28th and marched to the Warrenton Pike, where we were halted to wait for a wagon train to pass (we were told it was Sigel's). McDowell afterwards said it was Reynolds'. As our division had no wagons, unless the empty train heretofore spoken of could be classed as belonging to our division, McDowell was in error. That empty train, although attempted to be put on us, was not properly ours, nor did we see it again after it was parked in front of Warrenton.

This delay was our first disappointment of this unlucky day. We could not see why our division could not pass the wagons, as the road was bordered by open country. After at least two hours' delay, our division moved north on the Warrenton Pike. It had followed Sigel's Corps. Sigel's troops now, about 10 A. M., disappeared. They had turned off on a road leading to the right along the Manassas Gap Railroad. The head of our division had just crossed a small stream (General McDowell with his staff was riding ahead), when a Confederate battery opened on our column from our left front. Our column stopped and Ransom's battery was hurried forward, whose guns (twelve pounds) not being able to reach the enemy, Cooper's battery of rifle pieces was sent up. The enemy's artillery fire at the first discharge killed and wounded some men in the Eighth Reserves. General McDowell and staff rode hastily off to the right to some high ground. We saw this hasty retreat of the corps headquarters, and would have thought no more about it except as a joke on McDowell and staff to have to "skedaddle" in presence of a division newly attached to the corps; but it happened that our division did not see or hear from McDowell that day, nor so far as the writer is concerned till the morning of August 30th. After our battery had fired a few rounds, skirmishers were sent out to the right front, south of the pike, not in the direction of the enemy who had fired

on us. This caused remarks at the time. An officer or two rode off in the direction of the firing, the only effort that was made to find out what the enemy was.

After an hour or more our division was formed in line of battle on the right of the pike, and advanced diagonally to the right front, about parallel with the direction of the Manassas Gap Railroad (but the writer does not recollect any such railroad, wasn't it torn up and rails and ties all gone at this time?). The division continued this advance in line over a very rough country, through woods, over old fields, across dry runs, etc, for at least two hours; it seemed a week. The day was hot, and no water to drink. After the entire command was about used up, the division was halted, and waited for orders. General Reynolds went off to find McDowell or Pope for orders. He couldn't find McDowell; he went to Manassas Junction, where he met General Pope, who ordered him to move his division towards Centerville.

The division was started in that direction, but had not advanced far when, by General Pope's orders, it was moved towards Gainesville, the opposite direction from which it had moved in line of battle. There was no enemy, nor any Union troops in sight or hearing, at any time after the division left the Warrenton Pike in the morning. Towards night firing could be heard toward our front, in the direction of Gainesville. General Reynolds went off again to get orders, or at least to find some neighboring troops. When night overtook the division it was completely isolated and practically lost. The division now, at dark, was bivouacked in an old field; no water could be found. Pickets were thrown out in all directions. Never before or afterwards did the division get into such a predicament. It is feared this state of affairs did not cause the division to acquire any additional confidence in either General Pope or General McDowell. We concluded we wouldn't "bag Jackson" that evening if he would "let us off" in the morning. The division rested quietly, very quietly, until daylight, when it moved, under command of General Meade, in the direction of the firing, which began very early on our right front. General Meade, who also went after orders, got back during the night, but General Reynolds did not find us till we were moving to meet Sigel, whose firing we had heard.

About 7 A. M. the division reached the small stream flowing between the Henry House and Bald Hill, where it halted. In the meantime General Reynolds, going in the direction of the firing to the left front, had found Gibbon's Brigade of King's Division, which was having a

hard fight. Gibbon, in his report, says : " General Doubleday, of King's Division, only upon the urgent solicitation of General Reynolds, sent me two regiments." General Reynolds remained here until Rickett's Division had reached King's position, or at least until he got news of Rickett's Division falling back on King's, and heard that King was going to fall back on Manassas ; then General Reynolds started out (about 9.30 P. M.), to find his own division, which he reached soon after daylight, while on its way to Sigel's position.

The movements of the remainder of the Union and Confederate forces on the 27th and 28th were about as follows : The regiment sent out towards Bristoe Station by General Heintzelman discovered that the enemy was in force in their front. General Hooker's Division was sent on 27th east on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad ; this met Ewell's Division of Confederates and, after a sharp fight, Ewell's troops fell back to Manassas Junction, where Jackson's main force was. Jackson during the night of the 27th-28th retreated toward the Warrenton Pike, his main body going directly west and taking position from Sudley Springs to an unfinished railroad track northwest of Groveton, a part of his force going to Centerville and then joining his left. Hooker halted between Bristoe and Manassas Junction. The morning of the 28th he moved to Manassas Junction, and then followed towards Centerville the part of Jackson's force which had fallen back in that direction. Kearney and Reno moved toward Greenwich on 27th, then followed Hooker's movements on 28th, supporting him, Kearney passing to the front towards evening.

Longstreet, with General Lee's headquarters, followed during the 26th, 27th and 28th, the route of Jackson, a part of his command getting east of Thoroughfare Gap late on 28th. He was delayed somewhat by the movements of Buford's cavalry.

General Sigel, after crossing the Manassas Gap Railroad, moved southerly towards Manassas Junction ; when near this junction he, not being able to find General McDowell, sent to General Pope for orders, who directed him to move toward Centerville. He moved a short distance in that direction, when he received orders from General Pope to move toward the Warrenton Pike along the Sudley Springs Road. In the morning of the 28th General Sigel had reported to General McDowell that from information derived from his scouts and other sources he thought the enemy was in force on the west (or north) side of the Warrenton Pike. This information, and the firing upon our division, failed

to cause General McDowell to make any effort to find out if the enemy was in force west of the pike. He, on the contrary, in face of this information, obeyed to the letter an order he had received from General Pope, dated hours before and founded upon the presumption that Jackson would remain at Manassas Junction. Late in the morning of the 28th, Ricketts received orders to take his division to Thoroughfare Gap. He went there, where he met Longstreet's force, which he kept from passing through till after dark.

King's Division remained near its camp of the night of 27th until late in the afternoon of 28th, when, in obedience to General Pope's order to concentrate the army at Centerville, this division started along the pike to Centerville. King was not informed of General Pope's change of plan to concentrate at Groveton, nor was he informed that Sigel's scouts had located the enemy in force west of the Warrenton Pike. Hatch's Brigade led, with skirmishers out to the east of the road; Hatch passed the right of the Confederate position without seeing any enemy. Patrick's Brigade followed Hatch's; when it came opposite the Confederate right it was fired on. Gibbon, whose brigade followed Patrick's, sent out to see what was there; his men ran into Taliaferro's Confederate division. Gibbon sustained his skirmishers and a most bloody contest ensued between Gibbon's Brigade and two regiments of Doubleday's Brigade on the Union side and Taliaferro's Division and two additional brigades on the Confederate side. King commanding his division would not support Gibbon. Doubleday, as we have seen, at Reynolds' request, sent two regiments to help Gibbon.

At dark, Ricketts, finding himself without support, the enemy forcing both of his flanks, and hearing a severe engagement going on in his rear, very properly fell back on King's Division. Upon consulting together—King being the senior—the whereabouts of the army and corps commanders as well as the location of any other Union troops being unknown to them, King and Ricketts decided to fall back on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad. No one who was not with us at this time can properly criticise the action of isolated commanders. It is seldom in war that division commanders are so isolated as they were at this time.

Porter, with Fifth Corps, moved at 3 A. M. on 28th from near Warrenton Junction, instead of 1 A. M. as ordered; arrived at Bristoe Station about 10 A. M., where he remained all day without orders. Banks moved on 27th and 28th along the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, in

charge of the army trains, towards Manassas Junction. We frequently heard during the 28th that we were about to "bag Jackson." Officers and orderlies were riding about in every direction giving orders and reporting news. Meantime, as seen, General Pope's army was getting scattered to the four winds, and every member of it was losing confidence in the army commander. General McDowell's conduct this day (28th) is inexplicable to the writer, who admits that General McDowell's conduct in his presence during this campaign was such as to leave a bad impression upon him, but he thinks the true history of this campaign should be written, and one of the causes of the failure of General Pope's campaign is here given. General Pope has been hardly treated by all writers upon his campaign, and General Porter was dismissed. The writer's theory of this campaign would relieve General Pope of some of the burden for its failure and would show that Porter's actions, whatever they were, had little or no effect upon the campaign.

About 9 A. M., August 29th, the Reserve Division was advanced on the left of the Warrenton Pike, southerly, to support Sigel's left, Meade's First Brigade on the right, Seymour's Second Brigade in centre, and Jackson's Third Brigade on left. The First Brigade was sent more to the right to support Cooper's battery, and it had some sharp fighting, but the Second and Third brigades were not then engaged. The division was not advanced far before it was stopped, and the whole division fell back a short distance. Again, about 11 A. M., the division advanced in line of battle, Third Brigade on left, with skirmishers in front; this advance continued until the division was about one mile south of Groveton. When the advance began the skirmishers covered the division front and extended beyond the left, but when the division was halted it was closed in mass by regiment; it was then moved by the left flank, probably a quarter of a mile. The Twelfth Regiment was on the extreme left. The skirmishers did not follow this movement by the left flank, and thus, when the division halted, there were no skirmishers covering the left. Just before halting the Twelfth Regiment crossed a fence, which was bordered by brush and trees; the regiment being closed in mass became somewhat disordered crossing this fence; the regiment came out beyond the fence into an open field, where it was being reorganized, when a Confederate battery was run up to the crest of a hill to the left rear of the regiment, not more than one or two hundred yards distant, and fired one round; fortunately for the Twelfth Regiment the aim was high, the men instinctively dropped, and the

charge struck only the right front corner of the regiment, killing and wounding a small number. Command was instantly given to deploy to the rear, and steps were taken to open fire or charge the battery, when orders were received to retire, at the same time the battery limbered up and galloped off. The division then moved back to the rear, over ground a little south of that it had advanced over, the regiments in retiring being deployed at company distance. Soon after the division started to the rear the Confederate battery returned to its position and commenced firing again. This movement to the rear continued for a half mile or more, when the division was halted and here remained some time.

The brigades were moved about during the remainder of the afternoon in various directions, but did not again come under fire until about sunset. About half an hour before sunset the division advanced in line of battle over part of the ground it had been over in the morning, Second Brigade on the left, Third Brigade on the right, the First Brigade in rear of Third in reserve. When the division approached the enemy's position skirmishers were thrown out, and after some little time advanced with sharp firing. The division followed. The Third Brigade in the latter part of the advance moved down through a corn field (the corn standing) till it reached the bed of a dry run. The enemy were visible beyond the run. The brigade moved rapidly down to the run, receiving only skirmishers' fire. On the enemy's side of the run the bank was steep near the run, and then a gentle slope which continued up in open ground to a fence which ran along the front of an extensive woods. The division formed in the dry run, then advanced up the enemy's side of the run till it came to the crest of the steep part of the bank, where it came face to face with the Confederate line of battle. In front of the Third Brigade line were two batteries and three lines of infantry, one behind the other, all evidently waiting for our troops to endeavor to cross the grassy slope, about two hundred feet wide, which separated the forces. The division halted before the enemy fired. It was evident to every one that there was no chance with a single line of battle of carrying this triple line. The men needed no order to lie down, but dropped at once on seeing the enemy's lines of infantry behind the fence. There was no firing except by skirmishers till our troops reached the crest, when the enemy's artillery opened. General Seymour rode up on the crest in plain view of the enemy; one of their batteries sent a volley at him, but he remained until he had taken a good view of the



enemy's position, when he rode leisurely down the hill. One of the enemy's guns got a kind of enfilade fire against the right of the Twelfth Regiment; one shot undermined a tree against which Colonel Hardin was leaning, and he fell part way down the hill. This enfilade fire becoming serious some of the men endeavored to slip away down the hill, whereupon the officers walked up and down the line, thereby becoming targets for the enemy's sharpshooters. One shot scraped the ear of the Colonel of the Twelfth Regiment. Captain Lucas, of "C" company, evidently saw the sharpshooter who fired this shot, for a moment later he cried out "duck, Colonel, duck." The Colonel ducked, but not quite soon enough: the shot hit him in the head, cut away half his hat rim and sent the Colonel to grass.

Seeing there was no chance, with our small force, of carrying the enemy's position and hearing nothing of the expected attack of Porter's Corps on our left, orders were given to retire, one regiment at a time,

The Sixth Regiment, Colonel Sinclair commanding, moved back in beautiful order, by company front; as it retired the enemy's shells made an ugly lane through it. The Twelfth Regiment followed the Sixth in same manner. The Twelfth had better ground to retire on at first, but when it reached the corn field the enemy's infantry joined his artillery "in letting us have it." The regiment walked back, but not at a slow walk. The division moved back to the rear of a country road which led from Bald Hill east to a small farm house; went into camp here just at dark. Camp fires had scarcely been lighted when a Confederate battery opened on our camp from the vicinity of the little farm house on our left. Fires were at once extinguished, but the enemy's battery having got the range continued to fire for an hour or more. This artillery fire was very destructive, and the colonel of Twelfth Regiment, whose command was on the left, went over to headquarters of the division, which was in the woods near Bald Hill, to endeavor to get his camp moved, or to have the enemy's battery looked after. General Reynolds was absent after orders. (It would appear to have been the principal business of a division commander in this campaign to be looking for some one to give orders!) The colonel of Twelfth Regiment, in returning to his regiment, got between the hostile pickets, but the Egyptian darkness of the night enabled him to get safely within friendly lines. Thus this second unfortunate day ended, as it had begun, by the enemy's artillery surprising our left. All our movements this day seemed to be

without design, and a study of the official reports seem to confirm the opinion then expressed.

The movements of the other divisions of the Union army were (on 29th) about as follows: King's division fell back to Manassas Junction, and about 7 A. M., in the absence of General McDowell, was ordered by General Pope to join General Porter, who had arrived there about the same time from Bristoe Station, and who was ordered to advance toward Centerville. Later, King's Division was ordered by General Pope to go with General Porter towards Gainesville. General McDowell joined this division between 10 A. M. and 12 M. and continued towards Gainesville with General Porter. Whilst Generals Porter and McDowell were together the noted "joint order" was received. General McDowell had come from the direction of Manassas Junction; he brought with him a despatch from General Buford, stating "That seventeen regiments and 500 cavalry passed Gainesville going east at 8.45 A. M.," which he showed to General Porter. This is satisfactory evidence that the head of Longstreet's command joined Jackson by 9 A. M., and that Longstreet's entire command could have joined by noon. After the receipt of the "joint order" Generals McDowell and Porter consulted as to what they should do under the terms of the order. Whilst the consultation was taking place General McDowell turned suddenly away and took King's Division with him. General Porter, his staff and generals, understood that General McDowell went off with King's Division to make the connection between Porter's and Sigel's forces. General McDowell left General Porter not later than 2 P. M. He reached Sigel's rear about sunset (7 P. M.), about five hours going five miles, all the time in hearing of the battle near Groveton. King's Division, under command of General Hatch, just at dusk advanced along the Warrenton Road and attacked Hood's troops, who were coming in the opposite direction. A bloody contest ensued without advantage to either side.

If General McDowell had moved promptly with King's Division and joined Reynolds' Division (which was attached to his corps) he could have made the connection which Porter expected, the military necessity of which was so obvious that it was the topic of conversation all this day in Reynolds' Division. Yet, General McDowell, a learned soldier, made no effort to make this connection. General McDowell's actions this day are inexplicable. General Sigel in his report and testimony only stated what was common talk in the army.

Ricketts' Division having retreated from Thoroughfare Gap, and

afterwards from the place where King's Division had the fight (of 28th), fell back to the Orange and Alexandria Railroad at Bristoe, having taken this roundabout route so as not to interfere with King's Division, which retired on the direct road to Manassas Junction. This movement of Ricketts threw his division entirely out for the battle of the 29th, and left Longstreet and Jackson together. Ricketts' Division moved slowly along the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, and finally took the Sudley Springs Road, or a road to the east of it, reaching the rear of Sigel's position late at night. Kearney's Division advanced (29th) from Centerville, and came in on Sigel's right, attacking several times unsuccessfully with severe loss. Hooker's Division attacked near Kearney's. Reno's command attacked near Sigel's centre. Sigel, early on the 29th, advanced against Jackson's position, attacking it at first with his own corps; his left having been outflanked, Reynold's Division was sent to this part of the line. Later in the day Kearney, Hooker and Reno came to his assistance. Most of the Union attacks were made against that part of the Confederate line which rested on the unfinished railroad. Kearney late in the day attacked the Confederate left, which for a time was driven back.

Banks' Corps, moved along with the trains, was never brought to the fighting front. The official (Confederate) reports show that Longstreet's troops began to join Jackson at 9 A. M., and continued arriving until noon or a little later.

The morning of the 30th the Reserve Division was entirely out of rations; it was early moved north on the Sudley Springs Road to the Warrenton Pike, west on this pike a short distance, then moved up the face of Bald Hill, then back on this hill to the woods. About 9 A. M. an advance of a part of the division was made, and skirmishers were pushed well out on the left side of the pike in the woods, and, being reinforced, carried the edge of Groveton; then this advanced part of the division was marched back again to Bald Hill, where the division remained until noon.

Shortly after noon the division was formed in column, First Brigade leading, and advanced in beautiful shape over the ground immediately on the left of the Warrenton Pike, right resting on the pike. As we had seen the enemy's batteries throughout the morning, strung along their edge of the woods near Groveton, and extending around to their left as far as the open ground extended, and as these batteries had a perfectly open and enfilade fire on our division, as it advanced, we

were certainly astonished at our movement. The enemy watched us, but evidently thinking it was a ruse on our part, did not fire. The division was soon withdrawn; the now rear brigade fell back into the woods, whilst Cooper's battery was left out in the open ground and soon began firing. It was replied to. This movement of the Reserve Division appears to have been made to draw attention from Porter's attack, which was at this time preparing.

Longstreet held too good a position and was too old a soldier to be deceived by this movement. Moreover, he was playing a ruse on his part. He was forming his division behind the woods south of Groveton, screened by cavalry, preparing for attack on his part. Our skirmishers detected his ruse, and told General Reynolds, who went in person and verified their reports. He immediately rode to General Pope and told him that the enemy, instead of retreating (as some of General Pope's people had thought), was preparing to attack from his right. General Pope immediately ordered General Reynolds to post his division to meet this attack, and ordered General Sigel to send batteries and infantry to assist Reynolds. Reynolds posted his division in line of battle in front of Bald Hill, extending it to the left. Several of Sigel's batteries were sent to Reynolds' left, and McLean's Brigade of Sigel's Corps was placed on Reynolds' right, near the Warrenton Pike. The position was a good one with open ground several hundred yards wide in front, woods in rear.

Whilst the division was taking up this new position, General Porter, commanding his own corps and two brigades of King's Division, was preparing to attack Jackson's force along the unfinished railroad, where so many Union attacks had already failed. The withdrawal of the Reserve Division from the advanced position it had taken on the left of the Warrenton Pike leaving Porter's left exposed, he sent Warren's Brigade (Fifth and Tenth New York) to occupy this position. Porter formed Morrell's Division with its left resting on the pike and its right extending into the strip of woods in front of the unfinished railroad, as his front line of attack, with Sykes' Division immediately in rear as a reserve line. King's two brigades were placed on right of Morrell's Division. Kearney was to have attacked immediately on King's right, but he refused to assault this position, which he had seen attacked so often, and moved his division off to the extreme right. Kearney's movements caused some delay, but between 3 and 4 p. m. Porter's front line was advanced. It made a gallant struggle against this strong

position ; so strong was the assault that Jackson called on Longstreet for assistance.

From our position in front of Bald Hill we could see Porter's left brigade. It moved out of the strip of timber and formed a deep column fronting Groveton, and advanced rapidly toward that point. As soon as it was clear of the woods the Confederate batteries above the unfinished railroad, and those along the edge of the woods north of Groveton, opened on it, taking it in front and flank. The destruction was terrible, but the brigade moved bravely on, even after all organization was destroyed by its losses. Nothing human could reach that timber against that front and flank fire. When about midway of the distance from the strip of woods from which it started to the woods north of Groveton this doomed brigade stopped; it seemed at first as if all had been destroyed, but soon the remnants began moving to the rear. Just as this occurred the men who had attacked the Confederates near the unfinished railroad through the woods to the right, and who had failed to carry the position, began to come straggling out of the woods to the rear. At the same time a force of the enemy, about a brigade, charged in return over the same open ground where Porter's left brigade had failed. And, at first, it seemed as if this Confederate force would reach the strip of woods on our side, the Confederates followed Porter's retreating men so closely.

From our position we could not see what we had in the strip of woods to oppose the advancing enemy. We could only see one section and one battery on our side posted on the crests of the small hills near the Warrenton Pike, opposite the strip of woods. When the last of Porter's retreating men entered the woods and the enemy's advance was very near it matters were apparently serious in front of our centre, but at this moment the Union guns near the pike opened, every shot making a lane through the Confederate column; still they came on, the rear in disarray. The front entered the strip of woods, where it met a sheet of flame, Sykes' division having been placed here by Porter to meet this very case. In a moment the Confederate yell ceased and the column stopped, then swayed, then those not disabled started to the rear, and this fine brigade, as had the Union on the same ground, left its bravest and best dead or dying.

We were just congratulating ourselves upon the defeat of this return attack when orders were received to go to the assistance of Porter's and King's troops, many of whom were rapidly moving to the rear on north

side of the pike. We demurred to this order, as from our position we could see thousands of infantry and many batteries to our right rear, north of the pike, who could certainly stop any force coming across the wide open space in their front. Whilst we knew our division was posted to meet Longstreet's expected attack. General McDowell (who was present with us and who was the most excited officer the writer ever saw on a battle field) when he saw Porter's troops retreating ordered our division across the pike to cover Porter's withdrawal. As above shown, this was unnecessary, Sykes' Division having repulsed the enemy, and our division held a position which completely flanked any advance the enemy could make immediately north of the pike. Moreover, there was the large Union force above mentioned posted immediately north of the pike.

This order of General McDowell's (if General Pope gave the order it must have been at General McDowell's request) was not only fatal and caused the loss of the battle, but was a great military (tactical) blunder. This blunder was seen by us and commented on at the time.

About the time the division commander received this order to move, Lieutenant Chamberlain, aide to General Jackson, commanding the Third Brigade, rode up to Colonel Hardin, then in command of the Twelfth Regiment, and told him that General Jackson had been taken suddenly ill, and that General Reynolds desired him to take command of the Third Brigade. The division moved off to the right, the First and Second brigades, then the division batteries, then the Third Brigade. Just as the last battery (Kerns') reached the road, sharp firing was heard near Groveton south of the pike.

Cap'tain Kerns and Colonel Hardin rode rapidly to the crest of a small hill south of the pike to see what it was. They both saw Warren's men firing sharply and retreating. They agreed at once that Longstreet's expected attack was commencing. Kerns said he would bring his battery back to the spot where we stood. He did so. Colonel Hardin galloped backward to the Third Brigade, which was then moving down the slope toward the pike, gave the command "Left into line, wheel!" and moved the brigade up to the crest on the left of Kerns' battery, two regiments being on the crest and two about one hundred feet in rear. Kerns' battery opened on the enemy at once, but Warren's retreating men, Fifth and Tenth New York (Fifth were Zouaves and could be very distinctly seen) interfered with the fire of the brigade. It was, therefore, not as effective at first as it otherwise might have been. The enemy

advanced in line down the slope of the next hill west of the Third Brigade's position. A small strip of woods extended from the larger woods on the left at the foot of the hill, between the opposing forces, nearly to the pike.

The enemy advanced without firing till he reached the foot of the hill, where he was checked by Kerns' battery, when he moved by his right flank to the strip of woods and commenced firing. The enemy's fire began slowly to move around towards the left of the Third Brigade. He found he could not take the battery in front. His reinforcements could be seen moving to his right. The firing soon became so hot on the left that the left regiment of front line was partly moved to face it; then the second line was ordered to join the first.

About this time Colonel Warren appeared and placed his retreating men in the firing line. The enemy's fire now, both on the front and left of the brigade, was terrific. Captain Kerns was killed, and the entire personnel of his battery disabled. Colonel Hardin, whilst urging the men to hold on till reinforcements, which he saw coming, could reach them, was struck down. The remainder of the battle to the writer is pretty much a blank, except he remembers, whilst being carried to the rear, meeting Lieutenant Lamborne, of General Reynolds' staff, near the pike, not far from the Third Brigade. He gave the writer his small flask of brandy (a gift that probably saved his life), which would show how promptly General Reynolds came to the rescue of the left. The Twelfth Regiment came under command of Colonel Baldy, the Third Brigade came under, first, Colonel Kirk, of the Tenth, who was soon wounded, then under Colonel Anderson, of the Ninth (who was so often afterwards to bring this brigade out of battle). The Third Brigade, with some of Warren's men, held on here till a position was secured to their left rear. Milroy's, Tower's and other brigades were hurried to the support of the Third Brigade. Kerns' battery and the Third Brigade of Reserve division literally threw themselves into the breach without orders. Kerns and many noble men sacrificed their lives, and many more of us will go maimed to our graves, by reason of a military mistake which ought not to have been made.

No doubt General McDowell promised General Reynolds to replace his division, and did try to do so, but time is valuable in the face of the enemy and a general must keep his wits in battle. Sigel had no trouble in holding his front, and he put nearly his whole force on the left of the pike. As they returned to the left rear Reynolds and Meade saw that the

enemy was checked near the south side of the pike, and they knew he would push around to the south side of Bald Hill. They, therefore, hurried their commands along the Sudley Springs Road, back of Bald Hill, and met the advancing enemy, as expected.

When the ammunition of First and Second Brigades, Reynolds' Division, was expended they were relieved by Sykes' Division. The enemy succeeded in turning Bald Hill, but met such resistance from Reynolds' and Sykes' commands near the Henry House as to check his farther advance. Night closed the contest.

This battle was fought mainly by the men under Porter's command, aided by Sigel's. A gallant assault was made by Porter's command upon a position that had been so frequently assaulted without success that it was a military error to assault it again. (Kearney refused?) Then a most bloody and desperate resistance was successfully made to a thoroughly prepared assault by more than half of the Confederate army under their ablest fighting corps commander. An assault that had been foreseen by Reynolds, whose careful preparations to meet it were destroyed by McDowell. Yet Porter was dismissed and his command abused, Sigel and his command abused, whilst McDowell became a major-general in the regular army. However, "The mills of the gods grind slowly, but they grind exceeding fine." History is rectifying these matters. Porter made a long but successful fight, not only for himself but for the noble dead of his abused command. The writer has elaborated on this campaign for the reason that he hopes political or book generals will never in future be given preference over those who have had experience in the field. The bickerings and ill feelings which no doubt existed in Pope's command should teach this lesson, namely: not to injure the feelings of an army, although its commanding general fails to satisfy the powers that be. Under no circumstances allow the new commanding general to cast reflections upon the troops who are to come under his command.

Heintzelman's Corps, supported by Reno, attacked on the Union right, but whilst assaulting gallantly the enemy held his left. During the night the Union army was ordered to retire on Centerville.

The Reserve Division got together during the night of the 30th on the Warrenton Pike whilst en route to Centerville, but not until morning did most of the men find their regiments.

The Confederate army's movements were about as follows: General Lee says: "The victory of Cedar Run effectually checked the progress



of the enemy for the time, but it soon became apparent that his army was being largely increased. The corps of General Burnside from North Carolina, which had reached Fredericksburg, was reported to have moved up the Rappahannock a few days after the battle, to unite with General Pope, and a part of McClellan's army was believed to have left Westover (Harrison's Landing) for the same purpose. It, therefore, seemed that active operations on the James were no longer contemplated, and that the most effectual way to relieve Richmond from any danger of attack from that quarter would be to reinforce General Jackson and advance upon Pope. Accordingly, on August 15th, General Longstreet, with his division and two brigades under General Hood, were ordered to proceed to Gordonsville. At the same time General Stuart was directed to move with the main body of his cavalry to that point, leaving a sufficient force to observe the enemy still remaining in Fredericksburg and to guard the railroad. General R. H. Anderson was also directed to leave his position on James River and follow Longstreet. On the 16th the troops began to move from the vicinity of Gordonsville toward the Rapidan, on the north side of which, extending along the Orange and Alexandria Railroad in the direction of Culpeper Court House, the Federal army lay in great force. It was determined with the cavalry to destroy the railroad bridge over the Rappahannock, in rear of the enemy, while Longstreet and Jackson crossed the Rapidan and attacked his flank. The movement \* \* \* was appointed for August 18th. \* \* \* Its execution was postponed to the 20th. In the interval the enemy, being apprised of our design, hastily retired beyond the Rappahannock. General Longstreet crossed the Rapidan at Raccoon Ford and preceded by General Fitz Lee's cavalry brigade, arrived early in the afternoon near Kelly's Ford on the Rappahannock, where Lee had a sharp skirmish with the rear guard of the enemy, who held the north side of the river in strong force. Jackson passed the Rapidan at Somerville Ford and moved toward Brandy Station; a large body of the enemy's cavalry was encountered. \* \* \* General Jackson halted for the night at Stevensburg, and on the morning of the 21st moved upon Beverly Ford on the Rappahannock. \* \* \* As our positions on the south bank of the Rappahannock were commanded by those of the enemy, who guarded all the fords, it was determined to seek a more favorable place to cross higher up the river, and thus gain the enemy's right. Accordingly General Longstreet was directed to leave Kelly's Ford on the 21st and take the position in front of the enemy in the vicinity of Beverly Ford and

the Orange and Alexandria Railroad bridge, then held by Jackson, in order to mask the movement of the latter, who was instructed to ascend the river. On 22d Jackson crossed Hazel Run at Welford's Mill and proceeded up the Rappahannock, leaving Trimble's Brigade near Freeman's Ford, to protect his trains. In the afternoon Longstreet sent Hood, with his own and Whiting's brigade, under Colonel Law, to relieve Trimble. Hood had just reached the position when he and Trimble were attacked by a considerable force which had crossed at Freeman's Ford " (Buford aided by Sigel). \* \* \* General Jackson arrived at the Warrenton Springs Ford in the afternoon and immediately began to cross his troops to the north side, occupying the springs and neighboring heights. \* \* \* He was interrupted by rain and ordered to withdraw.

\* \* \* General Stuart, who had been directed to cut the railroad in the rear of General Pope's army, crossed the Rappahannock on the morning of the 22d, about six miles above the springs, with parts of Lee's and Robinson's brigades. Passing through Warrenton he reached Catlett's Station at night, but was prevented from destroying the railroad bridge at that point by the same storm that had arrested Jackson's movements. \* \* \* He retired after firing the enemy's camp, and recrossed the Rappahannock at Warrenton Springs. \* \* \* The rise of the river rendering the lower fords impassable enabled the enemy to concentrate his main body opposite Jackson, and Longstreet on the 24th was ordered to proceed to his support. \* \* \* He (Longstreet) reached Jeffersonton in the afternoon. \* \* \* The enemy was massed between Warrenton and the springs. \* \* \* The army of McClellan had left Westover; part of it it had already marched to join General Pope, and it was reported the rest would soon follow.

The captured correspondence of General Pope confirmed this information and also disclosed the fact that the greater part of the army of General Cox had been withdrawn from the Kanawha Valley for the same purpose." (Lee thus knew he was safe in resting his rear on the Shenandoah Valley.) "Two brigades of General D. H. Hill's Division under General Ripley had already been ordered from Richmond, and the remainder under General D. H. Hill in person with the division of General McLaws, two brigades under General Walker and Hampton's Brigade of cavalry, were now directed to join this army and were now approaching.

In pursuance of the plan of operations determined upon Jackson

was directed on the 25th to cross above Waterloo and move around the enemy's right, so as to strike the Orange and Alexandria Railroad in his rear. Longstreet \* \* \* was to divert his attention by threatening him in front, and to follow Jackson as soon as the latter should be sufficiently advanced. Jackson crossed the Rappahannock at Hinson's Mill, about four miles above Waterloo, and passing through Orleans encamped on night of 25th, near Salem, after a long and fatiguing march.

The next morning, continuing his route with his accustomed vigor and celerity, he passed the Bull Run Mountains at Thoroughfare Gap and proceeding by the way of Gainesville, reached the railroad at Bristoe Station after sunset. At Gainesville he was joined by General Stuart with the brigades of Robertson and Lee, who continued with him during the rest of his operations, vigilantly and effectually guarding both his flanks.

Thus far no considerable force of the enemy had been encountered, and he did not appear to be aware of his situation. \* \* \* General Trimble volunteered to proceed at once (on 26th) to that place (Manassas Junction), "with Twenty-First North Carolina and Twenty-First Georgia. \* \* \*

General Stuart was ordered to accompany him with part of his cavalry and to take command. \* \* \* About midnight the place (Manassas Junction) was taken. \* \* \*

General Jackson left Ewell's Division with Fifth Virginia Cavalry at Bristoe Station, and with the rest of the command proceeded to the junction, where he arrived early in the morning. Soon afterwards a considerable force of the enemy under General Taylor approached from the direction of Alexandria and pushed forward boldly to recapture the stores that had been lost. After a sharp engagement the enemy was routed and driven back, leaving his killed and wounded on the field, General Taylor being himself mortally wounded during the pursuit. The troops remained at Manassas the rest of the day, supplying themselves with everything they required from the captured stores.

In the afternoon the enemy (Hooker's Division) "advanced upon General Ewell at Bristoe from the direction of Warrentown Junction. They were attacked by three regiments and the batteries of Ewell's Division, and two columns of not less than a brigade each were broken and repulsed. Their places were soon supplied by fresh troops, and it was apparent that the Federal commander had now become aware of the situation of affairs, and had turned upon Jackson with his whole

force." (Hooker's attack created a strong impression.) " \* \* \* Ewell withdrew his command \* \* \* and rejoined Jackson at Manassas Junction, first destroying the railroad bridge over Broad Run. The enemy halted at Bri-toe. General Jackson's force being much inferior to that of General Pope, it became necessary for him to withdraw from Manassas and take a position west of the turnpike road from Warrenton to Alexandria, where he could more readily unite with the approaching column of Longstreet. \* \* \* Taliaferro's Division moved during the night by the road to Sudley, and, crossing the turnpike near Groveton, halted on the west side, near the battlefield of July 21, 1861, where it was joined on 28th by divisions of Hill and Ewell. Perceiving, during the afternoon (28th), that the enemy approaching from the direction of Warrenton was moving down the pike toward Alexandria, thus exposing his left flank, General Jackson advanced to attack him. A fierce and sanguinary conflict ensued, which continued until about 9 P. M., when the enemy slowly fell back and left us in possession of the field. The loss on both sides was heavy, and among our wounded were Major-General Ewell and Brigadier-General Taliaferro, the former severely. The next morning (29th) the enemy had taken a position to interpose his army between General Jackson and Alexandria, and about 10 A. M." (about daylight?) "opened with artillery on right of Jackson's line. The troops of the latter were disposed in rear of Groveton, along the line of the unfinished branch of the Manassas Gap Railroad, and extended from a point a short distance west of the turnpike toward Sudley Mill, Jackson's Division, under General Starke, being on the right; Ewell's, under Lawton, in the centre, and A. P. Hill's on the left. The Federal army was evidently concentrating upon Jackson, with the design of overwhelming him before the arrival of Longstreet.

The latter officer left his position opposite Warrenton Springs on 26th, being relieved by General R. H. Anderson's Division, and marched to join Jackson. He crossed at Hinson's Mills in the afternoon and encamped near Orleans that night. The next day he reached the White Plains; his march was retarded for want of cavalry to ascertain meaning of certain movements of the enemy " (Buford's cavalry), "from the direction of Warrenton, which seemed to menace the right flank of his column. On 28th, arriving at Thoroughfare Gap, he found the enemy prepared to dispute his passage. \* \* \* The enemy held the eastern extremity of the pass in large force" (Rickett's Division). " \* \* \* Hood, with two brigades, and Wilcox, with three, were ordered to turn the ene-

my's right, the former moving over the mountain by a narrow path to the left of the pass, and the latter farther to the north by Hopewell Gap. \* \* \* He (the enemy) kept up an active artillery fire until dark, and then retired. General Jones (with his division) and Wilcox bivouacked that night east of the mountains, and on the morning of the 29th the whole command resumed the march, the sound of cannon at Manassas announcing that Jackson was already engaged.

Longstreet entered the pike near Gainesville, and, moving down toward Groveton, the head of his column came upon the field in rear of the enemy's left. \* \* \* He immediately placed some of his batteries in position. \* \* \* Longstreet took position on the right of Jackson, Hood's two brigades, supported by Evans, being deployed across the turnpike and at right angles to it. These troops were supported on the left by three brigades under Wilcox and by a like force on the right under Kemper. D. R. Jones' Division formed the extreme right of the line, resting on the Manassas Gap Railroad. The cavalry guarded our right and left flanks, that on the right under General Stuart in person. After the arrival of Longstreet the enemy changed his position and began to concentrate opposite Jackson's left. \* \* \* Colonel Walton placed a part of his artillery upon a commanding position between the lines of Generals Longstreet and Jackson by the order of the former, and engaged the enemy vigorously for several hours." (These batteries or those that replaced them repulsed the left of Porter's attack on 30th.) \* \* \*

"Soon afterward General Stuart reported the approach of a large force from the direction of Bristoe Station, threatening Longstreet's right. The brigades under General Wilcox were sent to reinforce General Jones, but no serious attack was made, and after firing a few shots the enemy withdrew. While this demonstration was being made on our right a large force advanced to assail left of Jackson's position, occupied by the division of A. P. Hill. \* \* \* The enemy " (Kearney) "was repeatedly repulsed, but again pressed on to the attack with fresh troops. Once he succeeded in penetrating an interval between General Gregg's Brigade, on the extreme left, and General Thomas', but was quickly driven back. \* \* \* The contest was close and obstinate, the combatants sometimes delivering their fire at ten paces. While the battle was raging on Jackson's left, General Longstreet ordered Hood and Evans to advance; but, before the order could be obeyed, Hood was himself attacked. \* \* \* General Wilcox was recalled from the

right and ordered to advance on Hood's left. \* \* \* The enemy was repulsed after a severe contest." (Hatch's, late King's, Division attack at sunset.) " \* \* \* Our loss was severe in this engagement. \* \* \* On the morning of the 30th the enemy again advanced, and skirmishing began along the line. The troops of Jackson and Longstreet maintained their positions of the previous day.

\* \* \* R. H. Anderson's Division, which arrived during the forenoon, was held in reserve near the turnpike. The batteries of Colonel S. D. Lee took the position occupied the day before by Colonel Walton and engaged the enemy actively until noon, when firing ceased and all was quiet for several hours. About 3 P. M. the enemy, having massed his troops in front of Jackson, advanced against his position in strong force. His front line pushed forward until engaged at *close quarters* by Jackson's troops, when its progress was checked and a *fierce and bloody struggle ensued*. A second and third line of great strength was moved up to support the first, but in doing so came within easy range of a position a little in advance of Longstreet's left. He immediately ordered up two batteries, and two others being thrown forward about the same time by Colonel Lee, under their well-directed and destructive fire the supporting lines were broken and fell back in confusion. \* \* \* General Longstreet, anticipating the order for a general advance, now threw his whole command against the Federal centre and left. Hood's Brigade, closely followed by Evans', led the attack. R. H. Anderson's Division came gallantly to the support of Hood, while the three brigades under Wilcox moved forward on his left and those of Kemper on his right. D. R. Jones advanced on the extreme right, and the whole line swept steadily on, driving the enemy with great courage from each successive position until 10 P. M., when darkness put an end to the battle and the pursuit. During the latter part of the engagement General Wilcox, with his own brigade, was ordered to the right, where the resistance of the enemy was most obstinate. \* \* \* The obscurity of night and the uncertainty of the fords of Bull Run rendered it necessary to suspend operations until morning, when the cavalry \* \* \* discovered that the enemy had escaped to the strong position of Centerville. \* \* \*

Longstreet remained on the battlefield to engage the attention of the enemy, \* \* \* while Jackson proceeded by Sudley Ford to the Little River Turnpike to turn the enemy's right and interrupt his retreat to Washington. \* \* \* He reached Little River Turnpike in the

evening, and the next day (September 1) advanced by that road toward Fairfax Court House. The enemy, in the meantime, was falling back rapidly toward Washington, and had thrown out a strong force to Germantown. \* \* \* The advance of Jackson's column encountered the enemy at Ox Hill, near Germantown, about 5 P. M. Line of battle was formed at once, and two Brigades of A. P. Hill's Division \* \* \* were thrown forward to attack. \* \* \* They were subsequently supported by the brigades of Gregg, Thomas and Pender, all of Hill's Division, which, with part of Ewell's, became engaged. The contest was obstinately maintained until dark. \* \* \* Longstreet arrived after the action was over. \* \* \* Our army rested during the 2d, near Chantilly. \* \* \* In the series of engagements on the plains of Manassas 7,000 prisoners were taken, in addition to about 2,000 wounded left in our hands. Thirty pieces of artillery, upwards of 20,000 small arms, etc., were captured."

General Pope in his report says: "The attack of Porter" (on 30th) "was neither vigorous nor persistent, and his troops soon retired in considerable confusion."

The following is from the report of the Board ordered to examine the Porter case (Generals Schofield, Terry and Getty): "As Longstreet's army pressed forward to strike Pope's exposed left wing and flank, Warren, with his little brigade, sprang into the gap and breasted the storm until but a handful of brave men were left alive." (Our Third Brigade and Kerns' battery supported Warren without orders.) "Then Sykes with his disciplined regulars, and Reynolds with his gallant Pennsylvania Reserves, seized the commanding ground in the rear, and, like a rock, withstood the advance of the victorious enemy and saved the Union army from rout." The above, as well as the long extracts from General Lee's report, are given in answer to General Pope's remark in his report of the campaign, derogatory to the fighting of Porter's command.

"Early in the night of the battle the Reserve Corps marched toward Centerville and bivouacked on the east bank of Cub Run, and on the following morning it proceeded to Centerville. Never were the men of this division in more straitened circumstances. There had been no proper and full rations issued since the 24th of the month. \* \* \* For two days the men had subsisted on green fruit and herbs snatched by the wayside, and had been sustained more by the fierce excitement of battle than by physical strength. At 10 A. M. the division was led

down the pike two miles from Centerville, where the regiments were halted and a small quantity of coffee and hard bread were distributed.

\* \* \* In the afternoon the division marched back to Centerville, and there received rations of salt beef. It then marched back to Cub Run to relieve Reno's troops, who were guarding the crossing of this stream.

\* \* \* A heavy rain set in and the night was dark and dreary."

The further movements of the army are given in General Pope's report as follows: "The enemy during Monday again began to work slowly around to our right for the purpose of passing Fairfax Court House, and thus turning our rear. Couch's Division and one brigade of Sumner's had been left there, and I sent over Hooker on Monday afternoon to take command and to post them at or in front of Germantown, at the same time directing McDowell to take position along the turnpike from Centerville to Fairfax Court House, about two miles west of the latter place. Heintzelman was directed to post himself in rear and support Reno, who was pushed north of the road, at a point two and a half miles east of Centerville, to cover the turnpike. \* \* \* Late in the afternoon of Monday the enemy made his demonstrations upon Germantown, but was met by Hooker at that place, and by Reno, reinforced by Kearney, farther west. The battle was very severe, though short. \* \* \* Kearney and Stevens killed. By morning the whole of my command was massed behind Difficult Creek, between Flint Hill and the Warrenton Turnpike, with the advance under Hooker at Germantown."

Sypher says: "The retirement of the troops was commenced on the afternoon of the 2d, and by sundown of the 4th the combined forces of the three armies were posted behind the defences around the Capitol.

Retiring with McDowell's Corps, General Reynolds marched his division on the evening of the 2d on Alexandria and Columbia Pike, to the vicinity of Hunter's Chapel and Arlington, and on the afternoon of the 4th encamped north of Munson's Hill."

Casualties in Twelfth Regiment—Captain Schelling and Lieutenant Weber and Colonel Hardin wounded; 5 men killed, 35 men wounded; Lieutenant Cloyd and 22 men missing.

Wherever the Twelfth Regiment is not specially mentioned its movements were the same as the Third Brigade or the division. It did its share of picket duty and skirmishing during the campaign, but the lack of a daily diary prevents the writer from attempting to give the daily duties of the regiment. Part of it under Captain Gustin rein-



forced the Bucktails on skirmish south of Groveton the morning of August 30. These skirmishers had great difficulty in returning to the command—probably some were taken prisoners.

## CHAPTER X.

---

### SOUTH MOUNTAIN, ANTIETAM AND FREDERICKSBURGH.

Whilst the Reserve Division rested at Munson's Hill many men, who had been absent for various causes from the division during Pope's campaign rejoined, and thus the division started in this campaign stronger than it was when it joined Pope's army.


On the 7th day of September the Reserve Corps, as a division of the First Army Corps, General Reynolds commanding the division, General Hooker the corps, and General McClellan the re-organized army, marched from its camp near Munson's Hill, crossed the Potomac on Long Bridge, and thence marching through the streets of Washington encamped on Meridian Hill. On the following day, new clothes and a fresh supply of rations were issued to the men, and the division moved forward to a point near Brookville, in Maryland, where it encamped for two days. From Brookville it marched on the road towards Frederick, and on the night of the 12th encamped beyond New Market, near Monocacy Creek. Governor Curtin, believing the enemy would invade Pennsylvania, called out 75,000 militia. General Reynolds was, at the request of the Governor, assigned to command of the Pennsylvania militia; he was succeeded in command of the division by General Meade, the First Brigade being commanded by Colonel Magilton, the Second by General Seymour, and the Third by Colonel Gallagher, of the Eleventh; Third Brigade, composed of Ninth, Lieutenant-Colonel Anderson; Tenth, Colonel Warner; Eleventh, Lieutenant-Colonel Jackson; and Twelfth, Captain Gustin.

On the 13th the division crossed the Monocacy, and during the afternoon camped on the western bank.

The movements of the army of the Potomac after McClellan relieved Pope were, as described by McClellan, as follows:


“ Having made the necessary arrangements for the defence of the city (Washington) in the new condition of things, I pushed forward the First and Ninth Corps, under Hooker and Reno, forming the right

Battle of  
South Mountain  
Sept 14 '62









wing, under General Burnside, to Leesborough on the 5th; thence the First Corps by Brookville, Cooksville, and Ridgeville, to Frederick; and the Ninth Corps by Damascus, on New Market and Frederick; the Second Corps and the Eleventh (Twelfth) under General Sumner and Williams, on the 6th were moved from Tennallytown to Rockville, thence by Middletown and Urbana on Frederick, the Eleventh (Twelfth) moving by a lateral road between Urbana and New Market, thus maintaining the communications between the centre and right wing, as well as covering the direct road to Washington. The Sixth Corps, under General Franklin, was moved to Darnstown on the 6th, thence by Dawsonville and Barnsville on Buckeystown, covering the road from the mouth of the Monocacy to Rockville, and being in position to connect with and support the centre should it have been necessary (as was supposed) to force the line of the Monocacy. Couch's Division was thrown forward to Offuts Cross Roads and Poolesville by the River Road, thus covering that approach, watching the fords of the Potomac, and ultimately following and supporting the Sixth Corps.

The object of these movements was to feel the enemy, to compel him to develop his intentions at the same time that the troops were in position to cover Washington, or Baltimore, to attack him should he hold the line of the Monocacy, or to follow him into Pennsylvania if necessary."


On the 12th a portion of the right wing entered Frederick, after a brisk skirmish at the outskirts of the city and in its streets. On the 13th the main bodies of the right wing and centre passed through Frederick. On the 13th the advance, consisting of Pleasanton's cavalry and horse artillery, after some skirmishing, cleared the passage over the Cotoctin Hills, leaving no serious obstruction to the movement of the main body, until the base of the South Mountain range was reached. On the afternoon of the 13th General McClellan obtained General Lee's order of march, which, it is supposed, was lost by one of his generals, being found in an abandoned camp. At first General McClellan may have thought this order was a trick to get him far away from Washington, and thus enable Lee to get between his army and Washington, south of the Potomac, this move on Lee's part being greatly apprehended by General Halleck. A few hours after obtaining this order, the cavalry reports confirming the movements of the enemy directed by it, McClellan concluded to act upon the information thus obtained. His orders were correct, except that he did not require the

movements to be made at once, deferring all movements until the next day. McClellan might by a night march have prevented the battle of South Mountain from taking place, and have caused Lee's left wing to hasten over the river to join Jackson, but with Lee's fine body of cavalry, so ably commanded, there was little chance for so large an army as McClellan's to have reached any part of Lee's main force without his being prepared for it. Military critics who think McClellan ought to have captured or destroyed a large part of the Confederate army at this time, write without due consideration of the conditions of the two armies. In fact, it never was possible for either the Army of Northern Virginia, when strongest, as during the seven days on the Peninsula, or the Army of the Potomac, when nearly, if not quite double the strength of the Confederate, as it was under Grant, to capture or destroy its opponent.

It is believed that any army acting on the defensive, armed with modern weapons, *if properly handled and fought*, can hold its own against one of very nearly, if not quite double, its strength.

McClellan's orders after receiving Lee's order were for Franklin to move at daylight of the 14th by Jeffersonton and Burkettsville, upon the road to Rohrersville, to cut off McLaw's Confederate Division; the whole of Burnside's command was ordered to march the evening of the 13th and early on the 14th, to be followed by the corps of Sumner and Banks and Sykes' Division on Boonesborough, to carry that position. General Franklin's advance arrived at Burkettsville about noon, to find Crampton's Pass held by the enemy. Slocum's Division of Franklin's command was formed on the right of the road and Smith's on the left. Bartlett's and Torbert's brigades, supported by Newton, advanced steadily, the enemy was driven from his position at the base of the Mountain, where he was protected by a stone wall, and forced back up the slope until he reached his battery, posted in the road, well up the Mountain. He made a stand here, but was forced to retire, which he did by retiring his artillery in echelon and contesting the ground to the crest. Brooke's and Irwin's brigades, of Smith's Division covering Slocum's flank, moved up the Mountain on the left of the road, driving the enemy before them until the crest was reached. Four hundred (400) prisoners from seventeen organizations, one piece of artillery and three colors were captured in this brilliant advance. Franklin's command continued to advance until it reached Pleasant Valley, being within four miles of Maryland Heights that night, where he could have con-







nected with the Union force at these heights had it not been previously withdrawn. While the events which have just been described were taking place at Crampton's Gap, the troops of the centre and right wing were contending for the possession of Turner's Gap.

"On the morning of the 13th General Pleasanton was ordered to send McReynolds' Brigade and a section of artillery in the direction of Gettysburgh," (it will be seen that this was a noticeable point) "and Rush's Regiment toward Jefferson to communicate with Franklin, and (Pleasanton) was to proceed with the remainder of his force in the direction of Middletown. He reached Turner's Gap of the South Mountain in the afternoon, and found the enemy in force.

He sent back for infantry to General Burnside, who had been directed to support him. \* \* \* The South Mountain is at this point about one thousand feet high, and its general direction is from northeast to southwest. The National Road from Frederick to Hagerstown crosses it nearly at right angles at Turner's Gap, a depression some four hundred feet deep. The Mountain on the north side of the pike is divided into two crests or ridges by a narrow valley, which, though deep at the pass, becomes a slight depression at about a mile to the north.

There are two country roads, one to the right of the pike, the other to the left, which give access to the crests overlooking the main road. The one on the left, called 'The Old Sharpsburgh Road,' is nearly parallel to and about a half-mile distance from the pike, until it reaches the crest of the Mountain, where it leads off to the left. The other road, called 'The Old Hagerstown Road,' passes up a ravine in the Mountain, about a mile from the pike, and leading to the left over and along the crest, enters the pike at the Mountain House, near the summit of the pass.

\* \* \* On the 14th General Pleasanton continued his reconnoissance; Gibson's battery, and afterwards Benjamin's, of Reno's Corps, was placed on high ground on the left of the pike, and obtained a direct fire on the enemy in the Gap.

Cox's Division, which had been ordered up to support Pleasanton, left its bivouac near Middletown, at 6 A. M. The First Brigade reached the scene of action about 9 A. M., and was sent on the old Sharpsburgh Road by General Pleasanton to feel the enemy, and ascertain if he held the crest on that side in strong force. This was soon found to be the case, and General Cox having arrived with the other brigade, and infor-

mation having been received from General Reno that the column would be supported by the whole corps, the division was ordered to assault the position. Two twenty-pounders of Simmon's battery, and two sections of McMullins' were left in rear near the pike, and did good service all day. Colonel Scammon's Brigade was deployed, moved up the slope to the left of the road, with object of turning the enemy's right. It gained the crest and, supported by Crook's Brigade, retained its position against repeated assaults until noon.

There was now a lull for two hours, whilst Union troops continued arriving. Wilcox's Division came up first; it was moved about to several positions, and finally put on right of the old Sharpsburgh Road. Crook had moved up some guns near the crest; as Wilcox was coming into position, the enemy opened with a battery close to his right, creating a sort of panic there and almost took Crook's guns, but the Seventy-Ninth New York and Seventeenth Michigan rallied to their defence. Burnside now directed Reno to move up Sturgis' and Rodman's divisions to support Cox and Wilcox. Sturgis' Division arrived at 3.30 P. M., and was formed in rear of Wilcox; Rodman's was divided, Colonel Fairchild's Brigade was placed on the extreme left and Colonel Harland's on the right.

After it was ascertained that General Hooker's command on right of the main road was well advanced, a general advance on the left of the main road was ordered. The enemy made a desperate resistance, counter charging the Union lines, but were everywhere driven back. The fighting on the left of main road continued till 9 to 10 P. M. General Reno was killed in this advance. Wilcox's Division suffered the principal loss.

Hooker's Corps reached the Cotoctin about 1 P. M., having left the vicinity of the Monocacy that morning.

About 1 P. M. General Meade's Division (the Reserves) was ordered to make a diversion in favor of Reno, in accordance with the following order: "General Hooker; General Reno requests that a division of yours may move up on the right of the main road. General McClellan desires you to comply with this request, holding your whole corps in readiness to support the movement, and taking charge of it yourself. Sumner's and Bank's corps have commenced arriving. Let General McClellan be informed as soon as you commence your movement."

Meade's Division (the Reserves) left Cotoctin Creek about 2 P. M., and turned off to the right from the main road on the old Hagerstown

Road leading to Mount Tabor Church, where General Hooker was, and deployed a short distance in advance, its right resting about one and a half miles from the pike. The enemy fired a few shots from a battery on the Mountain side, but did no considerable damage. Cooper's battery was placed in position on high ground about 3.30 P. M., and fired at the enemy on the slope, but soon ceased, by order of General Hooker, and the position of our lines prevented any further use of artillery on this part of the field. The First Massachusetts Cavalry was sent up the valley to the right to observe the movements of the enemy in that direction, and one of Meade's regiments was posted to watch a road coming in the same direction. The other divisions of Hooker's Corps were deployed as they came up, Hatch's to the left, and Ricketts', which arrived at 5 P. M., in rear. "Gibbon's Brigade was detached from Hatch's Division by General Burnside, for the purpose of making a demonstration on the enemy's centre up the main road, as soon as the movements on the right and left had sufficiently progressed."

The First Pennsylvania Rifles (Bucktails), of Seymour's Brigade, were sent forward as skirmishers to feel the enemy; it was found he was in force. Meade was then directed to advance his division to the right of the road (old Hagerstown Road) so as to outflank him, if possible, and then to move forward and attack, while Hatch was directed to take with his division the crest on the left of the old Hagerstown Road, Ricketts' Division to be held in reserve. Seymour's Brigade was sent up to the top of the slope on the right of the ravine through which the road runs; it then moved along the summit parallel to the road, while Colonel Gallagher's and Colonel Magilton's brigades moved in the same direction along the slope and in the ravine. The ground was of the most difficult character for the movements of troops, the hillside very steep and rocky, and obstructed by stone walls and timber. The enemy was very soon encountered, and in a short time the action became general along the whole front of the division. The line advanced steadily up the Mountain side where the enemy was posted behind trees and rocks, from which he was gradually dislodged. During this advance Colonel Gallagher, of Eleventh, commanding the Third Brigade, was severely wounded, and the command devolved upon Lieutenant-Colonel Anderson.

General Hooker, reporting this action, says: "In front of us was South Mountain, the crest of the spiral ridge of which was held by the enemy in considerable force. Its slopes were precipitous, rugged, and

wooded, and difficult of ascent to an infantry in force, even in the absence of a foe in front. The National Pike crosses the summit of this range through a gentle depression, and near this point a spur projects from the body of the ridge, and running nearly parallel with it about a mile, when it is abruptly cut by a rivulet from the main ridge, and rising again and extends far to the northward. At and to the north of the pike this spur is separated from the main ridge by a narrow valley, with cultivated fields extending well up the gentle slope of the hill on each side. Here the enemy had a strong infantry force posted, and a few pieces of artillery. Through the break in the spur at the base of the principal ridge were other cleared fields, occupied by the enemy.

\* \* \*

As soon as these dispositions were made," (heretofore described) "and from my observations," (General Hooker being on a good point to see the whole field of battle) "anticipating no important sequence from the attack to the south of the pike, it was resolved to move to the assault at once, which was commenced with throwing forward a heavy body of skirmishers along my whole line, and directions were given for Meade and Hatch to support them with their divisions. Meade moved forward with great vigor, and soon became engaged, driving everything before him; every step of his advance was resisted stubbornly by a numerous enemy, and, besides, he had great natural obstacles to overcome, which impeded his advance but did not check it. From its great elevation and the dense smoke which rose over the top of the forest, the progress of the battle on this part of the field was watched with anxious interest for miles around, and while it elicited the applause of the spectators, they could not fail to admire the steadiness, resolution and courage of the brave officers and men engaged." (Hooker evidently regrets his remarks about this division on the Peninsula). "At this moment word was received that the enemy were attempting to turn Meade's right, when Duryen's Brigade of Ricketts' Division was dispatched to thwart it, and reached there in good time to render substantial aid in this, and also to assist their comrades in crowning the summit with our arms. This was taken possession of in fine style between sundown and dark, \* \* \* the battle was won. From here we threatened the retreat of the rebels posted between the main ridge and the spur of the mountain, while it commanded the pike on both sides of the mountain. On reaching the summit, Meade was ordered to hold it until further orders."

McClellan's report of same action says : "General Meade speaks highly of General Seymour's skill in handling his brigade on the right. \* \* \* While General Meade was gallantly driving the enemy on the right, General Hatch's Division was engaged in a severe contest for the possession of the crest on the left of the ravine. It moved up the mountain in the following order : two regiments of Patrick's Brigade, deployed as skirmishers, with his other two regiments in support. Colonel Phelps's Brigade in line of battalions in mass, and General Doubleday's Brigade in same order in rear ; the Twenty-first New York (as skirmishers) having gone straight up instead of around the slope, the Second New York, as skirmishers, were sent in its place." These three brigades, afterwards reinforced by Colonel Christian's Brigade of Ricketts' Division, advanced well up the hill, under severe fire. Finally Hartsuff's Brigade came up to fill an interval between Hatch's Division and Meade's, and then the whole line held their position near the crest all night.

Late in the afternoon General Gibbon with his brigade and one section of Gibbon's battery (B. 4, U. S.) was ordered to move up the main road on the enemy's centre. He advanced a regiment on each side of the road, preceded by skirmishers and followed by his other two regiments in double column, the artillery in the road. Gibbon advanced near to the crest under heavy fire, losing many men, but held his ground until relieved by Gorman's Brigade. The Second and Twelfth Corps reached their final positions soon after dark, Richardson's Division, near Mt. Tabor Church, Twelfth Corps and Sedgwick's Division bivouacked around Bolivar. Sykes' Division and the Artillery Reserve at Middletown. General Hatch was wounded in the last advance. At daylight skirmishers were advanced, who found the enemy had retreated, leaving his dead and severely wounded behind.

Cobb's, Semmes' and Mahone's brigades of McLaws' (Confederate) Division held Crampton's Gap, whilst D. H. Hill's Division, consisting of Garland's, Colquitt's, G. B. Anderson's and Ripley's brigades, and Rosser's command of cavalry and artillery, held Turner's Gap; this latter appears to have been the force opposed to Burnside till about the time of Hooker's attack on the right, when Longstreet's command had arrived. D. R. Jones' division, consisting of brigades of Pickett, Kemper, Jenkins and Evans, were in Hooker's front. Hood's Division, consisting of his own, Whiting's, Dayton's and D. R. Jones' (own) brigades were on Confederate right, opposite to Burnside's command.

General Lee says : "The battle continued with great animation

until night. On the south of the turnpike the enemy was driven back some distance, and his attack on the centre repulsed with loss. His great superiority in numbers enabled him to extend beyond both our flanks. By this means he succeeded in reaching the summit of the mountain beyond our left, and, pressing upon us heavily from that direction, gradually forced our troops back after an obstinate resistance. Darkness put an end to the contest." Lee further says in his report: "It was determined to retire to Sharpsburgh, where we would be upon the flank of the enemy should he move against McLaws, and where we would more readily unite with the rest of the army." Lee further says: "The attack on the garrison (Harper's Ferry) began at dawn (15th); \* \* \* in about two hours the garrison, consisting of more than 11,000 men, surrendered. \* \* \* Leaving General A. P. Hill to receive the Federal troops and secure captured property, General Jackson, with his two other divisions, set out at once for Sharpsburgh, ordering Generals McLaws and Walker to follow without delay. Official information of the fall of Harper's Ferry and the approach of Jackson were received soon after the commands of Longstreet and D. H. Hill reached Sharpsburgh on the morning of the 15th; General Jackson arrived early on the 16th, and General Walker came up in the afternoon.

The presence of the enemy in Crampton's Gap embarrassed the movements of General McLaws. He retained the position taken during the night of the 14th to oppose an advance towards Harper's Ferry until the capitulation of that place, when, finding the enemy indisposed to attack, he gradually withdrew his command toward the Potomac. Deeming the roads to Sharpsburgh on the north side impracticable, he resolved to cross at Harper's Ferry and march by way of Shepherdstown, his progress was slow, and he did not reach the battlefield at Sharpsburgh until some time after the engagement of the 17th began.

The commands of Longstreet and D. H. Hill, on their arrival at Sharpsburgh, were placed in position along the range of hills between the town and the Antietam, nearly parallel to the course of that stream, Longstreet on the right of the road to Boonesborough, and Hill on the left. The advance of the enemy was delayed by Fitz Lee's cavalry, and he did not appear on the opposite side of the Antietam until 2 P.M. During the afternoon the batteries on either side were slightly engaged."

It is said that "General McClellan expected to renew the battle" (of



South Mountain) "in the morning, and hence during the night moved up all his forces within easy supporting distance. The enemy, however, rapidly and quickly withdrew under cover of the night and retreated across Antietam Creek in the direction of Sharpsburgh. When the skirmishers advanced cautiously through the mist and gray dawn of the morning, they discovered that the enemy had fled. The heavy fog which had enveloped the mountain, and lay in impenetrable clouds upon the valley, screened the movements of the enemy and delayed a vigorous pursuit until after the middle of the afternoon." Fog and mist, not Fitz Lee's cavalry, delayed the Union advance.

The cavalry under Pleasanton, and three corps under Sumner, Hooker and Mansfield pursued the enemy by the National Turnpike in direction of Boonesborough, the corps of Burnside and Sykes' Division by the old Sharpsburgh Road. General Franklin was to move into Pleasant Valley and endeavor to relieve Harpers' Ferry. The cessation of firing at that post indicated it had fallen. McClellan had not been given command of Harper's Ferry till all communication with that post had been cut off.

Pleasanton's cavalry charged Fitz Lee's cavalry at Boonesborough and captured 250 prisoners and two guns. Richardson's Division of Second Corps and Sykes' Division pushed on through Keedysville and found the enemy in force on the heights on west side of Antietam Creek, his batteries overlooking our approach. This creek was deep and crossed only at distant points by bridges. The army was gotten up during the night and morning of 16th. Reconnaissances showed Lee's army in position awaiting attack. This position extended from the heights near the Potomac to the left of Sharpsburgh, running around in a semi-circle in front of that town. General Hooker with his (First) Corps was ordered to cross Antietam Creek to the Union right, to be supported by the Twelfth and Second Corps; Hooker's Corps crossed the creek about 2 P.M. on the 16th; the Twelfth Corps crossed the creek during the night of the 16th.

McClellan says: "His plan for the impending engagement was to attack the enemy's left with the corps of Hooker and Mansfield, supported by Sumner's, and, if necessary, by Franklin's, and as soon as matters looked favorable there, to move the corps of Burnside against the enemy's extreme right, upon the ridge running to the south and rear of Sharpsburgh, and having carried that position, to press along the crest toward our right, and whenever either of these flank movements

should be successful, to advance our centre with all the forces then disposable. \* \* \* On reaching the vicinity of the enemy's left, a sharp contest commenced with the Pennsylvania Reserves, the advance of Hooker's Corps, near the house of D. Miller. The enemy was driven from a strip of woods, where he was first met. The firing lasted until dark, when General Hooker's Corps rested on their arms on ground won from the enemy. \* \* \* At daylight on the 17th the action was commenced by the skirmishers of the Pennsylvania Reserves."

General Meade says in his report: "The division left the mountain gap on the morning of the 15th and marched beyond Keedysville, bivouacking in the forks of the little and big Antietam. On the afternoon of the 16th, about 2 o'clock, the division constituting the advance of Hooker's Corps moved \* \* \* on the road to Williamsport, when, after crossing the bridge over the main Antietam, the head of the column was moved to the left across the country, advancing on what was understood to be the enemy's left flank. Soon after leaving the road the cavalry \* \* \* reported having been fired upon, when \* \* \* the regiment of rifles was advanced as skirmishers to a piece of woods on our left, and four companies of the Third Regiment were deployed as skirmishers and sent into a piece of woods on our right.

The main column, formed of battalions in mass, division front, with the artillery, moved over the ground towards a high ridge in front. The Bucktail skirmishers finding the enemy, General Seymour with his brigade was directed to advance to their support. This was promptly done, and soon Seymour was closely engaged with the enemy's infantry and artillery, Cooper's battery being posted by Seymour to reply to the enemy's artillery.

In the meantime I had gained the crest with the head of the column, and entered a piece of woods, which proved to be in its direction perpendicular to the line along which Seymour had advanced. On entering these woods the enemy's battery could be plainly seen in a cornfield playing on Seymour's column in the front, the masses of his infantry deployed around the battery. The fact that only one regiment, the head of our column, was deployed, deterred me from endeavoring to capture the battery by a charge. Ordered up Ransom's battery and caused the enemy to withdraw his guns to an eminence in the rear, from whence he commenced shelling the woods we occupied, and the ridge immediately behind it.

In the meantime, Magilton's and Anderson's brigades came up and

were deployed in line of battle to support Ransom's battery. After driving the enemy from the woods, Seymour held his own, and darkness intervening the contest closed for the night. Seymour holding the woods immediately in front of the enemy and Anderson and Magilton the woods on their flank, Ransom was withdrawn to the rear; Cooper remained in the position occupied in the commencement of the action; and Simpson's battery of howitzers, which had been posted on the ridge to the rear, replying to the enemy's battery in its second position, also remained there.

During the night the enemy made two attacks on Seymour's pickets, in both of which he was repulsed with, it is believed, severe loss. At early daylight on the 17th, the contest was warmly renewed by Seymour, the enemy attacking him with vigor. The general commanding the corps had sent Ricketts' Division to Seymour's support, and had advanced Doubleday's Division along the woods occupied by Magilton's and Anderson's Brigades. These brigades were formed in columns of battalions in mass, and moved forward in rear of Doubleday. Seymour and Ricketts advancing through one piece of woods and Doubleday on their right advancing along the Hagerstown Pike, left an open space between them, in which was a ploughed field and an orchard; beyond this was a corn field, the possession of which the enemy warmly disputed. Ransom's battery was advanced into the open ground between the two advancing columns and played with great effect on the enemy's infantry and batteries.

The brigades of Anderson and Magilton, on reaching the corn field, were moved in a ravine extending up to the pike. Soon after forming, I saw the enemy were driving our men from the corn field; I immediately deployed both brigades, and formed line of battle along the fence bordering the corn field, for the purpose of covering the withdrawal of our people and resisting the further advance of the enemy. Just as this line of battle was formed, I received an order of the general commanding the corps to detach a brigade to reinforce our troops in the woods on the left; I directed Magilton's Brigade to move in that direction, which order was promptly executed, notwithstanding the brigade, moving by the flank, was subjected to a warm fire from the corn field. Anderson's Brigade still held the fence on the right, but the gap made by the withdrawal of Magilton's Brigade was soon filled by the enemy, whose infantry advanced boldly through the corn field to the woods; seeing this, I rode up to Ransom's battery and directed his guns on their

advancing columns, which fire, together with the arrival of Magilton's Brigade, in connection with Seymour and Ricketts, drove the enemy back, who as they retreated were enfiladed by Anderson, who eventually gained the crest of the ridge in the corn field.

At this time, about 10 A. M., my division had been engaged about five hours, and their ammunition was being exhausted; I, therefore, welcomed the arrival of Bank's Corps, the left column of which, commanded by the gallant Mansfield, moved up to our support in the woods on the left, and a column under General Williams moved up to the woods on the right of the turnpike. \* \* \* The Tenth Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Warner, was detached to the right of the road, was put in action by General Gibbon and did good service. \* \* \* also Cooper's and Simpson's batteries were early in the morning posted on the crest of the ridge we occupied the evening previous, from whence they had a command of the enemy's left flank, \* \* \* doing good service. \* \* \* Between 11 and 12 M. Mansfield's and Sumner's corps arrived. \* \* \*

General Hooker being wounded, I was directed to take command of the corps. I directed the various divisions to be withdrawn as soon as they were relieved and to be assembled and reorganized on the ridge in our rear.

By 2 P. M. the Pennsylvania Reserve Division, commanded by General Seymour, was organized on this ridge, supplied with ammunition and held in readiness to repel an attack of the enemy should he attempt one on our right flank, or assist in any advance we might make."

The Twelfth Corps, General Mansfield commanding, was brought up between 7 and 8 A. M. to assist the First Corps. The First Division of Twelfth Corps, General Williams commanding, was deployed to the right, its right resting on the Hagerstown Pike; the Second Division, General Greene, on the left, extending as far as the burnt building to the northeast of the white church on the pike. During the deployment of the corps General Mansfield was killed. The attack of this (Twelfth) Corps was begun by Knaps, Pa. Co'hran's N. Y. and Hampton's Pa. batteries. The attack of this corps continued about two hours, the enemy working around west of the pike, when the Second Corps (General Sumner commanding the right wing after the wounding of General Hooker) came up, Sedgwick's Division leading, and coming on to the ground held by the Twelfth Corps. Sedgwick's Division advanced to the west of the

pike, but being attacked in the front and on left flank by the enemy it was forced back, General Sedgwick and about the same time General Hooker, being wounded, about 11 A. M.

Batteries were now (General Sumner commanding) collected to stop the enemy's advance upon Sedgwick's repulse, and the Union attack practically ceased on the right. General French's Division of Second Corps came in more to the left near Union centre, near to the houses on Roulette's farm. The enemy counter-charged several times; the fighting here was alternately in favor of one and then of the other. General French captured several hundred prisoners and several flags. The Confederates considered this the critical point of the day; they had concentrated so much to their left, this part of their line was weak.

Richardson's Division came in still farther to the left; Meagher's Brigade getting up to Roulette's house, it was relieved by Caldwell's Brigade, near the crest overlooking Piper's house. Colonel Barlow, with Sixty-First and Sixty-Fourth New York flanked a part of the enemy's force in a sunken road and took prisoners and colors. Also Colonel Cross, with Fifth New Hampshire and Eighty-First Pennsylvania, performed a brilliant and gallant feat in counter-charging. Piper's house was ultimately gained.

A section of Robertson's battery under Lieutenant Vincent and Graham's Battery, First U. S., assisted to hold the position. General Richardson was killed and General Hancock came into command of the division. This part of the Union line was held by assistance of batteries from the cavalry and artillery reserve. About 1 P. M. Franklin's Corps came up on the right; its arrival was timely, as the enemy were beginning a return attack all along the left. Franklin was about to attack the position near Dunker Church when General Sumner ordered a postponement. Porter's Fifth Corps held the centre of the main line of battle, being posted on the left (east) bank of Antietam Creek. He sent during the day portions of his force to assistance of Richardson and Burnside.

Burnside with his corps and the Kanawha Division was about 8 A. M. ordered to carry the stone bridge and cross the Antietam. Crook's Brigade of the Kanawha Division was sent first, but not knowing the location of the bridge, struck the stream above it; the first attempt to carry the bridge was unsuccessful and Colonel Kingsbury, a most promising young officer, was killed. Later in the day the Fifty-First New York and Fifty-First Pennsylvania, being supported by troops above and

below the bridge, carried it. The enemy holding the bridge, learning that his flanks were threatened by Crook above and by Rodman's Division below the bridge, retreated to the heights on his side of the stream.

After crossing their command Burnside and Cox (both appear to have commanded the same troops) were slow in forming for attack, but their troops when ordered to advance, about 3.30 P. M., advanced most gallantly to the first crest; here being reformed and reinforced, the entire command pushed on to the edge of Sharpsburgh. Just as Burnside's command was entering Sharpsburgh (Burnside had moved up Rodman's Division from his left to the front, leaving his left uncovered), A. P. Hill's Division arrived upon the field coming from Harper's Ferry. Hill's command at once attacked the Union left and left rear and forced the whole line back to the crest near the Antietam. Both sides now being completely exhausted the battle ceased.

It was the hardest and best fought battle by both sides, of the war. McClellan had 87,000 men for duty, probably 70,000 in the action. Lee claimed he had only 40,000 muskets, but he held a chosen position with ample time to prepare it; this advantage with modern arms, fully counterbalanced McClellan's superior numbers. Moreover, McClellan had to retain one-fourth of his command practically idle to hold the connection between his widely separated wings. McClellan's attack on his right was too much by piecemeal, and made without sufficient artillery. These were faults too common throughout the war. Only at Gettysburg was artillery used properly on both sides. The attack on the left was badly managed; was especially too slow after it was begun.

General Lee of this campaign in his report says: "The war was thus (by Pope's campaign) transferred from the interior to the frontier, and the supplies of rich and productive districts made accessible to our army. To prolong a state of affairs in every way desirable, and not to permit the season of active operations to pass without endeavoring to inflict further injury on the enemy. (\* \* \* It was hoped military success might afford us an opportunity to aid the citizens of Maryland in any efforts they might be disposed to make to recover their liberties.) \* \* \* The army, though not equipped for invasion, was transferred into Maryland.

It had been supposed that the advance upon Frederickstown would have led to the evacuation of Martinsburg and Harper's Ferry, thus opening the line of communication through the valley. This not having occurred, General Jackson was directed to proceed with his command

to Martinsburg, and after driving the enemy from that place, to move down the south side of the Potomac to Harper's Ferry. McLaws, with his own and R. H. Anderson's Division, was ordered to seize Maryland Heights, on the north side of the Potomac opposite Harper's Ferry, and General Walker to take possession of Loudon Heights, east of the Shenandoah. These commands, after reducing Harper's Ferry and clearing the valley of the enemy, were to join the rest of the army at Boonesboro or Hagerstown. The march of the troops began on 10th; remainder of Longstreet's command and D. H. Hill's Division crossed South Mountain and moved towards Boonesboro. General Stuart remained east of the mountains to watch the enemy and to retard his advance. Longstreet went to Hagerstown and D. H. Hill to Boonesboro. \* \* \* It had not been intended to oppose passage of the Federal army through South Mountain. General Jackson crossed the Potomac near Williamsport on 11th; sent A. P. Hill to Martinsburg. Martinsburg was evacuated on the 11th, troops (Federal) going to Harper's Ferry. General Walker took possession of Loudon Heights on 13th. McLaws encountered more opposition, but carried Maryland Heights at 4.30 on 13th; Harper's Ferry was fully invested on 14th and surrendered at 8 A. M. on 15th. Hearing of McClellan's advance, the troops were returned as before described to South Mountain.

Longstreet was posted " (at Sharpsburg) " on the right of the road to Boonesboro, and D. H. Hill on the left. Hood's two brigades were transferred from the right on 16th to left, between D. H. Hill and Hagerstown Road, in anticipation of a movement against Confederate left. Jackson was posted on Hood's left, his right on Hagerstown Road, left toward the Potomac, with Stuart's cavalry on his left. General Walker with his two brigades was posted on Longstreet's right. At 10 P. M. (16th) Hood's troops were relieved by Lawton's and Trimble's brigades of Ewell's Division; Jackson's own division on Lawton's left, supported by remaining brigades of Ewell's Division.

At early dawn (17th) artillery opened. \* \* \* Under cover of their fire Union troops attacked Jackson; \* \* \* for several hours the conflict raged with great fury and alternate success. \* \* \* General Starke was killed, General Lawton wounded. \* \* \* Our troops slowly yielded to overwhelming numbers and fell back. \* \* \* Hood returned to the field and relieved the brigades of Trimble, Lawton and Hays. \* \* \* General Early, who succeeded to the command of Ewell's Division, was ordered to move with his brigade to take the

place of Jackson's Division withdrawn, a part of the latter remaining with Early, also portions of Trimble's, Lawton's and Hays' brigades. Hood was reinforced by brigades of Ripley, Colquitt and Garland of D. H. Hill's Division, and afterwards by D. R. Jones' Brigade. \* \* \*

The desperate resistance they (the enemy) encountered delayed their progress until the troops of McLaws arrived, and those of General Walker were brought from the right. \* \* \* Hood's Brigade was relieved by Walker's command, who immediately attacked and drove the enemy back. \* \* \* Colonel Manny, commanding Walker's Brigade, pursued until he was stopped by a strong fence, behind which were posted a large force of infantry" (Third Brigade of Reserves) "and several batteries; Colonel Manny was wounded and his command fell back. \* \* \* Upon the arrival of reinforcements under McLaws, General Early attacked; McLaws advanced at the same time, \* \* \* beyond the position occupied at the beginning of the engagement. The attack on the left was speedily followed by one in the centre; this was met by part of Walker's Division and brigades of G. B. Anderson and Rodes, of D. H. Hill's command, assisted by artillery. General R. H. Anderson's Division came to General D. H. Hill's support.\* \* \* At this time, by a mistake of orders, Rodes' Brigade was withdrawn; \* \* \* the enemy pressed through this gap and G. B. Anderson's Brigade was broken and retired; General G. B. Anderson was killed, Major-General R. H. Anderson and General Wright wounded. \* \* \* While the attack on the centre and left was in progress the enemy made repeated efforts to force the passage of the bridge over the Antietam defended by Second and Twentieth Georgia and General D. R. Jones' batteries; General Jones had about 2,000 men; \* \* \* he was reinforced by General A. P. Hill's command, it having left Harper's Ferry at 7.30 A. M."

The Reserve Division, already reduced by losses in battle on the Peninsula and in Pope's campaign, and by absentees with and without authority, went into the South Mountain and Antietam battles much reduced in numbers. The losses in these two last battles being so very heavy, the division, as it came out of them, was not larger than a brigade. Regiments were commanded by captains and companies by non-commissioned officers. Governor Curtin, September 30th, wrote to President Lincoln requesting that the division might be sent to the State to be recruited. This was refused, as it was hoped by the authorities that the Army of the Potomac would make another advance toward



Richmond before the bad weather set in. This was not accomplished, as the army did not begin to move till October 26th, on which day, Sunday, in a severe rain storm, the division broke camp near Sharpsburg, marched southeasterly and encamped at night in Pleasant Valley, at the base of South Mountain. The division, General Meade commanding, crossed the Potomac at Berlin October 30th and marched beyond Lovettsville and remained here until November 1st. The main army advanced along the east side of the mountains till it reached Warrenton. The Reserve Division passed through Waterford, Pennville, Union and Middleburg, and encamped south of Warrenton November 6th; General McClellan was relieved of command of the Army of the Potomac November 7th, and General Burnside immediately assumed command.

That McClellan ought to have advanced against the Confederate army sooner than he did is not now doubted, although his demands for necessary horses, shoes and other supplies were not promptly supplied.

Yet it was a great military error to relieve McClellan at the time he was relieved.

#### THE BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG.

When McClellan was relieved the Army of the Potomac was located about as follows: The First, Second and Fifth Corps, Reserve artillery and army headquarters were at Warrenton, the Ninth Corps on the Rappahannock, at Waterloo; Sixth Corps at New Baltimore; Eleventh Corps at Gainesville and Thoroughfare Gap; Sickles' Division of Third Corps on Orange and Alexandria Railroad; Pleasonton, with his cavalry opposite Longstreet, who was at Culpeper; Bayard's cavalry near Rappahannock Station. The Confederate General Jackson, with about half the Confederate army, was west of the mountains. General Seymour was relieved about this time, and General Jackson returned to duty. Colonel Sinclair, of the Sixth, commanded the First Brigade, Colonel Magilton the Second, and General Jackson the Third. The One Hundred and Twenty First Pennsylvania was attached to the First Brigade, and One Hundred and Forty-Second Pennsylvania to the Second. The Twelfth Regiment was commanded by Captain Gustin.

Burnside's plan of campaign, as approved by General Halleck, carried the army to Falmouth, where it was rapidly marched, arriving between the 18th and 21st. The pontoon bridges to cross the Rappahannock River having been delayed the Confederate army concentrated at Fredericks-

burg before the Union army could be crossed. General Burnside formed the Army of the Potomac, which at this time was very strong, into three grand divisions: The Right Grand Division consisting of the Second and Ninth Corps, under General Sumner; the centre, of the Third and Fifth Corps under General Hooker; the left, of the First and Sixth Corps, under General Franklin. The Eleventh Corps under General Sigel was held as a reserve.

The army was ordered to cross the Rappahannock, on the 10th; Franklin's Grand Division crossed without opposition on the 11th and 12th. The Reserves, commanded by General Meade, constituted a division of the First Corps, which was commanded by General Reynolds. The centre and right of the army were opposed by sharpshooters, and only after pontoon boats filled with infantry, at the suggestion of General Hunt, Chief of Artillery, had crossed and driven off the enemy's skirmishers, were the engineers able to place bridges for the centre and right. The First Corps, with the Reserve Division on the left of the corps, was on the extreme left of the army, the Sixth Corps supported the First. The evening of the 11th, Howard's Division of Second Corps occupied the town of Fredericksburg, the balance of the Second Corps and the Ninth Corps crossed during the night and next morning. Hooker's Grand Division followed Sumner's.

Longstreet's Confederate Corps held the heights on Lee's left, D. H. Hill's Division the right centre and Jackson's Corps the right. Jackson had been watching the lower Rappahannock.

It would appear that Burnside's original plan of attack was for Franklin to commence the attack on the Union left with his whole force and endeavor to turn Lee's right, and while this was being done, the Union right to attack in force Lee's left. But the order of attack as acted upon, both by Franklin and Sumner, was to attack with one division and to follow this attack up, Franklin "to keep his main command in readiness for a rapid movement along the old Richmond Road." The attack was made on the left by the Reserve Division, supported by Gibbon's Division on its right and by Doubleday's Division first in reserve and afterwards on its left.

General Meade describes the Reserves' attack as follows: "First Brigade, Colonel Sinclair commanding, Sixth, First Rifles, First and Second Regiments of Reserves, One Hundred and Twenty-first Pennsylvania; Second Brigade, Colonel Magilton, of Fourth, commanding, Third, Fourth, Seventh and Eighth Reserves and One Hundred and

Forty-Second Pennsylvania : Third Brigade, General Jackson commanding, Fifth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh and Twelfth Regiments Pennsylvania Reserves. Attached to this division were four batteries of four guns each, commanded by Captain Ransom, Third United States, and Lieutenant T. G. Simpson, Captain Cooper, and Captain Amsden of First Pennsylvania Artillery.

On the 11th instant the division moved from the camp near White Oak Church to the vicinity of the point on the Rappahannock River selected for the crossing of the Left Grand Division. The previous evening Captain Amsden's battery of rifled guns had been detached and ordered to report to Captain DeRussy, U. S. A., for service on the river bank. General Jackson's Brigade, together with Ransom's and Simpson's batteries, were also detached and sent down during the night of the 10th, and posted on the river bank to protect the crossing, which duty was successfully accomplished without loss, although there was considerable firing between our sharpshooters and those of the enemy posted on the opposite bank.

The bridges being completed, the division crossed the river on the morning of the 12th, and was posted on the plateau, on the left of the line of battle formed by the Left Grand Division. The following was the formation of the division : The First Brigade in line of battle, its left resting on the river bank, and the line extending in a northwesterly direction, along and in rear of the ravine at Smithfield, the right connecting with the left of Gibbon's Division. Two regiments of this brigade, the First Rifles and Second Infantry were detached, the former for picket duty, the latter to occupy the buildings and outhouses at Smithfield, and to hold the bridge across the ravine at its debouche into the river. The batteries were posted in front of the First Brigade, on the edge of the ravine, where they had complete command of the front and of the approach by the Bowling Green Road.

The Second Brigade was formed in line of battle three hundred paces in rear of the first and parallel to it; and the Third Brigade along the river bank in column of regiments, the head of the column being one hundred paces in rear of the left of the Second Brigade. This position was occupied by 3 P. M. without any serious opposition from the enemy, but with occasional skirmishes with the pickets in front.

Early on the morning of the 13th I accompanied the general commanding the corps to the headquarters of the Left Grand Division, where the Commanding General indicated the point he was instructed to

attack ; and I was informed that my division had been selected to make the attack. The point indicated was on the ridge, or rather range of heights, extending from the Rappahannock in rear of Fredericksburg, to the Massaponax, and was situated near the left of this ridge, where it terminated in the Massaponax Valley.

Between the heights to be attacked and the plateau on which the Left Grand Division was posted, there was a depression or hollow of several hundred yards in width, through which, and close to the foot of the heights, the Richmond Railroad ran. The heights along the east were wooded. The slope to the railroad from the extreme left, for the space of three or four hundred yards, was clear. Beyond this it was wooded, the woods extending across the hollows and in front of the railroad. The plateau on our side was level and cultivated ground up to the crest of the hollow, where there was quite a fall to the railroad. The enemy occupied the wooded heights, the line of the railroad and the woods in front. Owing to the woods, nothing could be seen of them, while all our movements on the cleared ground were exposed to their view.

Immediately on receiving orders, the division was moved forward, across the Smithfield ravine, advancing down the river some seven or eight hundred yards, when it turned sharp to the right and crossed the Bowling Green Road, which here runs in a parallel direction with the railroad. Some time was consumed in removing the hedge fences on this road and bridging the drains on each side for the passage of artillery. Between 9 and 10 A. M. the column of attack was formed as follows : The First Brigade in line of battle on the crest of the hollow and facing the railroad, with the Sixth Regiment deployed as skirmishers ; the Second Brigade in rear of the First three hundred paces ; the Third Brigade by the flank, its right flank being a few yards to the rear of the First Brigade, having the Ninth Regiment deployed on its flank as skirmishers and flankers ; the batteries between the First and Second brigades.

This disposition had scarcely been made when the enemy opened a brisk fire from a battery posted on the Bowling Green Road, the shot from which took the command from the left to rear. Apprehending an attack from that quarter, the Third Brigade was faced to the left (thus forming with the First two sides of a square). Simpson's battery was advanced to the front and left of the Third Brigade, and Cooper's and Ransom's batteries moved to a knoll on the left of the First Brigade.

These batteries immediately opened fire on the enemy's battery, and, in conjunction with some of Doubleday's batteries in our rear, on the other side of Bowling Green Road, after some twenty minutes firing, silenced and compelled the withdrawal of the guns.

During the artillery duel the enemy advanced a body of sharpshooters along the Bowling Green Road and under cover of the hedges and trees at the road side. General Jackson promptly sent out two companies of marksmen from his brigade, who drove the enemy back. No further demonstration on our left and rear being made, the advance was again determined on. Previous to pushing forward the infantry, the batteries were directed to shell the heights and the woods in front. For this purpose, and to protect our lines in case of falling back, Ransom's battery was moved to the right and front of the First Brigade and Amsden's battery, which had just rejoined from detached duty, was posted on the right of Cooper.

During this operation, by order of the general commanding the First Corps, the Third Brigade, changed front and formed in line of battle on the left of the First Brigade, its left extending so as to be nearly opposite to the end of the ridge to be attacked. The formation was barely executed before the enemy opened a sharp fire from a battery posted on the heights to our extreme left. Cooper's, Amsden's and Ransom's batteries were immediately turned on it, and after about thirty minutes rapid fire the enemy abandoned his guns, having had two of his limbers or caissons blown up, the explosions from which were plainly visible. As soon as the enemy's guns were silenced the line of infantry was advanced to the attack. The First Brigade to the right advanced several hundred yards over cleared ground, driving the enemy's skirmishers before them, till they reached the woods previously described as being in front of the railroad, which they entered, driving the enemy out of them to the railroad, where they were found strongly posted in ditches and behind temporary defences.

The brigade (First) drove them from there and up the heights in their front. Owing to a heavy fire being received on their right flank, they obliques over to that side, but continued forcing the enemy back till they had crowned the crest of the hill, crossed a main road which runs along the crest and reached open ground on the other side, where they were assailed by a very severe fire from a large force in their front, and at the same time the enemy opened a battery which completely enfiladed them from the right flank. After holding their ground for

some time, and no support arriving, they were compelled to fall back to the railroad.

The Second Brigade, which advanced in rear of the First, after reaching the railroad, had so severe a fire on their right flank that the Fourth Regiment halted and formed, faced to the right, to repel this attack. The other regiments in passing through the woods, being assailed from the left, inclined to that direction and ascended the heights, the Third going up as the One Hundred and Twenty-First Pennsylvania, of the First Brigade, was retiring. The Third continued to advance and reached nearly the same point as the First Brigade, but was compelled to withdraw for the same reason. The Seventh Regiment engaged the enemy to the left, capturing many prisoners and a standard, driving them from their rifle pits and temporary defences, and continuing the pursuit till, encountering the enemy's reinforcements, they were in turn driven back. The Third Brigade had not advanced over one hundred yards when the battery on the height on its left was re-manned, and poured a destructive fire into its ranks.

Perceiving this, I dispatched my aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Dehon, with orders for General Jackson to move by the right flank till he could clear the open ground in front of the battery and then, ascending the heights through the woods, sweep around to the left and take the battery. Unfortunately, Lieutenant Dehon fell just as he reached General Jackson, and a short time after the latter officer was killed. The regiments did, however, partially execute the movement by obliquing to the right, and advanced across the railroad, a portion ascending the heights in the front. The loss of their commander and the severity of the fire, from both artillery and infantry, to which they were subjected, compelled them to withdraw when those on their right withdrew.

It will be seen from the foregoing that the attack was for a time perfectly successful. The enemy was driven from the railroad, his rifle pits and breastworks for over half a mile, over two hundred prisoners were taken and several standards, when the advanced line encountered the heavy reinforcements of the enemy, who, recovering from the effects of our assault, and perceiving both our flanks unprotected, poured in such a destructive fire from all directions as to compel the line to fall back, which was conducted without confusion.

Perceiving the danger of too great penetration of my line without support, I dispatched several staff officers both to General Gibbon's command and to General Birney's (whose division had replaced mine at

the batteries from whence we advanced), urging an advance to my support, the one on my right, the other to the left. A brigade of Birney's advanced to our relief, just as my men were withdrawn from the woods, and Gibbon's Division advanced into the woods on our right in time to assist materially in the safe withdrawal of my broken line. An unsuccessful effort was made to reform the division in the hollow in front of the batteries. Failing in this, the command was reformed beyond the Bowling Green Road and marched to the ground occupied the night before, where it was held in reserve till the night of the 15th, when we recrossed the river.

Accompanying this report is a list giving the names of the killed, wounded and missing, amounting in the aggregate to 1,760. When I report that 4,500 men is a liberal estimate of the strength of the division taken into action " (this includes two new regiments, One Hundred and Twenty-First and One Hundred and Forty-Second Pennsylvania, say 1,000) " this large loss, being nearly 40 per cent., will fully bear me out in the expression of my satisfaction at the good conduct of both officers and men. While I deeply regret the inability of the division, after having successfully penetrated the enemy's line, to remain and hold what it had secured, at the same time I deem their withdrawal a matter of necessity. With one brigade commander killed, another wounded, nearly half their number *hors de combat*, with regiments separated from brigades, and companies from regiments, and all the confusion and disaster incidental to the advance of an extended line through woods and other obstructions, assailed by a heavy fire, not only of infantry, but of artillery, not only in front but on both flanks, the best troops would be justified in withdrawing without loss of honor.

\* \* \* My thanks are due to Colonel Sinclair, of Sixth Regiment, and Colonel Magilton, of Fourth, for the manner in which they handled their commands. To Colonel Sinclair particularly, who had command of the advance during the whole day, and who was severely wounded, I desire to express my obligation for the assistance rendered me.

\* \* \* The loss of Lieutenant Arthur Dehon, Twelfth Regiment, my aide, is greatly to be deplored. \* \* \* The public service has also to mourn the loss of Brigadier-General Jackson, an officer of merit and reputation, who owed his position to his gallantry and good conduct in previous actions. \* \* \*

Swinton in his history of the Army of the Potomac says: " Meade advanced across the plain, but had not proceeded far before he was

compelled to stop and silence a battery that Stuart had posted on the Port Royal Road, and which had a flank fire on his left. This done he pushed on, his line preceded by a cloud of skirmishers and his batteries vigorously shelling the heights and woods in his front. This caused considerable loss to Hill, who held Jackson's line; but the Confederates concealed in the woods made no reply from artillery or infantry until Meade reached within point blank range, when, suddenly opening, shell and canister were poured in from the long silent Confederate batteries. Yet this did not stay him; and the line advanced so boldly that the three Confederate batteries, posted in advance of the railroad, had to be hastily withdrawn. The division of A. P. Hill, which held Jackson's advance line, was thus disposed: The brigades of Archer, Lane and Pender, from right to left, with Gregg's in rear of the interval between Archer and Lane, and Thomas' in rear of that, between Lane and Pender. Meade pushed forward his line impetuously, drove back Lane through the woods, and then wedged in between Lane and the brigade on his right, swept back the right flank of the one and the left flank of the other, capturing above two hundred prisoners and several standards, crossed the railroad, pushed up the crest and reached Gregg's position on a new military road which Lee had made for the purpose of connecting his two wings." Meade met Gregg's Brigade at the military road, and while contending with it Early's Division came up and attacked both his flanks, compelling Meade by overwhelming numbers to retire. Swinton farther says: "Gibbon advanced on the right of Meade, and though he did not push on as far as the latter, he helped stem the hostile return, and assisted in the withdrawal of Meade's shattered line." Birney's Division came up too late to assist the attack, but in time to render valuable assistance to Meade's and Gibbon's retiring troops.

"At the time the attack on the left was fully developed, Sumner, on the right, was instructed to assail the height back of Fredericksburg. He was ordered to make the attack with a single division, supported by another. \* \* \* Couch's Second Corps occupied the town. Wilcox's Ninth Corps the interval between Couch and Franklin. \* \* \* Couch ordered forward French's Division from the town at noon, to be followed and supported by Hancock's Division. French \* \* \* moved out on the plank and telegraph roads, and, crossing the canal, found a rise of ground, under cover of which he deployed his troops \* \* \* with brigade front, Kimble in front, Andrew's and Palmer's (brigades) following. Hancock followed, in same formation, with



Zook's, Meagher's and Caldwell's brigades." These divisions made a gallant assault, but failed to reach Longstreet's line. Howard's Division, then Sturges' and Getty's attacked with same ill success. Finally, Humphreys' Division assaulted against the advice of General Hooker, and failed as had the other divisions, all with terrible losses.

"The losses in some of the commands," (says Mulholland, in his account of this battle) "were unusually severe. The Eleventh Reserves lost six color bearers inside of a few minutes, and Company 'E' of that regiment had but three men left unhurt. Company 'C' Twelfth Regiment lost forty of the forty-nine present, and among the wounded was the Captain, H. S. Lucas." During the night of the 15th the army was withdrawn and recrossed the Rappahannock.

This battle showed most conclusively the advantages of the defence with modern weapons. Even a temporarily fortified position can only be taken under favorable circumstances for the offence, such as dense woods near enemy's position, fog, darkness and the like. Twelfth Regiment lost in this action : Killed thirteen ; wounded, five officers and sixty-six men ; missing two officers and thirty-one men ; total one hundred and twenty-two, about one half the number taken into action. The losses in the Reserve Division had been so great in the battle of Fredericksburg, it was necessary to reorganize it and fill it up or to break it up. Its conduct had been so brilliant in this battle even the Secretary of War could not but see it would be best to retain the organization.

Colonel Hardin, of Twelfth, returned to the command the latter part of December and was assigned to command of the Third Brigade, but was not yet sufficiently recovered from wounds received at Second Bull Run battle to remain in the wet and cold camp at Belle Plain. On the 8th of January the Twelfth Regiment left Belle Plain on transports for Alexandria, arrived on 9th, camped near Fairfax Seminary two days, from whence it was moved to Union Hill. The Reserves had been transferred to the Department of Washington to give them rest, but the guerrilla, Mosby, was so active, the picket duty here became more arduous than it was with the Army of the Potomac, and altogether the duties were no lighter nor the quarters any better than they were in the active army. The command failed to obtain the rest it required, and consequently the slightly wounded and sick absentees were in no hurry to rejoin their command. The object of retiring the division, that is, giving the men rest and filling up the ranks, was not accomplished.

Many sick men who could be of no further service were discharged, and many commissioned officers, whose wounds or other injuries rendered them unfit for further service, were permitted to resign, or they were transferred to the Invalid Corps. Some sick were returned to the regiments.

Lieutenant-Colonel Bailey resigned February 15th, 1863, also Dr. Taylor and Chaplain Miller resigned and Captain Horn of Company D, who had been severely wounded on the Peninsula, was honorably discharged.

The 20th day of April, 1863, the Third Brigade, commanded by Colonel Fisher, was ordered to the City of Washington to guard Confederate prisoners and to do Provost duty. The Ninth and Twelfth Regiments, both under command of Colonel Hardin, were assigned to Carroll Barracks on Capitol Hill, where details were made to guard prisoners and Government property.

## CHAPTER XI.

### GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN.

The Gettysburg campaign on the Union side began with the battle of Beverly Ford, one of the results of which was the knowledge that Lee's army was moving northwestward. This action was the most important, as well as the most severe, the cavalry of the Army of the Potomac had fought. By it the Union cavalry not only developed General Lee's plan of campaign, but also learned its equality with the Confederate cavalry.

As soon as General Hooker received certain information that Lee had extended his army from Fredericksburg to the Shenandoah Valley, he proposed to General Halleck to attack Lee's rear at Fredericksburg; this movement was disapproved. General Hooker then gave orders preparatory to meeting General Lee's army in its northwestward movement.

There was some delay due to instructions from General Halleck, but in a few days the Army of the Potomac moved between the Confederate army and Washington, with the main body of its cavalry on its left (west) flank. The cavalry covered the Union army most thoroughly. It never performed its duty toward that army in a more scientific (military) manner. The fighting about Aldie, Upperville and Middleburg, Virginia, was admitted by the Confederates to have been the best the Union cavalry had done, except at Beverly Ford. The cavalry was supported by a small force of infantry, both at Beverly Ford and in the actions near Middleburg. A German officer, Major Von Bocke (who was with the Confederates), and others state that General Stuart's Confederate cavalry was never more numerous (Von Bocke estimated it at 12,000 and twenty-four guns) and never in better condition. Considering this, we can the better appreciate the fine work done by the Union cavalry on this advance northward. The Confederate cavalry considerably outnumbered the Union up to the time that General Stahl's Cavalry Division, from the defences of Washington, joined the army. The management of the cavalry, whilst en route to Gettysburg, was only surpassed when it was led by the indomitable will and marvelous skill of General Sheridan.

The Army of the Potomac, moving slowly northwestward, crossed the Potomac June 26 and 27. General Lee's main army had crossed that river at or near Williamsport, Md., on 23d and 24th. When General Hooker reached the vicinity of Washington his army had been much reduced by expirations of terms of service (Hooker said about 40,000). He now learned that there was a large number of troops (about 37,000) in the defences of Washington. Inasmuch as the Union army now covered Washington, he requested that some of these troops be sent to reinforce his army. He was authorized to take Stahl's Cavalry Division and the Pennsylvania Reserve Division. He ordered the latter division (June 24) to join his army.

When the Reserves heard that General Lee threatened to invade Maryland and probably Pennsylvania, officers and men began to take on the military air, which had been somewhat laid aside after Fredericksburg; and "talk" of applying to rejoin their comrades of the Army of the Potomac, on their march northward, became prevalent, and went so far, in one case at least, as to be put in the form of a written petition. Whatever the form, the feeling of the command, from drummer boy to chaplain, was to take another turn at the "Johnnies," to go in for a fight, if Lee's army went as far north as Pennsylvania. June 24, the Twelfth Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Gustin commanding, formed a part of the Third Brigade. Colonel Fisher commanded the brigade, General Crawford the division. The Third Brigade, consisting of the Fifth, Lieutenant-Colonel Dare; Ninth, Colonel Anderson; Tenth, Colonel Warner; Eleventh, Colonel Jackson, and Twelfth, Lieutenant-Colonel Gustin, was at this date in camp at Minors' Mill. The First Brigade, Colonel McCandless commanding, consisting of the First Rifles (old Bucktails) and First, Second and Sixth Regiments, was camped at Fairfax Court House. The Second Brigade, Colonel Sickel commanding, consisting of the Third, Fourth, Seventh and Eighth Regiments, was on provost duty in Alexandria, Va.

In accordance with instructions from General Hooker, General Crawford ordered the three brigades of the Pennsylvania Reserve Division to march on the 25th. The First and Third Brigades moved accordingly, but the Second Brigade was detained by General Slough, Military Governor of Alexandria. He thought a veteran brigade necessary to keep convalescents in camp! In violation of all military principles he retained this splendid body of veterans against their will and in disobedience of General Hooker's orders.

However, he was sustained by the action of the military "coterie" which surrounded our noble President. This "coterie" never forgave General Hooker for his first dispatch upon assuming command of the Army of the Potomac, namely, requesting that General Stone be made chief of his staff. Not only did they refuse to entertain General Hooker's charges against General Slough, but they refused him control of the large force at Maryland Heights, and ultimately forced him to throw up the command of the army. Few persons are acquainted with, and still fewer willing to acknowledge, the great difficulties of Mr. Lincoln's position, due principally to influential politicians and newspaper editors wishing to conduct the war, and jealous generals giving opposing counsels. The writer believes with Colonel Scott (compiler of "Rebellion Records"), "that Mr. Lincoln acquired a very great knowledge of the art of war," and that, if he had been permitted to act as he saw fit, many misfortunes would have been spared the Union forces. The Twelfth Regiment moved with the Third Brigade, in a rain storm, on the 26th of June, marching to Goose Creek, Va., that day. The division had been delayed two days waiting for transportation. The First Brigade joined the Third en route; the two brigades, about 3,417 strong camped together at Goose Creek. On the 27th the division moved at daylight along the Leesburg Pike. It was much delayed by the Army of the Potomac trains and by its own train.

General Crawford telegraphed General Meade, commanding the Fifth Corps: "On the Monocacy, June 27th, 4.15 P. M. General: I have received orders from headquarters, Army of the Potomac, to join your corps. I am on my way and just in from the rear; to-night I will encamp above the mouth of the Monocacy, as I find my train, which is entirely new, cannot go further; have two brigades, second detached at Alexandria. If I receive no instructions to the contrary, I shall move at daylight to overtake, if possible, your command."

The division crossed the Potomac at Edward's Ferry on pontoon bridge and camped at night at the mouth of the Monocacy. Colonel Hardin, of Twelfth, joined en route. The 28th, Sunday, was clear and pleasant; the division moved at daylight and soon crossed the aqueduct of the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal at the Monocacy and, passing through Buckeystown, bivouacked on Ballinger's Creek about two miles from Frederick. Here joined Fifth Corps.

General Meade was this day assigned to command of the Army of the Potomac, General Sykes to Fifth Corps.

General Hooker advanced a portion of his army through the south mountain passes, with the view of cutting General Lee's communications, but this movement was disapproved at Washington and the corps advanced through the mountain passes were ordered back to Frederick, and directed to proceed up the east base of these mountains. This latter movement was taking place when the Reserve Division joined the army. The greater part of the Union army at this time rested near Frederick.

At this date, June 28th, General Lee's army was stretched from Hagerstown to the Susquehanna, near Harrisburg, and to York, Penn.; Ewell's Corps at Carlisle and York. General Lee's headquarters with Longstreet's and Hill's Corps near Chambersburg. General Lee was preparing to cross the Susquehanna, but that night, he says, he learned from a scout that the Union army had crossed the Potomac and was threatening his communications at South Mountain. It was resolved, he says, to concentrate the army east of the mountains.

General Meade states: "That he had no special plan but to move northward until he made Lee let go his hold of the Susquehanna." General Meade learned on the 30th that General Lee was moving with his main force to the east side of the mountains, and he decided to concentrate his army on Pike Creek. The Army of the Potomac moved on the 29th as follows: Headquarters to Middleburg; First and Eleventh corps to Emmittsburg; Second Corps to Uniontown; Third Corps to Taneytown; Fifth Corps, via Frederick and Mount Pleasant, to Liberty; Sixth Corps to New Windsor; Twelfth Corps to Taneytown and Bruceville; Gamble's and Deven's brigades of Buford's Cavalry Division via Boonsboro, Cavetown and Monterey Springs to near Fairfield; Merritt's Brigade of Buford's Division to Mechanicstown; Gregg's Division of cavalry to New Windsor; Kilpatrick's Cavalry Division to Littleton, the Artillery Reserve to Bruceville. There were combats at Muddy Branch and Westminster, Md., and at McConnelsburg and near Oyster Point, Penn.

There was an assemblage of officers of the Reserve Division whilst it was camped near Frederick, looking over maps of the country and guessing at the future movements of the Union and Confederate armies. Colonel Warner, of the Tenth, and the writer agreed that the chances were in favor of a fight at or near Gettysburg, the next good crossing place in the mountains north of our then position, as shown by the maps we had.

The morning of the 29th the writer visited Frederick and conversed with officers of General Reynolds' command, First and Eleventh corps. They thought they were going to Gettysburg, or spoke of that place as their ultimate destination. Returning towards camp the writer met the division en route to Frederick; it had left Ballinger's Creek about noon: it marched but a short distance from Frederick when it was halted to permit other troops to take precedence. The division remained in this position several hours; it then followed the Artillery Reserve. The writer, during this delay, visited his old friend, Lieutenant "Cog" Hazlet, who was commanding Battery "D," Fifth United States Artillery. The weather was very warm: Lieutenant Hazlet wore a small white hat. As the writer left him to rejoin his command he called back. "'Cog,' we are going to have a fight soon: don't wear that white hat into battle!"

"At 7 P. M. we crossed the Monocacy Bridge on the Baltimore Pike, and turned up the banks of the stream, heading north; soon after we waded the stream and struck across the fields, and at about 10 P. M. bivouacked in a wood, having made a tiresome day's march of ten miles." The long delay before mentioned caused our division to get far behind the other divisions of the corps. We had to rush along well into the night to reach the corps camp, where the leading divisions had arrived early in the evening and in good order. Having arrived in camp late, and it being very dark, we made a bivouac, whilst we saw the other divisions of the Fifth Corps in a regular camp. Most of us were so hot and tired we dropped down and went to sleep without even making coffee. A bad beginning for a long march.

June 30th the Union army moved as follows: Headquarters to Taneytown; First and Eleventh Corps, to Marsh Run; Third Corps, to Bridgeport; Fifth Corps, via Johnsville, Union Bridge and Union, to Union Mills; Sixth Corps, to Manchester; Twelfth Corps, to Littlestown; Second Corps, to Uniontown: Gamble's and Devin's brigades, via Emmitsburg, to Gettysburg; Gregg's Division, via Westminster, to Manchester; Kilpatrick's Division, to Hanover; Artillery Reserve, to Taneytown. Action at Hanover, Penn.; skirmishes at Westminster, Md., and at Fairfield and Sporting Hill, Penn.

Stuart's Confederate Cavalry Division had crossed the Potomac, east of the Union army, and moved north, between it and Washington. Gregg's and Kilpatrick's divisions were watching Stuart and guarding the Union trains. "The morning of the 30th we started early, passing

through Liberty, Union Bridge and Uniontown (a pontoon train accompanied us this day) : marched twenty miles and bivouacked near dark ; were mustered two miles beyond Uniontown." The marching all the forenoon was very slow, with many stops ; but in the afternoon we were rushed along. This march was the cause of a great injustice done our Division, in that it was reported to the Army Commander that our division could not march as fast as the other divisions of the corps. It will be noted that these other divisions had clear roads, no trains to follow, early start, no forced delays ; in short, nothing to prevent them making their marches in time.

July 1st the Union army moved as follows : First, Eleventh and Third corps, to Gettysburg ; Second Corps, to near Gettysburg ; Fifth Corps, via Hanover and McSherrystown, to Boroughtown ; Sixth Corps, en route to Gettysburg ; Twelfth Corps, via Two Taverns, to near Gettysburg ; Gregg's Division, to Hanover Junction ; McIntosh's and J. L. Gregg's brigades, to Hanover ; Henry's Brigade returned to Manchester ; Kilpatrick's Division, from Hanover, via Abbottsville, to Berlin ; Artillery Reserve (Ransom's and Fitzhugh's brigades), to Gettysburg. First day's battle of Gettysburg.

General Meade's order on the expected battle was read to us before we started. The division left camp two miles beyond Uniontown at 5 A.M. (July 1st). Hearing of Confederate cavalry, skirmishers and flankers were thrown out; the division moved thus several miles. About 2 P.M. were halted on the Pennsylvania State line ; at 3 P.M. were addressed by General Crawford. We then moved on till we came to a fine open woods, where we rested till dark. All day we gathered cherries from the overloaded trees along the road side. The turnpikes along which we marched the greater part of the day were white, hot and dusty. We passed Kilpatrick's battlefield at Hanover in afternoon. At dark we resumed the march, which we continued without halt till dawn, when, utterly exhausted, we dropped down, compelling a halt of the division. After resting an hour we again took up the march and continued it mostly across country until 12.30 P.M., when we arrived on the battlefield, on the Baltimore Pike, in rear of the centre of the army. Our division, in very hot weather, marched in the worst possible manner, accomplished nearly seventy miles in three and a half days, and on the afternoon and evening of the fourth day went to the top of Big Round Top.

In the meantime, General Buford left Middleburg, Md., on 29th,



arrived at Gettysburg on 30th; passing through Gettysburg at noon (June 30), he reconnoitered west and north of that town. He saw the advantages of the Gettysburg position and he determined to hold it until he was driven away or relieved by infantry. The night of June 30th he notified General Reynolds, "That Hill's Confederate corps was camped nine miles west of Gettysburg and Longstreet's behind Hill's; that no Confederate force had yet passed through the mountains from the north toward Gettysburg, but that such force would soon be at Heidlersburg." This information was subsequently shown to be correct.

General Meade had directed General Reynolds, "That if he *has* to fall back, to do so on Emmitsburg; that the Third and Twelfth corps will come to the assistance there of his and the Eleventh Corps." When General Reynolds reached Gettysburg at 8.35 A. M., July 1st, General Buford was with his artillery and dismounted skirmishers "standing off" Hill's troops. General Reynolds joined General Buford in the Seminary tower, and as old companions in arms, with perfect confidence in each other, they discussed the position and the military situation. General Reynolds decided at once to support General Buford. He saw that, if his troops were brought up promptly to this position, General Lee could be made to take the offensive, or be compelled to fall back with his whole force without fighting, and thus, if a battle took place here, the Union army would be enabled to fight on the defensive.

General Buford promised to hold on until General Reynolds' infantry and batteries could get up. General Reynolds felt sure that his corps with the Eleventh could hold this position until the Third and Twelfth could reinforce him. The information he had of the Confederate army showed that it was as badly scattered as was the Union. Four corps of the Union army could reach this ground by the early afternoon, and the Second Corps by sundown—force sufficient with proper management and good fighting to withstand General Lee's army coming up from several directions until the whole Union army could be assembled.

It was most fortunate for the Union side that it had such intelligent and energetic generals in advance as Reynolds and Buford, and generals who had the confidence of the Army Commander. General Meade's giving General Reynolds (a fighting general) his advance with three corps proved to that general, as to the world, that General Meade was not attempting to avoid a battle. He was only anxious that the

fight which must take place should be a defensive one on his side, if possible.

Shortly after his arrival, as soon as he had taken a look at the ground from the Seminary tower and had had a few minutes' conversation with General Buford, General Reynolds (who was a most accomplished artilleryman), seeing what fine ground lay in every direction to the front for artillery (the arm well known to preponderate in the Army of the Potomac—more powerful and more numerous than Lee's—the only arm in which it was believed the Union army was superior), a battlefield to make an artilleryman grow enthusiastic, requested General Buford to hold on till his (Reynolds) batteries and infantry could get up.

He sent off in hot haste several officers for his own and the Eleventh Corps batteries, and to hurry up his own and General Howard's infantry. He then went to select positions for his batteries (he had brought up with him Captain Hall, Chief of Artillery of his leading division), so that no time would be lost (General Reynolds thus anticipated the present German instructions for battle). In a few minutes Captain Hall's battery arrived; it was immediately posted near General Buford's batteries. Soon after, the first division of Reynolds' Corps came up and was posted to support the First Corps and Buford's batteries. In expectation of the early arrival of the Eleventh Corps batteries, General Reynolds now went to select a position for them. Whilst doing so he was struck down by a sharpshooter. He had already seized this good position and had given such an impetus to his command that it went on without a break in carrying out his designs under his able successor, General Doubleday.

General Reynolds had planted the advance of the Union army in General Lee's route. He had secured a position across all the roads leading east of the mountains at this point, where the Confederate army must assemble if it united east of the mountains.

General Reynolds might have had three corps at Gettysburg earlier in the day, but he would not run the risk of throwing his whole force against Lee's main army, which might be at Gettysburg at the same time. He thus showed proper prudence. But when he arrived there in person and was satisfied that the information received from General Buford during the past night was correct, and that the Confederate army was still en route to assemble at this point, he acted as the prompt and intelligent soldier that he was.

General Buford's batteries and dismounted cavalry skirmishers suc-

ceeded in holding the enemy on the west side of Willouby Run till Wadsworth's Division arrived. Captain Hall, commanding the artillery of this division, had preceded the infantry, and had posted his own battery in aid of Buford's batteries, which were doing heroic service on the Chambersburg Road. As soon as it arrived, Cutler's Brigade was posted on either side of the Chambersburg Road, and across an old railroad cut, to support these batteries. Meredith's (Iron Brigade) was sent to the left of the road to occupy a piece of woods, which Hill's Confederate troops were entering. The Confederate General Heth attacked with four of his brigades the position held by General Reynolds' force. The three right regiments of Cutler's Brigade were forced back, and General Reynolds ordered Meredith's Brigade to attack across the front of the Confederate force. This attack was successful. The Confederate General Archer and many of his men were captured. These dispositions were just completed, in which his two brigades had defeated and almost destroyed two brigades of the enemy, when this most skillful and heroic general was killed. The falling back of Cutler's right left Hall's battery exposed, but the Fourteenth Brooklyn, Ninety-Fifth New York, and Sixth Wisconsin changed front and charged the Mississippi troops attacking Hall, and captured two Mississippi regiments in the old railroad cut. Hill's other two brigades pressing the Union left, Rowley's Division was put in here. Robinson's Division was held in reserve on Seminary Hill.

Soon Rodes' Division of Ewell's Corps attacked from the direction of Carlisle, and Robinson's Division was advanced to meet it. Baxter's Brigade went in on the right of Cutler and afterwards took Cutler's position. General Paul's Brigade went in on the right of Baxter. Robinson's Division resisted well Rodes' attack and captured three North Carolina regiments. So far the First Corps had more than held its own. "If the Eleventh Corps had been as well handled and fought, the day would probably have seen no reverse." General Howard spread his two divisions (Barlow's and Schurz's) to the right of the First Corps, but did not make strong connection with it. The Confederates seized Oak Hill, a prominent point between the Union corps, and charging from this point, turned the right of the First Corps and left of the Eleventh. Fortunately, General Howard had placed one of his divisions, Steinmetz's, in reserve on Cemetery Hill, and the left of the First Corps fell back in order and covered the retreat of the artillery and ambulances, but near 5,000 prisoners were left in the enemy's hands.

General Reynolds had, early in the day, sent word to General Meade that the enemy was in force near Cashtown and advancing on Gettysburg, and that he would endeavor to hold Gettysburg until reinforced. Soon after General Reynolds was killed the cool-headed Buford thought matters were not being conducted very well, and he sent a dispatch to the effect that "there seemed to be no head," and requested that some one be sent forward to command. It may have been in answer to this request that General Hancock was sent forward to take supreme command. When he arrived matters looked badly, so much so that he, at first, thought the part of the army here would have to be moved back. Soon, however, the Union batteries got into position on the left of the town, and Stemmetz's Division, with the Eleventh Corps batteries, showed a good front on the right, and the advantages of the position were explained to him, when he saw that General Lee would have to continue to attack, so that it was only a question whether the Union army could, at this point, hold its position. By sundown all was ready to meet an attack.

The Union position at this time appeared so strong that General Lee and his corps commanders concluded they could not assault it that evening with success. Thus two Union corps, even with the loss of their commander, had been sufficiently strong to hold the Confederate army for an entire day. How much easier and with how much less loss it could have been done had General Reynolds lived and been in command of three corps. Success is the best assurance of good generalship.

The morning of the 2d the Union force was disposed as follows: Twelfth Corps, Slocum, on Culp's Hill on the right; Eleventh Corps, Howard, on Cemetery Hill, supported by Robinson's and Doubleday's divisions of the First Corps; Wadsworth's Division of the First Corps on the left of the Twelfth Corps, on Culp's Hill; Second Corps, Hancock, to the left of the Eleventh, on Cemetery Ridge; Third Corps, Sickles, massed on left of Second, in low ground between Cemetery Ridge and Little Round Top; Fifth Corps, Sykes', on Baltimore Pike, in reserve; Sixth Corps, Sedgwick, coming up on Baltimore Pike, arriving late in the afternoon, in reserve.

General Lee's troops were disposed on Seminary Ridge about one mile from the Union line and parallel to it. Longstreet's two divisions (Hood's and McLaws') at first in rear of Hill, afterwards on extreme right. A. P. Hill's Corps (Anderson's, Heth's and Pender's divisions) in

centre ; Ewell's Corps (Early's, Rodes' and Johnson's divisions) on left. The Confederate line was about five miles long, concave to the Union line, which was only about three miles long.

It seems to have been intended by the Confederates that Ewell's Corps should attack early on the 2d. It was thought that Longstreet would also be in position to attack by 9 A. M. Such was no doubt the understanding when the senior generals (except Longstreet) separated for the night of the 1st. When morning came, and the formidable position crowned with earthworks and artillery was seen by General Lee and General Ewell, General Lee (who went early to Ewell's front) hesitated to order an assault until he could have thorough reconnaissances made, and until Longstreet's Corps should be up.

General Meade, noticing the movements of Ewell's Corps, and being strong himself on that flank, early in the morning ordered an attack on his right by the Twelfth and Fifth corps to be supported by the Sixth. But Slocum, commanding the Twelfth, and General Warren, Chief Engineer of the Army, reported the ground unfavorable. Also, the Fifth Corps did not come up in good shape to attack before noon, and the Sixth was then far off. There has been much controversy between the Confederate generals since the battle as to when Longstreet ought to have been ready to attack, also as to time, Ewell should have supported Longstreet's attack. It would appear that General Lee sent one of his staff (Johnson?) early in the day to reconnoitre in front of the Union left. This officer went over the ground about the Peach Orchard. When he returned he told General Lee that this was favorable ground on which to make an attack. At this time the Union Third Corps was massed on the left of the Second. The ground on Confederate right consisted principally of open fields. Longstreet's command was sent in a roundabout way to get to the Peach Orchard position, so as not to be seen by the Union signal officer on Little Round Top.

Longstreet himself was in no hurry, as he did not wish to attack without his third (Picket's) division. Moreover, he states that the agreement, on beginning the invasion, was that there should be no offensive battle delivered by their army. If this is true General Reynolds is entitled to credit for making General Lee change his plan. Whilst Longstreet was moving around to the Union left Sickles was moving out his corps, and taking position on the Union side of the Peach Orchard.

The controversy between Generals Meade and Sickles in regard to

this movement is well known. It seems to the writer that the matter stands about as follows: General Meade had been all the morning studying his right, with a view to attacking or receiving an attack there; no report had reached him that Confederate troops, in force, were threatening his left. General Meade supposed his cavalry, which had covered itself with honor the day before, and which had been directed to watch that flank, would be able to give him early warning of any extensive movement of Confederate troops in that direction.

Early in the afternoon, upon request from General Sickles to have ground selected for his corps to occupy, General Hunt, Chief of Artillery of the Army, was sent to assist General Sickles in selecting a position. Sickles and Hunt could not find any good line in this region without going out very far to General Sickles' front. It is now well known that the ground in front of Little Round Top is a most difficult region in which to select a line of battle. Artillery could be of little use on the Little Round Top line, and how far the woods and difficult country extended to the left front neither Hunt nor Sickles knew. Taking into consideration the short time they had to select a position in so difficult a country, it was probably as well done as it could have been.

Between 2 and 3 p. m. the signal officer on Little Round Top and the skirmishers of Sickles' command detected Longstreet's movements. At General Sickles' urgent request General Meade went to his left, about 3.30 p. m., to look up ground for Sickles' Corps. The fact seems to be, General Meade did not believe he would be attacked on the left. He thought his cavalry would certainly give him ample notice of any threatened attack on that front, so that he would have time to prepare for it. For some reason, at this critical moment of the day there was no Union cavalry on the left front.

General Meade arrived on his left just as Longstreet's attack was beginning, and, as Sickles' line was very far out in advance of Hancock, being ignorant of the region, Meade thought Sickles had moved his line unnecessarily far out. However, when Sickles and Hunt told him what a tangled place the ground was in front of Little Round Top, he concluded to reinforce Sickles where he was. Moreover, there was now no time left in which to select a new line. The subsequent loss of the Third Corps position was due to the fact that the Fifth and Sixth Corps were not brought up soon enough, the one to Sickles' support, the other to form a second line on the Little Round Top ridge. If Meade had been notified by his cavalry of Longstreet's movement, he would cer-

tainly have had the Fifth and Sixth Corps in place to meet this attack. Upon what small matters may turn the fate of a battle! The new position of Sickles brought Humphrey's Division several hundred yards to the left front of the Second Corps, and posted on the Emmitsburg road, Graham's Brigade of Birney's Division on the same road, on Humphrey's left, reaching to the Peach Orchard; Ward's and De Trobriand's brigades stretched back to the rear at right angles to Graham's Brigade, in front respectively of the Wheatfield and Devil's Den.

Longstreet's attack (with infantry) began about 4 P. M. He concentrated his artillery opposite the angle of Sickles' Corps at the Peach Orchard and opened such a concentrated fire on the Union artillery at this point as to overwhelm it. He then began his attack with his infantry, on his right, with Hood's Division, which pushed into the woods and outflanked the Third Corps on its left. Law's Brigade of Hood's Division, on extreme Confederate right, went over Big Round Top, coming out upon Union ambulances, but Law's Brigade had moved too far to its right, had lost connection with balance of Hood's command, and it was ordered to move to its left. Hood's other brigades broke through the left of De Trobriand's line and began to pass up and around Little Round Top.

The Union left being thus flanked and beginning to give way, McLaws' Division was pushed in on Hood's left, carrying the centre of the Third Corps' position. This corps was too weak to hold so long a line. The Union troops would now have had to fall back but that reinforcements began to arrive just as the Confederates reached the Union position. Humphreys, who was not at first attacked, sent Burling's Brigade to Birney's assistance. The whole Fifth Corps was ordered up to the support of Birney's line; Barnes' First Division arrived first, Tilton's and Sweitzer's brigades going in near the Peach Orchard; Vincent's Brigade, at the request of General Warren, Chief Engineer, to Little Round Top. Then came Caldwell's Division of the Second Corps to the Wheatfield, where its right was turned, and then two brigades of the Second Division of Fifth Corps to the Wheatfield, where they had scarcely arrived when their right was turned and they retreated to the position from which they had started, on the right of Little Round Top.

Soon McLaws' attack was supported by Anderson's Division of A. P. Hill's Corps, and Humphreys, although aided by Graham's Brigade,

was driven back from the Emmittsburg Road. Hancock sent two regiments of Gibbon's Division and Willard's Brigade of Hay's Division to assist Humphreys. General Sickles was here wounded, and Hancock, assuming command of the Third Corps, sent two additional regiments to help Humphreys. Finally General Meade brought up Stannard's Brigade, and a number of batteries were posted on Hancock's line and the Sixth Corps came up and took the position on the right of Little Round Top, from which the Third Corps had moved out.

In the meantime, Hood's troops had made a desperate effort to carry Little Round Top and the ravine between it and Big Round Top. General Warren, Chief Engineer, going early in the action to the signal station on Little Round Top, had seen Hood's troops approaching that position. The Signal Service men were about leaving when Warren arrived. He ordered them to remain, and he hurried off for troops to put on Little Round Top. The Fifth Corps was coming up, and as he had formerly served most gallantly in command of a brigade of that corps, his request for a brigade was immediately answered by General Barnes, who sent Vincent's Brigade, which, moving at a double quick, beat the Texans of Hood's command to the top of Little Round Top. The fighting for this hill was fierce, Law's Brigade pushing through between Little and Big Round Top contended with Vincent for this ravine. Vincent was soon supported by Weed's Brigade of Second Division, Fifth Corps, and Hazlett's battery was carried to the top of Little Round Top. When the ammunition of Vincent's and Weed's brigades was expended (both these brigade commanders being killed) Fisher's Third Brigade, P. R. V. C., was hurried to their support. By this time the Confederates had become exhausted, and those who had not fallen back were captured.

Upon arriving on the battlefield, about 12.30 P. M., the Twelfth Regiment, as the entire division of Reserves, was given time to rest and make a full meal, the first since leaving Frederick, Md. As soon as we had feasted many of the mounted officers of the division started out to see the line of battle. We rode up to the rear of the town of Gettysburg, then moved along the line of battle to General Meade's headquarters, where we had a conversation with some officers, then started to ride down General Hancock's line, when we heard the commencement of Sickles' fight.

We galloped over to our camp, where we found the Fifth Corps moving off to Sickles' support. The First Division of the corps led, fol-



lowed by the Second Division. Then came our division, Third Brigade leading, which at this time was well filled and closed up. We moved westerly along a wood road, and soon came to a part where the road was narrow and corduroyed, a fence on one side and brush on the other, woods on both sides. As we advanced we began to meet wounded men returning. Soon the road was so encumbered with wounded walking to the rear and ambulances going the same way, we had to take to the woods along side of the road. This caused some delay. Advancing by so many wounded we felt there was serious work ahead for us. We filed up on the north side of the ridge to the right of Little Round Top. The ground here was rocky and covered with thick brush. Some little time was taken in getting into position. Eventually we got into line by brigade front, Third Brigade in front.

We then advanced to the crest of the ridge. As we reached the crest we got our first view of the battle on the left; it was not a reassuring sight. The whole valley between us and the ridge opposite, about a third of a mile off, was filled with our retreating soldiers and batteries, thousands of the soldiers wounded and all the batteries disabled. Some of the men, especially toward the left front, were retreating at a run. The enemy's line was only visible by the white puffs of smoke at the crest of the opposite ridge. Very few of our men were firing; a man now and then would stop and take a shot. This great mass of thousands in the valley was moving sullenly to the rear at a walk. There seemed no organized force, a mere mass of men, officers and men inextricably mixed—all seeking safety behind the ridge upon which we stood. A battery was making its way into position in the underbrush on our right, and a few guns in position on the ridge to our left (since known as Little Round Top) were firing slowly at the enemy in the woods beyond the opposite ridge.

As soon as the division got into position, there being a lull in the action at this time, the writer rode up the ridge to the left to get a look at the enemy's position. When near the top he met a party of officers and men carrying General Weed, who was mortally wounded; the writer, who knew the General personally, stopped to see if he could be of any service; whilst conversing here another party came along, bringing back his old friend, Lieutenant "Cog" Hazlet, who in the haste of going into action had forgotten that fatal white hat. He was shot through the head, probably by the same sharpshooter who had killed General Weed.

Finding he could see little more here than at the position the division occupied, the writer started down; he met the Twelfth Regiment coming up with the Third Brigade, except the Eleventh Regiment. We scrambled up and over Little Round Top and moved down the left front, going to the assistance of Vincent's Brigade. As the Third Brigade moved away the First Brigade was ordered to advance to the front. The Eleventh Regiment being still on the ground when the First Brigade came up to the front line, joined that brigade and advanced with it. We saw the First Brigade and Eleventh Regiment make their gallant advance through the retreating multitude, as we clambered over the rocks on top of Little Round Top. We joined in their cheer and started at a double quick down the left front of Little Round Top, stumbling over rocks and the numerous dead of Vincent's and Weed's gallant brigades. As we advanced a few scattering shots came from the retiring enemy. Our advance was most fortunate, as Vincent's and Weed's brigades had expended all their ammunition. The Confederates (several hundred) remaining between Big and Little Round Top, seeing and hearing our advance, laid down their arms and became prisoners to the brigades which were so well entitled to receive them.

Darkness ended the contest. Thus our small division, coming on the field in the nick of time, and advancing boldly, turned the tide of success on the left, and the enemy's great efforts on this front were rendered entirely futile.

About 9 P. M. Colonel Fisher, commanding Third Brigade Pennsylvania Reserves Division, with the consent of the Division Commander, ordered an advance up Big Round Top. The Twentieth Maine deployed as skirmishers; the Fifth and Twelfth Reserves followed in support in line of battle. The skirmishers started promptly, but on account of the darkness and difficulty of deploying into line in this rough place, it was some minutes after they started before the line of the Fifth and Twelfth followed.

The skirmishers went promptly to the top of the mountain; only an occasional shot was fired by the Confederates. The Fifth and Twelfth advanced at the word of command, given in Colonel Fisher's stentorian tones. The line upon advancing, in utter darkness, was almost immediately broken, and became confused by the rocky, precipitous and difficult ground. Officers became separated from their men, but all pushed on up the mountain; when about one-third way up all order was lost. Officers and men of different companies and even of

the different regiments became intermingled. The commanding officers of the brigade and regiments began calling to each other; the rocks and woods resounded with their cries. It is said, and no doubt with good reason, that the Confederate troops stationed at this time on the mountain, hearing all this noise, and knowing that the Sixth Corps had lately arrived, believing that whole corps was about taking station on Big Round Top, hastily retreated down their side of the mountain. The confusion was so great that officers and men of Fifth and Twelfth concluded to return to the position they had started from, the valley between Little Round Top and Big Round Top.

In making this ascent a number of Confederate prisoners fell into the possession of members of Fifth and Twelfth regiments. A squad of officers and men (about seventy) in which the writer found himself, upon first descending to the foot of the mountain, sent forward two men to investigate the first camp fires seen. These scouts were answered by members of the Fifteenth Alabama. Our party then, after discussion, concluded to move around the mountain side toward the left or south, in which direction we were sure of finding the Sixth Corps pickets. We in this way, after an hour's very hard march, found the Vermont Brigade pickets, and went at once to our starting point. In the meantime, about all the members of the Fifth and Twelfth had found their way back to the same place. The Twentieth Maine skirmishers, finding themselves unsupported, had returned to this starting point.

The writer now suggested that our brigade march up the mountain by the flank, the Twentieth Maine skirmishers leading as before; this plan was adopted. Advancing in this manner all soon reached the top in good order. The Twelfth on the crest, the Fifth on its right; the Twentieth Maine skirmishers remained out as pickets toward the left front. The Fifth and Twelfth regiments threw out pickets in their front and to connect with the troops on the right. The Ninth and Tenth Reserves had been left in line across the ravine between Little and Big Round Tops. Two regiments of Vincent's Brigade were posted in the interval between the right of the Fifth Reserves and the Ninth and Tenth Reserves, but almost at right angles to the general line. (As shown by map accompanying Vincent's Brigade Commander's report.) The line remained thus till daylight, when a regular connected line was made from the top of Big Round Top to and across the ravine between Little and Big Round Tops, and stone breastworks were thrown up (which still stand, 1888, as we left them). There was some sharpshooting on

both sides. July 3d Frank H. Hench, Company "A," was killed, and Private James Aikens, Company "G," wounded, in the Twelfth Regiment.

A member of the Twelfth writes: "On the morning of the 5th a skirmish line, a detail of the Twelfth and Fifth, was sent out to feel for the enemy. I was one of the members. I have a very vivid recollection of what we saw, and how cautiously we approached the stone walls, the earthworks and entered the woods. We found no enemy, however, except a Georgian, sleeping by a tree in the woods. He was somewhat surprised when he awoke and found himself surrounded by Yankees. Going a little farther we met some Sisters of Charity in an ambulance coming to the battlefield. They told us that the enemy were in full retreat and eight miles away. We then returned to the regiments."

The Confederates on their right at dark (2d) slowly withdrew to the line the Third Union Corps had held. Ewell began his attack on Confederate left about sunset. He found the Union line stripped on its left. There was nothing but Green's Brigade of Twelfth Corps on Union right. Early attacked Cemetery Hill and Johnson, Culp's Hill. Early's attack was gallantly made, but failed. Johnson carried the Union works on his left, and remained in possession there. The result of the day's fighting has been described as follows: "Longstreet had carried the whole front, on which the Third Corps had been drawn. Ewell's left was thrust within the breastworks on the Union right, in a position which, if held by him, would enable him to take Meade's entire line in reverse, and the Union loss in the two day's combat had already reached the frightful aggregate of upwards of twenty thousand. But the army and corps commanders on Union side that night were unanimous for fighting it out here."

If this is a just summary of the result of the two days' fighting, was not General Lee justified in ordering the assault on the Union centre? If that had yielded at all, would not Longstreet's two divisions on Confederate right, and Ewell's whole corps on the left have followed up the success and overwhelmed the Union army? We now know that an attack, made in broad daylight, over open ground, against good troops, armed with modern weapons, although made strictly in accordance with the battle tactics of Frederick II. or Napoleon, must fail, as witness this grand attack and many made by General Grant's army whilst en route to Richmond. In this third day's magnificent assault and heroic defence

our regiment was only a deeply interested spectator. The grand scene was clearly in view to any member of the regiment who would chance his life against the deadly sharpshooter by raising his head above the stone breastworks.

The First Brigade of the Reserves, under command of Colonel McCandless, advanced late in the afternoon of the 3d, and by its bold and skillful movements defeated a force more than twice its strength, and recovered all the ground lost by the Union army on the 2d. The Third Brigade remained in the breastworks on Big Round Top until the morning of the 5th, when it moved off with the Fifth Corps toward Emmetsburg. The enemy withdrew the night of the 3d and morning of the 4th. Their absence being soon detected, many of us took advantage of this opportunity to visit the battlefield on the left and centre.

The criticism of General Meade for not attacking the Confederates after Gettysburg was refuted by subsequent events.

What chance had General Meade, with a force no larger than the enemy's, when General Grant with double the enemy's force in his repeated assaults (whilst en route to Petersburg) suffered such heavy losses and accomplished so little.

General Lee's concave position enabled him to utilize his large reserve artillery, both for connecting his wings and to crush that of the Union army. The artillery of Union army had to be concentrated too much. (On the third day on Cemetery Hill the guns were only a yard apart). The defects of General Lee's position were such that he was unable to make his troops, on so long a line, act together, and to reinforce either wing promptly. These defects had much to do with the failure of his attacks. If he had entrenched his centre and one of his flanks (wings) and had used his main army on his other wing, he might have succeeded in dislodging the Union army.

The numbers actually engaged were nearly equal. The Confederates were the stronger the first day, the two sides about equal the second day, the Union force stronger the third day. The losses, July 1-3 (by A. G. O.) were: "Union 23,003; Confederate 20,451. *Note.*—Confederate prisoners by name, wounded and unwounded, 12,227. Medical Director A. P. reported 6,802 Confederates wounded."

The latest estimate of the numbers actually engaged is: 69,000 Confederates, with 350 guns; 80,000 Union, with 350 guns.

In this estimate not sufficient allowance has been made for the filling up of the Confederate regiments with drafted men and convales-

cents. The Alabama regiments received many such ; the Fifteenth Alabama had 700 men present ; the Maryland regiments were quite strong, one company had ninety men, etc. Moreover, the Confederates could have few stragglers, as they were in an enemy's country, and two corps made very easy marches to the battlefield, whereas the Fifth and Sixth, two of the largest of the Union Corps, made very hard, forced marches to reach the battlefield. Still farther, the Confederates had always fewer men, proportionately, on extra and daily duty than the Union army, consequently they had more muskets in line in proportion to number of men present. For these reasons the writer thinks the above estimate decidedly in favor of the Confederates.

Extracts from Pennsylvania Reserve Division records as follows : " Headquarters Pennsylvania Reserves, July 2, 1863, on the field near Gettysburg, 3 P. M. Colonel; brigade commanders will hold their commands in readiness for an immediate movement. In case of an attack upon our left, we will be called upon to resist it, and they will make the dispositions now. The Third Brigade will take the right; keep the men in camp, let them rest. Towards evening the command will be marched by the left flank to the field on the left to a point to be indicated by a staff officer who will be sent. Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

S. W. Crawford, Brigadier-General Commanding."

" Headquarters Pennsylvania Reserves, on the field near Gettysburg, July 2, 1863, 10 P. M. General : I have the honor to report to you that I have just come in from the line of skirmishers in my front. We hold the field in advance of the woods beyond the ——; our line is diagonal; we hold all the woods on the right and half the woods on the left. I have no troops on either flank, and hold my advance position without assistance. My skirmishers report that they hear the enemy beyond. The battery in the road directly in front was withdrawn at sundown. I pushed my men into the woods beyond, but they were fired on. I would also report to you that I sent two regiments from Third Brigade of my division to take the high grounds on the left; they now hold the position. From a lieutenant of Georgia troops who was captured, having come into the lines while I was in front, I hear that the force that we have been fighting to-day is under Longstreet, also that General Lee is with the Rebel army. I respectfully ask instructions what to do with the brigade of my division now in front. Its flanks are not protected, and its position very exposed. The number of

wounded belonging to the First and Second divisions of this corps is large; they are lying uncared for. Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

S. W. CRAWFORD, Brigadier-General Commanding Division."

"July 4, 1863. Near Gettysburg. Report of arms captured: First Brigade, 3,072; Third Brigade, 600; total, 3,672. Also one Napoleon gun and three caissons."

Extracts from General Crawford's report: "The Third Brigade, under Colonel Fisher, was detailed and moved at once ('to the left of Barnes' Division on the crest of the ridge'). The firing in front was heavy and incessant. The enemy concentrated his forces opposite the left of our line, was throwing them in heavy masses upon our troops, and was advancing. Our troops in front, after a determined resistance, unable to withstand the force of the enemy, fell back, and some finally gave away. The plain to my front was covered with fugitives from all divisions, who rushed through my lines and along the road to the rear.

Fragments of regiments came back in disorder and without their arms, and for a moment all seemed lost. The enemy's skirmishers had reached the foot of the rocky ridge; his columns were following rapidly.

My command was formed in two lines, the second massed upon the first. The Sixth Regiment, Colonel Ent, on the right, the First, Colonel Talley, on the left, and the Eleventh Regiment of Fisher's Brigade, under Colonel Jackson, in the centre. The second line, consisting of the First Rifles (Bucktails), Colonel Taylor, and the Second Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Woodward; Colonel McCandless commanded the whole. Not a moment was to be lost; uncovering our front, I ordered our immediate advance. The command advanced gallantly with loud cheers. Two well directed volleys were delivered upon the advancing masses of the enemy, when the whole column charged at a run down the slope, driving the enemy back across the space beyond and across the stone wall, for the possession of which there was a short but determined struggle.

The enemy retired to the Wheatfield and the woods. The second line was immediately deployed to the left. The First Rifles (Bucktails), under their gallant leader, Colonel Taylor, gaining the flank and dashing upon the enemy, who endeavoring for a moment to make a stand, finally broke and fled in disorder across the field, leaving his dead and

wounded in our hands. As night was approaching and my flanks were unprotected, I directed Colonel McCandless to hold the line of the stone wall and the woods on the right. Heavy lines of skirmishers were thrown out and the ground firmly and permanently held.

I then rode to the left, towards Fisher's Brigade. Upon ascending the crest of the ridge I found, from the report of that officer as well as from Colonel Rice, of Barnes' Division, that the Round Top was still in possession of the enemy's skirmishers, who were firing upon our men. It was important to hold this hill, as from its position it commanded that part of our line. I directed Colonel Fisher to occupy it at once. He immediately detached the Twelfth, under Colonel Hardin, and the Fifth, under Lieutenant-Colonel Dare, and the Twentieth Maine, under Colonel Chamberlain, who advanced promptly, driving the enemy before them, capturing over thirty prisoners.

During the night the division commanded by General Bartlett, of Sixth Corps, was moved up to my support. At 5 o'clock on the 3d I received orders \* \* \* to advance that portion of my command which was holding the ground retaken on the left, and which still held the line of the stone wall in front, to enter the woods, and if possible drive out the enemy. It was supposed the enemy had evacuated the position. I proceeded at once to the spot, and directed the movement to be made.

McCandless' Brigade, with the Eleventh Regiment, under Colonel Jackson, were ordered to advance, throwing out skirmishers toward the right, in the direction of a battery established by the enemy about noon, and which was plainly visible. I requested General Bartlett to move up one of his regiments to the stone wall from which I advanced, and also to throw a force towards my right to protect that flank. The men of his command moved promptly into position and rendered efficient service. The movement had hardly begun before this battery opened with grape and canister. The woods on the right were soon cleared. As soon as our skirmishers approached the battery it ceased firing and fled. The line was then formed, and under the immediate direction of Colonel McCandless, dashed across the Wheatfield and into the upper end of the woods. The enemy's skirmishers were driven back as he advanced, and the upper end of the woods was now cleared. The command then changed front and charged through the entire length of the woods.

One brigade of the enemy, commanded by General Anderson, and



composed of Georgia troops, were encountered. It had taken position behind a stone wall running through the woods, and which they had made stronger by rails and logs. We fell upon their flank, completely routing them, taking over 200 prisoners, and one stand of colors. The colors were taken by Sergeant John B. Thompson, Company "G," First Rifles. Another brigade, under General Robertson, and composed of Texas troops, which lay concealed beyond the woods, and near the foot of the ridge, ran, as reported by the prisoners, without firing a shot. \* \* \* They (the enemy at this point) greatly outnumbered us; but the rapidity of the movement and the gallant dash of my men completely surprised and routed them. They fell back, nearly a mile, to a second ridge and entrenched themselves. By this charge of McCandless' Brigade and the Eleventh Regiment, Colonel Jackson, the whole of the ground lost the previous day was retaken, together with all of our wounded, who, mingled with those of the rebels, were lying uncared for. The dead of both sides lay in lines in every direction, and the large number of our own men showed how fierce had been the struggle, and how faithfully and how persistently they had contested the field against the superior masses of the enemy.

The result of this movement was the recovery of all the ground lost by our troops, one twelve-pounder Napoleon gun and three caissons and upwards of 7,000 stand of arms; large piles of these arms were found on brush heaps ready to be burned. \* \* \* Colonel Taylor, the gallant and brave leader of the Bucktails, fell while leading his regiment to the charge. \* \* \* Great credit is due to Colonel McCandless, commanding the First Brigade, for his management of his brigade and the prompt and faithful execution of the order given him in face of a galling fire on the 2d, and for the rapid and successful dash upon the enemy on the 3d, and I recommend him especially to the notice of the Major-General commanding the corps.

To Colonel Fisher, commanding Third Brigade, great credit is due in early realizing the importance of the occupation of Round Top and in promptly and successfully occupying it. The enemy would have undoubtedly occupied it during the night."

Extracts from report of Colonel Fisher, commanding Third Brigade :  
 " \* \* \* I marched my brigade to the left of General Sykes' Corps, being the extreme left of the Army of the Potomac, and at once engaged the enemy, although very shortly afterwards he retired, leaving large numbers of his killed and wounded on the field. Soon after

the close of the fight of the 2d, I discovered in my immediate front a hill called Round Top, from the summit of which the enemy was doing us great damage. I thought it highly important that we should at once occupy it. I accordingly took two regiments of my brigade, viz., Fifth, Lieutenant-Colonel Dare, and Twelfth, Colonel Hardin, and the Twentieth Maine, commanded by Colonel Chamberlain, and at 10 P. M. ascended the hill, which was occupied by a full brigade of the enemy. We went up steadily in line of battle" (?) "taking over thirty prisoners in our ascent. In the morning I discovered that the hill was of immense importance to us. \* \* \* I beg leave to call attention to the conduct of Colonel Hardin, of Twelfth Regiment, who was still suffering from wounds received at (second) Bull Run; Lieutenant-Colonel Dare of the Fifth Regiment, who was also wounded at Fredericksburg; \* \* \* Colonel Warner, of the Tenth Regiment, who is still so lame from wounds received at Antietam as to be unable to walk without support, \* \* \* and Lieutenant-Colonel Snodgrass of the Ninth Regiment; \* \* \* while all the subordinate field officers are deserving of special mention, especially Major Larrimer, of Fifth, who, suffering from acute rheumatism, refused to remain out of the battle. \* \* \* The members of my staff, Lieutenant Wright, A. A. G.; Captain Howard, Inspector; Lieutenant Chamberlain and Lieutenant Kerns, aides. \* \* \* My brigade captured and turned in to the proper officers over 1,000 stand of arms, brought off over 200 wounded Rebels and buried eighty of their dead. \* \* \*

---

#### AFTER GETTYSBURG.

Woodward says: "At 5 P. M., July 5th, we moved off in a south-westerly direction, over exceedingly bad roads, and at midnight bivouacked in an open field. The next morning, about 11, we marched to the State line, where General Meade's congratulatory address was read to us, and we bivouacked." We moved at 4 o'clock the next morning, passed near Emmetsburg, and continuing along the base of the South Mountain, marching in fields skirting the pike, passed through Graceham and Cregarstown, bivouacked, at dark, six miles from Frederick, having made twenty-one miles, over very bad roads. Marched at 6 A. M. on 8th, heading nearly west; passed over the Catoctin Mountains and through Middletown, and camped about one mile south of the latter place. The next morning marched at 6, and soon after heard heavy cannonading. Passed near Keedysville and La Roy; we struck Antietam

Creek, at Delamont Mills, where the enemy had been that morning, leaving behind a cavalry picket. We halted here and threw out skirmishers, who forced the enemy back to the Potomac.

The Fifth Corps followed its skirmishers slowly and bivouacked on top of the hill on west side of the Antietam. We thought our corps commander displayed little energy in finding the enemy or in following his skirmishers. We thought our part of the army could have reached the Potomac easily that afternoon if its commander so desired. It began to look as though it were intended that Lee should be allowed to cross the Potomac without another fight, if he wished. On the morning of the 11th our corps moved forward near to Sharpsburgh and Hagerstown Pike, where our division was deployed in line of battle, and rested until 4 P. M., at which time the division moved forward, in columns of companies, with regiments at deploying distance, with skirmishers in front and the pioneers pulling down fences. Having advanced about two miles, we halted and bivouacked. The 12th and 13th, the division made slight changes in position. The night of the 13th the Confederates retreated across the Potomac. The Union army followed, on 14th, to Falling Waters. Some of the rear guard of the Confederate army was captured, but main force crossed safely.

It is not believed any great effort was made on Union side to stop the Confederate army from crossing the Potomac, nor is it believed that any attack by the Union army at this time and place would have had any favorable result.

On the 15th of July our division (which was now near Williamsport) marched; retacing our steps, passed near Delamont and over Antietam battlefield, and encamped near eastern base of South Mountains. Moved at 5 A. M. on 16th, skirting along the base of South Mountain through Burkettsville and Petersall's and halted about two miles from Berlin. Our wagons came up and we had the first change of clothing since leaving Washington. It rained all night until 4 P. M. on 17th, when we moved to the Potomac and crossed at Berlin and bivouacked three miles beyond Lovettsville, being the first infantry that had crossed. On 18th marched to Wheatland, on 19th marched to Purcellville, on 20th moved at 4 A. M.; marched almost over the same ground that we did last year under McClellan, passing by Philamont and our old camp near Uniontown, and encamped at noon near Goose Creek (near Upperville).

On 21st marched to Rectortown, on 23d to Manasses Gap (one of the

longest and hardest of our marches). On 24th, at 7 A. M., marched up the Manassas Gap Railroad, and moving to the right formed in columns of divisions, and moved in by the right flank and advanced up the side of a steep mountain covered with timber and brush, acting as a reserve in the battle of Wapping Heights. Whilst the division was moving over some open ground where the firing between a part of the Third Corps and the enemy could be seen on the mountain side far in our front, a soldier near the head of our column broke suddenly out of ranks and rushed at full speed to the rear; his headlong speed carried him through several of the advancing lines before he could be stopped. He had become fairly a maniac from fear. He was placed under close guard and taken along with the command. Upon inquiry it was learned that this soldier had been specially noted for courage in former battles, that he had been wounded in the last one he was in. He had since Gettysburg returned to duty with his company. It was so singular a case it was deemed best to return him to duty without trial (his trial would have been fatal to him); he redeemed his character with his life's blood in a subsequent battle.

"On 25th, reveille at 3 A. M., moved at 6 A. M.; retraced our steps; were so short of provisions the men were living on blackberries. On 26th marched at 5 A. M.; at noon halted in a clover field, having made a march of thirteen miles, with a halt of but fifteen minutes. General Crawford was saluted with cry of 'crackers.' At 4 P. M. marched again, passing to the west of Warrenton, and encamped in a low open field, where we were troubled with mosquitoes for the first time during the war. The next morning, at 5, marched towards Fayetteville, near which we halted. On 28th moved one mile for water. On 1st August marched toward Warrenton and bivouacked. Considerable cannonading in direction of Sulphur Springs. On 3d moved at 8 A. M. about three miles to our old bivouac of 26th ult. Weather so hot some men were sunstruck. We remained here till dark, when we marched to our old bivouac of 28th, where we laid two hours, when we marched, circuitously, eight miles and camped within two miles of our last bivouac, on our old camp ground of November last. On 8th marched early, and at noon arrived at Rappahannock Station, where formed regular camp. These (latter) movements were made to deceive the enemy while we sent off troops to suppress the riot in New York."

We remained in camp, near Rappahannock Station till September 16th. Dug wells, made screened sinks, placed brush over the shelter

tents, built bough arbors and made ourselves as comfortable as possible. Clothing and full rations were issued. Sutlers, with full supplies, joined their commands. Daily papers received, bathing in Rappahannock, daily drills and camp amusements filled up the time. This camp and the next below Culpeper, were the most agreeable we had during our term of service. The writer was unfortunately absent at the "Meade Sword Presentation," which was one of the most interesting events (August 28, 1863) in the history of the Reserves. He heard the "boys" had a good time.

Orders were issued on the 15th of September to march; moved at 8 A. M. on 16th, crossed the Rappahannock at Beverly Ford and moved to Mountain Run. Early next morning marched and passed through Culpeper Court House and camped four miles beyond. Remained here till October 10th; made same kind of camps as last on the Rappahannock. Added to our former amusements that of horseback riding, "cutting heads," sabre exercises, etc., and had brigade drills. The Second Corps, General Warren commanding, was located near us. Some of his officers and many from the cavalry came to the riding exercises. At every exercise one rider at least suddenly and unexpectedly dismounted, to the amusement of the spectators. The cavalry officers were no more proficient either in riding or sabre exercises than the other mounted officers.

## CHAPTER XII

---

### BRISTOE STATION, RAPPAHANNOCK STATION AND MINE RUN.


On October 10th the division moved at 2 A. M. toward Culpeper Court House, and then turning to the left marched around Pony Mountain and bivouacked at Raccoon Ford, where we remained until 2 A. M., 11th, when we marched back to our old camp.

Soon after returning to camp the division moved as rear guard to the army; passing through Culpeper Court House, continued in direction of Rappahannock Station. Upon our arrival opposite the station the division was drawn up in line of battle, in which position it remained until night, when it crossed the river, and we bivouacked in our old camp of August and September last. Early in the morning of the 12th we recrossed the Rappahannock at Beverly Ford, formed line of battle and remained here until near sunset, when we advanced to Brandy Station.

Our cavalry commenced skirmishing in our front about 10 A. M. The cavalry fighting was in plain view most of the day. Our division advance was a part of that of the whole army, which moved in grand array in line of battle, stretching for miles to the right and left, offering battle to the enemy.

The latter, however, was hastening to turn the right of the Army of the Potomac via Warrenton. At midnight our division marched for the river again. In the night it became separated from the rest of the corps and did not reach our old camp until 3 A. M. on 13th. At 7 A. M. started again, moved some distance toward Warrenton, then inclining to the right marched for Catlett's Station, near which we bivouacked. At 4 A. M. on 14th we took up our march, moving nearly abreast of the Second Corps; the corps (Fifth) halted to rest after crossing Broad Run at the point where the road which runs north of and parallel to the railroad crosses that stream.

This point is about one-third of a mile north of the railroad; the woods extend from the south up to the stream; a large open field extends for half a mile on north side of the stream. After remaining here about an hour (near half-past 1 P. M.), General Sykes commanding the corps.







started off towards Manassas, followed by the First and Second divisions of his corps. These were followed by the corps batteries. Our division, for some unknown reason, did not start to follow the rest of the corps till the batteries had disappeared in the woods on the farther side of the open ground. About 2 P. M. our division was drawn out on the road leading to Manassas Junction, the Third brigade, commanded by Colonel Hardin, leading. The head of this brigade was near the woods where the other troops of the corps had disappeared, when the enemy opened fire from a battery posted just across Broad Run, to the left rear of the position our division had lately occupied when resting. Several officers and men of the Third Brigade were struck by the first fire of the enemy's battery, which fired directly down the marching line of the brigade. The brigade was brought from column into line, halted and faced toward the enemy.

The First Brigade, at the first volley of the enemy's battery, had moved into a clump of woods on its right. This brigade was formed in line on the edge of this wood, and the Third Brigade moved up (toward the enemy) to the right of the First Brigade. The instant after receiving the first fire of the enemy's battery the commander of the Third Brigade sent an officer towards Manassas for one of the corps batteries to return and answer the enemy's battery. A hasty consultation took place between the division and brigade commanders (the division was under orders to follow the balance of the corps), and it was decided to remain where we were for the present. The division had scarcely been formed in line of battle when the enemy's infantry attack on the Second Corps, stationed on the heights near Bristoe Station, could be seen from the right of our position. No battery of the Fifth Corps coming up as soon as expected, and the attack of the enemy on the Second Corps seeming to grow in force, several messengers were sent back for a battery, the commander of the Third Brigade sending to the commander of the regular battery his personal wish that he would come back. This battery eventually returned, and came into battery on the right of the division. Its position was such as to enfilade the enemy's battery, which was now engaged with the Second Corps' batteries. The enemy's batteries had at this time ceased firing in our direction.

The Reserve Division and battery were about 4 P. M. ordered by the corps commander to retire and rejoin the remainder of the corps at Manassas Junction. This movement was begun, but soon arrested, and

the whole Fifth Corps returned to the position where it had rested near noon. In the meantime a portion of the Second Corps was engaged with a portion of Hill's Corps near the railroad.

The Union army retired along the Orange and Alexandria Railroad; the Second Corps, General Warren commanding, acting as rear guard, moved close to the railroad; the Fifth Corps, Sykes commanding, on left front of Second Corps, the Third Corps in front of the Fifth, each corps being ordered to keep in communication with the other. General Warren was informed by General Meade that the road was clear for the Third and Fifth corps; that the Fifth Corps would remain near Bristoe (where the enemy might attack) until the Second Corps came up. General Sykes, commanding the Fifth Corps whilst his corps was resting in the fields north of Broad Run, was informed, about 1.30 P. M., that the head of the Second Corps was up. He then started his corps for Manassas Junction. As before mentioned, just as the Reserve Division, the rear of the Fifth Corps, was drawn out, the Confederates came up and opened fire with artillery on our division. At this time Webb's Division of the Second Corps was approaching Broad Run from the south, by the road the Fifth Corps had passed over.

General Lee's plan was to attack the Union army at Bristoe, and endeavor to cut it in two whilst it was on the march. In pursuance of this plan, Heth's Division of Hill's Corps began an attack, first against the Reserve Division, with artillery; then Hill advanced his infantry to take possession of Bristoe Station. The fire of Hill's artillery notified the Second Corps of Hill's presence, and General Webb immediately threw out skirmishers on his left; these at once met Hill's skirmishers thrown out from his right. Webb fell back to his right rear, to the railroad embankment, to connect with his corps and to take possession of the railroad crossing of Broad Run. General Warren now came up, and personally knowing the ground well, ordered Hay's Brigade and his corps batteries to make all speed to get possession of the heights and railroad embankment near the Station. Warren got a part of his corps into this strong position before the Confederates, who immediately made a determined effort to carry this position. They were repulsed with severe loss in guns, killed, wounded and prisoners. The action of the Second Corps at this time was most brilliant, infantry and artillery vying with each other in dash and courage.

The Second Corps was soon established strongly at the railroad crossing. The Confederate generals seeing this, and also seeing the

Reserve Division with artillery on their left, delayed any further attack until Hill's entire corps and Ewell's command could come up. Only skirmishing occurred after 4 P. M. No further attack being made by the Confederates, the Union forces retired during the night. Our division crossed Bull Run by fording at 3 A. M. on 15th, and then stopped to rest.

Neither the Reserve Division nor its commander ever received any credit for their action in this battle. A study of the ground, the circumstances of the action and of the Confederate reports, proves conclusively that it was the presence of our division and the battery which joined it that delayed or, rather, prevented an overwhelming attack on the Second Corps. It is not intended to detract from the skillful handling of the Second Corps, its divisions, brigades and batteries, and the splendid fighting of the rank and file, but the enemy had treble the Union force near this point all the afternoon, which for some reason he failed to use. Of course, the Confederates supposed our division was supported by the remainder of its corps and other troops, whereas we were more justified than General Warren in saying that the Fifth Corps "had deserted us."

---

#### RAPPAHANNOCK STATION, NOVEMBER 7, 1863.

"At 9 A. M. on 15th of October, we moved again (from north bank of Bull Run) passing through Centreville to Fairfax Court House, where we bivouacked in the woods near the town and remained until the 17th, when we advanced once more to Centreville and remained there all night. The next morning we returned to Fairfax Court House. On 19th, at 4 A. M., moved towards Centreville, fording Bull Run, and that night slept on battlefield of Second Bull Run, where we found our dead mostly as they had fallen, and we laid down and slept among the bones of our comrades."

The next morning we moved at 6 o'clock, passing through Gainesville and halting near New Baltimore, where we remained until the 26th. On this (26th) day's march the head of the corps came to a small stream, which was flooded from recent rains; it looked quite formidable, and without testing its depth or, in fact, doing anything towards making a crossing, the corps was halted and a pontoon bridge sent for. After a halt of an hour or more a bateau was brought up and put in the stream; it was too short to reach across; it was hauled out and the command continued to rest for several hours. One of the regular battery commanders (think it was Lieutenant Elder) asked authority to

try to take his battery across; he was allowed to make the attempt. First trying the ford by riding through it, he then started his battery a little above the ford, he pushed his horses across, they had to swim in the middle of the stream, but when the guns reached the deep part the horses had good footing and immediately passed up the farther bank. The infantry cheered lustily and, not to be outdone, some men called for axes and in a few minutes a large tree near the bank was felled across the stream, men ran across this and cut other trees on the farther bank, making them fall across the first tree felled, in a few minutes the infantry was crossing.

On the 30th marched to Warrenton and remained there until November 7th.

November 7th the Reserve Division, being Third Division of Fifth Corps, General Crawford commanding (Colon I Hardin commanding Third Brigade, Lieutenant-Colonel Gustin the Twelfth Regiment), moved from Warrenton across the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, arrived south of the railroad and within two miles of Rappahannock Station about 11 A. M. The Confederates held the north bank of the Rappahannock River with two brigades of infantry and a battery in a fortified position at Rappahannock Station, with a strong line of skirmishers in rifle pits extending about a thousand yards above and some distance below the station.

The First, Second and Third Corps of Union army, under command of General French, were directed to carry Kelley's Ford, and the Fifth and Sixth Corps, under command of General Sedgwick, were directed to attack Rappahannock Station. It was thought the movement of General French would cause the Confederates to evacuate Rappahannock Station, but it did not.

A strong skirmish line was formed to cover the advance of the Fifth and Sixth Corps. The Fifth Corps was to advance south of the railroad, the Sixth Corps north of it. The skirmishers of the Sixth Corps drove back the enemy's skirmishers to the Rappahannock River and held the north bank near to Rappahannock Station. The skirmishers of the Fifth Corps, about 900 strong, taken from the three divisions of the corps (seven officers and about 200 men (part being from the 12th), were taken from the Reserves), under command of General K. Garrard, covered the Fifth Corps advance. General Garrard in his report says: "The line was posted in front of the corps on the south side of the railroad, and about 3 P. M. I received orders to form my

whole force as skirmishers, to advance with my right on the railroad, and to establish the picket line on the Rappahannock River, driving in the enemy which was in front. The river was about one and a half miles to the front.

At 3.30 P. M. the advance was made, and in an hour or less the line was on the river on my left" (Third Division skirmishers on the left), "and up near to the railroad, where it bent back, owing to the opposition offered from an earthwork of the enemy near the river and on the north-west side of the railroad. My orders required me to regulate with the skirmishers of the Sixth Corps on the other side of the railroad, and in keeping up this connection a portion of the First Division, on the right of my line, crossed the railroad, and, at the time of the charge, entered the fort together with the Sixth Corps. \* \* \* Being unacquainted with the officers and men who had composed my temporary command, I am unable to report in detail in regard to their conduct. \* \* \*

General French found no serious opposition beyond severe skirmishing, and by night had taken possession of both banks of the Rappahannock at Kelly's Ford.

Bartlett's First Division, Fifth Corps, supported Garrard skirmishers, but was only under artillery fire. Artillery was posted on the right of the Sixth Corps and in front of the Fifth Corps, so as to have a cross fire on the enemy's earthwork. Late in the evening General Russell, commanding a division of the Sixth Corps, was ordered to assault the work with Upton's and Elmaker's brigades of his division. The assault was gallantly made, being led by General Russell and Colonels Upton and Elmaker, and the enemy's work carried, with a loss to him of 1,700 prisoners, four guns and a pontoon bridge.

On the 8th marched to Kelley's Ford and crossed the river there about 1 P. M., and then massed in column of divisions, rested a while and then advanced about two miles, when we reached some cabins built by A. P. Hill's Confederate troops. These cabins, made of logs, had large fireplaces and good large chimneys, with shingle roofs. We captured in this camp about 3,000 pairs of drawers and other clothing, some harness, a few muskets and some odds and ends. It had evidently been the intention of the Confederates to winter here. Marched on 10th to Mountain Run, where we again found Confederate quarters; remained here until the 24th. Colonel Hardin, commanding Third Brigade, had brigade drills. He tried division drill with batteries attached to infantry, but found tactics very incomplete.

## MINE RUN.

The army started on 24th to cross the Rapidan, but a severe rain storm coming on, the troops were sent back to their camps. The army started again on 26th; crossed at Lower Fords, the Fifth Corps, to which the Reserve Division was attached, crossing at Culpeper Mine Ford. The roads were muddy and the bridges were too short (their lengths having been estimated on a lower stage of water). The right wing of the army was delayed by this error of the engineers, and the Third Corps moved very slowly after crossing, possibly through ignorance of the proper roads to move on. General Lee moved promptly upon learning the movement of the Army of the Potomac. He made no effort to prevent the crossing, but took up a strong position behind Mine Run, and with a part of his force attacked the Third Corps, thus stopping it and preventing its rapid and effective junction with the rest of the army. He then withdrew his entire force behind Mine Run.

The Army of the Potomac was now moved up to this position, which for three days it threatened to assault, but finding it too strong the Union army was withdrawn and fell back behind the Rapidan. The regiments of the Reserve Division "left their camps on Broad Mountain Run at 5 P. M. on 26th November. Marched to the Rapidan, crossed at Culpeper Mine Ford and moved down the Fredericksburg Plank Road to a point four miles west of Chancellor'sville and bivouacked. On morning of the 27th the line was formed with the Sixth Corps on the right, Third and Fifth in the centre, First and Second on the left. \* \* \* The Reserves were sent forward to support Gregg's Division of Cavalry. They marched from their bivouac at 6 A.M., moving in a southerly direction over a road which entered the Orange Court House Plank Road at Parker's Store; the troops then marched westward on the Plank Road to New Hope Church, where they found the cavalry engaging the enemy. The division was here ordered to form and support the cavalry. The enemy was posted in an abandoned railroad cut and easily withstood the attack of the cavalry. The division was now deployed to dislodge the enemy and skirmishers were sent in advance. These moved rapidly and drove the Confederate force, which consisted of cavalry and artillery, supported by a brigade of infantry, beyond the railroad cut."

Colonel Hardin commanded the skirmishers on left of the road, where the enemy's skirmishers made the greatest resistance, they being supported here by a battery. A shell burst under Colonel Hardin's

horse, upsetting horse and rider without doing either any serious damage. General Sykes for once was complimentary to the Reserve skirmishers.

"On 28th the division moved forward to the right, and bivouacked at Robertson's Tavern. Next day the troops advanced two miles westward on the road from the tavern and formed in line of battle on the west bank of Mine Run. On Monday, 30th, moved to the right four miles and prepared to storm enemy's position." Lieutenant Rohn, of "C" company, Twelfth Regiment, and a picked party were sent out between the lines to find out the enemy's position, to learn how strong it was and if possible to find a crossing of Mine Run. The Lieutenant was highly complimented for his services on this occasion.

A cold rain had fallen, and the weather turned very cold, so that lying in line of battle without fires officers and men suffered terribly. Some men were frozen to death. The division was moved from one position to another in front of the enemy until the night of December 1st, when it relieved the Third Corps, which retired. The division started to the rear just after dark on December 1st, passed Robertson's Tavern and crossed the Rapidan at Raccoon Ford.

On this retreat, which was very quietly and rapidly made, a bridge was broken down, causing a delay of the artillery. No one from the Fifth Corps appeared to order it repaired, but General Sedgwick, whose command, Sixth Corps, was in rear, came up and superintended the repairs, working with his own hands to make men hasten the work.

After the Army of the Potomac returned from Mine Run expedition it was posted along the Orange and Alexandria Railroad in Winter quarters and in such positions as to guard this line of supplies. The Fifth Corps, to which the Reserve Division was attached, was ordered to guard the line of railroad from the Rappahannock River to vicinity of Washington. The Reserves guarded the line from Bristoe Station to Alexandria; Third Brigade headquarters, Colonel Fisher commanding, at Manassas. The Fifth and Twelfth Regiments and a detachment of cavalry, under command of Colonel Hardin, were posted at Catlett's Station. The duty of the command was to guard the railroad from cavalry and guerrilla raids.

Colonel Fisher with a detachment of cavalry dispersed a guerrilla party and captured a Captain Lee, their commander. Instead of being tried by court martial for being in our uniform, this Captain Lee, upon a telegram from the War Department, was sent to Washington,

where, it was said, he was the next day seen walking the streets on parole!

Soon after this Captain Lee was let off, a party of our officers and men were ambuscaded, and several of the men killed and wounded. December 14th, Colonel Hardin, accompanied by Lieutenant-Colonel Gustin and a mounted orderly, was riding the line of pickets which was posted along the railroad, selecting sites for block houses, when he encountered a party of five horsemen; supposing it to be a Union cavalry patrol, Colonel Hardin rode up to the officer who was riding in front (the entire party wore black slouch hats, Union overcoats and top boots), and had just asked: "Where are you going?" when the whole five raised their revolvers (which they had concealed behind their right legs) and fired. One shot struck Colonel Hardin in his crippled left arm (it was paralyzed from the wound received at Second Bull Run), one struck Colonel Gustin in his right hand, two struck Colonel Hardin's horse, which sprang forward a few paces and fell dead within the limits of an infantry picket post. The guerrillas after firing turned off into the brush and were seen no more. This party had passed a Union sentinel on post only a minute before Colonel Hardin addressed it, which proves conclusively that it was fully disguised in Union uniform. If that is fair warfare the writer is unable to understand what is unfair. Subsequently, Colonel Hardin was recognized by the man Paine, who attempted to assassinate Mr. Seward. Paine told General Hartranft that he was one of the men who shot at Colonel Hardin. Only a few months since the writer was told a preacher (God save the mark!) boasted that he shot Colonel Hardin. He and Paine were fit companions.

February 16, 1864, Major Larrimer, Inspector of our division, was killed by guerrillas.

As the terms of service of the Reserve regiments were about to expire, great efforts were made to get the men, in a body, to re-enlist. Applications were made to the War Department to give the division a furlough. General Crawford urged the matter very forcibly, using for the first time the argument that "seasoned" soldiers, as the remainder of the Reserves then were, were so very far superior to new levies. Also stating that the men were mostly young and the best material for soldiers. We were soon to learn how valuable were "seasoned" soldiers, such as formed the bulk of General Lee's army.

March 24th, 1864, General Warren assumed command of the Fifth



Corps. Its divisions were commanded as follows : First, by General Griffin ; Second, by General Robinson ; Third (the Reserves), by General Crawford ; Fourth, by General Wadsworth. The men of the Ninth Reserves, whose time was not out the first of May, were transferred to the Twelfth Regiment.

## CHAPTER XIII.

### GRANT'S CAMPAIGN—WILDERNESS AND SPOTTSYLVANIA.

The Army of the Potomac was reorganized in the Spring of 1864; corps and divisions consolidated, so that there were only three corps—the Second, General Hancock commanding; the Fifth, General Warren, and the Sixth, General Sedgwick. An independent army of heterogeneous materials was formed, under command of General Burnside, which joined in the Wilderness. General Grant, who had been made a Lieutenant-General, and assigned to command of all the Union armies, decided to make his headquarters in the field with the Army of the Potomac, “for the reason that the principal Confederate army lay in its front.”

General Grant assumed command of the Army of the Potomac March 27, 1864.

It is thought that General Grant believed that, in a scientific (military) point of view, the campaign should be made by the Peninsula route; but there was such opposition by the authorities in Washington to this plan, he concluded to adopt the overland route, with a co-operating force of considerable strength moving up the Peninsula by water. At the same time, to cover his right flank and to draw off somewhat from the enemy's main army, he formed Crook's and Sigel's armies, to operate in the valley of the Shenandoah and in West Virginia.

On the 29th of April, 1864, the Reserve Division broke camp on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, and marched near to Warrenton Junction; the next day it crossed the Rappahannock and camped near Culpeper Court House. It was attached to the Fifth Corps as its Third Division. On the 4th of May crossed the Rapidan about 11 A. M. at Germanna Ford, and bivouacked on the Lacy Farm. The Sixth Corps followed the Fifth; the Second Corps crossed at Ely's Ford, six miles below. Wilson's Cavalry Division preceded the Fifth Corps, and bivouacked at the old Wilderness Tavern.

The Second Corps, preceded by Gregg's Cavalry Division, moved to Chancellorsville. Lee's army extended from Raccoon Ford to Gordonsville. Ewell's Corps on Lee's right, Hill's in centre and Longstreet's at Gordonsville. General Grant's order for the Fifth says: “First—Major-

General Sheridan, commanding the Cavalry Corps, will move with Gregg's and Torbert's divisions against the enemy's cavalry in the direction of Hamilton's Crossing. General Wilson with the Third Cavalry Division will move at 5 A. M. to Craig's Meeting House, on the Catharpin Road. He will keep out parties on the Orange Court House Pike and Plank Road, the Catharpin Road, Pamunky Road (road to Orange Springs), and in the direction of Wayman's Store and Andrews' Store or Good Hope Church. Second—Major-General Hancock, commanding the Second Corps, will move at 5 A. M. to Shady Grove Church, and extend his right toward the Fifth Corps at Parker's Store. Third—Major-General Warren, commanding the Fifth Corps, will move at 5 A. M. to Parker's Store on the Orange Court House Plank Road, and extend his right toward the Sixth Corps, at old Wilderness Tavern. Fourth—Major-General Sedgwick, commanding the Sixth Corps, will move to old Wilderness Tavern, on the Orange Court House Pike, as soon as the road is clear. \* \* \*

The Army of the Potomac moved in accordance with this order and General Grant expected to get his army beyond the Wilderness before Lee's army could be assembled, and he expected himself to attack the Confederate army. General Lee, knowing thoroughly the Wilderness (a region of dense undergrowth, ditches and other obstructions with very few roads through it), and that by moving down the Orange and Fredericksburg Plank Road and Turnpike he would strike the Army of the Potomac in flank in its movement, advanced his army rapidly to the attack. Ewell's Corps on the Old Turnpike and Hill's on the Plank Road. Swinton says: "In this thick chaparral, through which no artillery could play, Grant's masses would lose their force of impact, while the Confederate marksmen, with an almost Indian skill in woodcraft, could lie unseen in their grey array amid these dun woods and deal death to the assailants."

Wilson's cavalry, which had preceded the Fifth Corps on the Old Turnpike, was withdrawn and sent to Parker's Store; thus there was no cavalry to indicate Ewell's movement. Griffin's Division of the Fifth Corps met Ewell's advance, and Crawford, commanding the Reserves, says: "Led the advance of the Fifth Corps at 5 A.M., with orders to proceed to Parker's Store; \* \* \* took the wood road from the Lacy House and pushed on till reaching the open space about one mile from Parker's Store. The cavalry had become engaged with the enemy. \* \* \* They sent back for support. I deployed the Buck-

tails at once to the front and they advanced just in time to resist an attack of infantry that had just arrived. Took up a position, and at 8.30 A. M. received an order from General Warren, stating that the movement had been suspended, and that Griffin and Wadsworth would attack on the Turnpike." Griffin's Division advanced on the Old Turnpike about noon, Wadsworth on Griffin's left and Robinson's Division in reserve; drove back Johnson's Division of Ewell's Corps, but Wright's Division of the Sixth Corps not finding the right of Griffin's, Ewell's other divisions coming up, struck Griffin's right, the Regular Brigade, and then Bartlett's Brigade, and drove them back; also struck Wadsworth's Division on its left and drove it back, the whole of the Fifth Corps falling back to the point it held when it began its attack.

In the meantime, the Reserve Division remained in position till afternoon, when McCandless, commanding the First Brigade, was sent to support Wadsworth's left; advancing without his flanks protected, he was compelled to retreat after the loss of nearly the whole of the Seventh Regiment. The gallantry of the Eleventh Regiment saved it from capture. It charged right through the Confederate intercepting force. The Third Brigade, Colonel Fisher commanding, was on picket; the enemy showing on both flanks, General Crawford hastily withdrew these pickets and moved back to his position of the morning. Getty's Division of the Sixth Corps had been sent early to hold the junction of the Brock and Plank Roads. Hancock's movement towards Shady Grove Church was suspended about 11 A. M. and he was ordered to move up the Brock Road to join the rest of the army.

Hill's Confederate Corps, which the Reserve Division struck on the Plank Road early in the morning continued on till it met Getty's Division. Getty held on till the Second Corps arrived about 3 P. M., when Getty and the Second Corps were ordered to drive Hill back. The attack began about 4.30 P. M., on both sides of the Plank Road, but Hill's troops could not be forced back; the fighting was perfectly terrific. Wadsworth's Division of Fifth Corps was sent through the woods to cover Hancock's right; it got lost in the woods and bivouacked in contact with Hill's skirmishers. It was a drawn battle with Burnside and Longstreet coming up.

The Sixth Corps was moved up on right of the Fifth Corps. Both the Second and Sixth corps were ordered to attack at 5 A. M. the next day. Confederate General Ewell anticipated Sedgwick, and the

contest on Union right continued for an hour or more, when the Confederates were repulsed. This attack by the Confederates was made to gain time for Anderson's Division of Hill's Corps, and Longstreet's Corps to get up. The Second Corps, with Getty's Division of Sixth, advancing at 5 A. M., drove back Wilcox's and Heth's divisions of Hill's Corps as far as the Confederate headquarters. Here halting to reform his line, Hancock met Anderson's Division of Hill's Corps and soon a part of Longstreet's Corps. Hancock, who had under his command half the army, could advance no farther.

There was now a cessation of fighting for several hours. During this time Longstreet had gotten up his whole corps, extending it well to his right, when he attacked; first forced back Hancock's left and then his whole line, as far back as the Brock Road. In the meantime, the Sixth Corps repeatedly assaulted Ewell's position (which the latter had entrenched) unsuccessfully. Two divisions of the Fifth Corps supporting Hancock, the other two divisions—the Reserves and Griffin's—could only attack with skirmishers. The Ninth Corps was ordered to attack in the interval, between the Fifth and Second corps, on Hancock's right. With the exception of Leasure's Brigade, the Ninth Corps, after moving all over the field and accomplishing nothing, fell back and entrenched. About 4 P. M. Lee attacked Hancock's position on the Brock Road. By reason of a fire in Hancock's parapets the Confederates carried a portion of Hancock's line, but they were soon driven out of this position by Carroll's Brigade.

The Reserve Division was held in reserve most of the day, and at night it returned to its position at the Lacy House. When the right of the Sixth Corps was attacked, and Seymour's and Shaler's brigades fell back, the Reserve Division went at double quick to their support, but the line of battle was restored by other troops of the Sixth Corps. Finding General Lee's army entrenched, General Grant decided to make a flank movement to Spottsylvania Court House. His order of march was in part as follows: “\* \* \* Sixth—At 8.30 P. M., Major-General Warren commanding Fifth Corps, will move to Spottsylvania Court House by way of Brock Road and Todd's Tavern. Seventh—At 8.30 P. M., Major-General Sedgwick, commanding Sixth Corps, will move by the Plank and Pike Road to Chancellorsville, where he will be joined by the authorized trains of his own and the Fifth Corps; thence by way of Aldrich's and Piney Branch Church to Spottsylvania Court House and the road

from Alsop's to Block House. Eighth—Major-General Hancock, commanding Second Corps, will move to Todd's Tavern, by the Brock Road, following the Fifth Corps closely. Ninth—Headquarters during the movement will be along the route of the Fifth and Second Corps, at the close of the movement near the Sixth Corps. Tenth—The pickets of the Fifth and Sixth Corps will be withdrawn at 1 A. M. and those of the Second Corps at 2 A. M. \* \* \* Thirteenth—Major-General Sheridan, commanding the Cavalry Corps, will have a sufficient force, on the approaches from the right, to keep the corps commanders advised in time of the appearance of the enemy. Fourteenth—It is understood that General Burnside's command will follow the Sixth Corps."

The Fifth Corps started at 9 P. M.; was delayed one and a half hours at Todd's Tavern by General Meade's cavalry escort blocking the way. At two miles beyond was detained by Merritt's Cavalry Division, who had been and still were fighting Stuart's Cavalry. At 6 A. M. the cavalry moved out of the way and the infantry pushed on. The road was obstructed and some pioneers were killed removing obstacles. At 8 A. M. of the 8th the column emerged from the woods into a clearing two miles north of Spottsylvania Court House. Robinson's Division of the Fifth Corps deployed and advanced over the field. At the crest of a ridge it met Anderson's Division of Longstreet's Corps and was repulsed.

Anderson had moved the night before at 8 P. M. Having orders to start the morning of the 8th he had anticipated the movement of the Union army. No doubt he learned from his cavalry and scouts that the Union army had already started on a flank movement. He says he concluded to leave at night and get to the high ground about Spottsylvania by a night march. He reached his position about daylight. Griffin's Division advanced on the right of Robinson's and was also repulsed. The Reserve Division came up last, having been double-quickened to the field; it went in with a rush and drove the enemy out of the woods on Griffin's left. Wadsworth's Division came up on the right; a line was formed and the men began entrenching without orders. No other troops coming up till late, the attack was delayed till the Sixth Corps arrived.

The principal attack was made by the Reserves, who formed in two lines; First Brigade, Colonel Talley commanding, in front; Third Brigade, Colonel Baily commanding, in rear; a third line commanded by Colonel Herring. The attack of the Reserve Division was very success-

ful, but it was not supported, and there was no adequate result from their brilliant charge. Colonel Talley was captured. The division was commanded by Colonel McCoy, A. A. G. (General Crawford having been injured). The division was withdrawn by Colonel Jackson, of the Eleventh. "The troops held the line in front of the enemy during the night of the 8th; rations were issued at midnight, and early on Monday morning the forces were rearranged for a renewal of the battle. The Reserves were moved a short distance to the right to relieve a portion of the Sixth Corps, where they laid down in the entrenchments until late in the afternoon. During the day the First Brigade made a reconnaissance to the Po River on the right."

The Second Corps had been stopped at Todd's Tavern on the 8th to watch the enemy, to guard against an attack on the rear. On the 9th the whole army was brought up; the Sixth Corps on the left of the Fifth, the Ninth Corps on the left of Sixth, and Second Corps on right of Fifth, on the Po River.

Late in the afternoon Barlow's Division of Second Corps crossed the Po River, but before it could be supported the rest of the Corps was ordered to support the attack of the Fifth and Sixth corps. The attack of the Second, Fifth and Sixth corps was against Laurel Hill; the brigades of Webb and Carroll, of Gibbon's Division, had assaulted this position at 11 A. M., and Cutler's and the Reserve divisions at 3 P. M., without success. Now a grand assault was made, after 5 P. M., by the Fifth and Sixth corps, which failed after heavy losses. General Rice, of Fifth Corps, was killed. Upton's Brigade of the Sixth Corps carried the entrenchments, but it was not supported.

May 11th was given up to rest and to moving the Second Corps to the left of the army to make an assault there. May 12th Hancock made his grand successful assault on "the Bloody Angle."

In regard to the controversy as to who was to blame for the failure of the Union army to get to Spottsylvania Court House before the Confederates, General Humphreys (Chief of Staff) says: "Their (Confederate's) route was about three miles shorter than Warren's, who, when he arrived at General Merritt's headquarters at 3.20 A. M., had marched as far as they had when arriving at the point where their leading troops met those of General Warren between 9 and 10 A. M. \* \* \* The Confederates had a clear route, no obstructions; they had time to rest and breakfast before arrival of Fifth Corps. \* \* \* The presence of Fitz Lee's Cavalry on the Brock Road, Hampton's Cavalry and Long-

street's Corps on the Shady Grove Road, settled the question as to who should first hold the Court House with infantry."

Of the labors of the Union army at this time it has been written : "No mere general statement can give any idea of the enormous amount of labor, suffering and privation that befel the troops in these continual shiftings of the corps from point to point of the long line. May 13th, the battle of the 12th having ended in Lee's retirement to an inner and shorter line, it was resolved to attempt to turn his right flank. With this view the Fifth Corps during the night of the 13th was ordered to march from its position on the extreme right, to take post on the extreme left, to the left of Burnside's command, and assault in connection with that command at 4 P. M. on 14th. The march was begun at 10 P. M. The wet weather had, however, badly broken up the roads, and the night being one of Egyptian darkness, the move was made with immense difficulty. The route of march was past the Landrum House to the Ny River, which had to be waded. Across the Ny the route followed no road but traversed the fields and a piece of woods where a track had been cut. Here, midway of the journey, a dense fog arose and covered the ground, so that not even the numerous fires that had been built to guide the column could be seen.

The men, exhausted with wading through the mud knee deep and in darkness, fell asleep all along the way. In addition to this, the locality where the troops were to take position was quite unknown, and at broad daylight, when the head of the column got to the left of Burnside's Corps, near the Fredericksburg Turnpike, the only troops on hand with which to execute the meditated assault were 1,200 fagged out men of Griffin's Division. It was 7 A. M. before Cutler got 1,300 men up."

May 14th, Jet House was occupied, abandoned and reoccupied. The Sixth Corps had followed the Fifth Corps, so that on the 15th and 16th Birney's Division of Second Corps was on the right, then Burnside, then Fifth Corps. On 17th the Second Corps, assisted by the Sixth and Ninth, was ordered to return to the scene of its assault and make another attack. The attack was made at 4 A. M. on the 18th, but the enemy was found entrenched and attack failed. The Fifth Corps on the 18th held the greater portion of the line of the Union entrenchments. Warren opened with his batteries to cover the attack.

During the artillery firing a number of picked men, mostly Buck-tails, were advanced close to the enemy's line in front of the First Brigade of the Reserve Division (Colonel Hardin having reported for duty on



18th was assigned to command the First Brigade), and strongly supported by skirmishers. It was hoped this good position could be held, from which an attack could be made the next morning. The First Brigade of the Reserves was relieved just before dark by Colonel Coulter's Brigade; his men were warned to expect the enemy to try to drive in this advanced picket line. When the enemy's expected attack was made, two of Colonel Coulter's regiments made little resistance. Whilst reinforcing his line and displaying his usual boldness, Colonel Coulter was wounded, and the advance line lost.

The 19th was set for the next turning movement, but Ewell attacked Tyler's Division of new troops on the road to Fredericksburg, and delayed it. The Reserve Division was double quickened to the right two or more miles. It passed by the lines of knapsacks left by Tyler's men, and came up behind the left of his line of battle; his men were standing up in line of battle and every few minutes blazing away at nothing, unless a shot from a straggling Confederate could be called something. It seemed impossible to stop this firing. The First Brigade was ordered to advance in front of Tyler's left to see what was there. The command, on account of this unsteadiness of Tyler's troops, could not be sent directly to the front; the brigade was fied off to the left and halted, where a skirmish line of the Bucktails was formed, and advanced into the woods in front. The enemy had already retired. The Bucktails remained on picket all night. The next morning the writer rode the picket line; finding all the pickets' shelter tents and blankets on the enemy's side of large trees, he naturally inquired the reason of this extraordinary state of affairs. The pickets said they received a blizzard every little while from the Union line, and only an occasional shot from the enemy's side. Yet these new troops had shown good pluck in resisting Ewell's reconnaissance. Lee's veterans were surely as two to one of such troops, however courageous. The division returned to its old camp the next day.


In the meantime General Sheridan, with the greater part of the mounted force, had gone on his raid in the rear of Lee's army, during which the battle of Yellow Tavern occurred, and the famous Confederate cavalry leader, General Stuart, was killed. As a raid, this movement of the Union cavalry was a success (Sheridan was the kind of leader to make successes), but as a military movement, leaving the main army short of cavalry at this supreme time, it was a military error. The principal reason why the infantry was marched hither and thither

was to find out positions which the cavalry would have found for it. The infantry was so much exhausted by marching, especially at night and in rain, it had little stomach for a fight when the attacks were ordered.

The night of the 20th the Second Corps moved from the right of the army in rear of the entire line to Massaponax Church, and next day, preceded by Torbert's Cavalry, passed Milford Station, on the Fredericksburg and Richmond Railroad. The Second Corps reached Bowling Green that evening and remained there till the 23d. The Fifth Corps started on the morning of the 21st, followed in the afternoon by Burnside's command. In the night the Sixth Corps left its position. Lee learned on 20th of this movement and sent Longstreet's Corps to head off the Second Corps. Ewell's followed Longstreet's. Hill attacked the Sixth Corps, which had been left to cover the rear of the army; Hill was repulsed.



# Battle of North Anna



## CHAPTER XIV.

---

### NORTH ANNA AND BETHESDA CHURCH.

The Reserve Division broke camp at Spottsylvania Court House, at 12 M. on 21st, being on left of the Corps; marching rapidly it arrived at Gurney's Station at 6 P. M. A small force of the enemy's cavalry was driven from the station by the Sixth Regiment and Bucktails. Captain Pattee, in charge of the division pioneers, with men from the Tenth and Bucktail regiments, captured Gatewood House on morning of 22d. Colonel Gates, commanding Baxter's Brigade, reconnoitered on 22d three miles beyond Gurney's Station, and saw the enemy moving south in force.

The whole of Grant's army now pushed rapidly on toward the North Anna. At 11 A. M. on 22d the Fifth Corps moved from Gurney's Station, and marched down the telegraph road to Bowling Green, near which place it bivouacked. The Reserve Division was in advance, having skirmishers covering its front; these latter searched houses and sought information as well as guarded against a surprise.

The Fifth Corps moved early on 23d, passed the Second Corps at Milford, and advanced to Jericho Ford on North Anna, where it crossed. The Second Corps came up in the afternoon and took position to the left of Fifth Corps on the railroad. Advancing along the railroad it stormed the Chesterfield or County bridge above railroad bridge. Thus the Fifth and Second Corps crossed the North Anna at the points designated for them. Between them was a space of three to four miles, which Burnside's command was to occupy, and it was to cross at Quarles Mill about half way between the crossings of Fifth and Second Corps. But this command came up slowly and stopped on the left bank, making no effort to cross. This enabled the Confederates to seize a point on the river below Quarles Mill which they entrenched and held.

Griffin's Division, the head of the Fifth Corps, reached the North Anna at 1 P. M., and before 2 P. M. was crossing. The river here has a rocky bed and steep banks. It was difficult to make approaches for a pontoon bridge. The water ran rapidly, and was about waist deep. The men waded across. Griffin's Division was promptly formed on the right bank, and advanced to the woods about half a mile from the


river, where it formed line of battle. The Reserve Division crossed and advanced, and formed line on Griffin's left. Cutler was to come up on Griffin's right. Before he could get into position, the enemy, under Wilcox, attacked Griffin; a fierce infantry fight now ensued. The enemy were forcing Griffin's left back and about to gain an interval which existed between Griffin's left and the First Brigade of the Reserve Division. One regiment of First Brigade had been thrown to the rear and faced to the right, when two regiments of Cutler's Division, coming from the rear, looking for their division, at the request of Colonel Hardin, advanced to cover the interval above mentioned. They soon got into the hot infantry fight on Griffin's left. They were of the right material, and went in with a will; they forced the enemy back, and this part of the line was fully restored.

The Reserve Division was in open ground; the First Brigade on the right, Third on the left. The enemy opened about thirty pieces of artillery on the division. As the division had not had time to entrench, the men were under about as warm artillery fire as they ever had in the open. Division Headquarters was driven back to the river for shelter. The First Brigade Headquarters seized an icehouse, which was unfortunately directly in rear of a farm house, which appeared to be the Confederate target. The ice house was blown up. About the same time Colonel Hardin's horse was struck by a piece of shell. Soon after, while posting Cutler's regiments, Colonel Hardin was himself struck by a piece of shell.

The Bucktails, under Major Hartshorn, were sent out to take a house in front of the division. They made a brilliant advance, capturing the house and forcing the enemy to change the location of his artillery.

In the meantime Cutler was attacked as he was coming into position on the right of Griffin, and a part of his command thrown into confusion; but the Eighty-Third Pennsylvania, Lieutenant-Colonel McCoy commanding, struck Brown's Confederate Brigade in flank, capturing Colonel Brown and several hundred men. This, and the good work done on Griffin's front and by the Bucktails, caused the Confederates to cease the attack and to retire.

Early in the morning of the 24th the Fifth Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Smith, and the Sixth, Colonel Ent, reconnoitered to the railroad in front, captured some prisoners, and learned the enemy had left the front of the Fifth Corps. The First Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Stewart,







art, was sent early in the morning along the right bank of the river to connect with Burnside's command. Colonel Stewart was informed that Burnside's troops had crossed at Quarles Ford. Colonel Stewart advanced until he came opposite to Burnside's command, who were inclined to treat him as an enemy. They would not join him, so the Reserve Division was ordered to go to Colonel Stewart's support and hold the right bank for Burnside's command to cross behind them.

The division, advancing cautiously, succeeded in getting some distance below Colonel Stewart's position; here it halted and entrenched, expecting every moment to be attacked. Burnside's troops now came down to the river and went to washing, bathing and swimming, at the same time hallooing and making all the noise they could as though there were no enemy within miles. The writer was never so indignant in his life. His troops were then in peril of their lives, and had been in the utmost danger of capture since early in the morning, holding an uncovered position on the right of the river within sight of the whole Confederate army.

It took about six hours to get one of Burnside's Divisions over the river and in position to attack. We all said then we would be better off without Burnside's army, as it was then commanded. The enemy came close up to our front and entrenched, whilst this division of Burnside's was getting over and into position. And when it attacked, as it did about sundown, with considerable spirit, it struck entrenchments, lost heavily, and gained nothing. General Meade was perfectly justified in demanding that Burnside should be put under him, and his troops made a corps of the Army of the Potomac.

The withdrawal from the North Anna was begun at dark on 26th, when the Second, Fifth and Sixth corps withdrew to the North bank. The army moved east and south for the Pamunky. The Sixth Corps, preceded by two divisions of cavalry under General Sheridan, took the advance the night of 26th, and on morning of 27th crossed the Pamunky at Hanover town. The Fifth and Ninth corps followed. The Second Corps covered the rear.

The Reserves bivouacked on Mrs. Orman's plantation Friday night: resumed the march next morning early, passing Hanover town, crossed the Pamunky, advanced two miles on the Mechanicsville Pike, were formed in line of battle on extreme left of the army, and threw up entrenchments facing southward. Late in the day the division changed front and constructed rifle pits facing westward. By night the whole

army had formed line, facing westward, stretching from the Pamunky across the Tolopotomoy, to a point near Coal Harbor. During the day the cavalry fought at Hawes' Shop.

During the 29th (Sunday) the whole army advanced toward the Chickahominy; only a skirmish line of the enemy found. On Monday morning, 30th, Fifth Corps crossed the Tolopotomoy; Griffin's division was ordered to advance on the direct road leading from Hanover Court House to Richmond; Crawford's Division to move forward on the Mechanicsville Pike and to connect with Griffin's left. This latter road was held by the enemy's cavalry, and in rear of this advance guard was Rodes' Division of Ewell's Corps. The Reserve (Crawford's) Division (now composed of First and Third brigades of the Reserves and Kitching's Brigade of new troops) was about one-half mile north of Bethesda Church. A wood (country) road led south from position of Crawford's Division to the Mechanicsville Pike.

The enemy's cavalry was supported by artillery, which early in the day opened on the position of the Reserve Division. The Fifth Regiment, being on picket, was ordered to advance and take a strip of woods in its front which crossed the wood road. This regiment, being armed with smooth-bore muskets, was unable to dislodge the enemy from the strip of woods. The Tenth Regiment was ordered to relieve the Fifth. It did so, and was deployed as skirmishers on the left of the wood road, and tried to advance, but could not carry the strip of woods, which by this time was strongly held by Confederate infantry skirmishers.

Directions were now received for the First Brigade (about 5 P. M.) to advance in line and take this strip of woods. The Bucktails were immediately deployed as skirmishers on the right of the wood road, and the other regiments of the First Brigade formed in line of battle to support the line of skirmishers. The Bucktails, led by Major Hartshorn, began to work across an old corn field, which lay between the woods on one side and the strip of timber before mentioned, in a manner to excite the admiration of friend and foe. Being deployed at our edge of the timber, they made a rush into the open, which drew the enemy's fire. The instant this fire began the Bucktails dropped. As soon as the enemy's fire slackened the Bucktails rose and delivered a rapid fire of three to five shots a piece from their breechloaders, advancing at the same time. As soon as the enemy had loaded he began firing again: in an instant the Bucktails literally disappeared. The enemy's fire diminish-

ing, the Bucktails again rose, delivered three to five shots in rapid succession, and ran for the enemy's strip of woods, which they carried, the enemy falling back to a house where he made a short stand, but was soon driven out and back to his main line, which the Bucktails discovered to be about a quarter of a mile beyond Bethesda Church. In the meantime the First Brigade followed the skirmishers, and was soon on the Mechanicsville Pike at Bethesda Church. The men were ordered to tear down the fences and make a breastwork, and word was sent back to the division commander that the enemy's skirmishers had been driven back to his entrenched line, that reinforcements should be sent up at once, or the First Brigade, which was half a mile or more beyond any support, having accomplished the object of its reconnaissance, should be withdrawn.

The answer was to hold on where the brigade was, but no reinforcements came up. Soon the enemy formed a column of attack, consisting of Rodes' Division; each brigade of it formed in line. This column, five or six times the strength of the First Brigade, came down the Mechanicsville Pike at a run, its left resting on the pike, and its front extended off to the right. There had been only time for the First Brigade of Reserves to pile up some fence rails and lay down behind them, when this column came rushing over them. The volley or two delivered by our feeble force made no impression on the enemy; he ran over and around the piles of rails, and his division headquarters arrived amidst the headquarters of the First Brigade before the latter could extricate itself. The enemy was so confident of his ultimate success, he did not stop to secure the First Brigade prisoners, but continued on his charge down the pike.

The Confederate Headquarters and the First Brigade Headquarters came together on the pike near Bethesda Church. Officers and men of the First Brigade began at once to slip back by the wood road, and just as the last of them had gotten clear of the enemy's rear, the Third Brigade, Colonel Fisher commanding, came up by the flank on the Wood Road. The disorganized but undismayed First Brigade immediately joined the Third Brigade. About this time Colonel Kitching formed his brigade on the ridge, opposite the point of the strip of woods heretofore mentioned, and commenced firing on the Confederate column, which still continued down the Mechanicsville Pike.

The Confederates, at last, finding they were moving in the wrong direction, to wit, parallel to the Union line, halted and changed front.

In the meantime their rear had thrown out skirmishers along the pike, who kept up a sharp fire on the First and Third Brigades and on Kitching's command. Colonel Hardin's command (the First Brigade) having formed in with the Third Brigade, and it being plainly seen that the enemy's division was changing front to charge us, he sent word to Colonel Fisher to fall back to our line of battle, whilst he would go to Kitching's command (near which he had arrived in extricating himself and his headquarters from the Confederate column). Kitching's men were standing up on the crest firing as fast as possible; Colonel Hardin went up to this line and tried his best to get the men to lie down, as the skirmish fire (the only fire of the enemy) was dealing destruction amongst them. No amount of persuasion nor orders could make the men lie down; Colonel Hardin then asked Colonel Kitching to move his brigade back to his former position in the general line of battle.

From Colonel Kitching's position we could now plainly see the enemy forming to charge in our direction. Colonel Kitching now ordered his command back, and Colonel Hardin hastened to the position from which the First Brigade had started in making its reconnaissance. Every effort was now made by Colonel Fisher, Colonel Kitching and Colonel Hardin to get a connected line formed to meet the expected attack. A battery of artillery was posted so as to reach the open ground, A slight breastwork which had been begun earlier in the day across the wood road was finished. There was an interval between the right of the Reserve Division and Griffin's Division. The Bucktails were placed as a skirmish line to cover this interval. Whilst these were being placed, General Griffin rode up and, as there was now no firing and no enemy in sight, he asked what we were making such preparations for. He was requested to ride with the writer to the crest of the ridge at the point of the strip of woods before mentioned, which he did or started to do. Just after crossing the wood road we came face to face with the same Confederate Headquarters, those of General Ramseur (an old army acquaintance) commanding Rodes' Division, that the writer had lately encountered. General Griffin called out, "I'm satisfied," and galloped off to prepare his own division to receive the attack.

The Confederates charged apparently in column of brigade front, five or six brigades deep. They succeeded in getting within fifty feet of our lines, but were repulsed with very severe loss, whilst the loss to the Reserve Division in this final attack was very slight. Part of the

enemy's attack was against the ground held by the Bucktails, whose fire seemed fairly continuous.

After the enemy was repulsed, General Crawford got on the breastworks and ordered a charge, but it was now dark, and the enemy had withdrawn, leaving their killed and severely wounded behind. If the enemy had advanced in the proper direction, as it was natural to suppose he would, the First Brigade would have been destroyed or captured.

However, "all's well that ends well," and the Reserves in their last battle, so near their first on the Peninsula, escaped with a comparatively small loss, and caused as large a loss proportionately to the enemy as at Mechanicsville. The Reserves then were about ten thousand strong, and attacked by about twenty thousand. At Bethesda Church, the Reserves were about two thousand five hundred, and attacked by more than double their number.

General Grant, ordering an advance after the Battle of the Wilderness, and especially after the misfortune on his right late in the evening, (his communications were behind his right) proved him to be superior in generalship to any prior commander of the army of the Potomac. This movement discouraged the Confederate rank and file, the Confederate civil authorities, and the people from whom recruits for the Confederate army were to be obtained.

The failure of the attacks of General Grant's armies in this campaign, and the terrible losses in these attacks, were principally due to the advantage the defensive has with modern weapons when the defensive is properly conducted. General Lee's campaign is a model well worthy of study. Other causes of these great losses were: that a large part of General Grant's armies was composed of new troops, extremely brave, but unable to cope fairly with Lee's veteran's in such a region as the Wilderness and like country, through which this campaign was conducted; and, that General Lee had more experienced corps, division, and brigade commanders,

The writer would reinforce his opinion by such examples as: Burnside's failure at Fredericksburg; the failure of General Lee's grand assault on third day at Gettysburg; the failure of General Sherman's assault on Kenesaw Mountain—in fact, the real success of Sherman's campaign began when his enemy, under General Hood, assumed the offensive.

On May 31st the Reserve Corps was relieved from duty with the

Army of the Potomac; took leave of General Warren, commanding Fifth Corps, and prepared for its departure to Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, to be mustered out. About one thousand two hundred officers and men returned to the State, and one thousand seven hundred and fifty-nine re-enlisted and formed the One Hundred and Ninetieth and One Hundred and Ninety-First Pennsylvania regiments.


The veterans of the Twelfth Regiment went to the One Hundred and Ninetieth Pennsylvania, Colonel Hartshorn.

On the 1st of June, General Crawford issued a farewell address to the Corps.

"The Reserves marched down the North bank of the Pamunky, having in charge six hundred Rebel prisoners, and a long train of ambulances and wagons, carrying wounded soldiers to the transports at White House. The Reserves embarked there on the 3d, and sailed for Washington, where they arrived on the following day. They went from Washington to Harrisburg by rail, arriving at the latter city on the 6th.

There was a review for the Governor (Curtin), reception by the citizens, much speech-making, and they were mustered out on the 11th of June, 1864.


**MAP**  
OF PORTIONS OF  
VIRGINIA, MARYLAND & PENNSYLVANIA











## CHAPTER XV.

---

### *BIOGRAPHIES AND MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS.*

---

#### GENERAL MARTIN D. HARDIN

Was born at Jacksonville, Morgan County, Illinois, June 26, 1837. He is a descendant of martial ancestry. His great-grandfather was General John Hardin, of Kentucky, who commanded a company of troops in Colonel Morgan's celebrated regiment of riflemen at the battle of Saratoga, and was present at the capture of the British army under General Burgoyne on 17th October, 1777. He subsequently distinguished himself in the Indian wars, and finally fell a victim to their barbarous treachery while negotiating a treaty of peace. His grandfather was General Martin D. Hardin, of Kentucky, who served with honor with General Harrison in the war of 1812. His father was General John J. Hardin, of Illinois, whose mother was a daughter of the distinguished General Logan, of Kentucky. General John J. Hardin served in the Black Hawk war in Illinois. Was a general of militia at the time of the Mormon troubles in Illinois, represented his district (the one in which the lamented Lincoln resided), in Congress, and raised the First Illinois Volunteers and went to Mexico as its Colonel. He was killed whilst gallantly leading his regiment at the battle of Buena Vista.

The subject of this sketch was appointed a Cadet at Large to the West Point Military Academy in 1854, graduated in the artillery in 1859. His class was the first five year class at that academy. Was breveted a second lieutenant in the Third United States Artillery July 1, 1859, and ordered to report in September following at the Artillery School at Fortress Monroe, Va. Served at this post until March, 1860. Accompanied a command from Fort Monroe, Va., to Harper's Ferry to recapture the arsenal at that point, which had been seized by John Brown and his followers. Served as Aid-de-Camp (temporary) to Lieutenant-Colonel R. E. Lee, commanding regular troops at Harper's Ferry. Made a reconnaissance and official report of method of defence of Harper's Ferry. Volunterred to join and joined a command which was to endeavor to cross from the headwaters of the Missouri to

the headwaters of the Columbia River under command of Major Blake. Left St. Louis, Mo., May 3, 1860; arrived at Fort Vancouver in October following. Joined Company "L," Third Artillery, at Fort Umpqua, Oregon, October, 1861, having been promoted Second Lieutenant (January 2d) in that company. Commanded Fort Umpqua, Oregon, from Winter, 1860-61 to October, 1861. Returned to "States" with light battery "C" of regiment (Third Artillery) Fall of 1861. In Camp Barry, east of Capitol, November, 1861, to December 25, 1861. Promoted First Lieutenant Company "H" May 14, 1861. Crossed the Potomac with that company, Captain J. Stewart commanding, and served with McCall's Division (Pennsylvania Reserves) Winter 1861-62. Company "H" having been ordered March, 1862, to California, he requested to remain East, and was ordered to report to Colonel H. J. Hunt, commanding Artillery Reserve as Aid-de-Camp. Served with Artillery Reserve until July 8th, 1862. Was elected Lieutenant-Colonel Twelfth Regiment Pennsylvania Reserves April 1st, 1862. Present at Yorktown. Absent sick with swamp fever from the first of May to first of June. Rejoined Army Potomac on Chickahominy about June 12th, 1862. Present in Seven Day's battles. Promoted Colonel Twelfth Regiment Pennsylvania Reserves July 8th, 1862, and ordered by General McClellan, commanding Army Potomac, to assume command of that regiment. Assumed command July 8th, 1862.

Present in General Pope's campaign. Was slightly wounded in head, August 29, whilst commanding regiment. Was assigned to command of Third Brigade Pennsylvania Reserve Division (General Jackson, the permanent commander, being sick) on afternoon of August 30, 1862. Was severely wounded in left breast whilst commanding said Third Brigade, about 5 P.M. August 30, 1862 (battle of second Bull Run). Absent on account of wounds from August 30, 1862, to December 18, 1862. Commanding Third Brigade Pennsylvania Reserves, December 18, 1862, to January 12, 1863. Absent, sick on account of wounds, January 12, 1863, to March 11, 1863. On Provost and Court Martial duty in defences of Washington. March 11, 1863, to May 31, 1863. On leave, May 31, 1863, to June 25, 1863. Rejoined regiment whilst en route to Gettysburg. Commanded regiment at Battle of Gettysburg. Commanding regiment at "Falling Waters." Commanded Third Brigade Pennsylvania Reserves in Rapidan Campaign, September to December, 1863. Present at combat of Bristoe Station, October 14, 1863. Rappahannock Station, November 7, 1863,

and Mine Run campaign, November 26 to December 3, 1863. In command of two regiments of infantry and a squadron of cavalry guarding Orange and Alexandria Railroad, December 3-14, 1863. Severely wounded by guerrillas, whilst inspecting line of railroad, December 14, 1863, losing left arm. Absent, sick on account of wounds, December 14, 1863, to January 10, 1864. On Court Martial and Military Commission in New York City and Boston, Mass., January 10 to March 26, 1864. In command of draft Rendezvous at Pittsburg, Pa., March 26 to May 14 (?) 1864. Applied to rejoin regiment in field, joined May 18, 1864. Assigned to command of First Brigade Crawford's Division (Pennsylvania Reserves) Fifth Corps, present at Battle of Spottsylvania, May 18-20, 1864; battle of North Anna, May 23, 1864, where he was slightly wounded by piece of shell; Battle of Talopotomoy, May 28, 1864; Battle of Bethesda Church, May 30, 1864. Mustered out with the regiment, June 11, 1864. On sick leave on account of wounds, June 11, 1864, to July 8, 1864. Promoted Brigadier-General, July 2, 1863. Assigned to command of defences of Washington, north of the Potomac, July 8, 1864. Engaged in defence of the Capitol against General Early's army, July 10-12, 1864. Relieved from command of the defences of Washington, north of the Potomac, August 4, 1865. In command of district of Raleigh, N. C., August 15, 1865, to January 15, 1866. On leave of absence, January 15, 1866, to April 4, 1866. Mustered out as Brigadier-General Volunteers, January 15, 1866. On recruiting service at Chicago, Ill., April 4, 1866, to October 5, 1866. Promoted Major Forty-third U. S. Infantry, July 28, 1866. Superintendent of regimental recruiting service, Detroit, Mich., November 4, 1866, to Winter of 1866-7. Acting Judge-Advocate Headquarters Department of the Lakes, Detroit, Mich., Spring of 1867. On leave abroad, 1867-8. June, 1868, to April, 1869, on duty at Headquarters of Department or commanding Fort Wayne, Michigan. Transferred to First U. S. Infantry, April, 1869. Commanding Fort Porter, Buffalo, N. Y., April, 1869, to August, 1870. Commanding Fort Gratiot, Michigan, August, 1870, to December 15, 1870.

Retired as Brigadier-General, December 15, 1870.

Brevet Captain, August 29th, 1862, for gallant and meritorious services at the battle of Groveton, Va.

Brevet Major, August 30th, 1862, for gallant and meritorious services at the battle of Manassas, Va.

Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel, December 14th, 1863, for gallant and meritorious services in an encounter with a band of guerrillas.

Brevet Colonel, May 22d, 1864, for gallant and meritorious services at the battle of North Anna.

Brevet Brigadier-General, March 13th, 1865, for gallant and meritorious services in the field during the Rebellion.

After he was retired General Hardin made his home in Chicago, Ill. Having read law in various offices, (in Chicago, in Scammon, McCogg & Fuller's) he was admitted to the bar in 1871, and practiced law in Chicago actively for twelve years, although several times having to take a rest on account of chills and fever which he had contracted at Yorktown, Va. He married November 15th, 1864, Estelle Graham, second daughter of Major James Graham, of San Francisco, California. Has passed nine Winters in St. Augustine, Florida, at first on account of severe attack of ague, afterward on account of the delicate health of his wife, who died at Highland Falls, near West Point, N. Y., August 24th, 1890. Mrs. Hardin was one of the most beautiful and intellectual women, and one of the loveliest characters of her day. She was remarkably well read, and by means of her extraordinary memory was never amiss on a quotation or a work of art. Although so unusually well informed, on account of her gentle, modest and retiring nature, few but her friends (all who knew her were her friends) were aware of her accomplishments. General and Mrs. Hardin had no children. The loss of his beloved companion was a terrible blow to the survivor. General Hardin was for a long time an active member of the Chicago Literary Club; he has written many articles for societies to which he belongs, for the magazines, etc. He is also an accomplished horseman, a good shot, an ardent and successful fisherman, and an excellent swimmer even since he lost his arm; is passionately fond of small boat sailing and of mountain climbing. He is a professed Christian of the Roman Catholic faith.

---

#### JOHN HENRY TAGGART.

Colonel John H. Taggart, editor and senior proprietor of *Taggart's Times*, of Philadelphia, was born in Georgetown, Kent County, Md., on the 22d of January, 1821. His father and mother were both Marylanders, the former being a native of Cecil, and the latter of Kent County, on the eastern shore of the Chesapeake Bay. After the death of his father, Henry L. Taggart, he came to Philadelphia, in 1829, with his mother and sister, where he resided up to the breaking out of the Rebellion in 1861. In May, 1844, he married Miss Elizabeth Graham, a

native of Philadelphia, by whom he had six sons and four daughters, of whom only four, two sons and two daughters, are now living (1888).

He is a practical printer, and began setting type when only ten years old, on the old *National Gazette*, published by William Fry. After it ceased publication, about 1840, he became a compositor on the *Public Ledger*, and, except about six months in the latter part of 1849, when he published a weekly military paper, called the *Pennsylvania Volunteer*, he remained on the *Public Ledger*, setting type until 1858, when he accepted a position as a reporter on the *Sunday Mercury*; next he was employed as a reporter on the *Public Ledger* for about a year; then on *Forney's Press*, till the early part of 1860. At that time he bought a half interest in the *Sunday Mercury*, and it was then published by Jones & Taggart, the senior partner being George W. Jones.

Colonel Taggart had a taste for military exercises, and was for many years connected with the Washington Blues, Captain William C. Patterson, of Philadelphia, and carried a musket in defence of the civil authorities in the Kensington and Southwark riots of 1844. After the attack on Fort Sumter, in 1861, he raised a company of one hundred and two men in Philadelphia, called the Wayne Guards, which was accepted by Governor Curtin as part of the Pennsylvania Reserve Volunteer Corps. Captain Taggart marched his company to Harrisburg on the 7th of June, 1861, and remained in Camp Curtin for several weeks in command of it and the camp, until the 25th of July of that year, the day on which the Twelfth Regiment of the Reserve Corps was organized, when he was elected Colonel, and placed in command of the regiment. During this time he rendered efficient service in preventing a serious riot on the return of the three months' enlisted men, who were discharged in Harrisburg before being paid off, and great dissatisfaction existed at the delay of the paymasters, who were threatened with personal violence. For his prudence on this trying occasion Colonel Taggart received the warm commendation of Governor Curtin. Soon after this, the regiment was ordered to Washington, and formed part of the division of Pennsylvania Reserves, under command of Brigadier-General George A. McCall. Colonel Taggart's regiment was assigned to the Third Brigade, commanded by Brigadier-General E. O. C. Ord. Colonel Taggart, in command of his regiment, took part in the battle of Dranesville, December 20, 1861, and for his gallantry in action was recommended for Brevet Brigadier-General by General E. O. C. Ord, who commanded the Third Brigade in that brilliant engagement, which

was the first Union success after the first disastrous battle of Bull Run and the massacre at Ball's Bluff in the Fall of 1861. Colonel Taggart was also highly complimented by General George A. McCall, in his official report of the battle of Mechanicsville, in the first of the seven days' battles in front of Richmond, Va., for gallantly defending Ellerson's Mill against an overwhelming force of the enemy.

Colonel Taggart also commanded his regiment in the battles of Gaines' Mill, New Market Cross Roads and Malvern Hill in the Seven Days' Battles. He resigned his commission as Colonel July 8, 1862, and, after the dissolution of the partnership with Mr. Jones, Colonel Taggart again returned to the army as a war correspondent for the *Philadelphia Inquirer*, and in that capacity was at the first battle of Fredericksburg, of Gettysburg and other engagements.

In the beginning of 1864 he was selected by the Supervisory Committee for Recruiting Colored Troops in Philadelphia as Chief Preceptor of the "Free Military School for Applicants for the Command of Colored Troops," which proved a great success, as upwards of one thousand of the students passed General Silas Casey's examination board in Washington, and more than five hundred were commissioned as officers in the Union army to command colored troops. This school was organized under the authority of Secretary of War E. M. Stanton, and was supported by the contributions of the patriotic citizens of Philadelphia.

After the close of the War of the Rebellion, Colonel Taggart, in 1865, was appointed Collector of Internal Revenue for the First District of Pennsylvania, one of the largest in the State. He held this position for nearly a year, and afterwards removed to Washington City, where he became a correspondent for the *Inquirer*, *Evening Telegraph*, *Evening Bulletin*, and *Sunday Dispatch*, of Philadelphia, Cincinnati *Times* and Chicago *Republican*. He remained in Washington till the fall of 1869, when he removed his family to Philadelphia, and in November of that year bought the *Sunday Morning Times*, published by Robert C. Smith & Co. This was enlarged several times, and now enjoys a large and prosperous share of business. Colonel Taggart is a vigorous and aggressive editorial writer, devoting much attention to the reform of local abuses, by which he has established for his paper a reputation of fearless independence and as a staunch advocate of the rights of the people. In 1871 he associated with him his eldest son, Harry L. Taggart, under the firm style of John H. Taggart & Son. In October, 1873, the publication office was removed from the northeast corner of Third



and Dock streets to 819 Walnut street, where they afterwards erected a handsome and spacious building, expressly designed as a newspaper office, with extensive back buildings containing the press-room, stereotyping and composing rooms. The name of the paper has been changed from the *Sunday Morning Times* to *Taggart's Times*, by which it is known far and wide. Colonel Taggart is the editor-in-chief ; Harry L. Taggart, managing editor ; and William M. Taggart, business manager. At the Presidential election in 1838, Colonel Taggart was chosen as a Republican elector for the First Congressional District of Pennsylvania, and in January, 1889, voted for Harrison and Morton in the Electoral College, which met at Harrisburg.

---

#### COLONEL RICHARD GUSTIN

Was born at Frankford, Sussex County, New Jersey, July 5, 1827. His father was William Gustin ; mother, Mary Gustin. Colonel Gustin's parents were wealthy, and he had the best means of being educated. Attended school in Sussex County, New Jersey, and afterwards in New York City. Soon after finishing his schooling, his father, through commercial misfortune, lost his wealth ; he moved to Bradford County, Pennsylvania, in 1844. Young Richard went into his uncle's store ; not liking this business he learned photography (probably to take daguerreotypes), a business not so easily learned then as now. He taught school a short time. After perfecting himself in the photographic business he went to Topeka, Kansas, where he invested his savings in real estate. He also contracted for buildings and took part pay in real estate. The Kansas troubles coming on he took the Free State side against the so-called Border Ruffians. Was Captain of a company. When the Free State party was overcome he left Kansas and returned to Pennsylvania (1858), and took up his residence near Troy, Bradford County, where he married Emily Stull, of Elmira, New York. She lived only six months. In May, 1861, he raised the Troy Guards and was elected Captain.

Colonel Gustin's military career was so extensive, and his services so numerous and useful to his country, they can only be described by a history of the command with which he served. He was never absent from duty. He led his company in every engagement until his rank as Senior Captain of his regiment entitled him to lead his regiment. As Lieutenant-Colonel of his regiment, he commanded the regiment a great part of the time, and occasionally the brigade. He was ever the most

conspicuous member of his command when the fighting was going on. He was one of the few men who seemed born without fear. He was repeatedly selected to lead the skirmishers—in short, he was one of the fighting field officers of the famous Third Brigade, Pennsylvania Reserves.

After the war he went to Topeka, Kansas, but could recover only about thirty-one lots out of much real estate to which he had claims.

He was married a second time, August 1, 1864, to Maria H. White, who survives him. He lived in Troy four years, then purchased a farm in the town of Jackson, Tioga County, Pennsylvania, and lived there until his unfortunate death, which occurred April 12, 1877. He had four children, George H. and Richard, and two daughters. The eldest daughter married —————, and lives in Philadelphia. His eldest son is studying medicine.

Colonel Gustin's death is described by an Elmira newspaper as follows: "Colonel Richard Gustin, of the town of Jackson, Tioga County, Penn., met with a fearful death in Elmira at the Water street crossing at half-past two o'clock yesterday afternoon. He was driving a spirited team of horses when they became frightened at a man throwing dirt out of a ditch. They sprang out of the control of Colonel Gustin and ran down the street at a furious rate. A freight train was passing down the track and the horses ran furiously into it, upsetting the wagon and throwing Colonel Gustin therefrom under the wheels of the cars. Before help could come to him fully three cars passed over him, crushing his left leg and lower part of his body in a fearful manner. He was carried to the office of Dr. J. M. Flood, and an attempt made to relieve him. He was past human help. \* \* \* He lived but a few moments after arriving at the office."

Colonel Gustin, like many excellent officers, retired from the exciting scenes of the war to the quiet but more useful life of a farmer. That he succeeded in this business as he had as a soldier is shown by the following "Interesting Memorial Services":

"Agreeably to a resolution passed and noticed in last week's *Advocate*, a goodly number of the members of Millerton Grange, No. 377, met at the house of widow Gustin, Saturday afternoon, June 2d. Worthy Master Tillinghast, assisted by Worthy Overseer Hamilton, planted a beautiful tree (Norway Spruce) in memory of Colonel Gustin, late Worthy Master of said Grange. A hymn, 'We will Gather at the River,' was sung, prayer offered by Rev. A. Ensign, and appropriate

and feeling remarks were made by Rev. A. J. Blanchard. The Rev. A. Ensign, being called, spoke partly as follows: ‘\* \* \* In assembling here to-day to plant this tree in memory of Colonel Richard Gustin, late Master of Millerton Grange, No. 377, we do all—yea, more than has been described. At the first call of his country he hastened to the front. Knowing no fear, he met hand to hand and foot to foot conflict with the enraged foe, canopied by the sulphurous cloud. Often faint, starved and weary, under the broiling sun, bent by the howling storm, he firmly stood for one country and one flag. But his career of usefulness stopped not as the clarion’s sound of war ceased to vibrate the air of his native land. As the banner of his country draped its folds in peace, he unfurled the patron’s flag, beat his sword into the ploughshare that marked his battle lines; his spear into the pruning hook, and turned his great genius and mature judgment, like Cincinnatus of o’d, into the noble, God-planned work of the husbandman. Here his constant excelling, his honest mien, his high social qualities, his deep devotion to the best interests of his fellow men, his cheerfulness, like sunbeams of midsummer, warmed and enlivened all upon whom they fell. His deeds of kindness were scattered to all with a princely hand.’” \* \* \*

Colonel Gustin was a noble specimen of the American character. A kind and loving husband and father, a courageous and skillful soldier and a useful and successful citizen, whose death created a great void in his neighborhood, and whose memory will ever be cherished by his family and friends.

---

#### GENERAL CHARLES W. DIVEN

Was the son of Thomas N. and Evelina (Barton) Diven; was born in Huntingdon County, Penn., July 27th, 1831. At sixteen he went to Mexico and served through the entire contest in Geary’s regiment. In May, 1861, came out with “Bailey’s Invincibles” as First Lieutenant, afterward Company “G” Twelfth Regiment. Served in command of this company through Peninsular and Pope’s campaigns, and in the battles of South Mountain, Antietam and Fredericksburg, in Gettysburg battle and succeeding campaign, promoted Major for gallant and meritorious services in the field, and served as such through Grant’s campaign to muster out of the regiment. After the muster out of the Twelfth Regiment, Pennsylvania Reserves, General Diven raised the Two Hundredth Pennsylvania Regiment and joined Grant’s army before Petersburg. This regiment contained many men who had served in the

Twelfth Reserves, who so leavened the spirit of the regiment that it stood like a veteran regiment at the battle of Fort Steadman, where Colonel Diven was wounded by explosion of a shell. For his distinguished services at this battle Colonel Diven was breveted Brigadier-General. After the war General Diven was prominent in the politics of the State, holding for a number of years the office of Custodian of the State Arsenal. General Devin was noted for his "coolness and calmness in battle." He had a gentle and most kindly disposition. He was a great sufferer in his last years. His children were very delicate, and one by one passed away, so that now that our dear friend has himself passed to the home of the good and the noble, there remains only his greatly bereaved widow and his many friends to mourn for him.

---

O. H. MILLER, CHAPLAIN,

Was born June 22, 1822, near Murraysville, Westmoreland County, Penn., hard by the place where the original Murraysville gas well was drilled. His parents, Joseph Miller and Mary Newton Miller, were of Scotch-Irish extraction and had five sons in the army. He was educated at and graduated from Washington and Jefferson colleges, 1843, and the Western Theological Seminary, 1846. He was licensed to preach in 1846 and ordained in 1847. His first charge was in Ligonier Valley, Westmoreland County, Penn. His second pastorate, from 1848 to 1858, was in Lebanon Presbyterian Church, Allegheny County, Penn., near Pittsburgh. After two years' missionary service in Iowa he returned to New Florence, Westmoreland County, Penn., where he was settled as a pastor when the war broke out. Many of Company "II," Twelfth Regiment, P. R. V. C., were from his congregation in Indiana County, and in due time he found himself Chaplain of the regiment. After the war he was settled as pastor of the church in West Newton during five years. In 1869 he became connected with the State School Department, where in his third year of service he was appointed by Governor Gerry State Librarian for a term of three years, and was re-appointed for a like term by Governor Hartranft. From Harrisburg he returned to Pittsburgh and soon was elected Chaplain of the Alleghany County Workhouse. After serving over five years he was disabled by an attack of catarrh, which necessitated his retirement to a fruit farm overlooking the Alleghany, and on the line of the A. V. R. R., eighteen miles above Pittsburgh, near Arnold Station, but a little above Parnassas. He writes: "If you will call and see me I will show you the largest variety

of apples, peaches, pears, quinces, plums, apricots, nectarines, English walnuts, Japan and American chestnuts, with the various small fruits, hennery, apiary, etc., etc.

These are not all yet of bearing age, but many of them are."

He has two sons, J. Kerwin Miller and J. Wilson Miller, dealers in wall paper, 543 Smithfield street, Pittsburgh.

Four daughters, one a graduate of the Pittsburgh Female College, and one a graduate of the School of Design.

Still preaches occasionally. His health has entirely recovered as a result of out door life.

#### MAJOR HENRY S. LUCAS

Was born in Wells Township, Bradford County, Pennsylvania, January 3, 1835. His parents were of sturdy stock, his ancestors on his father's side being Scotch-Irish. Traces of them are first found in Chemung County, New York, while that county was yet a wilderness. The mother of Major Lucas, Lucy H. Potter, traces her ancestry back to the Plymouth Colony. Uriah Lucas, the father of Henry, was a frontiersman in the truest sense, whose rough but healthful life was spent in felling the timber and clearing the land which formed his homestead in Wells Township, Bradford County, Penn. Here, amid these surroundings of incredible hardships and toil, Henry S. Lucas was born, and here he spent the years of his boyhood in helping to hew a home out of the wilderness and provide a living for a rapidly increasing family. For about two months each Winter, until his thirteenth year, he attended school, usually presided over by a lady. He then left the old log school house, which had served the double purpose of a school house and a place of worship on Sunday for the Methodists. With such schooling as he had received, and the assistance rendered by his mother at home, he had become able to read well, though without having made any special literary progress, his surroundings having been better calculated to develop the perceptive faculties and muscular powers than his scholastic abilities. During the next five years he was employed at home, and among the neighboring farmers at farm labor, manfully performing his share of the work, and becoming inured to all the duties of seed time and harvest. At the age of eighteen years he apprenticed himself to a saddle and harness manufacturer, and was duly initiated into the mysteries of that business. Three years of incessant toil by day, and of study by night, brought him to the age of which all young men are so

delighted to reach, and found him an expert in his chosen business, as well as with his stock of knowledge in all the common branches very much increased. Five years later, viz., April 20, 1861, found him at his bench in the same shop where he commenced to learn his trade. He then enlisted as a private, and was subsequently elected First Lieutenant of a company which proceeded to Harrisburg, Penn., and became Company "C" of the Twelfth Regiment Pennsylvania Reserves. He was appointed adjutant of Camp Curtin by the commander, Captain Tarbutton, and served in that capacity until the regiment was sent to the front, after the first Battle of Bull Run. He also acted as Adjutant of the regiment until the Fall of 1861.

While lying in Camp Pierpont, Virginia, Lieutenant Lucas was taken suddenly ill with camp fever, and was delirious for some days, but he did not leave camp. With his regiment he participated in the battle of Dranesville, and in the seven days' battles in front of Richmond, being wounded and captured at the battle of Glendale, June 30th, 1862. He was promoted to Captain July 8th, 1862, and exchanged about August 20th, 1862.

He immediately joined his command, participating in the battles of Groveton, second Bull Run, South Mountain, and Antietam, where he was slightly wounded but did not leave his command. He marched with the regiment into Virginia and led his company in the charge at Fredericksburg, where he lost over 75 per cent. of his force and was again severely wounded. He recovered and rejoined the regiment in time to take part in the muddy march under Burnside. Later, he led his company at Gettysburg, Williamsport, Wapping Heights, Bristoe Station, Mine Run, Wilderness, and Spottsylvania Court House, where (in the latter engagement) he was again severely wounded and taken from the field. He was mustered out June 11th, 1864, at Harrisburg, Penn. Was breveted Major, March 13th, 1865, for meritorious conduct at the battle of Antietam. As an officer and soldier, he won the respect and confidence of his superiors. His love of country, his prudence and coolness under the most trying circumstances, his watchful care for his soldiers, as well as his personal purity and integrity, are traits which his comrades will never overlook or forget.

Upon his return from the army he located at Williamsport, Penn., and commenced the manufacture of harness in all its various branches, and in January, 1865, was married to Miss Martha E. Pinkham, of Tioga County, Penn.

About April 1st, 1876, he retired from active business, since which time he has been variously occupied in clerical positions, having served as Deputy Prothonotary, Deputy Sheriff, and in other clerical positions about the Court House. He recently held the position of Bookkeeper at the United States Court House and Post Office, now being erected at Williamsport. Since 1871 he has held the position of Oil Inspector, under appointment of the State.

In the political field, Major Lucas has always been active and prominent in his county, having served as Chairman of his party's City and County Committees. He has also served three terms as a member of Common Council for the city. In politics he is a Democrat, and, like all Democrats reared in his native county, a stiff one.

During the Hancock campaign he was a member of the State Veteran Executive Committee. He is a man of positive convictions, and shows his Scotch blood in the persistency with which he maintains an opinion or a position where he thinks he is right. The Major has not forgotten how to use the rifle, even in civil life, and is an expert at bringing down large game. He was for several years president of a fish and game club for the protection of game.

Although he bears upon his person the scars of wounds received in preserving the Republic, the Major retains his fine appearance of physical strength, and is as erect and soldierly looking as ever; he goes in and out among his fellow men quietly, serenely and unostentatiously, never showing undue excitement, and never losing his balance; he still shows signs of having a large reserve force. He is a man who bears close acquaintance, a man who is instinctively accorded respect by all who meet him. A man, in brief, among men. It needs but a casual acquaintance with him to discover that he possesses all the qualities to make him a political or military leader.

---

#### CAPTAIN SCHELLING.

His father was born in Wurtemberg, Germany, in 1800 or 1801. Came to Philadelphia about 1815, in which city he followed the trade of shoemaker. About 1828 married Miss Mary Piral, of Bethlehem, Pa., who came from the old Moravian stock. From this union nine children were born, Captain Schelling being the eldest. He was born May 7th, 1829, at Philadelphia. His parents had little of this world's goods, therefore they could give their children only a common school education. Four brothers served in the late war. One was killed at

Fredericksburg. Captain Schelling remained with his parents, and served his time as apprentice at house and sign painting. February 9th, 1847, he enlisted as a private in Eleventh U. S. Infantry, and was sent with a detachment to Fort McHenry, Baltimore; remained there with 300 officers and men for three weeks, when embarked on bark *Paola* for Vera Cruz, Mexico.

The enlistment was for three years or the war; he was assigned to Company "II," Eleventh United States Infantry, commanded by Captain F. Fippen, regiment commanded by Colonel Graham.

Landed at Vera Cruz after the city had been captured by General Scott; remained there till 9th or 10th of April, when he continued with his command to city of Mexico. "After a good deal of fighting with the enemy, this command reached the city and captured it." Colonel Graham was killed at Molino del Rey. The war being over, on the 9th February, 1848, his regiment returned to Vera Cruz, and then embarked on ship *American* and arrived at Fort Hamilton, N. Y., and was mustered out of United States army, August 15th, 1848, receiving honorable discharge and pay. Went back to Easton, Penn., and followed his occupation of painter. Married Miss Sarah Snyder, of Easton, Penn., September 2, 1849. Has had nine children; three sons, six daughters, all living except one son.

Belonged to military company of Easton, called "Citizen's Artillery." Followed occupation of painting till breaking out of the late war. With Major Baldy, helped to raise "Easton Guards." This company offered its services to the State, May 6th, 1861. May 14th, 1861, company accepted and left for Harrisburg, and went into Camp Curtin and became "E" Company, Color Company Twelfth Reserves.

Captain Schelling served in command of "E" Company until August 30, 1862, when he was severely wounded. Returned to duty before Gettysburg and served in command of his company till September 1, 1863, when he was transferred to Veteran Reserve Corps. Reported to Colonel Rush; was sent out to Fourteenth street, Washington, D. C., to organize five companies of men from the field and from the hospitals of Washington, D. C., to arm and equip them and forward them to the different provost marshals in different States. Was ordered to report to Colonel Bomford at Harrisburg, Penn., who assigned Captain Schelling to "D" Company, Sixteenth United States Veteran Reserves, commanded by Charles M. Provost, formerly of One Hundred and Eighteenth Pennsylvania (Corn Exchange Regiment). All men from "D"



Company were from the front and had been wounded, but were able to carry muskets; were well drilled and disciplined and did excellent and hard work. They were from Massachusetts, Illinois, Michigan, Pennsylvania and Vermont regiments. Commanded this company to end of his service. On G. C. M. here, then ordered to Chambersburg, Penn.; arrived October 3, 1863, under orders of General Couch; did provost duty-taking prisoners to Fort Delaware, etc.; was ordered to Elmira, N. Y., December 25. A banquet given his command at Chambersburg. Joined Sixteenth United States Veteran Regiment at Elmira; performed provost duty and had charge of camp here for deserters and bounty jumpers; remained six months, when company and its officers ordered to report to General Pitcher, Provost Marshal of Vermont, at Brattleboro. Whilst here Captain Schelling applied to Secretary of War to join his old regiment in the field; was refused. Received a commission from President Lincoln; remained here three months, then ordered back to regiment at Elmira with Company "D." There was a prison camp of 21,000 rebel prisoners here; remained six months, then ordered with company to Harrisburg; remained here one month; company then split up and sent to different places. Headquarters of company at Hollidaysburg. Were acting as provost guard along the Pennsylvania Railroad. With company ordered to escort body of Mr. Lincoln from depot to House of Representatives at Harrisburg. Acted as guard of honor as far as Albany, N. Y. Returned to Harrisburg; then to Hollidaysburg, and then with company to Braddock's Fields, near Pittsburg, where West Pennsylvania Volunteers were mustered out, Major Morehead, being mustering officer, had charge of Government property, ordnance, camp and garrison equipage, etc.

Was here mustered out September 13, 1866. Residence, 151 Rose street, Easton, Penn.

---

### COLONEL CHILL. W. HAZZARD,

DEPARTMENT COMMANDER G. A. R. PERSONAL SKETCH OF THIS  
DISTINGUISHED OFFICER AND CIVILIAN.

Yesterday's session of the Grand Encampment of the Grand Army of the Republic of the Department of Pennsylvania was occupied in balloting for Department Commander, Senior Vice-Department Commander, Medical Director, Council of Administration and delegates to the National Encampment. Colonel Chill. W. Hazzard, of Post 60, Monongahela

City, was elected Department Commander, the vote being as follows : Hazzard, 153 ; William A. Stone, of Post 88, Allegheny City, 145.

Colonel C. W. Hazzard, of Monongahela City, Washington County, is a volunteer army officer of high reputation, and one of the best known members of the Grand Army of the Republic in the Union. He was among the original number who organized the society under the leadership of United States Senator John A. Logan, of Illinois, some twelve years ago, and has been actively engaged in the work ever since. He has never before held any department office, though he was frequently named for different positions of trust, because he invariably declined to allow the use of his name. He was, however, a delegate to the National Encampment during the years 1878 and 1879, held at Albany, New York, and Springfield, Massachusetts, respectively. He permitted his name to be used for the first time at this session for Department Commander, and though his chief competitor, William A. Stone, Esq., of Allegheny City, came to the Encampment with the united support of his city, Pittsburg, the county and the earnest aid of numbers of individual members, Colonel Hazzard was elected. The result is more than an ordinary compliment, because the votes for both candidates were unsolicited, and are therefore the voluntary expression of a general sentiment which carefully measured the two men and then decided. Mr. Stone is the rising young lawyer at the Western Pennsylvania bar, an able practitioner and in a large and and lucrative practice.

#### HAZZARD'S MILITARY RECORD.

Hazzard entered the volunteer service as a private in Company "F," Twelfth Regiment Pennsylvania Reserves, the Forty-First of the line, in May, 1861, and the regiment was mustered into the State service for three years. On August 10, 1861, the Twelfth Regiment was mustered into the United States service. Private Hazzard was promoted to Lieutenant, September 10, and to Captain, Company "I," April 20, 1863, and was breveted March 13, 1864. As Captain, he was transferred to the staff as mustering officer, and served in this capacity with General S. W. Crawford and General William McCandless. He received his brevet as Major for gallant and meritorious conduct in the Battle of the Wilderness, in 1864, at the hands of General George G. Meade. Since the war closed he has been connected with the National Guard of Pennsylvania. He was Adjutant-General of the Eighth Division under the old régime, commanded by General Gallagher. On the reorganization and consolidation of the National Guard under Major-General Hartranft, he

was made Inspector-General of the Fourth Brigade, commanded by General James A. Beaver, with the rank of Colonel.

#### HIS CAREER AS A CIVILIAN.

Colonel Hazzard is the editor of the *Monongahela Republican*, Washington County ; has been in the office for twenty-six years, and has been the owner for the past fifteen years. He is also Secretary of the Pennsylvania, Ohio and West Virginia Press Association, to which position he has been unanimously elected for the past six years. He is President of the Washington County Veteran Association, having been elected three times, and Secretary of the Pennsylvania Reserve Association, a position he has held for the past eight years. By the partiality of his fellow citizens and approval of the President, he enjoys the emoluments and honor of the Postmastership of Monongahela City. In the height of the Junior P. O. S. of A. furor he published and edited the *Junior's Friend* and presided over the first State Convention of the Juniors at Altoona. He continues a member of the P. O. S. of A., and is prominently connected with the Masonic order.

Personally, Colonel Hazzard is a man of fine appearance, tall, broad-shouldered, has a well-knit frame, and looks every inch a soldier. His career shows him to possess a high order of administrative ability, tenacity of purpose and superior judgment. While exhibiting a suavity of manner, combined with an attractive personal address, he maintains an agreeable dignity, indicative of a mental reserve power which gives weight to his opinions. There is no more captivating speaker in the order, and he numbers his friends by legions. His elevation to the office of Department Commander is an honor he has richly deserved by years of faithful devotion, and the Department is to be congratulated upon its choice. Where Hazzard leads every member of the Order may follow.

---

#### CAPTAIN JAMES BAKER, "I" COMPANY,

Was born and raised on a farm adjoining my (Lieutenant F. D. Stevens) father's farm in Huntingdon County, Penn. He followed the trade of stone mason for several years. At time he entered the service he was proprietor of an hotel in Orbisonia. He died at Harrison's Landing, Virginia, August 7th, 1862. Seven brothers were in the army, three of whom died of disease while in the service; one of them in a Rebel prison. One died very soon after being discharged for disability; one was wounded in battle. Only one of the seven is now living.

## LIEUTENANT FRANK D. STEVENS

Was born March 13, 1841, in Huntingdon County, Penn. His father's name was Benedict Stevens, his mother's maiden name was Eve Orr; his father was a farmer. When he was seventeen his father quit the farm and engaged in mercantile business, and he was placed as an apprentice at house carpentry. Two years later he determined to have an education. Having had a fair common school training, he entered a seminary, Spring of 1860. Taught the following Winter. Spring of 1861, enlisted as a private in three month's service; went with company eighteen miles to Mount Union, where expected to get transportation to Harrisburg, but were too late, the call having been filled, and were compelled to return to their homes. Returned to school during Summer. and taught again following Winter. In February, 1862, he again enlisted, and on March 13, the day he was twenty-one, he left his home with the company. Some time in April they joined the Twelfth Regiment as Company "I." In May he was promoted from private to Orderly Sergeant. Was engaged in first and second days' battles on Peninsula. On second day was taken prisoner and confined in Richmond. Being sick for several days previous to the battle, he grew worse until four weeks after his capture, when he was paroled, barely in time to escape with his life. In hospital several months, and then in Camp Parole.

About December 1, 1862, he, with others, was sent to his regiment. There arising some doubt about his exchange, it was decided not to place him on duty. But, at his request, he went on duty December 10, and on December 13 went into Fredericksburg battle, where he received two wounds; one serious, on head, other slight, on arm. Sent to Alexandria Hospital, thence, later, to Rhode Island. In March, 1863, was ready for duty, and joined the regiment. A few weeks later was commissioned Second Lieutenant, to date July 18, 1862, and was mustered in. Was with company and on duty in every battle with the regiment from that time until regiment left the field for muster out, May 31, 1864, except one battle, at which time he was off duty on account of sickness. He commanded company from about July (soon after Gettysburg) until May 31, 1864, Captain and First Lieutenant being on detached service. On the 8th of May, 1864, his brother, David W. Stevens, who was a Sergeant in his company, was killed in battle. The following day he wrapped his body in his own blanket and was placing him in his grave just at the moment that General Sedgwick fell a few rods from the spot.

On May 31 his company was made Company "D," One Hundred and Ninetieth Regiment Veteran Volunteers, and he was placed in command of company. In June he was commissioned First Lieutenant. On June 13, while his corps was moving to cross the James, his regiment was left back, and his company was placed on skirmish line, balance of regiment being on reserve. In the evening of the same day his command charged by battle line, and he, with a part of the company, several cavalry men and two guns of artillery, were captured. He says: "I cannot describe my horror at being a prisoner a second time. I was robbed of hat, money and watch. Being the only commissioned officer among the prisoners, I was taken before Confederate General Wright, who tried every possible way to obtain information from me concerning the movements of our army. Failing in this, he became enraged, and addressed the guard in these words: 'Take him away, and if he don't behave himself run your bayonet through him.' I had to accompany the guard alone through a thicket of about one half mile, and not without some fear. Was confined one week in Libby, then sent to Macon, Ga.

About August 1 we were moved to Savannah, Ga. While here I, in company with a large number of fellow prisoners, attempted an escape through a tunnel, but the evening before we had arranged for our departure a cow on the outside of the stockade, walking over the mouth of our tunnel, broke through, and when the first man reached the outer end he found a rebel guard stationed there. For this the authorities threatened to take our tents from us, as our tunnel was started under a bunk in one of our tents. About September 10 we were removed to Charleston, S. C., and placed in the city jail yard. Here we were exposed to the fire of our guns on Morris Island. We had no quarters of any kind; were exposed to the hot rays of the sun without any protection. The yard was alive with lice, having been used for a length of time as a prison pen. This was the most filthy place of all, and the suffering with heat by day and cold at night was by no means easily endured.

During October we were sent to Columbia, S. C. Some said the reason of our removal was that the Federal Government had placed Rebel prisoners on Morris Island under fire of their own guns, in retaliation. Others said it was because of yellow fever, which had broken out among the Rebel soldiers, the Captain in charge of us having died of the disease. At Columbia we were placed in an old open field without a stockade, a heavy guard line and an inner dead line. Here we spent most of the Winter without any shelter whatever, and we were com-

pelled to dig down and live in the ground with, perhaps, some brush to cover us. While in this camp I and five comrades attempted to escape one dark night by running the guard. We were fired upon, one of our number being shot in the arm, causing amputation. We were driven back, and thus another attempt to escape found a failure. I do not want to say much, but I want to assure you, General, that during my imprisonment I learned what hunger was, and what real suffering was. I knew what it was to lie all night not able to sleep a wink because of the cold. I came from prison in March, 1865, more loyal and more willing to fight than ever before.

April 17, 1865, I was honorably discharged at Camp Parole by special order. Two or three days later I had the sad privilege of joining the procession that followed the remains of our dear President from the White House to the Capitol. We were five brothers in the Army of the Potomac, serving respectively from two to over three years. Four of us are living to-day, two of whom passed through the war unhurt, one fell in battle, one was totally disabled in right arm, being shot through above and below elbow." After the war he graduated at Iron City Commercial College, Pittsburg, Penn., after which he was a teacher in that college for six months. He resigned his position there, and in March, 1867, engaged in the hardware business in Mount Union, Penn., in which business he remained until October, 1884, when he sold out his business and moved to California. In October, 1885, he engaged in the hardware business in Pasadena, where he now is the senior member of The Stevens Hardware Company. He was married to Miss Annie A. Bush, of Orbisonia, Penn., July, 1867. In April, 1881, she died, leaving four children. In December, 1883, he was married to Miss Annie Hiney, of Mount Union. The following year he sold out his business and brought her an invalid to South California, but disease was rapidly doing its work and in a few months she died. In October, 1887, he married Miss Dora M. Bucher, of Philadelphia, Penn.

His father and mother had fifteen children. They lived together nearly sixty-one years, and died within a period of nine months. At the time of their death they had living and dead 128 children, grandchildren and great-grandchildren.

---

FIRST LIEUTENANT P. O. ETCHISON, "1" COMPANY,  
Was a resident of Shirleysburg, Huntingdon County, Penn. He died soon after he resigned.

**SECOND LIEUTENANT SAMUEL J. CLOYD, "I" COMPANY,**  
Was born and raised on a farm near Orbisonia, Huntingdon County, Penn. He was wounded at Antietam, losing his right arm. Since the war he has served a term of three years as County Treasurer of Huntingdon County. He now resides in a retired way on the old farm place.

**SERGEANT FRANCIS FISH, "C" COMPANY,**  
Was born in Bristol, R. I., March 5, 1836; moved with his parents to Troy, Bradford County, Penn., in 1838, living in and near Troy. Attending school, working on a farm, and at the butcher business, etc., until the war. Was the first one to put his name to the roll in (Troy Guards) Company "C," Twelfth Regiment Pennsylvania Reserve Volunteer Corps. April 17th, 1861, was elected Sergeant; was a good and faithful soldier, and became Sergeant of the Regimental Pioneers or Sappers and Miners. Was wounded in the leg below the knee at the last battle of Bull Run. Was discharged on account of said wound, April 16th, 1863.

Returning to Troy, and soon after engaged in the livery business, then at his old trade, the butcher business. Married, and at his death left wife, one daughter and one son. Without any doubt his wound shortened his days, as he carried the bullet in his leg nearly twenty years before it worked out.

Was a member of Gustin Post, No. 154, Department of Pennsylvania, G. A. R., at his death.

**ORDERLY-SERGEANT JAMES JOHNSON, "E" COMPANY,**  
Was born in Easton, Penn., September 9, 1841; son of James Johnson and Elizabeth Christian Johnson. Went to public school till ten years old, then, on account of death of his mother, was taken from school and put to work to earn his living. Worked in a bottling establishment, then on a farm, then drove mules on a canal, then on a farm, then in woods getting out lumber, bark and railroad ties, and assisted down the river to market these; then drove team, and delivered ties and lumber. Made a short trip with a circus; left that very quick (did not suit him). After the war, was on the river, then went to work for Bil. Del. Railroad Company, under the old Camden and Amboy Railroad, in 1886. On March 6 went to work for the Lehigh Valley Railroad as station baggage master. In 1870, was promoted to be a passenger train conductor, and been in employ of company ever since as such, running every day and sometimes on Sunday.

Sergeant Johnson's conduct in rescuing the regimental flag is described by Lieutenant Fackenthal, commanding Company "E," as follows: "The salvation of our old battle flag by Orderly-Sergeant James C. Johnson, of Company 'E,' Color Company of Twelfth Regiment, at the Battle of Laurel Hill, Va., on the 10th of May, 1864. On the day above mentioned the regiment occupied an entrenched position at the edge of a woods, while the Confederates were just as nicely fixed on the opposite side of the woods, about a half a mile distant, with an open field in their front and batteries in position to harrow and cross harrow the ground at the same time. Late in the day we received notice that a grand charge, all along the line, would be made about sundown. Forty rounds extra ammunition were issued, and a hasty meal of hard-tack and salt pork partaken of. While eating, my messmate, George Kettle, was instantly killed by a shell from Rebeldom bursting over us. Our orders were: 'Still charge and cold steel'; and just as the sun kissed the tops of the trees upon the hill in our rear, where General Sedgwick was killed the day before, Grant gave the signal forward. The Twelfth advanced by division, Companies 'E' and 'F' forming centre division, and having in charge the colors. Before leaving the woods the troops on our right commenced to yell, giving the enemy timely notice of our approach, and he replied vigorously with shot, shell, grape and canister. The roar of cannon and rattle of musketry was deafening, and when we reached the clearing those fellows who yelled so lustily in the start broke and ran for dear life, and no power on earth could stop them, and 'the jig was up.'

Color-Sergeant William H. Weaver, of the Twelfth, was hit by a grape and fell upon his flag. The regiment was swept back like chaff before a hurricane, and the rout was complete. Sergeant Johnson, seeing the colors drop, ran to Weaver and pulled the flag from under him, and vainly attempted to rally the men, but it was too hot. Waving the old tattered and torn flag in their teeth, he gave them three bucks and a ball and skedaddled for our side of the woods with the Johnnies close upon his heels. In the meantime (and a mean time it was) our boys got home, and seeing Johnson coming through the brush, mistook him for a Rebel sergeant, and, of course, opened fire on him. Seeing the danger, he dodged behind a tree until the shower passed, and the next minute was safe within our works. The division on our right did not stop behind their works, but continued their flight far to the rear. The



Reserve Division not only occupied their own front that night, but also the ground of the division on our right.

Johnson had bravely saved our old battle flag, and if the Lieutenant in command did then and there kiss him under a scorching fire of shot and shell, what of it; it is the only recognition he has ever received for the gallant act, notwithstanding members of Congress have been informed of the facts and a suitable reward requested."

---

GEORGE H. MASON, "C" COMPANY,

Born March 10, 1832. Son of George Mason and Fidelia Hitt. Brought up on a farm near Troy, Penn., going to school three months in Summer and three months in Winter. At seventeen went to work for himself; worked on a farm; voted for Abraham Lincoln; joined Troy Guards April 30, 1861; Corporal August 7, 1862. August 10, 1862, Third Brigade ordered across the Potomac to picket. February 15, 1863, detailed with part of Company "C," Lieutenant Lucas commanding, to go to Chain Bridge to do guard duty; remained there till March 11, 1863, when were relieved and started to rejoin command. Upon arriving at Camp Pierpont, found army gone; overtook regiment at Hunter's Mills; badly wounded at South Mountain. Mason writes: "Was helped off the field by Lieutenant Jewell, Comrades Spence, James Peters and others; was carried back to an old log house; no one being at home but the lady of the house, my wound was here examined, and our Regimental Surgeon said the bullet was where he could not extract it, but would have to remain in the body.

While laying on the floor in the evening of the day I was wounded a little incident occurred that I still remember. It was, as I lay there with my eyes closed, and, of course, a little weak from the effects of the wound, I distinctly saw a new made grave with dirt thrown out in a pile, and a box there ready for use; also distinctly heard a voice say that was for me, and my answer was you do not get me into that hole yet, and opened my eyes with a strong determination, God willing, I would not go into that hole at present; it is most twenty-seven years, and have not fallen in it yet. After getting to this house I thought I would like some rations to eat; our haversacks were empty, or nearly so, and the best the lady of the house could afford was some sour thick milk; her cows had been scared or driven away by the racket about the place, so she could not furnish any sweet milk, but the boys took the thick milk, put some sugar in it, and scraped off some crumbs of hard-

tack for my supper; it, of course, was not quite so nice as toast and sweet cream, yet it answered the same purpose. Comrade Cyrus Spence, who stayed over night with me, the next day went back to the company, and on the 17th, in the battle of Antietam, was shot through and through the heart and instantly killed; was a noble, brave young man; all that knew him loved him. I was taken back to the Novitiate Hospital in Frederick, Md., September 19; the bullet showed itself and the surgeon cut and extracted it, and I still keep it as a reminder of other days \* \* \*."

May 1st, 1861, found my brother, Daniel J., at work in a saw mill at Corning, N. Y. I wrote him from Troy, Penn., that I had enlisted, and he immediately came to Troy and joined the Troy "Guards," and went with us, and remained with the company, as one of its best men, till the battle of Fredericksburg, when, in the fatal charge, and with a few men well in advance, was known to be wounded, but nothing more could ever be seen or heard of him, and was reported as wounded and missing. My brother William G. volunteered early in the war, and went from Minnesota, where he was living, served three years, and returned to Minnesota, all broken up by injuries and exposures."

#### SOLDIER'S MEDITATION.

G. II. MASON, Dear Comrade :

I am sitting to-day in my new home,  
The sun is running high,  
And thinking, dear Jack, of the comrades  
That we messed with in days gone by.

'Twas many a time we stood on picket,  
All the dark and weary night,  
And watched for the dawning morrow,  
And dreamed of the coming fight.

As I sit and think, dear Jack,  
Other forms I see,  
That stood in line of battle,  
By the side of you and me.

The Troy Guards met the foe on many fields,  
And did their duty well;  
But naught is left to mark the spot,  
Where many of the Troy Guards fell.

No camp fire burns to-day, dear Jack,  
 Along Virginia's shore ;  
 No picket keeps his weary watch,  
 As in those days of yore.

But in that land where war is unknown,  
 Where strifes never come,  
 May you and I, with them at last,  
 Find our eternal home.

As we gathered around the camp fire,  
 We thought of the days to come,  
 When we could stack our guns  
 And return to our dear home.

Now we think of the reunion, dear Jack,  
 The one that is to come ;  
 We long for the time, dear Jack,  
 In Troy, where the boys will beat the drum.

Yours in F. C. L.,

Central City, Neb., June 18, 1884.

CYRUS D. CHAPMAN.

# WILLIAM W. WOODS, "I" COMPANY.

## SKETCH FROM THE EDITOR'S NOTE BOOK.

About the middle of last February a man entered my office, and, speaking casually, took a seat. I did not recognize him readily, but soon he turned his head, and I saw the profile of a face known twenty-five years ago. Gray hairs did not hide the features of William W. Woods, once the handsome young First Sergeant, who had trudged by my side many a long mile down in Virginia, back in the sixties. One day a bit of lead tore out the corner of his eye, and that organ went blind. Since the war, he told me, he had studied medicine, and was then in active practice. His one eye gone out, he had replaced with a glass eye, and went on with his profession, to which he was devotedly attached. He was called to Pittsburg to have the remaining eye treated by a skilled optician, for symptoms of pain darting through it like a flash of torture told his professional mind that the windows of his soul were soon both to be closed, and that entire blindness was to shut out the light of Heaven, the smile of wife, the faces of children and friends, and the chrism of life. It is a terribly sad thing to go blind for ever ! The

Pittsburg physician confirmed his worst suspicions. The verdict was sealed.

This was the story he told me, and it was a sad one. We "visited" together, and away into the night recalled stories of march and bivouac, and the memory of friends in the old Twelfth Reserves. Next day, when he went away, the doctor said, as he tremulously pressed my hand, "Good bye, Chill, old boy, I am going blind. I wanted to see you once more before that happened to me, and this good bye means more to me than you can ever understand." Then he grasped my hand warmly, this gallant soldier, who had faced a thousand deaths without tremor, and stepping into the car, was gone. I choked back a lump in my throat, and hoped it might not be so bad. Alas, it was to be more than true.

Yesterday came a letter from his dear wife, which told a sad story. The Sergeant had been mustered out—he was dead. The darkness was crowding down upon him, but an angel had taken him by the hand and led his soul up into the light. Gentle fellow, how he must have suffered.

C. W. H.

---

#### WILSON C. FOX

Was born at Newville, Cumberland County, Penn., July 24, 1844; parents, Henry C. Fox and Martha E. Fox; schooling was meagre until two years prior to the war. Up to that time had been with his father, who was engaged in the woolen manufacture. After his term expired he spent one Winter in the Academy. From that he went to railroad-ing, and rose from freight brakeman to baggage master. He traveled three years for the Grim and Baker Sewing Machine Company, then entered the employ of the Harrisburg Mill Company, Senator J. Don Cameron, treasurer, as bookkeeper and paymaster for the next eleven years, at which time the mill changed hands and he accepted a clerkship in post office; the next year appointed Chief of Police, from which he resigned to accept the management of the Harrisburg Photo. Copying House. At the expiration of two years, and the death of the proprietor, he bought this studio from the widow. Politically he is a Republican, having served seven years as secretary of the best Young Men's Republican Club in the city or State.

His father entered the service in August, 1862, as Commissary Sergeant, Company "C," Third Heavy Artillery; promoted Second and First Lieutenant, afterwards commanded Company "K," One Hun-

dred and Eighty-Eighth Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers, as Captain; appointed Chief of Ambulance on Staff of General Butler; parents reside in the city. His family consists of wife, two boys and two girls, W. Stewart, Ella M. (Dale Edgar and Daisy Edna—twins).

---

#### JAMES P. GILES, "I" COMPANY,

Was born at Lewiston, Penn., September 29, 1844. Educated at public schools and academy. Occupation for a long time, teaching. Elected member of Pennsylvania Legislature from Huntingdon County in 1884. At present (1889) Statistical Clerk in State Department of Public Instruction. Served with "I" Company till muster out of Twelfth Reserves, when became a member of "D" Company, One Hundred and Ninetieth Pennsylvania. Most of this company was captured August 19, 1864, at Weldon Railroad, Va. Was confined for about six months in Libby Prison, Belle Island and Saulsbury. He writes: "Most of those captured died in prison or afterwards from the effects of prison life."

---

#### SUMMARY OF BIOGRAPHY.

The writer regrets his inability to give the personal history in civil life, as well as in the regiment, of all the officers, and of those non-commissioned officers and privates who specially distinguished themselves. He has made strenuous efforts to get such information, but partly through his inability to reach them, and partly through the indifference of those who have received his letters and circulars, he is obliged to publish the history of the Regiment with this most interesting part very incomplete.

---

#### MISCELLANEOUS.

It was proposed to erect a Memorial Hall for the Reserves at Gettysburg. A bill for this purpose passed the Legislature, but it was vetoed by Governor Beaver.

The State Monuments for the reserve regiments were dedicated in September, 1890.

The writer has been able to attend but one of the annual meetings of the Reserve Division Association, but he is informed they are invariably successful and quite fully attended.

"C" Company keeps up annual meetings, etc.

"WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O. }  
WASHINGTON, November 18, 1889. }

COLONEL J. P. NICHOLSON, Secretary Pennsylvania Board of Commissioners on Gettysburg Monuments, Philadelphia, Penn.

SIR: In complying with your request of 5th ult., I have the honor to furnish from the records of this office the following information relative to the Twelfth Reserves, namely: Muster in May 30 to July 3, 1861; mustered out June 11, 1864. Strength at Gettysburg, return for June 30, 1863, reports twenty-six officers and two hundred and ninety-four men present for duty; the number taken into action is not of record. Losses at Gettysburg, one man killed, one wounded. Total losses in action:

	Officers.	Men.	Total.
Killed.....	1	60	61
Wounded.....	15	263	278
Captured or missing.....	2	95	97
	<hr/> 18	<hr/> 418	<hr/> 437

#### TOTAL DEATHS.

	Officers.	Men.	Total.
Killed in action.....	1	60	61
Wounds received in action.....	...	52	52
Of disease.....	1	65	66
Other causes.....	...	4	4
	<hr/> 2	<hr/> 181	<hr/> 183

Total enrollment 1,100.

Approximate estimate (only men in United States service).



#### BATTLES, ETC.

Dranesville, Gaines Mill, Glendale or New Market Cross Roads, Malvern Hill, Groveton, Bull Run (second), South Mountain, Antietam, Fredericksburg, Gettysburg, Bristoe Station, Rappahannock Station, Mine Run, Wilderness, Spottsylvania, North Anna, Toloptomoy, Bethesda Church.

Very respectfully,

C. MCKEEVER, A. A. G."

NOTE.—No record of officers and men who were wounded or captured more than once.







## FROM OFFICIAL RECORDS FOR TWELFTH REGIMENT.

	KILLED.		WOUNDED.		MISSING.		TOTAL K. W. M.	
	Offs.	Men.	Offs.	Men.	Offs.	Men.	Offs.	Men.
Dranesville.....	...	...	...	1	...	...	...	1
Mechanicsville.....	...	2	...	11	...	5	...	18
Gaines Mill.....	...	5	*1	*12	...	8	1	25
New Market Cross Roads	1	5	2	36	...	24	3	65
Second Bull Run.....	...	5	3	35	...	23	...	66
South Mountain.....	...	6	1	18	...	...	1	24
Antietam.....	...	13	2	44	...	2	2	59
Fredericksburg.....	...	13	...	...	...	2	7	110
Gettysburg.....	...	1	...	1	...	...	...	2
Wilderness.....	...	...	...	3	...	...	...	3
Spottsylvania.....	...	7	...	16	...	2	...	25
North Anna.....	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Bethesda Church.....	...	...	...	1	...	...	...	1
							14	399
Seven days.....	1	12	3	59	...	37		

\* Captured.

## ABSTRACT FROM RETURNS TWELFTH REGIMENT P. R. V. C.

	Present for Duty.		Aggregate Present.	Aggregate Present and Absent.	
	Offs.	Men.			
1861.					
August .....	28	741	831	843	
September .....	27	701	823	849	Last return 861.
October .....	28	694	808	859	
November .....	26	295	817	864	Last return 860.
					Error
December .....	23	677	797	849	Last return 863.
1862.					
January .....	26	706	777	830	
February .....	28	681	751	804	
March .....	21	681	740	803	
April .....	24	682	730	893	Gain of "I" Co.
May .....	33	726	810	885	
June .....	27	587	717	831	Agg. last ret. 884.
July .....	19	533	685	796	
No August .....					
September .....	12	324	421	735	
October .....	12	351	408	695	
November .....	16	351	413	659	
December .....	9	263	324	575	
1863.					
January .....	10	280	335	563	
February .....	10	299	360	548	On daily
March .....	13	301	378	528	Extra
April .....	24	329	413	546	Duty.
May .....	26	350	436	549	Sick.
June .....	26	294	370	546	Offs. Men. Offs. Men
July .....	22	260	333	538	1 38 1 10
August .....	18	254	323	515	
September .....	22	275	328	508	
October .....	19	279	330	483	
November .....	16	283	345	487	
December .....	12	290	348	481	
1864.					
January .....	17	227	287	468	
February .....	22	265	319	461	
March .....	16	306	403	475	
April .....	19	320	437	493	

# COMMANDERS OF THIRD BRIGADE P. R. V. C.

- Colonel McCalmont, from Organization to November, 1861.
- General Ord, from November, 1861, to June 18, 1862.
- General Seymour, from June 18 to June 30, 1862.
- General C. F. Jackson, from June 30 to August 21, 1862, A. P.
- General C. F. Jackson, from August 21 to August 31, 1862, Pope's Army.
- Hardin, Kirk (Tenth) and Anderson (Ninth), August 30, 1862 (battle Second Bull Run).
- Lieutenant-Colonel Anderson (Ninth), from August 30 to September 6, 1862.
- Colonel Gallagher, from September 6 to September 14, 1862.
- Colonel Anderson (Ninth), from September 14 to ———, 1862.
- General Jackson, from ——— to December 13, 1862.
- Colonel Jackson (Eleventh), from December 13 to December, 1862.
- Colonel Hardin, from December, 1862, to January, 1863.
- Colonel Fisher (Fifth), from January to August 10, 1863.
- Colonel Hardin, from August 10 to August 13, 1863.
- Colonel Jackson (Eleventh), from August 13 to August 15, 1863.
- Colonel Fisher, from August 15 to September 17, 1863.
- Colonel Hardin, from September 17 to September 19, 1863.
- Colonel Fisher, from September 19 to September 20, 1863.
- Colonel Hardin, from September 20 to December 4, 1863.
- Colonel Fisher, from December 4, 1863, to January 27, 1864.
- Lieutenant-Colonel Dare, from January 27 to January 30, 1864.
- Colonel Fisher, from January 30 to February 25, 1864.
- Lieutenant-Colonel Gustin, from January 25 to February 26, 1864.
- Colonel Fisher, from February 26 to February 27, 1864.
- Lieutenant-Colonel Gustin (Twelfth), from February 27 to February 28, 1864.
- Colonel Fisher, from February 28 to March 29, 1864.
- Lieutenant-Colonel Gustin, from March 29 to March 30, 1864.
- Colonel Fisher, from March 30 to June 11, 1864.

## DIVISION COMMANDERS P. R. V. C.

General McCall, from Organization to June 30, 1862.  
 General Seymour, from June 30 to August 21, 1862.  
 General Reynolds, from August 21 to September 12, 1862.  
 General Meade, from September 12 to September 17, 1862.  
 General Seymour, from September 17 to September 29, 1862.  
 General Meade, from September 29 to December 25, 1862.  
 General Doubleday, from December 25, 1862, to January 18, 1863.  
 Colonel Sickel (Third), from January 18 to February 9, 1863.  
 Colonels McCandless and Sickel, from February 9 to June 3, 1863.  
 General Crawford, from June 3 to August 28, 1863.  
 Colonel McCandless, from August 28 to November 1, 1863.  
 General Crawford, from November 1 to December 7, 1863.  
 Colonel McCandless, from December 7 to December 12, 1863.  
 General Crawford, from December 12, 1863, to February 20, 1864.  
 Colonel McCandless, from February 20 to May 1, 1864.  
 General Crawford, from May 1 to May 31, 1864.  
 Colonel McCandless, from May 31 to June 11, 1864.

## CORPS DIVISION OF P. R. V. C. SERVED IN

First Corps (McDowell's) part of May and June, 1862, near Fredericksburg.

Fifth Corps (A. P.) Porter's, part of June, July to August 13, 1862.

Ninth, Burnside's, near Falmouth, August 13 to August 24, 1862.

Third Corps. A. N. Va. (McDowell), August 25, 1862, near Warrenton.

First Corps (Hooker) Burnside's grand division, Ninth and First Corps, September 6 to 17, 1862; through South Mountain and Antietam campaigns—Hooker or Meade commanding corps. After Antietam, Reynolds Commanding First Corps, until February 10, 1863, when division moved to Washington.

Department of Washington, Twenty-Third A. C. (Heintzelman), February 10 to June 23, 1863.

Fifth A. C. A. P. (Sykes), June 28, 1863 to end of service.

Sykes relieved by Warren March 23, 1864.

# MUSTER-OUT ROLL OF FIELD AND STAFF AND NON-COMMISSIONED STAFF.

NAME AND RANK.	Muster-in.		DISCHARGED. How and When.	REMARKS.
	Rank.	Date.		
<i>Colonels.</i>				
John H. Taggart .....	Colonel..	Aug. 10, '61.	Resigned July 8, '62...	Reinstated by order Sec. War Aug. 19, '62; discharged Sept. 23, '62.
Martin D. Hardin.....	Lt.-Col..	July 8, '62.	Exp. service.....	Com'd Col. July 8, '62; Col. Sept. 1, '62; w'd Groveton, Va., Aug. 29, '62; 2d B. Regt., Aug. 30, '62; near Catlett's Stn., Va., Dec. 13, '63; North Anna May 23, '64; Brig.-Gen. Vol. July 2, '64. How discharged unknown.
<i>Lt. Colonels.</i>				
Daniel N. Bailey.....	Lt.-Col..	Aug. 10, '61.	Mar. 4, '62.....	
Peter Baldy .....	Major....	"	Resigned Feb. 15, '63..	
Richard Gustin.....	Captain..	"	Exp. service.....	P. Lt.-Col. Apr. 6, '63; B't Lt. Col. for Wilderness; w'd by Guerrillas near Catlett's Stn Dec. 14 '64.
<i>Majors.</i>				
Charles W. Diven .....	Captain..	"	Exp. service.....	P. Apr. 19, '64; Col 200th Pa.; w'd at Ft. Steadman, Va.; B't Brig.-Gen. Com'd Major July 8, '62.
Andrew J. Bolar.....	Captain..	"	For w'ds, July 30, '63.	
<i>Surgeons.</i>				
Wm. H. Thorne .....	Surgeon..	"	By promotion.....	P. Brig. Surgeon Apr. 28, '62.
Isaac J. Clark.....	As. Sur..	"	Exp. service.....	P. Surgeon Apr. 28, '62; B't Lt.-Col. for Wilderness.
<i>Ass't Surgeons.</i>				
James B. Crawford....	"	June 21, '62	Discharged Sept. 18, '62	
Henry A. Grim .....	"	Oct. 6, '62..	By promotion.....	
James M. Shearer.....	"	Apr. 11, '63	Discharged Aug. 18, '63	P. Surgeon 5th Reserves April 15, '64.
Wm. Taylor.....	"	Aug. 2, '62.	Resigned Dec. 20, '62..	
David R. Beaver.....	"	Apr. 8, '64..	Exp. service.....	
<i>Adjutant.</i>				
Theo. McMurtrie.....	Adjutant	Dec. 5, '61..	By transfer to I Corps.	Trs. to Invalid Corps Oct 18 '63; w'd & cap'd at Fredricksburg; B't Maj. for Fredricksburg.
<i>Chaplains.</i>				
W. B. Holt.....	Chaplain.	Dec. 11, '61.	Never joined.....	
Obadiah H. Miller....	"	Jan. 18, '62.	Resigned June 9, '63..	
<i>Quartermasters.</i>				
Eliene D. Reid.....	Q'master	Aug. 10, '61.	By promotion.....	P. Captain A. C. S. Sept. 22, '62.
James T. Woodall.....	Corporal.	"	Exp. service.....	P. Q'm-Sgt. Feb., '62; Q'm Nov 23, '62; remained back with 190th Pa., appt'd Brig.-Q'm.
<i>Sergeant Majors.</i>				
Charles Thompson....	Sgt. Maj.	"	By promotion.....	P. Elected 1st Lt. A Co. Dec. 7, '61; res. July 11, '62; probably never mustered.
Wm. Myers.....	Private...	"	"	P. Sgt.-Maj. Dec. 7, '61; 1st Lt. I Co. April 21, '63.
Joseph W. Eckley.....	Private...	"	Re-enlist Vet.....	P. Sgt.-Major May 1, '63; re-enl. vet. in F Co.; see record in F Co.
<i>Quarterm'r Sergeants.</i>				
Charles T. Harvey.....	Q'm Sgt..	"	By transfer.....	Dropped and sent to Co. B Dec., '61.
Charles W. Croasdale.	Corporal.	"	By promotion.....	P. Q'm-Sgt. Nov. 1, '62; 1st Lt. A Co. May 1, '63.
James Loan.....	Private...	"	Exp. service.....	P. Q'm-Sgt. May 1, '63.
<i>Hospital Stewards.</i>				
— Le Moyne.....	H. St'd..	"	By promotion.....	P. made Medical Cadet Oct. 1, '61.
John Evans .....	Sergeant.	"	Exp. service.....	P. Hospital Steward Nov. 8, '61.
<i>Surgeon's Mate.</i>				
Thomas R. Williams..	Private...	"	By transfer.....	P. Surg.-mate Aug. 31, '61; returned to A Co. Oct. 1, '61.
<i>Commissary Serg'ts.</i>				
Henry D. J. Bell.....	1st Sgt...	"	By promotion.....	P. Com'y-Sgt. Aug. 31, '61; 2d Lt. F Co. Sept. 10, '61.
Henry W. L. Drips....	Corporal.	"	By transfer.....	P. Com'y-Sgt. Feb. '62; ret'd to Co. H.
Henry W. Dean.....	"	"	"	P. Com'y-Sgt. Mar. 21, '62; ret'd to Co. B June, '62.
Henry Kraft.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	P. Com'y-Sgt. June, '62.
<i>Drum Majors.</i>				
Lew. J. Miller.....	Musician.	"	By transfer.....	P. Drum Maj. Nov. 22, '61; ret'd to Co. B Mar. 22, '62.
Jacob Eppley.....	Corporal.	"	"	P. Drum Maj. Mar. 22, '62; ret'd to Co. G.
John E. Eckart.....	Private...	"	Exp. service.....	P. Drum Maj. Aug. 4, '62; principal musician Aug., '63.

# MUSTER-OUT ROLL OF "A" COMPANY.

NAME AND RANK.	Muster-in.		DISCHARGED. How and When.	REMARKS.
	Rank.	Date.		
<i>Captains.</i>				
Henry B. Whisner.....	Captain..	Aug. 10, '61.	Resigned Dec. 4, '61...	P. 1st Sgt. Oct. 11, '61; elec. 1st Lt. Oct. 11, '61; Cap't Dec. 4, '61; n'r mustered.
Frank Daniels.....	Sergeant.		Exp. service.....	
<i>1st Lieutenants.</i>				
La Fayette Palmer....	1st Lieut.	"	Resigned Oct. 8, '61...	Enlisted as private in this Co. Mar. 4, '62; see sub. record.
Charles W. Croasdale..	Corporal.	"	Exp. service.....	P. Sgt. Oct. 11, '61; Q'm-Sgt. Nov. 1, '62; 1st Lt. May 1, '63.
Charles Thompson....	Sgt. Maj.	"	Resigned July 11, '62..	P. Elected 1st Lt. Dec. 7, '61.
<i>2d Lieutenants.</i>				
George W. Montony....	2d Lieut..	"	Resigned Oct. 8, '61...	Re-e. as pvt; killed in a.; see sub. rec'd
Joseph B. Vallee.....	Sergeant.	"	Resigned Nov. 13, '62..	P. 1st Sgt. Aug. 31, '61; 2d Lt. Oct. 11, '61.
Frank Quantin.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	P. 1st Sgt. Dec. 18, '61; 2d Lt. May 1, '63.
<i>1st Sergeants.</i>				
Charles Daugherty....	"	"	Disability Dec. 18, '61..	P. 1st Sgt. Oct. 11, '61.
Henry B. Bayne.....	Corporal.	"	Killed in action.....	P. 1st Sgt. May 1, '63; re-enlisted Vet.; killed in Wilderness.
<i>Sergeants.</i>				
Jos. W. Killingsworth.	Sergeant.	"	Exp. service.....	
James M. Allen.....	Corporal.	"	Re-enlist Vet.....	Wd. Antietam; tr. "H" 190; pr. Aug. 19, '64; ded. June 13, '65; reported died at Saulsbury.
Luther D. Middlekauf..	Sergeant.	"	"	Pr. N. M. X rds.; tr. fr. "K" Co.; to "H" 190 (Sgt.); pr. Aug. 19, '64; ded. June 24, '65.
Samuel Simon.....	Corporal.	"	Disability Sept. 15, '62.	Name spelled Simpson on M-in roll.
Wm. H. Ellis.....	"	"	Killed in action.....	Wd. Fred'b'g; re-enlisted Vet.; killed in Wilderness.
<i>Corporals.</i>				
John T. Rowlett.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	
Wm. E. Lowther.....	"	"	"	
John C. Cooper.....	"	"	Disability Dec. 18, '62..	Wd. and pr. N. M. X roads.
Wm. Albright.....	"	Sept. 12, '61	By transfer.....	Pr. N. M. X rds.; tr. to 190 Pa. (no rec. in 190); surv. war.
John Kelly.....	Private...	Aug. 10, '61.	Exp. service.....	Ab. sick at M-o. Wd. May 12, '64.
Thomas Downing....	"	"	"	
Mathias Lauderback..	"	"	"	Wd. 2d B. Run.
Alex. McDonald.....	"	"	Re-enlist Vet.....	(Joined by re-enl. Aug. '61, M. R.) to 190; dis. June 28, '65.
Headley Pannett.....	"	"	Disability Apr. 18, '64..	Tr. fr. "K" Co.
Dan'l C. Odenbauer..	"	"	Killed in action.....	Killed at Antietam.
<i>Musician.</i>				
Charles Daugherty....	Musician.	"	Deserted Dec. 11, '61..	
<i>Privates.</i>				
Jesse K. Allen.....	Recruit.	Feb. 19, '63.	By transfer.....	Tr. to 190 (no record in 190).
James Allison.....	Private...	Aug. 10, '61.	Killed in action.....	Killed at Antietam.
Leander Arndt.....	"	"	"	Killed at Antietam; from "K."
George W. Barnitts...	Corporal.	"	Re-enlist Vet.....	Tr. fr. "K"; to "B" 190; pr. Aug. 19, '64; ded. June 5, '65.
Ebenizer Beech.....	Private...	"	Disability date unk....	Wd. Antietam.
Joseph Blair.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	Ab. sick at M-o.
Robert C. Bridges....	"	"	"	
Thomas Brady.....	"	"	Deserted date unk....	
John Boyd.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	
Benj. F. Brown.....	"	"	Re-enlist Vet.....	To 190 (no rec. in 190); tr. fr. "K"; surv. w
John Boyer.....	Recruit..	Mar. 26, '63.	By transfer.....	To 190 (no record in 190).
Richard A. Carr.....	Private...	Aug. 10, '61.	Killed in action.....	Killed at N. M. X roads.
Anderson Callahan...	"	"	Disability Jan. 9, '63	
Benj. F. Cochran....	"	"	Re-enlist Vet.....	To 190 (no rec. in 190); died Dec. 12, '64, at Saulsbury.
Peter Collins.....	"	"	Deser'ed date unk....	
Samuel L. Cooper....	"	"	Disability Jan. 16, '63..	Wd. N. M. X roads.
James C. Cunningham	"	"	Re-enlist Vet.....	Pr. Aug. 28, '62; to "B" 190; pr. May 8, '64, to Aug. 24, '64; ded. June 24, '65.
James J. Cunningham	"	"	Disability Dec. 20, '62..	
John Curren.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	
Wm. H. Davison.....	"	"	Deserted Mar. 5, '64...	Dtd. to Vet. R. Corps; ab. at M-o.
John Dallaway.....	"	"	Disability Dec. 16, '61..	
Wm. Doan.....	"	"	Deserted Mar. 5, '63...	
Henry Duddy.....	"	"	Disability Sept. 15, '62.	Wd. N. M. X roads.
Robert Duddy.....	"	"	Disability Aug. 2, '62..	
Edwin E. Edwards....	Recruit..	Nov. 3, '63..	By transfer.....	To 190 (no record in 190).
Joseph Ellingsworth..	Private...	Aug. 10, '61.	Re-enlist Vet.....	Pr. May 8, '62; to "B" 190 (no rec in 190); died at Saulsbury, Feb. 15, '65.
Andrew Elliott.....	"	"	Disability Dec. 24, '62..	
Moses Finley.....	"	"	Disability Mar. 28, '63..	
George W. F. Fleming	"	"	Re-enlist Vet.....	Fr. "K"; to 190 (no record in 190).
Joseph S. Fry.....	"	"	Disability Jan. 6, '63..	Wd. South Mountain.

NOTE.—Many men were transferred from "K" Company of 12th to other companies of 12th. All veterans were transferred to 190 Penn. Vols.—M. D. H.

# MUSTER-OUT ROLL OF "A" COMPANY—Continued.

NAME AND RANK.	Muster-in.		DISCHARGED. How and When.	REMARKS.
	Rank.	Date.		
<i>Privates.</i>				
Wm. A. Fry.....	Corporal.	Aug. 10, '61.	Died Nov. 2, '62.	From "K."
Michael J. Gillan.....	Private...	"	Exp. service.....	Wd. Wilderness May 5, '64.
John E. Goshart.....	"	"	"	Pr. Fred'g; ab. sick at M-o.
George F. Gumpfer.....	"	"	"	Tr. to Vet. R. Corps. date unknown.
Henry Hacking.....	"	"	Killed in action.....	Missing N. M. X roads.
Noel J. Hall.....	"	"	"	Wd. 2d B. Run; tr. fr. "K"; re-enl. Vet.; killed in Wilderness.
James Hardy.....	"	"	Deserted date unk.....	
Charles G. Hankins.....	"	"	Re-enlist Vet.....	To 190; disc'd at end of war.
George A. Hanky.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	
Frank H. Hench.....	Corporal.	"	Killed in action.....	Killed at Gettysburg; tr. fr. "K" Co.
Nicholas J. Hench.....	Private...	"	Exp. service.....	Tr. from "K."
John Hoover.....	"	"	Disability Sept. 15, '62.	
Peter Haney.....	"	"	Re-enlist Vet.....	To 190 (no rec. in 190); disc'd end of war
Alfred Hyneman.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	Wd. North Anna May 23, '64.
Joseph Jeffries.....	"	"	"	
Thomas Jones.....	"	"	Deserted June 8, '62.	
Daniel C. Kane.....	"	"	Killed in action.....	Re-enlist Vet.; killed in Wilderness.
Edward Lamb.....	"	"	Died Sept. 8, '63.	
Stanley Lane.....	"	"	Re-enlist Vet.....	Wd. & pr. N. M. X roads; to 190 (no rec. in 190); surv. war.
Henry Lawrence.....	Recruit	Aug. 16, '61.	"	To 190 (no rec. in 190); dis. at end of war.
Wm. A. Leach.....	Private...	Aug. 10, '61.	Killed in action.....	Killed at Fredericksburg.
Daniel McCarty.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	Pr. Catlett's St'n date unk & in Wild'n's
John M. Maguire.....	"	"	Promoted Nov. 28, '61.	Unknown how promoted.
Henry McManomy.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	
Samuel McKargue.....	"	"	Disability Aug. 2, '62.	
Joseph A. Malmesbury	"	"	Deserted Aug. 10, '61.	
Ellis Mackey.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	Wd. Fredericksburg.
Robert E. Marshall.....	"	"	Disability Jan. 26, '63.	Wd. N. M. X roads; tr. from "K."
Wm. A. Mead.....	"	"	Deserted Mar. 5, '63.	
Stephen Mellett.....	"	"	Re-enlist Vet.....	Fr. "K"; wd. N. M. X roads; to "B" 190; disc'd July 15, '65
Richard A. Miles.....	"	"	Deserted Aug. 10, '62.	
John A. Miller.....	"	"	June 1, '63.	Fr. "K."
George S. Moore.....	"	"	Disability Feb. 26, '63.	
George W. Montony.....	Recruit..	Mar. 14, '62.	Killed in action.....	Killed at N. M. X roads; formerly a Lieut. in this Co.
George M. Morris.....	Private...	Aug. 10, '61.	Deserted Aug. 10, '62.	
Jacob E. Moyer.....	Recruit..	Mar. 10, '63.	By transfer.....	To 190 (no record in 190).
La Fayette Palmer.....	"	Mar. 14, '62.	To Vet. Res. Corps....	Wd. & pr. N. M. X roads; tr. to Vet. Res. Corps Sept. 1, '63.
Wilson R. Pelkington.	Sergeant.	Aug. 10, '61.	Killed in action.....	Killed at S. Mountain; tr. fr. "K" Co.
Daniel Price.....	Private...	"	Re-enlist Vet.....	To 190; died pr. at Salsbury.
Wm. Quinn.....	"	"	Disability Dec. 30, '62.	Wd. Antietam.
John M. Ross.....	"	"	Re-enlist Vet.....	Fr. "K"; to 190 (no rec. in 190); surv. war.
Wm. H. Rowlett.....	"	"	Disability Jan. 20, '62.	
John Ryan.....	Recruit..	Oct. 6, '63.	By transfer.....	To 190 (no rec. in 190); d'c'd at end of war
George W. Sharp.....	Private...	Aug. 10, '61.	Re-enlist Vet.....	To 190 (no record in 190).
John Short.....	"	"	Killed in action.....	Wd. June 27, '62; killed at 2d B. Run.
Francis A. Smith.....	"	"	Disability May 30, '62.	Pr. May 8, '62.
James Smith.....	"	"	Deserted Aug. 10, '61.	
Patrick Starr.....	"	"	Disability Jan. 16, '63.	
Edward Strohman.....	"	"	Deserted Dec. 7, '63.	
Joshua Sweeger.....	"	"	Re-enlist Vet.....	Fr. "K"; to 190 (no record in 190).
August Swenson.....	Recruit..	July 27, '63.	By transfer.....	To 190 (no record in 190).
Robert Trayford.....	Private...	Aug. 10, '61.	Died Aug. 20, '62.	At Philadelphia.
Ezra Toomey.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	Fr. "K"; ab. sick at M-o.
James Turnbull.....	"	"	"	
Charles Valiant.....	"	"	Disability date unk.....	
John Wallace.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	Ab. at M-o.
Wm. Walker.....	"	"	Re-enlist Vet.....	To 190 (no record in 190); surv. war.
Joseph Watson.....	"	"	"	To 190 (no rec. in 190); disc'd at end war.
Thomas R. Williams.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	P. Surg.-mate Aug. 31, '61, to Oct. 1, '61.
David Williams.....	Recruit..	Jan. 1, '61.	By transfer.....	To 190 (no record in 190).
John Weber.....	Private...	Aug. 10, '61.	Re-enlist Vet.....	To 190 (no record in 190); surv. war.
Thomas Wilson.....	Recruit..	July 27, '63.	By transfer.....	
James E. White.....	Private...	Aug. 10, '61.	Disability Dec. 11, '62.	Pr. N. M. X roads.
Thomas White.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	Pr. June 27, '62.
Peter Woods.....	"	"	"	
Washington Yates.....	"	"	By transfer.....	Detached to Navy Feb. 18, '62.
Benj. Yarnall.....	"	"	"	
Wm. P. Zeigler.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	Tr. fr. "K" Co.

# MUSTER-OUT ROLL OF "B" COMPANY.

NAME AND RANK.	Muster-in.		DISCHARGED.	REMARKS.
	Rank.	Date.	How and When.	
<i>Captains.</i>				
David N. Matthews	Captain.	Aug. 10, '61.	July 31, '62.	How discharged unknown.
Simon H. Briggs	Sergeant	"	Exp. service.	P. 1st Sgt. Jan. 1, '62; 1st Lt. Mar. 18, '62; Com'd Capt. July 31, '62; Capt. April 21, '63; Brevet Major, Mar. 13, '62; wounded Fredericksburg.
<i>1st. Lieutenants.</i>				
James B. Harding	1st Lieut.	"	Board ex. Mar. 4, '62.	P. com'd 1st Lt. July 31, '62; 1st Lt. April 20, '63; wounded Antietam.
John F. Hoadley	Sergeant.	"	Exp. service.	
<i>2d Lieutenants.</i>				
Arthur M. Phillips	2d Lieut.	"	Resigned July 21, '62	P. com'd 2d Lt. July 31, '62; 2d Lt. April 20, '63.
Philetus H. Reynolds	Corporal.	"	Exp. service.	
<i>1st Sergeants.</i>				
Andrew F. Ely	1st Sergt.	"	Disability Feb. 21, '62.	P. 1st Sgt.; pr. Mechanicsville.
Martin N. Reynolds	Corporal.	"	Exp. service.	
<i>Sergeants.</i>				
Porter Squiers	Sergeant.	"	Disability Jan. 1, '62	
Mason Parker	"	"	Dec. 30, '61.	
Henry W. Dean	Corporal.	"	Killed in action.	P. Sgt.; com'y Sgt. Mar. 21, '62; ret'd to Co. June, '62; killed South Mountain. P. Sergeant.
George Moore	"	"	Exp. service.	
Oscar H. Benjamin	Private..	"	"	
Samuel A. Danner	"	"	Died May 6, '63.	Pr. Gaines Mill; died at Wash'g'n, D.C.
Charles Johnson	Recruit..	Dec. 1862	By transfer.	To 190 (no record in 190).
Charles A. Meeker	Private..	Aug. 10, '61.	Died Oct. 30, '62.	Wd. Antietam.
<i>Corporals.</i>				
Merritt S. Harding	Corporal.	"	Disability Feb 27, '63	Wd. 2d B. Run; disc'd for wds.
Alexander Morgan	"	"	Died Dec. 3, '61.	
Jacob Maynard	"	"	Killed in action.	Killed at Antietam.
Levi B. Knowles	"	"	By transfer.	To Battery "A" 43 Penn. April 6, '62.
George Fitzer	Private..	"	Disability Jan. 23, '63.	Wd. & pr. Fred'bg; discharged for wds
James C. Kenney	"	"	Died July 22, '62.	Died at Harrison's Ldg.
Aaron H. Wintermute	"	"	Exp. service.	
Milton Moyer	"	"	"	
Jeremiah C. Reynolds	"	"	"	
John Shugler	"	"	"	
<i>Musicians.</i>				
Frederick Waugh	Musician	"	Deserted Aug. 10, '61.	P. Musician.
Christian C. Eckart	Private..	"	Exp. service.	Tr. fr. "K" Co. to Staff as Prin. Mus. July 31, '63.
John C. Eckart	Musician.	"	"	P. Drum-Major Nov. 22, '61; ret'd. to Co. Mar. 22, '62; wd. Fredericksburg
Lewis C. Miller	"	"	"	
<i>Privates.</i>				
William Andrews	Private..	"	Re-enlist Vet.	To "H" 190; pr.; died at Saulsby, Jan. 30, '65.
Christian L. Arnold	"	"	Exp. service.	
Samuel Arnold	"	"	Disability May 20, '62.	Wd. South Mountain; disc'd. for wds.
Silas Aumick	"	"	Dec. 15 '62.	Tr. fr. "K" Co.; wd. 2d B. Run.
Leander V. Armstrong	"	"	Exp. service	Died at Acquia Creek.
James Bailey	Recruit..	Nov. 13, '61	Died Dec. 1, '62	To 190 (no record in 190); died at Sauls-
John Banno	"	Mar. 3, '64	By transfer	bury Jan. 6, '65.
Warren Barber	Private..	Aug. 10, '61	Re-enlist Vet.	To "H" 190; pr. Aug. 19, '64; disc'd. June 28, '65.
Alonzo H. Beebe	"	"	Disability Dec. 15, '62.	
Chauncey C. Beuinger	"	"	Exp. service.	Tr. to Vet. Res. Co.; ab. M-o.
Robert Blakeslee	Unk.	Unknown.	Disability date unk.	
Charles L. Card	Recruit..	Nov. 7, '61.	By transfer	To 2d U. S. Cav'y May 31, '64.
Asher Cook	"	Mar. 17, '64.	"	To 190 (no record in 190); disc'd. Mar. 30, '65.
Harvey Corby	Private	Aug. 10, '61	Exp. service.	
Abraham Crawford	"	"	died of wounds.	Pr. Gaines Mill and Fredericksburg.
William Croop	"	"	Disability March 6, '63.	Wd. Antietam and Fredericksburg.
John H. Davis	"	"	Exp. service.	Wounded Fredericksburg.
Thomas Davis	"	"	"	
Joseph Dellinger	"	"	Killed in action	Died of wds; pr. and wd. N. M. X r'ds
John Dressler	"	"	Disability April 21, '62.	
Eliah Dymond	"	"	Disability Jan. 1, '63	
Isaiah Evans	"	"	"	
James B. Fisk	Recruit..	Mar. 31, '64.	By transfer	To 190 (no rec. in 190); disc'd June 23, '65
Squires B. Fisk	"	Nov. 21, '61.	Disability May 24, '62.	
Sydney Freeman	Private..	Aug. 10, '61.	Exp. service	
Lyman J. Freeman	"	"	"	
William Fox	"	"	By transfer	To 5th U. S. Arty. Nov. 24, '62.
Patrick Gannon	"	"	Disability Feb. 2, '62.	
Edwin J. Gardner	Recruit	Nov. 21, '61	Died April 5, '62.	Died at Philadelphia.
James Gillespie	"	Feb. 7, '62.	By transfer	To "H" 190; pr. d'd at Sauls. Dec. 18, '64



## MUSTER-OUT ROLL OF "B" COMPANY.—Continued.

NAME AND RANK.	Muster-in.		DISCHARGED. How and When.	REMARKS.
	Rank.	Date.		
<i>Privates.</i>				
James C. Hastings.....	Private..	Aug. 10, '61.	Re-enlist. Vet.....	Wd. N. M. X roads; to "H" 190; killed at Petersburg June 17, '64.
John Hastings.....	Recruit..	Aug. 2, '62	By transfer.....	To 190; discharged June 27, '65.
William Hastings.....				To 190; discharged June 2, '65
Charles T. Harvey.....	Q.M. Sgt	Aug. 10, '61.	Disability Feb. 4, '62	Q'm Sgt. till Dec. '61.
James Hedden.....	Private..		Killed in action.....	Killed at New Market Cross Roads.
James N. Herbert.....	Recruit..	Aug. 10, '62	By transfer.....	To 190; discharged June 2, '65.
Joseph Hess.....	Private..	Aug. 10, '61.	Killed in action.....	Killed at Spottsylvania, May 8, '64.
Frederick Hinkley.....			Disability Oct. 15, '62	
Oran Hinkley.....	"	"		
Jasper Hoadley.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	
Albert Hodsell.....	"	"	Disability Oct. 11, '62	
Edward House.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	
Fuller A. Johnson.....				
James Jones.....	Recruit..	Nov. 13, '61.	By transfer.....	To Vet. Res. Corps, Feb. 19, '64.
John H. Jacquis.....		Mar. 19, '64		To 190; died at Phila. Sep. 12, '64, of wds.
George Labarr.....	Private..	Aug. 10, '61.	Disability Feb. 23, '63.	
Francis J. Lathrop.....			Disability May 21, '62.	
Wm. Langley.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	Wounded Mechanicsville.
Francis J. Leppo.....	"	"	Disability Sept. 20, '61.	
James C. Linthurst.....	"	"	Disability April 9, '63	Wd. Anti-tam; d. of wds.; tr. fr. "K."
Theo H. Luckey.....	Recruit..	Mar. 29, '64.	By transfer.....	To 190 (no rec. in 190); died at Arlington Feb. 2, '65.
David F. Lurch.....	Private..	Aug. 10, '61.	Re-enlist Vet.....	To 190; never reported; tr. fr. "K" Co.
Thomas May.....	"	"	Deserted Jan. 15, '62	
John McCord.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	Tr. to Vet. Res. Corps.
Reuben Mesherer.....	"	"	By transfer.....	To 6 U. S. Cav'y Nov. 2, '62.
Calvin Moore.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	Wounded New Market Cross Roads.
Martin Morgan.....	"	"		
Jacob Moyer.....	"	"	Killed in action.....	Killed at Fredericksburg.
John Moyer.....	Recruit..	Mar. 19, '64	By transfer.....	To 190; discharged June 28, '65.
Miner Moyer.....	Private..	Aug. 10, '61.	Re-enlist Vet.....	To "H" 190; pr. from Aug. 19, '64, to Mar. 2, '65; discharged June 28, '65.
John H. Mulison.....	"	"	"	To "H" 190; pr. June 13, '64; disc'd June 26, '65.
Harrison Noel.....	"	"	Deserted July 2, '62.	
Thomas Osterhaut.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	
Mason Parker.....	Recruit..	Mar. 25, '64.	By transfer.....	To 190; discharged May 15, '65.
Warren Parrish.....	Private..	Aug. 10, '61.	Died Feb. 10, '62.	Died at Georgetown, D. C.
Harrison Patrick.....			Missing in action.....	Pr. N. M. X roads, Fred'bg and Spottsylvania May 9, '64.
Marvin Potter.....	Recruit..	Nov. 7, '61.	Died of wounds.....	Wd. New Market Cross Roads.
Fredrick K. Puckner.....	Unk.....	Unknown.	Deserted Sept. 28, '62.	
Worden Reynolds.....	Wagoner	Aug. 10, '61.	Exp. service.....	Wounded South Mountain.
Alexander Rogan.....	Private..		Disability Nov. 24, '62.	
Rensselaer Ross.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	
Patrick Rowan.....	"	"	Deserted May 12, '63.	
Wm. H. Sanders.....	"	"	Disability July 18, '62.	
Sidney Schooley.....	"	"	Jan. 15, '62.	
James Schaeffer.....	Recruit..	Mar. 31, '64.	By transfer.....	To 190; discharged June 28, '65.
Jacob R. Shotwell.....	Private..	Aug. 10, '61.	Exp. service.....	
Daniel Shumber.....	"	"	"	
Cyrus Smeed.....	"	"	"	
John Sly.....	"	"	"	
John H. Snyder.....	"	"	Re-enlist Vet.....	To "H" 190; pr. Aug. 19, '64; tr. fr. "K."
Floyd T. Sprague.....	Recruit..	Mar. 10, '64	By transfer.....	To 190; disc'd June 28, '65.
Joseph B. Sprague.....	"	Mar. 18, '61.		
Norman Sprague.....	"	Nov. 21, '61		To "H" 190; disc'd June 28, '65.
Wm. Stager.....	Private..	Aug. 10, '61.	Died of wounds.....	Wounded Mechanicsville.
Wm. E. Stark.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	
Wm. Stonier.....	"	"	Died Nov. 18, '61.	Died at Camp Pierpont.
Wm. Story.....	"	"	Nov. 21, '61.	
Truxton T. Stansbury.....	Recruit..	Mar. 2, '64.	By transfer.....	To 190; pr. died at Saulsby Dec. 13, '64.
Perrin L. Taylor.....	"	Mar. 31, '64		discharged for disa. March 9, '65.
James Taylor.....	"	Nov. 21, '61	Disability Oct. 27, '62	
Charles Terry.....	Private..	Aug. 10, '61.	Deserted July 2, '63.	
Harvey Tiffany.....	Recruit..	Mar. 18, '64	By transfer.....	To 190; discharged June 28, '65.
Charles A. Thompson.....	Private..	Aug. 10, '61	Died Nov. 3, '61.	Died at Camp Pierpont.
George K. Thompson.....			Disability Sept. 24, '62	
Wm. Thompson.....	"	"	N. v. 22, '62	Wounded Mechanicsville.
Morris Toomy.....	"	"	Re-enlist Vet.....	To "H" 190; d'd at Saulsby Dec. 12, '64.
Edward Vanamaker.....	"	"	Disability Aug. 10, '61	
George W. Wagoner.....	"	"	By transfer.....	To 5 U. S. Art'y. Nov. 24, '62.
Sanford Wandall.....	"	"	Prisoner at M-o.....	Pr. 2d B. Run; pr. April 8 to May, '64; discharged June 11, '64.
Conrad Weismiller.....	"	"	Died of wounds.....	Tr. fr. "K" Co.; wounded Fred'bg.
Almuda Wilbur.....	"	"	Exp. servce.....	Detached to artiller.
James Wilson.....	"	"	Re-enlist Vet.....	To 190, never reported; tr. fr. "K" Co.
Thomas C. Woods.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	
Orland Wright.....	"	"	Disability Feb. 9, '63.	Pr. Fred'bg; discharged for wounds.

# MUSTER-OUT ROLL OF "C" COMPANY.

NAME AND RANK.	Muster-in.		DISCHARGED. How and When.	REMARKS.
	Rank.	Date.		
<i>Captains.</i>				
Richard Gustin.....	Captain..	Aug. 10, '61	By Promotion.....	P. Lt.-Col. Apr. 6, '63. See Field and Staff.
Henry S. Lucas.....	1st Lieut.	"	"	P. Capt. April 6, '63; Bvt. Maj. for Antietam; pr. N. M. X rds.; wd. Antietam and Fredericksburg, and May, '64.
<i>1st Lieutenant.</i>				
Daniel R. Jewell .....	Corporal.	"	"	P. Sgt.; first Sgt. Aug. 30, '62; 1st Lt. May 14, '63; pr. Fredericksburg.
<i>2d Lieutenants.</i>				
Jacob J. Grantier.....	Sergeant.	"	Resigned Aug. 11, '62.	P. 2d Lt. Sept. 10, 1861.
John G. Rohm.....	Private..	"	Exp. service.....	P. 2d Lt. May 1, '63; Bvt. 1st Lt. sp. gal. Mine Run; tr. from "K" Co.
<i>1st Sergeants.</i>				
Wm. Russell.....	1st Serg..	"	"	Tr to Vet. R. C. Nov. 15, 1863.
Wilde E. King.....	Sergeant.	"	"	P. 1st Sgt.; wd. Spottsylvania.
<i>Sergeants.</i>				
Frank Fish.....	"	"	Disability Apr. 16, '63.	Wd. 2d Bull Run.
Wm. Daggett.....	"	"	" Feb. 21, '62.	"
Lyman Douglas.....	Corporal.	"	Exp. service.....	P. Sgt.; w l. Fredericksburg.
Ellis A. Foster.....	"	"	"	P. Sgt.; wd. N. M. X rds., Antietam and Fredericksburg.
Joshua H. Graves.....	"	"	Disability Mar. 24, '64	P. Sgt.; wd. and pr. Fredericksburg.
<i>Corporals.</i>				
Henry M. Richardson.	"	"	By Sec. War, May 23, '62	Pr. May 8, 1862.
Edwin D. Benedict.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	Pr. Mechanicsville.
Wm. A. Corzatt.....	"	"	"	Wd. Antietam.
Samuel Bryan.....	Private...	"	"	P. Corp'l; wd. N. M. X rds. and Antietam; pr. Fredericksburg.
John H. Snow.....	"	"	"	P. Corp'l; wd. S. M. & F'b'g; fr. "K" Co.
George H. Mason.....	"	"	Disability Nov. 12, '62.	P. Corp'l; wd. S. Mt'n.
David Walter.....	"	"	Re-enlist Vet.....	P. Corp'l; wd. Fredericksburg; tr. to 190; died pr. at Petersburg.
Daniel J. Mason.....	"	"	Killed in action.....	P. Corp'l; killed at Fredericksburg.
John F. Gerald.....	"	"	Disability Jan. 6, '64.	P. Corp'l; wd. Antietam.
George M. Pardoe.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	P. Corp'l; pr. Fredericksburg.
Miller W. Barnes.....	Corporal.	"	Disability Oct. 26, '61.	"
<i>Musicians.</i>				
Cyrus J. Spencer.....	Musician	"	Killed in action.....	Killed Antietam.
Robert E. Jacobs.....	Private...	"	Exp. service.....	Wd.; time and place unk; fr. "K" Co.
John H. Harris.....	Musician	"	"	Wd. Wilderness.
<i>Privates.</i>				
Frank Adams.....	Private..	"	"	Wd. N. M. X rds.; tr. to V. R. C.; ab. at M-o.
Joseph Bailey.....	"	"	By transfer.....	To 2d U. S. Art. July 18, 1862
James Barnes.....	Recruit..	Mar. 18, '62	Killed in action.....	Killed at Antietam.
Lemuel Barnes.....	Private..	Aug. 10, '61	Disability Feb. 4, '63.	Wd. South Mountain.
Wm. H. Bentzel.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	Tr. fr. "K" Co.; wd. Ant'm and F'b'g.
Henry H. Bennett.....	"	"	Killed in action.....	Killed at Fredericksburg.
Duncan Black.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	Wd. Gaines Mill; ab. at M-o.
Jerome Blauco.....	"	"	Killed in action.....	Wd. and pr. N. M. X rds.; k. Antietam.
George S. Borden.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	"
John Bossinger.....	"	"	"	Wd. Bethesda Ch.; tr. from "K" Co.
Lewis Boughton.....	"	"	Disability Oct. 29, '62.	Wd. Mechanicsville.
James Burke.....	"	"	By Sec. War, June 9, '62.	Pr. May 8, 1862.
Thomas Bush.....	"	"	Disability Feb. 17, '63.	Wd. Antietam.
David Bryan.....	"	"	Exp. s. rvice.....	Wd. Mechanicsville June 27, 1862.
John T. Calless.....	"	"	"	Wd. Fredericksburg.
Wm. Carnochan.....	"	"	D. of wds., Jan. 20, '63.	Wd. Fredericksburg
Cyrus D. Chapman.....	"	"	By transfer.....	To Battery "A" 43d Pa. July 20, 1862; wd. N. M. X rds.
Miles M. Cooper.....	"	"	Killed in action.....	Gaines Mill
George D. Comfort.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	Wd. Fredericksburg
Michael Cunningham.....	Recruit..	July 10, '62	Detached.....	Det'd Prov. M. off. 3d Div., 5th C.
Calvin L. Davis.....	Private..	Aug. 10, '61	By transfer.....	Tr. to 6th U. S. Cav. Nov. 10, 1862.
Charles Davis.....	"	"	Disability Jan. 4, '62.	"
George Davis.....	"	"	By transfer.....	To 2d U. S. Art. July 18, 1862.
Lewis Davis.....	"	"	Re-enlist Vet.....	Wd. N. M. X rds. and F'b'g; tr. to 190; pr. Petersburg; discharged end of war.
Wm. Davis.....	"	"	"	At Washington D. C.
Timothy Fellon.....	"	"	Disability Jan. 15, '63.	Wd. South Mountain.
Edgar F. Fenton.....	"	"	Prisoner at M-o.....	Wd. Antietam; released Sept. 19, '64 (2).
Horace Fenton.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	Wd. Antietam and F'b'g; ab. sick at M-o
Elbridge Fenton.....	Recruit..	Oct. 22, '62	By transfer.....	Pr. F'b'g; tr. to V. R. C. Sept. 1, 1863.
Newton Ford.....	Private..	Aug. 10, '61	Killed in action.....	Killed Gaines Mill.
John W. Garrison.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	Wd. Mechanicsville June 27, 1862. S. Mt'n; wd. and pr. Fredericksburg.
Samuel C. Griffin.....	Sergeant	"	Deserted May 4, '63.....	Tr. from "K" Co.; wd. Fred'burg.
Abe Grover.....	Private..	"	Disability Jan. 2, '64.	Wd. Mechanicsville and Fred'burg.
John Haines.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	Tr. from "K" Co.; wd. Groveton April 29, 1862, and Fredericksburg.
Wm. Hardy.....	"	"	"	Ab. sick at M-o.
Joseph Ilagar.....	"	"	Deserted Aug. 29, '62.	"

# MUSTER-OUT ROLL OF "C" COMPANY—Continued.

NAME AND RANK.	Muster-in.		DISCHARGED.	REMARKS.
	Rank.	Date.	How and When.	
<i>Privates.</i>				
Jacob Hockersmith.....	Private..	Aug. 10, '61	By G. C. M.....	Tr. from "K" Co.
Isaac Holly.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	Wd. 21 Bull Run; pr. Fredericksburg.
Austin Horton.....	"	"	Disability Jan. 17, '63..	Wd. N. M. X roads.
Franklin S. Howard.....	"	"	Deserted Sept 12, '62	
Peter B. Humel.....	"	"	By transfer.....	To Battery "A" 43d Pa., July 20, 1863;
Joseph W. Inscho.....	"	"	Killed in action.....	wd. Fredericksburg.
Wm. E. Jones.....	"	"	Re-enlist Vet.....	Killed at N. M. X roads.
Lester O. Kent.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	Wd. Fredericksburg; to "E" 190; pr.
Henry M. Knox.....	"	"	Killed in action.....	Petersburg; died en route home.
Wm. Kuh.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	Wd. N. M. X roads; killed Fred'burg.
Augusta Laud.....	"	"	Deserted June 30, '62..	Tr. fr. "K" Co.; pr. Fredericksburg.
Volney M. Levally.....	"	"	Re-enlist Vet.....	Wd. N. M. X roads.
James Loan.....	"	"	By transfer.....	Wd. Groveton; to "E" 190; pr. Aug.
George Matson.....	"	"	Re-enlist Vet.....	19, '64, discharged June 2, '65.
Wm. McDougall.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	Tr. fr. "K" Co.; P. Q'm-Sergeant
Frank McIntyre.....	"	"	Re-enlist Vet.....	May 1, 1863; (see staff).
Frederick Mellott.....	"	"	Died of wounds.....	Wd. Antietam; to "E" 190; discharged
Henry J. Mentzel.....	"	"	Deserted Sept. 25, '62	end of war.
Wash'ton Musselman.....	"	"	Disability May 18, '63	Tr. fr. "K" Co.; wd. Malvern Hill.
David Myers.....	"	"	Disability Oct. 16, '62.	Wd. S. M'n; to 190; dis'd end of war.
Edward F. Newell.....	Recruit..	Jan. 30, '62	By transfer.....	Wd. S. M'n; died Oct. 1, '62; tr. fr.
Anthony Novitsky.....	Private..	Aug. 10, '61	Killed in action.....	"K" Co.
John S. Osler.....	"	"	Disability Mar. 18, '62.	Pr. May 8, '62; pr. Fredericksburg.
John Ogara.....	Recruit..	Feb., '62	Died of wounds.....	Tr. fr. "K" Co.; wd. 3d Bull Run.
Ebin R. Packard.....	Private..	Aug. 10, '61	By transfer.....	To 190; discharged 1865.
John Patton.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	Killed Fredericksburg.
James Peters.....	Recruit..	Dec. 21, '63	By transfer.....	Wd. Fred'burg; died Jan. 4, '63.
Phillip Petty.....	Private..	Aug. 10, '61	Disability Mar. 18, '62..	Wd. Fred'burg; tr. to Battery "A" 43d
Peter W. Poland.....	"	"	Disability Aug. 16, '62.	Pa. July 20, '63.
Isaac Readway.....	"	"	Deserted July 12, '64..	Wd. Mech'ville; pr. Fredericksburg.
Wm. A. Rice.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	To 190; pr. '64; dis'd end of war.
Nelson H. Robbins.....	"	"	Re-enlist Vet.....	Wd. South Mountain.
Thos. T. Shillem.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	Wd. Gaines Mill.
David Short.....	"	"	Deserted Dec. 1, '62...	Pr. Fredericksburg.
Edmund W. Snell.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	Wd. & pr. N. M. X rds; to 190; dis. end war
Eugene Smith.....	"	"	Died Nov. 25, 1861.....	Pr. Fredericksburg.
Frederick M. Smith.....	Recruit..	Mar. 25, '64	By transfer.....	At Washington D. C.
Daniel Stewart.....	Private..	Aug. 10, '61	Exp. service.....	To 190; k. at Petersburg, June 17, '64.
James Sturdivant.....	"	"	Killed in action.....	Wd. 2d Bull Run.
John B. Vanard.....	"	"	Re-enlist Vet.....	Tr. fr. "K" Co.; killed Fred'burg.
Herman A. Vaughan.....	"	"	"	Wd. Fred'burg; to 190; dis. end of war.
Richard J. Watts.....	"	"	"	Wd. N. M. X rds. and pr. Fred'burg; to
Abner Williams.....	"	"	Killed in action.....	190; surv. war.
Oscar Williams.....	"	"	"	Killed N. M. X roads.
Seely Williams.....	Wagoner	"	Disability July 17, '62.	Killed N. M. X roads.
Aaron Wilson.....	Private..	"	" June 28, '63.	
Henry D. Witmer.....	Sergeant	"	Exp. service.....	Tr. fr. "K" Co.; tr. to V. R. C.
Charles K. Wright.....	Private..	"	"	Pr. Fredericksburg
Richard Woods.....	"	"	"	Wd. N. M. X rds.; tr. fr. "K" Co.; tr.
Frisby T. Wiant.....	"	"	"	to Vet. R. C.
				Wd. Fredericksburg; ab. at M-o.

# MUSTER-OUT ROLL OF "D" COMPANY.

NAME AND RANK.	Muster-in.		DISCHARGED.	REMARKS.
	Rank.	Date.	How and When.	
<i>Captains.</i>				
Samuel Wilt.....	Captain..	Aug. 10, '61.	Disability Nov. 5, '61.	P. 1st Lt. Nov. 15, '61; Capt. May 1, '63; wd. 2d Bull Run.
Wm. H. Weaver.....	2d Lieut.	"	Exp. service.....	
Thomas D. Horn.....	Sergeant	"	Disability Feb. 10, '63..	P. Capt. Jan. 13, '62; wd. and pr. N. M. X roads.
<i>1st Lieutenants.</i>				
Henry Mather.....	1st Lieut.	"	Nov. 5, '61; cause unk.	P. 2d Lt. Nov. 5, '61; 1st Lt. May 1, '63; Bvt. Capt. for Gettysburg; wd. F"b'g.
Edward B. Snyder....	1st Sergt.	"	Exp. service.....	
<i>2d Lieutenant.</i>				
Wm. R. Peacock.....	Sergeant.	"	Re-enlist Vet....	P. Com'd 2d Lt. Feb. 10, '63; (not must'd); 2d Lt. and 1st Lt. "E" 190; dis'd June 28, '65.
<i>1st Sergeant.</i>				
Robert Neidig.....	Corporal.	"	"	P. 1st Sgt.; 1st Sgt. "E" 190; 2d Lt. "E" 190 Sept. 19, '64; pr. Aug. 19, '64; dis'd June 5, '65.
<i>Sergeants.</i>				
Wm. H. Woodall.....	Sergeant.	"	By transfer.....	Tr. to Signal Corps Aug. 29, '61.
Frank Carroll.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	Ab. at Muster-out.
Jacob R. Baughman..	Private..	"	Re-enlist Vet.....	P. Corp'l, sgt.; wd. 2d Bull Run and F"b'g; to "E" 190; died in pr. Feb. 20, '65
<i>Corporals.</i>				
Jeremiah Winters....	Corporal	"	Exp. service.....	Killed 2d Bull Run.
Benj. Brightbill....	"	"	"	
Aaron L. Burke.....	"	"	Killed in action....	P. Com'y Sgt.; (see staff).
Henry Krafft.....	"	"	By transfer.....	P. Q'm-Sgt. Regimental Q'm; (see staff).
James T. Woodall....	"	"	"	Killed South Mountain.
Henry H. Hoppel.....	"	"	Killed in action....	Wd. Fredericksburg.
Monroe B. Wenger....	"	"	Exp. service.....	P. Corporal.
John Good.....	Private...	"	Disability Nov. 5, '62..	P. Corporal; wd. and pr. Fredericksb'g.
John A. Walker.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	P. Corp'l; wd. & pr. N. M. X rds.; to "E" 190; wd. & pr. July 8, '64; d'd end of war
John Rennett.....	"	"	Re-enlist Vet.....	P. Corp'l; dr. in Pamunkey River.
James M. Allen.....	"	"	Drowned June 4, '64..	P. Corporal.
Richard Fleming.....	"	"	Disability Dec. 15, '62..	
<i>Musicians.</i>				
Charles Speckler.....	Musician	"	Exp. service.....	P. Corporal.
John Irlam.....	"	"	Disability Jan. 27, '62..	
<i>Wagoner.</i>				
Wm. Hock.....	Wagoner	"	Exp. service.....	Detached.
<i>Privates.</i>				
Wm. Anderson.....	Private...	"	"	Wd. and pr. Mechanicsville.
Wm. P. Austin.....	"	"	"	
John Babb.....	"	"	Deserted June 1, '63..	Wd. South Mountain.
Wm. H. Barnes.....	"	"	By G. C. M. Feb. 20, '64	Wd. and pr. N. M. X roads.
John Bates.....	"	"	Disability Feb. 22, '62..	
John Beatty.....	"	"	Killed in action....	To "E" 190; died of wds. Sept. 11, '64.
George F. Black.....	"	"	Disability July 21, '63.	
Alex. Brewster.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	Wd. Fredicksb'g; tr. to Vet. R. Corps.
James Bird.....	"	"	Re-enlist Vet.....	
Lewis Boston.....	Unk....	Unknown.	Deserted date unk....	Wd. and pr. F'd'g; to 190; d'd end of war
Isaac Bumburgh....	Private...	Aug. 10, '61.	Disability Nov. 5, '63..	
Lemuel Burbaker....	"	"	Deserted Oct. 1, '62..	Detached.
John Bryan.....	Unk....	Unknown.	Deserted date unk....	
Frank Collins.....	Private..	Aug. 10, '61.	Exp. service.....	Wd. Antietam; to 190; pr. Aug. 19, '64; dis'd end of war.
David Campbell.....	"	"	"	
David H. Carpenter..	"	"	Re-enlist Vet.....	To "E" 190; pr. '64; detached.
John Clunghart.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	
Thomas Connor.....	"	"	Re-enlist Vet.....	Wd and pr. F'd'g; to "E" 190; died in pr. Nov. 16, '64.
John Donohue.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	To "H" 190; pr. Aug. 19, '64; d'd June 21, '65
Samuel Dugan.....	"	"	"	
Christian Frankhouser	"	"	Re-enlist Vet.....	Wd. 2d B. Run; died of wds. May 13, '64.
Edward Fuller.....	"	"	Deserted June 1, '63..	
Wm. Fulton.....	"	"	Died May 13, '64..	Killed Fredericksburg.
George Fetterman....	"	"	Deserted June 1, '63..	
Richard Fleming.....	"	"	Disability Dec. 15, '62..	To 190 (Adam Garnee of "H" 190, killed Aug. 13, '64).
Samuel Garst.....	"	"	Killed in action....	
Adam Garner.....	"	"	Re-enlist Vet.....	Dis'd by Order War Department.
George Gorman.....	"	"	Disability Feb. 28, '62..	
Henry Gorman.....	"	"	Disability Oct. 24, '62..	Tr. fr. "K" Co.; killed Fredericksb'g.
John Gill.....	"	"	Killed in action....	
John Gurtner.....	Recruit..	April, '64..	Died of wds. May 11, '64	Wd. Wilderness May 6, '64.

## MUSTER-OUT ROLL OF "D" COMPANY.—Continued.

NAME AND RANK.	Muster-in.		DISCHARGED.	REMARKS.
	Rank.	Date.	How and When.	
<i>Privates.</i>				
George Gurtler .....	Recruit..	April, '64..	By transfer.....	To "E" 190; died in prison.
Robert Hall.....	Unk.....	Unknown.	Deserted date unk.....	
Thomas Hall.....	Private...	Aug. 10, '61.	Deserted July 10, '62..	
John Holt.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	
Charles Haines.....	Unk. ...	Unknown.	Deserted date unk.....	
John E. Harnes.....	Private..	Aug. 10, '61.	Disability Sept. 1, '63..	
James Helbert.....	Unk. ...	Unknown..	Deserted date unk.....	
Peter Henseler.....	Private..	Aug. 10, '61.	Disability July 18, '62.	
John Hicks .....	"	"	Re-enlist Vet.....	Wd. 3d B. Run; pr. May 8, '64; to "K" 190; surv. war.
John Hudgeon.....	"	"	By transfer.....	To Signal Corps Aug. 29, '61.
Richard Hughes.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	Detached.
John Jones.....	"	"	"	
Isaac Kelly.....	"	"	Died Dec. 10, '61.....	Died at Georgetown, D. C.
Nicholas Krouse .....	"	"	By transfer.....	To Art'y July 18, '63.
George Kugler .....	"	"	Deserted Oct. 1, '62...	
Samuel Lessly.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	Wd. and pr. Mechanicsville.
Alex. Leiby.....	"	"	"	Wd. N. M. X roads.
Henry G. Lewis.....	"	"	"	
Joseph W. Long.....	"	"	"	
Edward Lyons.....	"	"	By Sec. War Nov. 26, '62	
Francis F. Mann.....	"	"	Re-enlist Vet.....	To 190; died at Goldsboro, N. C. (2).
John Mahrters.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	
Harri-on McCabe.....	Recruit..	Aug. 29, '61	Rest'd fr. deser. ....	Tr. to 190; deser. from 190 Aug. 15, '64.
Thomas McCord.....	Private...	Aug. 10, '61	Died of wounds. ....	Wd. 2d B. Run; died; r. A. B. X. Sept. 18, '62
Hugh McCoy.....	"	"	Killed in action.....	Wd. N. M. X roads; killed 2d B. Run.
Samuel McDaniels .....	"	"	By transfer.....	To Art'y Aug. 1, '62.
Wm. McFarland.....	"	"	Killed in action.....	Missing South Mountain.
George McLain.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	Wd. and pr. Fredericksburg.
John McLeister.....	"	"	"	
James Mills.....	"	"	"	Wd. and pr. Fredericksburg.
Edward Miller.....	"	"	Disability Nov. 1, '61.	
George Miller.....	"	"	Re-enlist Vet.....	To "E" 190; disc'd June 5, '65; r. r. '64.
Christian Moorhead...	"	"	Killed by accident.....	Killed by companion Sept. 25, '61.
John Murphy.....	"	"	Disability May 23, '62.	
John Quinn.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	Wd. and pr. Fred'bg; tr. to V. R. C.
Valentine Quenzler...	"	"	Re-enlist Vet.....	Wd. and pr. Fred'bg; to 190; disc'd end of war.
Thomas Ray.....	Recruit..	Feb. 11, '64.	By transfer.....	To "E" 190; disc'd for wds. June 8, '65; pr. '64.
Samuel Redfern.....	Private...	Aug. 10, '61.	Exp. service.....	Detached.
Samuel Reichert.....	Recruit..	Feb. 29, '64.	By transfer.....	To 190; disc'd end of war.
Robert Simpson.....	Private..	Aug. 10, '61.	Killed in action.....	Killed Gaines Mills.
Henry Seiger.....	"	"	Missing in action.....	Missing Bristoe Station Oct. 14, '63.
James Shaeffer.....	"	"	Deserted date unk.....	
George Shoemaker.....	"	"	Disability Dec. 3, '62...	
Thomas Skidmore.....	"	"	Deserted date unk.....	
Edward Stevens.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	Det'd to Signal Corps Aug. 29, '61.
Adam Strauser.....	"	"	Sec. War Oct. 24, '62..	
Theodore Spaulding..	"	"	Disability Feb. 17, '63..	
Richard L. Tell.....	"	"	Killed in action.....	Killed Fredericksburg.
George W. Walker.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	Wd. 3d Bull Run.
Peter Weaver.....	"	"	Re-enlist Vet.....	To "E" 190; died pr. date unknown.
Philip Weaver.....	"	"	Disability Oct. 14, '62..	
Charles Woodall.....	"	"	Disability Oct. 22, '62	
George Yohn.....	"	"	By transfer.....	To U. S. Art'y Nov. 25, '62.

# MUSTER-OUT ROLL OF "E" COMPANY.

NAME AND RANK.	Muster-in.		DISCHARGED.	REMARKS.
	Rank.	Date.	How and When.	
<i>Captains.</i>				
John J. Horn.....	Captain..	Aug. 10, '61	Resigned Feb. 17, '62	P. Capt. Mar. 10, '62; wd. 2d Bull Run; tr. to V. R. Corps Sept. 1, '63.
Francis Schelling.....	1st Lieut.	"	Exp. service.....	
<i>1st Lieutenants.</i>				
Edward Kelly.....	2d Lieut.	"	Disability Jan. 17, '63.	P. 1st Lt. Mar. 14, '62; wd. Antietam. (?) P. 2d Lt. Mar. 14, '62; 1st Sgt. Oct., '61; 1st Lt. May 1, '63; Bvt. Capt. for Gettysburg.
James C. Fackenthal.....	Sergeant.	"	Exp. service.....	
<i>2d Lieutenant.</i>				
Wm. Lind.....	"	"	Disability Dec. 23, '63.	P. 1st Sgt. Jan. 1, '63; 2d Lt. May 1, '63.
<i>1st Sergeants.</i>				
John Haggerty.....	1st Serg..	"	Exp. service.....	Detached.
James Johnson.....	Corporal.	"	"	P. 1st Sgt.; pr. Gaines Mill.
Wm. R. Kidd.....	Sergeant.	"	Dis. wds., Dec. 15, '62.	P. 1st Sgt. Apr., '62; wd. 2d Bull Run.
<i>Sergeants.</i>				
Theodore Hance.....	"	"	Disability Apr. 24, '62.	P. Sgt. Sept. 1, '63; wd. Mehan'ville, Antietam, Bristoe Station and Spott- sylvania; ab. at M-o.
William Ruch.....	Corporal.	"	Exp. service.....	
John Herp.....	"	"	Deserted Sept. 30, '6	P. Sergeant.
Wm. F. Keller.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	P. Sgt.; wd. 2d Bull Run; to V. R. Corps Sept. 1, '63.
Reuben L. Miller.....	Private...	"	"	P. Sgt.; wd. and pr. Fredericksburg.
Henry Hess.....	"	"	"	P. Sgt. Jan. 1, '63.
James Cummskey.....	"	"	"	P. Sgt.; prisoner; date unknown.
John Williams.....	"	"	"	P. Corp'l and Sgt.; wd. Antietam and Fredericksburg.
<i>Corporals.</i>				
James Taylor.....	Corporal.	"	Missing in action.....	Missing at Gaines Mill.
Chr. F. Oestricher.....	"	"	By transfer.....	To Signal Corps Sept. 15, '63.
Wm. I. Kuehner.....	"	"	Died Nov. 1, 1861.....	Died at Camp Pierpont.
Jesse Roseberry.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	P. Corporal.
David Campbell.....	Private...	"	"	
James H. Coffin.....	"	"	"	P. Corporal.
Samuel Tolan.....	"	"	"	P. Corporal.
Daniel H. Laubach.....	"	"	Dis wds. Dec. 15, '62.	P. Corporal; wd. 2d Bull Run.
Aaron Rossler.....	"	"	Died Dec. 20, '63.....	P. Corp'l; died at Warrington Junction.
Geo. Derhammer.....	"	"	Killed in action.....	P. Corporal; killed at Antietam.
George Ketchledge.....	"	"	"	P. Corp'l; killed at Spottsylvania May 11, '64.
Jackson H. Messinger.....	"	"	Died of wds. Oct. 16, '62	P. Corporal; wd. 2d Bull Run
Wm. H. Weaver.....	Recruit..	May 18, '64.	By transfer.....	To 190; p. Corporal; died, date unkn.
<i>Musicians.</i>				
Thomas Duffin.....	Musician	Aug. 10, '61	Killed in action.....	Killed at Gaines Mill.
John A. Wolf.....	"	"	Died Dec. 27, '63.....	etached; died at Washington, D. C.
<i>Wagoner.</i>				
Aaron E. Beisel.....	Wagoner	"	Exp. service.....	P. Mus. and Corp'l; tr. to V. R. Corps Feb. 19, '64.
<i>Privates.</i>				
Robert G. Barnes.....	Private...	"	Re-enlist Vet.....	To "A" 190; died pr. at Saulsbury Jan. 26, '65.
Joseph Barros.....	"	"	Deserted Sept. 24, '61.	Wd. Mechanicsville; to 190 (no record in 190); surv. war.
John Barry.....	"	"	" 25, '62.	
Lackbold Beck.....	"	"	Re-enlist Vet.....	To 6th U. S. Cavalry Dec. 7, '62. Tr. from "K" Co.
Max Bertrand.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	
Joseph Bird.....	"	"	Deserted Oct. 5, '61.....	Wd. Fredericksburg; ab. at M-o.
Wm. H. Bodley.....	"	"	By transfer.....	
John H. Boran.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	Killed at 2d Bull Run.
Daniel Brownell.....	"	"	Disability Apr. 12, '63	
Jacob M. Buchter.....	"	"	Deserte 1 June 1, '63.	Tr. fr. "K" Co.; wd. Spottsylvania May 11, '64; ab. at M-o.
Ramsay Case.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	
Hoffman Connor.....	"	"	Deserted Aug. 21, '62.	Killed at 2d Bull Run.
Charles Custard.....	"	"	Killed in action.....	
James Devine.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	Killed at 2d Bull Run.
Wm. Dice.....	"	"	Killed in action.....	
Casper Eichelstein.....	"	"	Desert d Feb. 2, '63.	Wd. Antietam; dled May, '64.
Daniel Eli.....	"	"	Re-enlist Vet.....	
Josiah Ettleman.....	"	"	Killed in action.....	Ki led Mechanicsville.
Sanders Everett.....	"	"	Died Sept. 7, '62.....	
Adam Fisher.....	"	"	By transfer.....	Trans to P. M.; date unknown
Paul H. Fishel.....	"	"	Deserted Aug. 24, '61.	
Wm. Frederick.....	"	"	Disability Mar. 3, '63	Tr. fr. "K" Co.; killed at Antietam.
Jarvis Gould.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	
David H. Graham.....	"	"	Killed in action.....	Killed at Gaines Mill.
Mathew Haase.....	"	"	"	
Wm. Handwork.....	"	"	"	Killed at Fredericksburg.
Wm. F. Handwork.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	

## MUSTER-OUT ROLL OF "E" COMPANY—Continued.

NAME AND RANK.	Muster-in.		DISCHARGED. How and When.	REMARKS.
	Rank.	Date.		
<i>Privates.</i>				
Wm. Harden.....	Private..	Aug. 10, '61.	Deserted June 1, '63...	Detached to Artillery.
John H. Hummel.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	
Wm. Ivy.....	"	"	Deserted Aug. 11, '61.	To 190; discharged by Sec'y of War.
Warren H. Joline.....	Recruit..	July 22, '64.	By transfer.....	
Edward Kimble.....	"	Aug. 6, '63.	Deserted Nov. 27, '63.	To Navy Feb. 6, '64.
Josiah Kirkendall.....	Private..	Aug. 10, '61	By transfer.....	
Sidney Kuchner.....	"	"	Disability Mar. 22, '64.	Groveton Aug. 29, '62.
Jeremiah Klein.....	Recruit..	Feb. 15, '64.	By transfer.....	
John W. Leffel.....	Private..	Aug. 10, '61.	Exp. service.....	To 190; discharged by Sec'y of War.
Edward Leidy.....	"	"	Died Oct. 2, '62.....	
Jacob Leidy.....	"	"	Re-enlist Vet.....	Detached to Navy.
Barney Maloy.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	
John May.....	"	"	Disability Oct. 6, '62.	To "A" 190; discharged June 28, '65.
Thomas McCormick.....	"	"	Disability Dec. 6, '62.	
Jacob Moyer.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	Wd. Mechanicsville and 2d Bull Run.
Jacob Muffy.....	"	"	Disability Jan. 1, '63.	
Amadus Miller.....	"	"	Jan. 2, '64.	Killed at Fredericksburg.
George A. Miller.....	"	"	Killed in action.....	
Fort W. Nicholas.....	Recruit..	Jan. 22, '64.	By transfer.....	To 190; discharged by Sec'y of War.
Robert Nolf.....	Private..	Aug. 10, '61.	Disability Jan. 21, '62.	
John Nunemacher.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	Wd. at Fredericksburg.
Michael O'Brien.....	"	"	Killed in action.....	
Sullivan Otto.....	Recruit..	Jan. 22, '64.	By transfer.....	Issued at Fred'sburg; tr. fr. "K" Co.
Isaac Peifer.....	Private..	Aug. 10, '61.	Disability Aug. 1, '63.	
James Pilkington.....	"	"	Deserted Sept. 5, '62.	To 190; discharged by Sec'y of War.
Wm. Raub.....	Recruit..	Jan. 25, '64	By transfer.....	
Calvin Reed.....	Private..	Aug. 10, '61	"	To 190; discharged by Sec'y of War.
George Retzler.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	
Lewis Roth.....	"	"	Died Dec. 15, '62.....	Wd. 2d B. R. and S. M'tn; died of wds.
Paul Roth.....	"	"	Killed in action.....	
Thomas Ruth.....	Recruit..	Jan. 22, '65	"	Killed at Todds Tavern.
Wm. H. Santee.....	Private..	Aug. 10, '61.	Exp. service.....	
Lewis H. Sassaman.....	"	"	Re-enlist Vet.....	Wd., date unknown; tr. to V. R. Corps
Lewis Schenk.....	"	"	"	
Wm. Schooley.....	"	"	Deserted Sept. 5, '62.	Sept. 1, '63.
Philip Seagler.....	Recruit..	Feb. 8, '64.	By transfer.....	
Patrick Shine.....	Private..	Aug. 10, '61.	Disability Oct. 15, '62.	To 190; discharged by Sec'y of War.
Stephen Sholes.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	
Christian F. Smith.....	"	"	Died June 14, 1862.	Detached to Signal Corps.
Joseph Snyder.....	Recruit..	Jan. 18, '64.	By transfer.....	
Peter S. Snyder.....	"	Feb. 22, '64.	"	To 190; discharged by Sec'y of War.
Urias Stahr.....	Private..	Aug. 10, '61.	Deserted Oct. 1, '63...	
Lewis Stein.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	To 190; discharged by Sec'y of War.
Robert W. Surrill.....	"	"	Disability Mar. 26, '63.	
Benj. Tallman.....	"	"	Re-enlist Vet.....	Wd. Fredericksburg; discharged for
Charles R. Teeliu.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	
Samuel Traugh.....	Recruit..	Jan. 22, '64.	By transfer.....	To "A" 190; pr.; died Jan. 12, '65.
Wm. Traugh.....	Private..	Aug. 10, '61.	Re-enlist Vet.....	
Joseph Trexler.....	"	"	Deserted Aug. 21, '62.	Tr. fr. "K" Co.; ab in arrest at M-o.
Benj. Troxell.....	"	"	Re-enlist Vet.....	
George Troxell.....	"	"	"	To 190; discharged by Sec'y of War.
John P. Troxell.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	
George Walls.....	"	"	Killed in action.....	Died Jan. 27, '64.
Robert Warner.....	Recruit..	Feb. 6, '64.	By transfer.....	
John Waucht.....	Private..	Aug. 10, '61.	"	To "A" 190; discharged June 28, '65.
John B. Wilson.....	Recruit..	May 15, '61	"	
Albert Wise.....	Private..	Aug. 10, '61.	Deserted July 26, '62...	To "A" 190; wd. Mech'ville; pr. Aug.
Robert White.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	
John Worman.....	"	"	By transfer.....	19, '64; discharged June 7, '65.
John Younkins.....	Recruit..	Feb. 8, '64.	"	
				Tr. to Vet. Res. Corps Mar. 5, '64.
				Killed at 2d Bull Run.
				To "A" 190; pr. Aug. 19, '64; dis-
				charged June 6, '65.
				To Bat. "B" Second U. S. Oct. 24, '62.
				To 190; (no record in 190); discharged
				by secretary of War.
				To Vet. Res. Corps Sept. 15, '63.
				To Navy Feb. 6, '64.
				To "A" 190; died in pr. Jan. 21, '64, at
				Sausbury.

# MUSTER-OUT ROLL OF "F" COMPANY.

NAME AND RANK.	Muster-in.		DISCHARGED.	REMARKS.
	Rank.	Date.	How and When.	
<i>Captain.</i>				
Andrew G. Oliver.....	Captain..	Aug. 10. '61.	Exp. service.....	Ab. D. S. at M-o ; wd. Mechanicsville.
<i>1st Lieutenants.</i>				
John W. Kress.....	1st Lieut.	"	Resigned Sept. 10, '61..	1st Lt. Sept. 10, '61; Capt "I" Co. April
Chill W. Hazzard.....	2d Lieut.	"	By transfer.....	20, '63; wd. Fr-dericksburg.
Thomas Linn.....	Unk.....	Unknown..	Resigned July 31, '63.	1st Sgt.; 1st Lt. Apr. 20, '63; wd. F'd'b'g.
<i>2d Lieutenants.</i>				
Henry D. J. Bell.....	1st Sergt.	Aug. 10, '61.	Resigned Nov. 15, '62..	Com'y Sgt. Aug. 31, '61; 2d Lt. Sept. 10, '61
John F. Thomas.....	Sergeant	"	Exp. service.....	2d Lt. April 20, '63.
<i>1st Sergeant.</i>				
Watson Muse.....	Private..	"	"	1st Sgt. April 20, '63.
<i>Sergeants.</i>				
Wm. Fox.....	Sergeant.	"	Disability May 7, '62...	Wd. N. M. X roads.
John Carson.....	"	"	Disability July 8, '63...	Wd. Antietam; to 190 (no record in 190;
James M. Davis.....	Corporal.	"	Exp. service.....	surv. war.
Augustus E. Hessler..	"	"	Re-enlist Vet.....	Wd. Antietam; to 190 (no record in 190;
Alex. Bayne.....	Private..	"	Disability Sept., '62...	Pr. Aug. 28, '62.
Joseph M. Eckley.....	"	"	Re-enlist Vet.....	Sgt. Maj. Apr. 20, '63; to "G" 190; 2d Lt.
Abram Gross.....	Unk.....	Unknown..	"	Sept. 19, '64; never mus'd; pr. Aug. 19,
John Ulrich.....	Private..	Aug. 10, '61.	"	'64; disc'd June 28, '65.
<i>Corporals.</i>				
George A. Campbell...	Corporal.	"	Killed in action.....	Corpl "G" 190; ab. s. at M-o; fr. 190.
John C. Sykes.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	Sgt. "K" and "B" 190 (no rec. in 190).
Eben G. Smith.....	Private..	"	Killed in action.....	Wd. Gaines Mill; killed Antietam.
Daniel Coughenour...	"	"	Exp. service.....	Pr. and wd. Fredericksburg.
Wm. D. Jones.....	"	"	"	Killed Fredericksburg; P. Sergeant.
Nelson Mathews.....	"	"	Killed in action.....	Wd. 2d Bull Run.
George H. Baer.....	"	"	Disability Jan. 13, '63..	Killed N. M. X roads.
Wm. Billett.....	"	"	Re-enlist Vet.....	Pr. Aug. -8, '62.
Theodore Campbell...	"	"	"	To "G" 190; pr. Aug. 19, '64; d'd June 28, '65
Christopher Neff.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	To "G" 190; disc'd June 28, '65; wd. N.
<i>Musicians.</i>				
Augustus Fox.....	"	"	Re-enlist Vet.....	M. X roads.
Wm. Smith.....	"	"	"	Wd. Fredericksburg.
<i>Privates.</i>				
Robert Axton.....	"	"	Disability Feb. 28, '63..	To "G" 190; disc'd June 28, '65.
Eli Applegate.....	"	"	Died of wds. date unk...	To 190; disc'd June 28, '65; tr. fr. "K" Co.
Samuel Applegate.....	"	"	Re-enlist Vet.....	To "G" 190; pr. Aug. 19, '64; disc'd June
Vincent Applegate...	"	"	Exp. service.....	13, '65.
Calvin Baer.....	"	"	Killed in action.....	Wd. 2d Bull Run; detached.
Jacob Baldwin.....	"	"	Disability Feb. 13, '63..	Killed Antietam.
Hugh Bayne.....	"	"	Disability Dec 30, '61..	Wd. N. M. X rds.. Antietam and F'd'b'g;
Jeremiah Brubaeker..	"	"	Re-enlist Vet.....	to "G" 190; pr. Aug. 19, '64; disc'd
Allen Campbell.....	"	"	"	June 28, '65.
John Campbell.....	Recruit..	—, '64.	By transfer.....	Wd. Antietam; to "G" 190; pr. Aug. 19,
Humphrey Carson.....	Unk.....	Unknown..	Disability date unk...	'64; disc'd June 28, '65.
James Caull.....	Private..	Aug. 10, '61.	Disability Jan. 16, '63..	To 190; disc'd by Sec. War.
James Chapman.....	"	"	Re-enlist Vet.....	Wd. N. M. X roads.
Samuel W. Collins.....	"	"	"	To "G" 190; disc'd June 28, '65.
James Collins.....	Recruit..	Feb. 22, '64.	By transfer.....	To 190; disc'd by Sec. War.
John M. C. Cravens...	Private..	Aug. 10, '61.	Unknown.....	Not on Muster-out Roll.
Samuel Cravens.....	"	"	Deserted July 15, '63..	
Jacob Culp.....	"	"	Deserted Dec. 17, '61..	
Oliver Culp.....	"	"	Deserted Jan. 20, '62..	
John W. Dutton.....	"	"	Disability Nov. 23, '63..	
Henry Eisle.....	"	"	By transfer.....	To U. S. Cavalry Oct. 28, '62.
George Evans.....	"	"	"	To "B" Fifth U. S. Art'y Aug. 1, '62.
Joshua Fillmore.....	"	"	Killed in action.....	Killed N. M. X roads.
Finley Foster.....	"	"	Re-enlist Vet.....	To "G" 190; disc'd June 28, '65.
William Foster.....	"	"	Disability April 3, '63..	Wd. 2d Bull Run.
John W. Fox.....	"	"	By transfer.....	To Sixth U. S. Cav'y Oct. 28, '62.
Louis Ghems.....	"	"	"	To Second U. S. Art'y Dec. 9, '62.
James Halfin.....	Recruit..	Aug. 23, '61.	"	To 190; disc'd by Sec. War.
John Henderson.....	Private..	Aug. 10, '61.	"	To Second U. S. Art'y Dec. 9, '62.
Theodore Hoogh.....	"	"	Re-enlist Vet.....	To "G" 190; disc'd June 28, '65.
John Hoover.....	"	"	Killed in action.....	Killed N. M. X roads.



**MUSTER-OUT ROLL OF "F" COMPANY.—Continued.**

NAME AND RANK.	Muster-in.		DISCHARGED.	REMARKS.
	Rank.	Date.	How and When.	
Privates.				
Thomas Householder..	Private...	Aug. 10, '61.	By transfer.....	To Second U. S. Art'y Dec. 9, '62.
James Howard.....	"	"	Disability Dec. 30, '61..	Killed Spott's May 11, '64; re-enl. Vet.
Alfred Hurst.....	"	"	Killed in action.....	Killed Antietam.
Charles Jones.....	"	"	"	To "B" Fifth U. S. Aug. 1, '62.
Theophilus Jones.....	"	"	By transfer.....	To Second U. S. Art'y Dec. 9, '62.
John Kain.....	"	"	"	To "G" 190; pr. died of wds. at Peters-
David Kier.....	"	"	Re-enlist Vet.....	burg Aug. 7, '64.
George Kleinshirts...	"	"	Disability Jan. 31, '63..	"
John Kyle.....	"	"	Disability Nov. 3, '62..	Wd. 2d Bull Run.
James Lyons.....	"	"	Re-enlist Vet.....	To "G" 190; pr. June, '64; surv. war.
John D. Malone.....	"	"	"	To "G" 190; disc'd June 28, '65; wd.
				Gaines Mill.
Samuel Malone.....	"	"	Disability Sept. 26, '62.	Wd. and pr. N. M. X roads.
Wm. Malone.....	"	"	Disability Mar. 10, '63..	"
Clifford Mattox.....	"	"	Re-enlist Vet.....	To 190 (no rec. in 190); (A Clifford Mattox
				on Roll of Honor May 22, '64); sup. to
				have surv. war.
John Mattox.....	Recruit..	—, '64....	By transfer.....	To 190; disc'd by Sec. War.
Wm. McAndrey.....	Unk.....	Unknown..	Died date unknown..	"
Wm. McCready.....	Private..	Aug. 10, '61.	Deserted Jan. 30, '63..	"
John McCrolus.....	Unk.....	Unknown..	Disability Aug. 13, '62..	"
John McDowell.....	Private..	Aug. 10, '61.	Exp. service.....	Wd. Fredericksburg.
Joseph McFeely.....	"	"	Re-enlist Vet.....	To 190; disc'd June 28, '65.
John E. McIntyre.....	Recruit..	Aug. 21, '61.	By transfer.....	To 190; disc'd by Sec. War.
Adam E. McKelvy.....	Private..	Aug. 10, '61.	"	To 190 (no record in 190); surv. war.
Robert McKelvy.....	"	"	Re-enlist Vet.....	Wd. Antietam; to "G" 190; pr. Aug. 19,
				'64; disc'd June 28, '65.
Wm. McQuancy.....	"	"	Died Dec. 14, '61. ....	At Camp Pierpont.
Asher Meaus.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	Wd. South Mountain.
Charles Morrow.....	Unk.....	Unknown..	Deserted date unk....	"
George Murry.....	Private..	Aug. 10, '61.	Dec. 30, '62. ....	Cause of disc. unk.; wd. 2d B. Run.
Emanuel Neff, Sr.....	Recruit..	Aug. 23, '61.	Re-enlist Vet.....	To "G" 190; disc'd June 28, '65.
Emanuel Neff, Jr.....	Unk.....	Unknown..	By transfer.....	To Sixth U. S. Com'y Oct. 28, '62.
John Neff.....	Private..	Aug. 10, '61.	"	"
John Obie.....	Unk.....	Unknown..	Died date unknown..	"
John Orelly.....	Recruit..	Sept. 1, '61.	Disability Feb. 14, '63..	"
Wm. Painter.....	"	Feb. 2, '64..	By transfer.....	To 190; ab. s. at M-o.
Wm. Pamler.....	Unk.....	Unknown..	"	Disc'd by Sec. War date unknown.
Thomas Peden.....	Private..	Aug. 10, '61.	Exp. service.....	Detached to Art'y.
Abram Pennman.....	"	"	Suicided Aug., '62....	"
John Prescott.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	"
James Redmond.....	"	"	Died of wds. Oct. 6, '62.	Wd. 2d Bull Run.
Robert Russell.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	Wd. Fredb'g; to V. R. C.; ab. at M-o.
Charles Shellock.....	"	"	Re-enlist Vet.....	To "G" 190; disc'd June 28, '65.
Samuel Sloan.....	"	"	Disability Feb. 4, '63..	"
George Soles.....	"	"	Re-enlist Vet.....	To "G" 190; disc'd June 28, '65.
Nelson Soles.....	"	"	Disability date unk....	"
Jacob Spidal.....	"	"	For wds. Jan. 6, '63....	Wd. Antietam.
John Steiss.....	Recruit..	Feb. 17, '64.	By transfer.....	To 190; disc'd by Sec. War.
John Stoneman.....	Private..	Aug. 10, '61.	Died of wds. Feb. 12, '63	Wd. Fredericksburg.
George Strohman.....	"	"	Deserted date unk....	"
Benjamin Tipton.....	"	"	Re-enlist Vet.....	Wd. 2d Bull Run; died May 4, '64.
John Tyler.....	"	"	Killed in action.....	Killed Antietam.
John Umberger.....	"	"	Died of wds. Dec. 27, '63	Wd. Fredericksburg.
John Upton.....	"	"	By transfer.....	Tr. to 43d Penn. April, '62.
George Webster.....	"	"	Disability June 2, '62..	"
Eli Wilson.....	"	"	Died Jan. 22, '63.....	Died at Richmond; pr. Fredericksburg.
Robert Whigham.....	"	"	Died Dec. 14, '61.....	Died at Camp Pierpont.

# MUSTER-OUT ROLL OF "G" COMPANY.

NAME AND RANK.	Muster-in.		DISCHARGED. How and When.	REMARKS.
	Rank.	Date.		
<i>Captains.</i>				
Charles W. Diven.....	Captain..	Aug. 10, '61.	By promotion.....	Major Apr. 19, '64; Col. 200 Penn.; Bvt. Brigadier-General.
<i>1st Lieutenants.</i>				
James K. Miller.....	1st Lieut.	"	Res. Sept. 1, '61.....	
Wm. W. Arnold.....	2d Lieut.	"	Killed in action.....	Killed N. M. X rds; 1st Lieut. Sept. 1 '61.
George Huber.....	Sergeant.	"	Exp. service.....	2d Lieut. Sept. 1, '61; 1st Lieut. May 1, '63.
<i>2d Lieutenants.</i>				
Nathan Carman.....	"	"	"	1st Sgt. Oct. 10, '62; 2d Lieut. May 1, '63; wounded N. M. X roads and Fred'b'g.
<i>1st Sergeants.</i>				
James L. McClure....	1st Sgt.	"	Died of wds Oct. 9, '62	Wd. N. M. X roads and Antietam.
George W. Ebaugh....	Sergeant.	"	Exp. service.....	P. 1st Sergeant.
<i>Sergeants.</i>				
Henry Gise.....	"	"	"	
John Conway.....	Corporal.	"	"	P. Sgt.; wd. Spottsylvania May 8, '64.
George C. Bush.....	"	"	Re-enlist. Vet.....	Wd. Fred'b'g; to " F " 190; died of wds. date unknown.
Isaac D. Cullemeny..	"	"	Exp. service.....	Wounded May 8, '64.
<i>Corporals.</i>				
Charles Palmer.....	"	"	Disability May 20, '62.	
Hiram Kendig.....	"	"	" May 21, '62.	
Jere. Waltemeyer....	"	"	Exp. service.....	Wd. N. M. X roads and Fred'b'g.
Augustus L. Hursh..	"	"	Disability Mar. 4, '63.	
Henry Balsi.....	Private..	"	Re-enlist Vet.....	Wd. Aug. 27, '62; ab. at M-o.
John D. Campbell....	"	"	Exp. service.....	
Ambrose Eusminger..	"	"	"	
Jacob Shannon.....	Unk.....	Unknown..	"	
Daniel D. Bailey....	Private..	Aug. 10, '61.	Died of wds. Oct. 8, '62.	Wd. & pr. Gaines Mill; tr. fr. " K " Co.
Christian S. Wagner..	"	"	Killed in action.....	Killed South Mountain.
George Writer.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	
Eli Harnish.....	"	"	Disability Feb. 20, '63	Wounded South Mountain.
David Shirk.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	Wd. and pr. N. M. X roads.
Jacob Eppley.....	Corporal.	"	Disability Mar. 4, '63..	P. Drum-Major Mar. 22, '62.
<i>Musicians.</i>				
John Emb'ck.....	Musician	"	" Mar. 20, '64.	
Daniel Repman.....	Private..	"	Re-enlist Vet.....	To 190 (no record in 190).
<i>Wagoners.</i>				
William Gibbs.....	Wagoner	"	Disability Oct. 20, '62	
William Wetzel.....	"	Oct. 18, '61.	" Mar. 15, '63.	
<i>Privates.</i>				
George Albert.....	Private..	Aug. 10, '61.	Exp. service.....	
Paris W. Albert.....	"	"	Disability Jan. 26, '63	
Levi Aikin.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	Wounded Gettysburg.
Wash. Alexander....	"	"	Disability Feb. 20, '63.	
— Babin.....	"	"	Unknown.....	
William Bettinger....	"	"	Exp. service.....	Wd. and pr. N. M. X roads; ab. at M-o.
John Bishop.....	"	"	Disability Oct. 10, '62.	
Frederick Bongey....	"	"	" Feb. 23, '63.	Wounded, date unknown.
Samuel Breneman....	"	"	" July 18, '62	
George B. Brown.....	"	"	Re-enlist Vet.....	Fr. " K " Co. to " F " 190; pr. Aug. 1, '64.
Michael Burger.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	Wounded Fredericksburg.
Hugo L. Bush.....	"	"	Disability Jan 23, '63..	
Amas Day.....	Recruit..	Feb. 27, '64.	By transfer.....	To " F " 190; discharged June 28, '65.
John A. Duffield.....	"	Mar. 1, '64.	"	To 190 (no record in 190); wounded '64.
Winfield J. Duffield..	Private..	Aug. 10, '61.	Re-enlist Vet.....	Fr. " K " Co. to " F " 190; died pr. at Saulsbury Nov. 12, '64.
William Eaton.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	To Vet. Res. Corps.
William R. Eaton....	"	"	Disability Aug. 10, '61.	
David Ehrman.....	"	"	" Aug. 29, '61.	Died.
Wilson Everall.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	
James Filttenberger..	"	"	Re enlist Vet.....	To 190 (no record in 190).
Wilson C. Fox.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	Fr. " K " Co.; detached.
William R. Fox.....	"	"	Died of wds Oct. 2, '62.	Wd. Antietam; fr. " K " Co.
John B. Fry.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	
Arthur E. Fulton....	"	"	Disability Sept. 7, '62.	Pr. Gaines Mill.
Henry Gable.....	"	"	D'd of wds. Sept. 18, '62	Wounded Antietam.
John Gantz.....	"	"	Disability July 18, '62.	
Moses Gardner.....	"	"	Deserted Oct. 21, '62..	
Arnun Gogler.....	"	"	Disability Feb. 20, '63	
Lewis Grove.....	Recruit..	Feb. 15, '64.	By transfer.....	To " F " 190; disc'd June 28, '65.
Michael Halev.....	Private..	Aug. 10, '61.	Re-enlist Vet.....	To " F " 190; disc'd June 28, '65; pr. '64.
Solomon C. Hampson	"	"	Disability July 18, '62..	
Jacob Hanefins.....	"	"	Deserted Aug. 10, '61.	
George Hardy.....	"	"	Re-enlist Vet.....	To " F " 190; disc'd; June 28, '65.
Henry Harman.....	"	"	D'd of wds. Oct. 3, '62.	Wounded Antietam.
Nicholas B. Heim.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	Fr. " K " Co ; wd. Fredericksburg.

## MUSTER-OUT ROLL OF "G" COMPANY.—Continued.

NAME AND RANK.	Muster-in.		DISCHARGED.	REMARKS.
	Rank.	Date.	How and When.	
<i>Privates.</i>				
Cornelius Hoover.....	Private..	Aug. 10, '61.	Re-enlist Vet.....	To " F " 190; pr. '64; disc'd June 28, '65.
Frederick Ingles.....	"	"	Deserted June 26, '63..	
James Isenberg.....	"	"	D'd of wds. Dec. 13, '63.	Wd. Mechanicsville; wd. & pr. Fred'b'g.
Jacob Kaylor.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	
George Kenny.....	"	"	D'd of wds. Oct. 1, '62.	Wounded at Antietam.
Andrew Kinter.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	
Washington Laird.....	"	"	D'd of wds. Oct. 28, '62.	Prisoner Aug. 28, '62.
Christian C. Leib.....	"	"	Re-enlist Vet.....	To 190 (no record in 190).
George W. Lowe.....	"	"	"	To " F " 190; disc'd June 28, '65.
Ira E. Lowe.....	"	"	Deserted June 1, '63.	
Telbert Lowe.....	"	"	" Sept. 24, '63	
Edward Mackinson.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	
John A. Marks.....	"	"	"	
James Martoe.....	Recruit..	Dec. 30, '63.	Deserted Dec. 31, '63..	
Wesley McCleary.....	Private..	Aug. 10, '61.	Exp. service.....	Prisoner Fredericksburg.
Archibald McMonagle	"	"	"	
Wm. Montzberger.....	"	"	Died Nov. 3, '63.....	
George Messmore.....	"	"	Disability Mar. 20, '62	
Charles Montgomery..	Recruit..	Jan. 15, '62.	By transfer.....	To 190 (no record in 190).
James Morrison.....	"	"	Disability Dec. 27, '62.	Wounded New Market Cross roads.
Charles Moyer.....	Private..	Aug. 10, '61.	Died July 4, '63.....	Pr. N. M. X roads; wd. South Mountain.
Wm. H. Myers.....	"	"	Disability May 21, '62.	
James Osborn.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	
Jeremiah Parison.....	"	"	Re-enlist Vet.....	Wd. Fred'b'g; to "F" 190; d'd pr. Nov. 22, '64 at Saulsbury.
James Quimberg.....	Unk.....	Unknown..	Died. date unknown..	Wounded Fredericksburg.
John Rorabough.....	Private..	Aug' 10, '61.	Re-enlist Vet.....	To 190 (no record in 190).
— Sawin.....	"	"	Unknown.....	
Orlando Simpson.....	"	"	Re-enlist Vet.....	To " F " 190; died pr. Feb. 15, '65; pr. at Saulsbury.
Augustus Shaeffer...	"	"	Exp. service.....	
Joseph Shaeffer.....	"	"	"	
David Shirk.....	"	"	"	Corporal; pr. New Market Cross roads.
Samuel Skipper.....	"	"	Disability Sept. 23, '62.	Died.
George W. Smith.....	"	"	Disability Oct. 15, '62..	
Henry Smith.....	"	"	Disability Mar. 6, '63..	
Richard Sneath.....	"	"	Disability Feb. 20, '63	
George F. Steading...	"	"	D'd of wds. July 26, '62	Wounded Aug. 28, '62 (?).
James Stevenson.....	"	"	Re-enlist Vet.....	To "F" 190; pr. d. Nov. 19, '64 at Saulsb'y.
Robert Stevenson.....	"	"	"	To "F" 190; pr. d. Nov. 2, '64 at Saulsb'y.
Charles Stewart.....	"	"	D'sability Oct. 22, '62.	
John Tennis.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	Wounded Fredericksburg.
David Torbert.....	"	"	D'd of wds. Dec. 13, '62	Wounded and prisoner Fredericksburg.
Adam Waltemeyer.....	Recruit..	Feb. 15, '64.	By transfer.....	To 190; discharged June 28, '65.
John Waltemeyer.....	Private..	Aug. 10, '61.	Disability Apr. 28, '63.	
Lewis Waltemeyer.....	Recruit..	Unknown..	Killed in action.....	Killed Spottsylvania May 10, '64.
Peter Whalen.....	Private..	Aug. 10, '61.	Disability June 19, '63.	Died; wounded Mechanicsville.
Thomas H. White.....	"	"	" Jan. 18, '62.	Died.
Washington Williams.	"	"	Exp. service.....	Prisoner Spottsylvania May 10, '64.
John Wisser.....	Unk.....	Unknown..	Killed in action.....	Killed Fredericksburg.
Henry Zorger.....	Private..	Aug. 10, '61.	Exp. service.....	

# MUSTER-OUT ROLL OF "H" COMPANY.

NAME AND RANK.	Muster-in.		DISCHARGED How and When.	REMARKS.
	Rank.	Date.		
<i>Captains.</i>				
Andrew J. Bolar.....	Captain..	Aug. 10. 61.	Disability for wounds Jan. 30, '64.	Com. Maj. July 8, '62 (N. M.); wd. and pr. Fredericksburg.
Samuel L. Elder.....	1st Lieut.	"	Exp. service.....	Com. Capt. July 8, '62; Capt. Feb. 6, '64; Lvt. Maj. for Wilderness.
<i>1st Lieutenants.</i>				
Wm. H. H. Kern.....	2d Lieut.	"	April 28, '64.....	How dis. unk: Com. 1st Lt. July 8, '62; 1st Lt. Mar. 22, '64; wd. G.M. and F'b'g.
James T. Kelly.....	1st Lieut.	"	Resigned Aug. 3, '63..	Not on M-in roll on return for Aug., '61.
<i>2d Lieutenant.</i>				
Franklin Harner.....	1st Sergt.	"	Exp. service.....	Com. 2d Lt. July 8, '62; not m't'd; pr. Gaines Mill.
<i>Sergeants.</i>				
John Evans.....	Sergeant.	"	By transfer.....	P. H-sp. Stew'd Nov. 8, '61; (see staff).
Thomas W. Dick.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	Wounded May 8, '64.
Mowry T. Moorehead..	"	"	Disability Oct. 31, '62.	
Watson R. Bracken....	"	"	Died of wds.; date unk.	Wd. and pr. N. M. X roads.
James Irwin.....	Corporal.	"	Exp. service.....	Wounded at Fredericksburg.
John Bills.....	Private...	"		Wounded at Fredericksburg.
Samuel McClaren.....	"	"	Re-enlist Vet.....	Wd. at Bristoe St'n; to 190; pr. Aug. 19, '64; discharged at end of war.
John P. Griffith.....	"	"	Killed in action.....	Killed at Fredericksburg.
<i>Corporals.</i>				
Samuel Johnson.....	Corporal.	"	Exp. service.....	Tr. to Vet. Res. Corps May 1, '64.
John C. Lardin.....	"	"	Disability Dec. 13, '62.	Prisoner Aug. 29, '62.
James D. Love.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	Wd. 2d Bull Run; wd. and pr. F'burg.
Andrew Kerr.....	"	"		
Samuel Cunningham...	"	"	Disability Dec. 26, '62.	For wds.; wd. 2d Bull Run.
George W. Robertson..	"	"	May 7, '63.....	For wds.; wd. N. M. X rds. and F'burg.
Henry W. L. Drips....	"	"	Re-enlist Vet.....	To 190; (no record in 190); dis. end of war; Com Sergt; (see staff).
Wm. Myers.....	Private ..	"	By promotion.....	P. Sgt. Maj. and 1st Lt. "I" Co.; (see "I" Co.).
John H. Brown.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	
Samuel H. McNett.....	"	"		Wounded N. M. X roads.
Wm. Hamilton.....	"	"	Re-enlist Vet.....	To 190; d. pr. Jan. 17, '65, at Saulsbury.
James D. Goal.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	Wd. 2d Bull Run; pr. Fredericksburg.
<i>Musicians.</i>				
James Sponeberger...	Musician	"	Deserted Aug. '61....	
Samuel W. Drips.....	"	"	Re-enlist Vet.....	To 190; discharged at end of war.
Wm. Wetzel.....	Recruit..	Oct. 16, '61.	By transfer.....	To 190; discharged Oct. 16, '64.
<i>Wagoner.</i>				
Edward Stephens.....	Wagoner	Aug. 10, '61.	Disability Feb. 25, '62.	
<i>Privates.</i>				
Wm. Altimus.....	Private...	"	Dis. wds. Sept. 29, '62.	Wd. Mechanicsville and Gaines Mill.
Wm. W. Altimus.....	"	"	Dis. wds. Jan. 23, '63.	Wounded at South Mountain.
Benjamin F. Angus....	"	"	Exp. service.....	
David W. Barkley.....	"	"	Killed in action.....	Killed at Fredericksburg.
Franklin R. Barr.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	Detached.
Thomas Barr.....	"	"	Disabil.; date unk....	
Joseph Barry.....	Recruit..	April, '62..	By transfer.....	To "E" 190; pr.; d. at S'b'y Feb. 20, '65.
Valentine Barry.....	"	"		To "E" 190; pr.; d. in pr.; date unk.
Enoch Benson.....	Private..	Aug. 10, '61.	D. of wds. Nov. 12, '62.	Wounded at Antietam.
Foster Bracken.....	"	"	Disability June 20, '62.	
Wm. Bracken.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	Wd. at Fredericksburg; detached.
John N. Cameron.....	"	"		Detached.
John W. Campbell.....	"	"	Disability Aug. 22, '62.	From "K" Co.
Wm. M. Campbell.....	"	"	Re-enlist Vet.....	To 190; died pr.; date unknown.
John M. Carpenter.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	Tr. from "K" Co.; detached.
Timothy Connelly.....	"	"	Disability Oct. 15, '62.	
George G. Cribbs.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	Detached.
Ezekiel Davis.....	Unk.....	Unknown..	By transfer.....	To "E" 190; died April 1, '65, at Camp Parole, Annapolis.
Albert S. Devlin.....	Private..	Aug. 10, '61.	Disability Mar. 11, '62.	Died at Camp Pierpont.
George W. Dick.....	"	"	Died of wds. Jan. 5, '63.	Wounded at Fredericksburg
Thompson Dick.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	Detached.
Andrew J. Duncan....	"	"	Killed in action.....	Killed at 2d Bull Run.
A. Evans.....	Unk.....	Unknown..	Disability for wounds.	Date of discharge unknown.
Samuel W. Evans.....	Private..	Aug. 10, '61.	Exp. service.....	
Robert C. Edlebutte...	Recruit..	April, '62	Dis. wds. Nov. 10, '63.	Wounded at South Mountain.
Joseph Faloon.....	Private..	Aug. 10, '61.	Exp. service.....	
Samuel J. Ferguson...	Recruit..	April, '62..	By transfer.....	To 190; discharged at end of war.
John C. Fulton.....	Private..	Aug. 10, '61.	Exp. service.....	Wounded at Fredericksburg.
Wm. H. Gamble.....	"	"	Disability Dec. 30, '61.	
David L. Ginter.....	Unk.....	Unknown..	Re-enlist Vet.....	Wd. 2d B. R.; to "E" 190; dis. end war.
Jedidiah Grover.....	Private..	Aug. 10, '61.	Disability Dec. 28, '61	
John J. Grossmire.....	"	"	By transfer.....	To Fifty-first Penn. Oct. 29, 61.
Jacob Grumbling.....	"	"	Disability Dec. 31, '62.	

## MUSTER-OUT ROLL OF "H" COMPANY—Continued.

NAME AND RANK.	Muster-in.		DISCHARGED. How and When.	REMARKS.
	Rank.	Date.		
<i>Privates.</i>				
Wm. Grumbling.....	Private..	Aug. 10, '61.	Exp. service.....	Wd. Mechanicsville and Gaines Mill; to 190; discharged at end of war.
Wm. M. Hedden.....	Recruit..	April, '62..	Disability April 1, '63..	
Isaac J. Hamlin.....	Private..	Aug. 10, '61.	Re-enlist Vet.....	
Alex. N. Hart.....	Private..	Aug. 10, '61.	Exp. service.....	Pr. Fredericksburg; wd. May 8, '64.
Joseph D. Henderson..	"	"	Disability Dec. 5, '62..	
Jasper D. Hildebrand..	"	"	Exp. service.....	
Thomas Hogan.....	"	"	Deserted July 15, '63..	Wounded at Fredericksburg. Killed at 2d Bull Run.
Wm. Junkins.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	
John Lawson.....	"	"	"	
Wm. Makin.....	Recruit..	April, '62..	Killed in action.....	Wd. Antietam; killed Spottsylvania, May 12, '64. To 190; (no record in 190).
James Mardis.....	Private..	Aug. 10, '61.	Exp. service.....	
George Martin.....	"	"	Killed in action.....	
Calvin Martin.....	"	"	Re-enlist Vet.....	To "F" 190; (deserted). Wounded June, '62.
Benjamin May.....	"	"	Disability Dec. 23, '61..	
James McClure.....	Recruit..	April, '62..	By transfer.....	
James McDonald.....	Private..	Aug. 10, '61.	Exp. service.....	Killed at N. M. X roads. To 190; discharged at end of war. Wounded at N. M. X roads. Prisoner N. M. X roads. Wounded May 10, '64; re-enlist Vet.
Michael McLaughlin..	"	"	"	
Alex. R. McMillen.....	"	"	Killed in action.....	
Joseph Mentzger.....	"	"	Re-enlist Vet.....	Wd. May 8, '62; absent sick at M-o.
Stohler Mentzger.....	Recruit..	April, '62..	Died of wds. July 6, '62..	
Wm. Mentzger.....	Private..	Aug. 10, '61.	Disability April 12, '63..	
Steward Meredith.....	"	"	Died of wds. May 16, '64.	Wd. and pr. N. M. X rds.; k. Antietam.
George Murritts.....	"	"	Disability Oct. 8, '62..	
Henry Murritts.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	
Archibald Miller.....	"	"	Disability Oct. 15, '62..	Killed at N. M. X roads. To 190; pr. Aug. 19, '64; discharged at end of war.
David H. Oberdorf.....	"	"	Killed in action.....	
Francis Oberdorf.....	"	"	Disability Dec. 24, '61..	
Harvey Oberdorf.....	"	"	Killed in action.....	Wounded at Antietam.
Henry Painter.....	"	"	Re-enlist Vet.....	
Thomas Painter.....	"	"	Dis. wds. Jan. 22, '63..	
Alex. Ream.....	Recruit..	Oct., '62..	Dis. wds. Oct. 22, '62..	Wounded at Fredericksburg. Pr. Fredericksburg; k. Spottsylvania.
Wm. Ream.....	Private..	Aug. 10, '61.	Disability date unkn..	
Wm. Reckord.....	"	"	Killed in action.....	
Bennet Rode.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	Wounded 2d Bull Run. Wd. N. M. X rds. and Fredericksburg. To "E" 190; died pr., date unknown.
Jeremiah H. Rode.....	"	"	"	
Archibald M. Rodgers..	"	"	"	
David S. Simpson.....	"	"	Dis. wds. Feb. 20, '63..	Killed at South Mountain. Wounded at Fredericksburg. Killed at South Mountain.
Bernadine B. Sherman..	Recruit..	April, '62..	By transfer.....	
Henry Sherman.....	"	Mar. 19, '62.	Killed in action.....	
Wm. B. Somers.....	Private..	Aug. 10, '61.	Exp. service.....	Wounded and prisoner at Fred'burg. To 190; prisoner Aug. 19, '64; discharged at end of war.
Oliver Sproul.....	"	"	Killed in action.....	
George W. Stouteagle..	"	"	Re-enlist Vet.....	
James S. Stewart.....	"	"	Dis. wds. May 16, '63..	Wounded at Antietam. Wounded at Fredericksburg. Died at Georgetown.
Robert B. Stewart.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	
Robert Stuckard.....	"	"	Disability Oct. 13, '64.	
John Swarts Waller.....	"	"	Killed in action.....	Wd. N. M. X rds.; k. at Spottsylvania. At Camp Pierpont. Wounded and prisoner at Fred'burg.
James E. Thomas.....	"	"	Died Mar. 21, '62..	
James F. Tomb.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	
Henry Waltemeyer.....	"	"	Re-enlist Vet.....	To 190; pr.; how discharged unknown. To 190; (no rec. in 190); dis. end of war. Groveton, Aug. 29, '62.
Wm. Waltemeyer.....	Recruit..	Feb. 13, '64.	By transfer.....	
John W. Williams.....	Private..	Aug. 10, '61.	Re-enlist Vet.....	
Joseph Williams.....	"	"	Dis. wds. Oct. 13, '62..	From "K" Co.; prisoner at Fred'burg. To "E" 190; prisoner Aug. 19, '64; discharged June 1, '65.
Sanford Williams.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	
Abetnego B. Wilson.....	"	"	"	
Andrew Wolf.....	"	"	Re-enlist Vet.....	

# MUSTER-OUT ROLL OF "I" COMPANY.

NAME AND RANK.	Muster-in.		DISCHARGED.	REMARKS.
	Rank.	Date.	How and When.	
<i>Captains.</i>				
James C. Baker.....	Captain..	April 7, '62.	Died Aug. 7, '62.....	At Harrison's Landing.
Chill W. Blazzard.....	2d Lieut.	Aug. 10, '61.	Exp. service.....	Wd. Fred'burg; Capt. April 20, '63; tr. fr. "F" Co.
<i>1st Lieutenants.</i>				
Perry O. Etcheson.....	1st Lieut.	April 7, '62.	Resigned July 18, '62..	
Wm. H. Myers.....	Private..	Aug. 10, '61.	Exp. service. ....	Tr. fr. Staff; 1st Lt. "I" Co. Apr. 20, '63.
<i>2d Lieutenants.</i>				
Samuel J. Cloyd.....	1st Sergt.	April 7, '62.	Disa'y wds. Jan. 7, '63.	Wd. Antietam (lost right arm); 2d Lt. April 14, '62.
Frank D. Stevens.....	Private..	"	By transfer.....	1st Sgt. Apr. 14, '62; 2d Lt. Apr. 20, '63; pr. Gales Mill; wd. F'd'b'g; to "D" 190; 1st Lt.; n'r m.; pr. June 13, '64. disc'd June 28, '65.
<i>1st Sergeants.</i>				
Wm. W. Woods.....	"	Aug. 10, '61.	Exp. service.....	Fr. "K" Co.; wd. date unknown.
Joseph R. Dufield.....	Sergeant.	"	"	Fr. 1st Sgt. "K" Co.; 1st Sgt. "I" Co. April 20, '63.
Andrew J. Demming..	Private..	April 7, '62.	By transfer.....	To 190; pr. Aug. 19, '64 (no further rec.).
<i>Sergeants.</i>				
Wm. D. Hancock.....	"	"	"	To 190; wd. N. M. X rds.; wd. at Peters- burg, '64; disc'd Mar. 28, '65.
David W. Stevens.....	"	"	Killed in action.....	Wd. F'd'b'g; k. Spottsylvania May 8, '64.
David Loug.....	"	"	—, 1862.....	How disc'd unk.; wd. N. M. X roads.
James M. Davis.....	Corporal.	Aug. 10, '61.	Exp. service.....	Tr. to "F" Co.; wd. N. M. X roads.
John Rinker.....	Private..	April 7, '62.	Disability date unk..	Died in hospital at Alexandra.
<i>Corporals.</i>				
Abraham D. Long.....	"	"	June 26, 1862.....	How disc'd unknown.
Wm. Copenhauer.....	"	"	By transfer.....	Corp'l "D" 190; pr. June 13, '64; died date unknown.
Benj. R. Martin.....	"	"	Unknown.....	Wd. Mechanicsville
Joseph A. Thomas.....	"	"	By transfer.....	To 190; pr. Aug. 19, '64; date of dis. unk.
John F. Butts.....	"	Aug. 10, '61.	Exp. service.....	Fr. "K" Co.
Joseph Beers.....	"	April 7, '62.	By transfer.....	To Corp'l "D" 190; surv. war.
John B. Chilcoat.....	"	"	Disability date unk..	
Wm. H. Harris.....	"	"	By transfer.....	To 190; disc'd May 16, '65.
Elias B. Wilson.....	"	"	Disability date unk..	
<i>Musicians.</i>				
John Harvey.....	Musician	"	Died Aug. 30, '62.....	
George Weight.....	Private..	"	By transfer.....	To "D" 190; disc'd June 28, '65.
<i>Wagoner.</i>				
John Gluck.....	Wagoner	"	Disability date unk..	
<i>Privates.</i>				
Henry Albert.....	Private..	"	By transfer.....	To "D" 190; pr. Aug. 19, '64; disc'd Mar. 28, '65.
Seth Alexander.....	"	"	Disability —, '62.....	
Robert J. Allen.....	"	"	Died Aug. 26, '62.....	In hospital.
Robert Y. Asken.....	"	"	Disability date unk..	
George S. Baker.....	"	"	Disability —, '62.....	
Josiah Baker.....	"	"	Disability May 20, '62..	
Adam Berg.....	Unk.....	Unknown..	By transfer.....	To "D" 190; killed in action June 18, '64.
Herman Beyfus.....	Private..	April 7, '62.	Died —, '63.....	In hospital at Alexandra.
John Black.....	"	"	By transfer.....	To "D" 190; pr. Aug. 19, '64; d'd date unk.
George B. Bowman...	"	Aug. 10, '61.	Exp. service.....	Fr. "K" Co.
John Briggs.....	"	April 7, '62.	Unknown.....	
Wm. H. Carothers...	"	"	By transfer.....	To "D" 190; pr. Aug. 19, '64; disc'd May 15, '65.
Thomas O. Cloyd....	"	"	"	On detached hos'l duty; disc'd end war.
John Cornelius.....	"	"	"	To "D" 190; pr. died at Saulsbury.
Robert C. Davis.....	"	Aug. 10, '61.	Unknown.....	Pr. N. M. X roads.
John C. De Armit.....	"	April 7, '62.	By transfer.....	To "D" 190; pr. Aug. 19, '64; d. at Saulsb'y
Isaac H. Durboran....	"	Aug. 10, '61.	Exp. service.....	Fr. "K" Co.
James A. Elliott.....	"	April 7, '62.	Disability April 24, '63.	
George W. Fleik.....	"	"	By transfer.....	To "D" 190; disc'd, '65; pr. '64.
James P. Giles.....	"	"	"	To "D" 190; pr. Aug. 19, '64; disc'd May 4, '65, to date Mar. 24, '65.
Peter Hammon.....	"	"	Disability date unk..	
Aquila Hancock.....	"	"	Killed at Fred'burg..	
Jeremiah Hancock...	"	"	Disability date unk..	Wd. Mechanicsville.
Wm. Harvey.....	"	"	"	
Thomas Hicks.....	"	"	Unknown.....	
Augustus B. Hudson..	"	"	Missing.....	In Pope's Campaign.
James H. Huntsman..	"	"	Deserted date unk..	
John E. Johns.....	"	"	By transfer.....	To 190; pr. Aug. 19, '64; surv. war.
Alfred Kelly.....	"	"	Disability date unk..	
T. D. Kelly.....	"	"	Died in hos'l date unk.	
Thomas M. Kelly.....	"	"	Disability —, '62.....	

## MUSTER-OUT ROLL OF "I" COMPANY.—Continued.

NAME AND RANK.	Muster-in.		DISCHARGED.	REMARKS.
	Rank.	Date.	How and When.	
<i>Privates.</i>				
James Knobb.....	Private...	April 7, '62.	Disability —, '62	To "D" 190; pr. Aug. 19, '64; disc'd May or June, '65; wd. 2d Bull Run.
Adam Leerd.....	"	"	By transfer.....	
George Leerd.....	"	"	"	To "D" 190; pr. Aug. 19, '64; d'd June 14, '65
Benj. F. Liveringhouse	"	"	"	To "D" 190; pr. Aug. 19, '64; d. at Saulsb'y
John C. Liveringhouse	"	"	"	To "D" 190; disc'd at end of service.
Daniel Lock.....	"	"	"	
Jonathan Lock.....	"	"	"	To "D" 190; pr. Aug. 19, '64; died at Saulsbury.
Michael Lynch.....	"	Aug. 10, '61.	"	To "D" 190; pr. Aug. 19, '64; (no further record); tr. fr. "K" Co.
Oliver C. Madden.....	"	April 7, '62.	Disability, '62.....	To 190; pr. Aug. 19, '64; disc'd June 9, '65; wd. Gettysburg (?).
Wm. Malone.....	"	"	By transfer.....	
Wm. A. McCallister..	"	Aug. 10, '61.	Unknown.....	Tr. fr. "K" Co.
John McMullen.....	"	April 7, '62.	Deserted, '62 (?)	
Jacob Montgomery..	"	"	Disability date unk...	To 190; pr. at Saulsb'y; (no further rec.)
John J. Myers.....	"	"	"	
Isaac Naugle.....	"	"	Unknown.....	Fr. "K" Co. to 190; disc'd end war.
George M. Need.....	"	"	By transfer.....	
George Neff.....	"	Aug. 10, '61.	Re-enlist Vet.....	Fr. "K" Co.
Peter Neff.....	"	"	Exp. service.....	
Henry O'Neal.....	"	April 7, '62.	Deserted April 8, '62..	To "A" Co.
La Fayette Palmer..	"	"	By transfer.....	
Austin Ramsay.....	"	"	"	To "D" 190; disc'd end of term.
Rob't Ramsay.....	"	"	Disability date unk...	
Thomas Ramsay, Jr..	"	"	Died date unknown..	Buried at Alexandria.
John Riley.....	"	"	By transfer.....	
Wm. Reichert.....	"	"	Died date unknown..	Died in hospital at Alexandria; injured unloading wagon.
Alfred Rutten.....	"	"	Disability date unk...	
Elisha Rutten.....	"	"	Unknown.....	To "D" 190; pr. Aug. 19, '64; disc'd April 27, '65.
Daniel Roberts.....	"	"	By transfer.....	
David Roberts.....	Unk.....	Unknown..	Unknown.....	To "D" 190; wd. Five Forks April 1, '65; disc'd June 25, '65.
Ed. H. Shaeffer.....	Private...	April 7, '62.	Deserted April 23, '62.	
George F. Shaeffer..	"	"	By transfer.....	To Corp'l "D" 190; disc'd Mar. 28, '65; wd. May 8, '64.
Henry Shaeffer.....	"	"	"	
John J. Sneath.....	"	"	"	Pr. Gaines Mill; wd. F'd'b'g; to "D" 190; pr. Aug. 19, '64; disc'd April, '65.
W. C. Sneath.....	"	"	"	
Jesse Smith.....	Unk.....	Unknown..	Disability '62.....	To "D" 190; disc'd Mar. 29, '65; wd. Spottsylvania.
Ellis Snyder.....	Private..	April 7, '62.	Disability date unk...	
James A. Speaker..	"	"	By transfer.....	To "D" 190 (no record in 190).
Simon Staubs.....	Unk.....	Unknown..	Disability date unk...	
Daniel Swartz.....	Private..	April 7, '62.	"	Deserted '62.....
Geo. P. Taylor.....	"	"	"	
Thomas Vaughan....	"	"	Deserted date unk...	To "D" 190; disc'd end of war; wd. Mechanicsville.
Wm. Walls.....	"	"	By transfer.....	
Henry C. Weight.....	"	"	"	Injured Jan. 1, '63; pr. June 27, '62; to "D" 190; pr. Aug. 19, '64; d'd end war.
John A. Whitman....	"	"	Unknown.....	
Anthony Yohn.....	"	Aug. 10, '61.	Died May 19, '63.	Tr. fr. "K" Co.; d'd in hosp'l May 19, '63.
George Young.....	"	April 7, '62.	Died Sept. 22, '62.	
Jacob A. Young.....	"	"	Unknown.....	Buried at Alexandria, Va.

# MUSTER-OUT ROLL OF "K" COMPANY.

NAME.	Muster-in.		REMARKS.	NAME.	Muster-in.		REMARKS.
	Rank.	Date.			Rank.	Date.	
John S. Eyster.....	Captain.	Aug. 10, '61.	Discharged July 20, '62.	James Harden.....	Private..	Aug. 10, '61.	Wd. Gaines Mill; no further record.
Thomas L. Fletcher.....	1st Lieut.	"	Resigned Sept., '61.	Warren P. Harder.....	"	"	To "A."
Eli D. Reid.....	2d Lieut.	"	Promoted Quarterm'r Sept. 22, '61.	Peter Haney.....	"	"	To "G."
Jesse Little.....	1st Sergt.	"	1st Lieut. Sept. 13, '61; res. July 20, '62.	Nicholas B. Heim.....	"	"	To "A."
John Rohn.....	Private.	"	2d Lieutenant "C."	Jacob Hockersmith.....	"	"	To "C."
J. R. Duffield.....	Sergeant.	"	1st Sergeant Sept. 13, '61; to "D"	Rob't E. Jacobs.....	"	"	"
Luther D. Middlekauf.....	"	"	To "A."	Wm. Kulh.....	"	"	To "B."
Wilson R. Pilkington.....	"	"	To "C."	David R. Lirch.....	"	"	Died Jan. 6, '62.
Henry D. Whitmer.....	"	"	No record.	John Leggett.....	"	"	To "L."
John W. Setchel.....	Corporal.	"	To "A."	Michael Lynch.....	"	"	To "B."
Frank Hench.....	"	"	To "C."	James F. Linthurst.....	"	"	To "C."
John H. Snow.....	"	"	Wd. N. M. X roads; no further rec.	James Loan.....	"	"	To "H."
Samuel Focklen.....	"	"	To "C."	Rob't E. Marshall.....	"	"	To "A."
John Patton.....	"	"	Deserted Dec. 30, '61.	Calvin Martin.....	"	"	To "L."
Franklin Rhodes.....	"	"	To "A."	Wm. A. McAllister.....	"	"	To "C."
Wm. A. Fry.....	"	"	To "B."	Wm. McDougal.....	"	"	To "A."
Geo. M. Barnitts.....	"	"	To "B."	Fred'k L. Mellott.....	"	"	To "A."
John C. Eckart.....	Musician	"	To "B."	Stephen Mellott.....	"	"	To "C."
Wm. Smith.....	Private.	"	To "A."	Henry J. Mentzel.....	"	"	To "A."
L. V. Armstrong.....	"	"	No further record.	John A. Miller.....	"	"	To "C."
Wm. Armstrong.....	"	"	To "A."	David Myers.....	"	"	To "A."
Leander Arndt.....	"	"	Discharged disability Feb. 6, '62.	George Neff.....	"	"	To "E."
George Bodily.....	"	"	To "E."	Michael O'Brien.....	"	"	To "A."
John H. Boren.....	"	"	To "C."	Headly Pannett.....	"	"	Killed at Gaines Mill.
John Bossinger.....	"	"	To "L."	Wm. Rouse.....	"	"	To "C."
Geo. B. Bowman.....	"	"	To "A."	John M. Ross.....	"	"	To "B."
Benj. F. Brown.....	"	"	To "G."	Thos. T. Shillem.....	"	"	To "H."
George B. Brown.....	"	"	To "C."	John H. Snyder.....	"	"	To "E."
Wm. H. Bentsel.....	"	"	To "H."	G. W. Stoutledge.....	"	"	To "A."
Frederick R. Buckner.....	"	"	No further record.	Rob't W. Surrill.....	"	"	To "E."
John F. Butts.....	"	"	To "L."	Joshua Sweeger.....	"	"	To "A."
Wm. M. Campbell.....	"	"	To "E."	Ezra Toomy.....	"	"	To "E."
Robert C. Davis.....	"	"	To "G."	John Vanard.....	"	"	To "C."
James Devine.....	"	"	No further record.	Charles R. Thlan.....	"	"	To "B."
Isaac H. Dubaron.....	"	"	Died March 17, '62.	Jas. M. Van Dyke.....	"	"	To "C."
W. S. Duffield.....	"	"	To "A."	Frisby T. Wiant.....	"	"	To "H."
Chas. R. Feeten.....	"	"	Wd. Drainsville; d. of wds. Oct 10, '62	Sanford Weismiller.....	"	"	To "B."
Peter F. Flanagan.....	"	"	To "G."	James Wilson.....	"	"	To "C."
G. W. F. Fleming.....	"	"	To "A."	Rich'd D. Woods.....	"	"	To "B."
Wm. R. Fox.....	"	"	To "E."	Thos. C. Woods.....	"	"	To "L."
Wilson C. Fox.....	"	"	To "C."	Wm. W. Woods.....	"	"	To "A."
Jos. S. Fry.....	"	"	To "A."	Anthony Yohn.....	"	"	
David H. Graham.....	"	"	To "C."	Wm. P. Zeigler.....	"	"	
Samuel C. Griffin.....	"	"	To "A."				
John Hines.....	"	"					
Noel J. Hall.....	"	"					



# DUTY ROSTER OF OFFICERS BY THE MONTH.

NAME AND RANK.	1861.					1862.											
	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Jan.	Feb.	March.	April.	May.	June.	July.	August.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.
<i>Colonels.</i>																	
John H. Taggart.....	C. R.	C. R.	C. R.	Ac. by G. C. M.	C. R.	C. R.	C. R.	C. R.	C. R.	C. R.	C. R.	Res.	Rest. Brig.	Decd.	A. wd.	A. wd.	C. Br.
Martin D. Hardin.....																	
<i>Lieutenant-Colonels.</i>																	
Daniel N. Bailey.....	P.	P.	P.	B. B. P.	B. B. A. F. D.	In A. P.	B. B. P.	Decd. P.	P. N. R. Lt. C.	C. R.	C. R.	C. R.	C. R.	A. S. wd.	A. S. wd.	C. R.	P.
Peter Bailey.....	P.	P.	P.	C. Co.	C. Co.	C. Co.	C. Co.	C. Co.	C. Co.	C. Co.	C. Co.	C. Co.	C. Co.	C. Co.	C. Co.	C. Co.	C. Co.
Richard Gushin.....	C. Co.	C. Co.	C. Co.	C. Co.	C. Co.	C. Co.	C. Co.	C. Co.	C. Co.	C. Co.	C. Co.	C. Co.	C. Co.	C. Co.	C. Co.	C. Co.	C. Co.
<i>Major.</i>																	
Chas. W. Diven.....	C. Co.	C. Co.	C. Co.	C. Co.	A. T.	Ac. by C	C. Co.	A. S.	C. Co.	C. Co.	C. Co.	C. Co.	C. Co.	C. Co.	C. Co.	C. Co.	C. Co.
<i>Surgeons.</i>																	
Wm. H. Thorne.....	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	Pro. P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.
Isaac J. Clark.....	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	Pro. P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.
<i>Asst Surgeons.</i>																	
Henry A. Grim.....																	
Jas. B. Crawford.....																	
Wm. Taylor.....																	
<i>Chaplain.</i>																	
Obadiah H. Miller.....																	
<i>Adjutant.</i>																	
T. McMurtrie.....						P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	wd & pr
<i>Quartermasters.</i>																	
E. D. Reid.....	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.
J. T. Woodall.....	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.
<i>COMPANY OFFICERS.</i>																	
<i>A Company.</i>																	
H. B. Whisner.....	P.	P.	P.	P.	Res.	P.	P.	A. in A.	A. S.	P.	P.	P.	A. wd.	A. wd.	P.	A. D. S.	D. S. S.
F. Daniels.....	P.	P.	P.	P.	Pro. P.	P.	P.	A. in A.	P.	P.	P.	Res.					
L. Palmer.....	P.	P.	P.	P.	Pro. P.	P.	P.	A. w. L.	P.	P.	P.						
C. Thompson.....	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	A. w. L.	A. w. L.	P.	Res.	
G. W. Montony.....	P.	P.	Res.	P.	P.	Itz.	Rtz.	Rtz.	Rtz.	P.	P.	P.					
J. B. Vallee.....			Pro. P.														
<i>B Company.</i>																	
D. N. Mathewson.....	P.	P.	P.	P.	A. L.	In A.	P.	A. S.	A. S.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	S.	Decd.
S. H. Briggs.....	P.	P.	P.	P.	P. B. R.	In A.	Decd.	Pro. P.	A. S.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	A. wd.
J. B. Harding.....	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.
J. F. Hoadley.....	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	In A.	P.	P.	P.	Pro. P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.
A. M. Phillips.....	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	Res.					



## DUTY ROSTER OF OFFICERS BY THE MONTH.

NAME AND RANK.												1863.												1864.						
												Jan.	Feb.	March.	April.	May.	June.	July.	August.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Jan.	Feb.	March.	April.	May.	June.	
<i>Colonel.</i> Martin D. Hardin.....												C. Br.	A. wd.	C. R.	C. R.	C. Postl.	C. R.	C. JR. or Br.	C. R. or C. R. or Br.	C. Br.	C. Br.	C. Br.	C. Postl. & wd.	A. S. D.	A. S. D.	A. S. D.	C. R. C.	C. Br.	C. Br.	
<i>Lieutenant-Colonels.</i> Peter Baldy..... Richard Austin.....												In A. C. Co.	In A. C. Co.	In A. C. Co.	Res. Pro. P.	C. R.	P.	P.	C. R.	C. R.	C. R.	C. R.	C. R. wd.	C. R.	C. R.	C. R.	C. R.	C. R.	C. R.	
<i>Major.</i> Chas. W. Diven.....												C. Co.	C. Co.	C. Co.	C. Co.	C. Co.	C. Co.	C. Co.	C. Co.	C. Co.	C. Co.	C. Co.	C. Co.	Rtg.	Rtg.	Rtg.	Maj. P.	P.	P.	
<i>Surgeon.</i> Isaac J. Clark.....												P.	A. S.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	A. S.	P.	F.	P.	P.
<i>Asst Sergeants.</i> Henry A. Gphm..... J. M. Shearer..... D. R. Beaver.....												P.	P.	P.	P. P.	P. P.	P. P.	A. D. S. A. D. S.	P. Decl.	P.	P.	P.	A. D. S.	A. D. S.	A. D. S.	Pro.	P.	P.		
<i>Chaplain.</i> Obadiah H. Miller.....												P.	P.	P.	A. L.	A. L.	Decl.													
<i>Adjutant.</i> T. McMurtrie.....												A. pr.	A. pr.	A. pr.	A. wd.	A. wd.	A. wd.	A. wd.	A. wd.	A. wd.	Tr. I Co									
<i>Quartermaster.</i> J. T. Woodall.....												P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	P.	A. B. Q.	A. B. Q.	P.	P.		
<i>COMPANY OFFICERS.</i> <i>A Company.</i> E. Daniels..... G. W. Crossdale..... F. Quantin.....												A. S.	P.	P.	P.	P. P. Pro. P.	P. Rtg. P.	P. Rtg. P.	P. Rtg. P.	P. Rtg. A. S.	P. Rtg. A. S.	P. Rtg. A. S.	P. Rtg. A. S.	P. Rtg. A. S.	L. A. Adj.	A. S. A. Adj.	P. A. Adj.	P. A. Adj.	P. A. Adj.	
<i>B Company.</i> S. H. Briggs..... J. F. Hoodley..... P. H. Reynolds.....												A. wd. P.	P. P.	P. P.	Pro. P. P. Pro. P.	P. P. P.	P. P. P.	P. P. P. S.	P. P. P.	P. P. P.	P. P. P.	P. P. P.	P. P. P.	P. P. P.	D. S. P.	P. P.	P. P.	P. P.	P. P.	

[illegible]







LIBRARY OF CONGRESS



0 013 709 288 8